Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 – s.7 – Sample taken from the Ghee that was stored for the purpose of making jalebis – Allegation that the sample of Ghee did not conform to the standards of Ghee as per the Act – Conviction under ss.2(ia), (a),
(c) and (m) punishable under s.16(1)(a) r.w. s.7 of the Act – Acquittal by first appellate court – High Court declined to set aside acquittal on the ground that sample of Ghee was not meant for sale but it was meant to be used merely as an ingredients in the preparation of sweets which in turn were meant for sale – On appeal, held: s.7 prohibits the storing of adulterated food notwithstanding the fact that such adulterated food is itself not offered for sale, but is used in making some food which is offered for sale – Thus, whether the adulterated food is stored for sale, or such food is stored for making some other food which is sold, such storing is an offence – Acquittal of the respondent is set aside – However, sentence is confined to the period already undergone since the accused is now about 70 years old and the proceedings commenced in 2004 and the business has closed down since.
Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 – s.13 – Variance between the reports of Public Analyst and the Director, CFL – Evidentiary value of certificate from the Director – Held: The law accords greater importance to the report from the Director that it prohibits the Court from continuing with the prosecution until the receipt of the certificate from the Director – Sub-section 3 of s.13 clearly attributes a higher evidentiary value to the certificate from the Director when compared to the report given by the PA – The proviso to sub-Section 5 provides that the certificate from the Director shall be final and conclusive evidence of the facts stated therein – Thus, the report of the PA loses any significance in the proceedings as a piece of evidence.
Allowing the appeal, the Court
HELD: 1. The explanation to Section 7 clearly lays down that if a person stores any adulterated food for the purpose of manufacturing from it any article of food for sale, he shall be deemed to store adulterated food. The purpose of this provision is clear, it prohibits the storing of adulterated food notwithstanding the fact that such adulterated food is itself not offered for sale, but is used in making some food which is offered for sale. It is clearly to prevent the adulteration of food and its sale to the public even when it is meant to be used for preparing some other food which is offered for sale. Thus, either way, whether the adulterated food is stored for sale, or if such food is stored for making some other food which is sold, such storing is an offence. Parliament has rightly assumed that no one, who offers food for sale, would store food which is not meant to be used in some food meant for sale. [Para 6][321-G-H; 322-A-C]
2. The law accords such great importance to the report from the Director that it prohibits the Court from continuing with the prosecution until the receipt of the certificate from the Director. Sub-section 3 of Section 13 clearly attributes a higher evidentiary value to the certificate from the Director when compared to the report given by the PA. The proviso to sub-Section 5 provides that the certificate from the Director shall be final and conclusive evidence of the facts stated therein. Thus, the report of the PA loses any significance in the proceedings as a piece of evidence. Therefore, there is no reason for the Court to refer to the contents of the report of the PA. Where there is no reason to refer to its contents of the report of the PA, there is even less reason to refer to the variation between the report of the PA and the Director. The Court is enjoined by law to consider the contents of the certificate of the Director only. [Paras 9, 10][325-A-B, E-H]
3. The finding of the High Court that the variation between the two reports was 0.76% and therefore more than 0.3% as permitted in Ram Singh’s case is completely unsustainable and liable to be set aside. It is thus clear that the accused was not entitled to the acquittal and the acquittal is liable to be set aside. However, the proceedings commenced in the year 2004, the business has closed down since and the accused is now about 70 years old. In these circumstances, the sentence is confined to the period already undergone. [Para 12][326-E, G; 327-A] Calcutta Municipal Corporation v. Pawan Kumar Saraf and Another (1999) 2 SCC 400 : [1999] 1 SCR 74 – relied on.
Kanshi Nath v. State 2005 (2) FAC 219 ; State v. Mahender Kumar & Ors. 2008 (1) FAC 177 – not good law.
Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Laxmi Narain Tandon (1976) 1 SCC 546 : [1976] 2 SCR 1050 – held
inapplicable.
State (Delhi Administration) v. Ram Singh and Another (2009) 1 FAC 371 ; Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Kacheroo Mal (1976) 1 SCC 412 : [1976] 2 SCR 1 – referred to.
As published in the Supreme Court Reports, Supreme Court of India. Text from the Indian Supreme Court Judgments open data set (Dattam Labs), CC BY 4.0.
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