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Civil · Reportable judgment

Dr. S. K. Jhunjhunwala vs Mrs. Dhanwanti Kaur & Anr.

Court
Supreme Court of India
Date
1 October 2018
Case No.
Civil Appeal No. 3971 of 2011
Result
Allowed
Bench
Abhay Manohar Sapre, Vineet Saran
Citation
[2018] 12 S.C.R. 868 : 2018 INSC 915
Supreme Court Reports [2018] 12 S.C.R. 868 : 2018 INSC 915
Headnote

Consumer Protection Act, 1986 – Medical Negligence – When not – Appellant performed laparoscopy and thereafter general surgery to remove the Gall Bladder of Respondent No.1 – Respondent No.1 filed complaint alleging negligence by the appellant in performing the surgery and claimed compensation for the mental suffering and pain suffered by her throughout after the surgery as a result of various ailments suffered by her post surgery – Respondent No.1 further alleged that she never gave consent for performing general surgery of her Gall Bladder rather she had given consent for performing laparoscopy only – Complaint dismissed by State Commission – National Commission awarded Rs.2 lakhs to be paid by the appellant to Respondent No.1 on account of negligence on his part – Propriety of – Held: Appellant is a qualified senior doctor with experience in the field and possessed the requisite knowledge and skill in the subject to perform the surgery of Gall Bladder – Initially he proceeded to perform the laparoscopy of the Gall Bladder but while so performing he noticed some inflammation and swelling on the Gall Bladder and therefore, decided to perform the conventional surgery – There is evidence on record that the appellant sought consent of Respondent No.1’s husband to perform the substitute operation and only thereafter proceeded to do conventional surgery – Further, in terms of Clause 4 of the Consent Form, the appellant was entitled to perform the conventional surgery as a substitute to the former one having noticed some abnormalities at the time of performing laparoscopy – Thus, there was no need to have another Consent Form to do the conventional surgery – Present is a clear case of grant of consent to the appellant to perform the substituted operation of Gall Bladder of Respondent No.1– Respondent No.1 failed to prove any specific kind of negligence of the appellant while performing the operation or/and thereafter – Impugned order set aside – Order passed by the State Commission restored.

Consumer Protection Act, 1986 – Medical Negligence – Factors to be proved – Discussed.

Allowing the appeal, the Court

Read the full headnote (11 more paragraphs)

HELD: 1.1 The appellant is a professionally trained doctor and has acquired the post-graduate degree in the subject (FRCS) from London way back in 1976 and worked there (UK) for seven years and earned enough experience in the field of surgery. It is also not in dispute that since 1976/1977, he has been in the field of surgery in India till the date he performed operation of respondent No.1 on 08.08.1996. These undisputed facts clearly prove that the appellant is a qualified senior doctor with an experience in the field and had also possessed the requisite knowledge and skill in the subject to perform the surgery of Gall Bladder. Initially he proceeded to perform the laparoscopy surgery of the Gall Bladder of respondent No.1 as advised but while so performing he noticed some inflammation, adhesion and swelling on the Gall Bladder and, therefore, decided to perform the conventional surgery, which he actually did on respondent No.1, to remove the Gall Bladder. [Paras 25-27] [878-C-E]

1.2 Clause 4 of the Consent Form empowers the performing doctor to perform such additional operation or procedure including the administration of a blood transfusion or blood plasma as they or he may consider substitute necessary or proper in the event of any emergency or if any anticipated condition is discovered during the course of the operation. In terms of clause

4 of the Consent Form, the appellant was entitled to perform the conventional surgery as a substitute to the former one having noticed some abnormalities at the time of performing Laparoscopy. There was no need to have another Consent Form to do the conventional surgery in the light of authorization contained in clause 4 itself because the substitute operation was of a same organ for which the former one was advised except with a difference of another well known method known in medical subject to get rid of the malady. There is an evidence on record that the appellant having noticed while performing laparoscopy that there was some inflammation, adhesion and swelling on Gall Bladder, he came out of operation theater and informed respondent No.1’s husband who was sitting outside the operation theater about the condition of respondent No.1’s gall bladder and sought his consent to perform the substitute operation. It is only after the consent given by the husband of respondent No.1, the appellant proceeded to do conventional surgery. There is no reason to disbelieve this fact stated by the appellant in his evidence. It is a natural conduct and the behavior of any prudent doctor, who is performing the operation to apprise the attending persons of what he noticed in the patient and then go ahead accordingly to complete the operation. A clear case of grant of consent to the appellant to perform the substituted operation of Gall Bladder of respondent No.1 was, therefore, made out to enable the appellant to perform the conventional surgery, which he actually performed. [Paras 30-34, 36] [879-C-G; 880-A-B]

1.3 Respondent No.1 never raised the objection of “consent issue” to the appellant or/and respondent no.2-Hospital and it was for the first time in the complaint, she raised this issue and made a foundation to claim compensation from the appellant. Nothing prevented her or her husband to raise the issue of consent immediately after performance of the surgery while she was in hospital as an indoor patient and even after discharge that being the natural conduct of any patient. It was, however, not done. It is not in dispute that respondent no.1 failed to prove any specific kind of negligence of the appellant while performing the operation or/and thereafter. Indeed, even the National Commission held this issue in favour of the appellant. [Paras 39, 40] [880-G, H; 881-E]

1.4 Respondent No.1 failed to prove with the aid of any medical evidence that the stones, which were noticed in the second surgery performed after 11 months, were the same stones which the appellant failed to remove from the Gall Bladder. Had it been so, the appellant could be held liable for failure on his part to remove the stones and allowed them to remain in the Gall Bladder for such a long time. There was no medical evidence adduced by respondent No.1 to prove this fact. [Paras 41, 42] [881-D-E, H ; 882-A]

1.5 Respondent No.1 was under legal obligation to prove a specific kind of negligence on the part of the appellant in performing the surgery and also was required to prove that any subsequent ailment which she suffered on her return to home such as, jaundice, dysentery, fever, loss of weight etc. were suffered by her only due to improper performance of conventional surgery by the appellant and if the surgery had been successful, she would not have suffered any kind of these ailments. There has to be a direct nexus with these two factors to sue a doctor for his negligence. Suffering of ailment by the patient after surgery is one thing. It may be due to myriad reasons known in medical jurisprudence. Whereas suffering of any such ailment as a result of improper performance of the surgery and that too with the degree of negligence on the part of Doctor is another thing. To prove the case of negligence of a doctor, the medical evidence of experts in field to prove the latter is required. Simply proving the former is not sufficient. [Paras 43, 44] [882-B-E]

1.6 Respondent No. 1 was not able to prove that the ailments which she suffered after she returned home from the Hospital were as a result of faulty surgery performed by the appellant. The impugned order is set aside and that of the order passed by the State Commission is restored. [Paras 45, 50] [882-E-F; 884-C]

Jacob Mathew v. State of Punjab (2005) 6 SCC 1 : [2005] 2 Suppl. SCR 307 – relied on.

Samira Kohli v. Dr. Prabha Manchanda & Anr.

(2008) 2 SCC 1 : [2008] 1 SCR 719 – referred to.

Bolam v. Friern Hospital Management Committee [1957] 1 WLR 582 ; Eckersley v. Binnie (1988) 18 Con LR 1 ; Hucks v. Cole (1968) 118 New LJ 469 – referred to.

As published in the Supreme Court Reports, Supreme Court of India. Text from the Indian Supreme Court Judgments open data set (Dattam Labs), CC BY 4.0.

Full Judgment Text

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE, J. 1. This appeal is directed against the final judgment and order dated 01.09.2009 passed by the National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission (hereinafter referred to as “the National Commission”), at New Delhi in First Appeal No. 93 of 2004 whereby the National Commission allowed the appeal filed by respondent No.1 and set aside the order dated 19.01.2004 of the State Commission, West Bengal, Kolkata in Complaint Case No.698/O/1997. 2. In order to appreciate the issue involved in the appeal, it is necessary to set out the r
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