Case Details Rajo @ Rajwa @ Rajendra Mandal vs The State of Bihar & Ors.

Held: Sentencing is a judicial exercise of power – The act thereafter of executing the sentence awarded, however, is a purely executive function which includes the grant of remission, commutation, pardon, reprieves, or suspension of sentence – This executive power is traceable to Article 72 and 161 of the Constitution of India – Whilst the statutory (u/s.432 CrPC) and constitutional (under Articles 72 and 161 of the Constitution) powers are distinct- the former limited power, is still an imprint of the latter (much wider power), and must be understood as such and placed in this context – This executive power which is inherently discretionary in nature, has to be exercised fairly, reasonably, and not arbitrarily – Absence to do so, would compel the court to exercise its judicial review and in appropriate cases remit the matter for reconsideration – Procedure laid out in s.432(2), has been held to be mandatory.[Paras 9 and 10]

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – Remission – Parameters to be considered – Discussed.[Para 11]

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – Remission – Role of presiding judge’s view – Weightage to be attached:

Held: The discretion that the executive is empowered with in executing a sentence, would be denuded of its content, if the presiding judge’s viewwhich is formed in all likelihood, largely (if not solely) on the basis of the judicial record- is mechanically followed by the concerned authority – Such an approach has the potential to strike at the heart, and subvert the concept of remission- as a reward and incentive encouraging actions and behaviour geared towards reformation- in a modern legal system – If the presiding judge’s report is only reflective of the facts and circumstances that led to the conclusion of the convict’s guilt, and is merely a reiteration of those circumstances available to the judge at the time of sentencing (some 14 or more years earlier, as the case may be), then the appropriate government should attach weight to this finding, accordingly – Such a report, cannot be relied on as carrying predominance, if it focusses on the crime, with little or no attention to the criminal.[Paras 16 and 17]

Sentencing – Heinous crimes:

Held: Even at the stage of sentencing, the judge ideally is to exercise discretion after looking at a wide range of factors relating to the criminal and not just the crime; but as noticed in numerous precedents that have dealt with sentencing in the commission of heinous crimes, this is unfortunately, often not the reality – Guidance has been offered by this court on how to mitigate this in recent years, but it is pragmatic to acknowledge that it will require time for our criminal justice system to incorporate, and uniformly reach such standards.

Sentencing – Imprisonment – Aim and goal of – Discussed.[Para 19]

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – Remission – Report submitted by the SP in the second round was adverse – Duty of the appropriate government:

Held: Report submitted by the Superintendent of Police in the second round (was diametrically different from that which was submitted in the first round), was adverse – In each case, the appropriate government has to be cognizant of the latent (not always) prejudices of the crime, that the police as well as the investigating agency, may be citing- especially in a case such as the present one, where the slain victims were police personnel themselves, i.e., members of the police force – These biases may inform the report, and cannot be given determinative value – Apart from the other considerations (on the nature of the crime, whether it affected the society at large, the chance of its recurrence, etc.), the appropriate government should while considering the potential of the convict to commit crimes in the future, whether there remains any fruitful purpose of continued incarceration, and the socio-economic conditions, review: the convict’s age, state of heath, familial relationships and possibility of reintegration, extent of earned remission, and the post-conviction conduct including, but not limited to- whether the convict has attained any educational qualification whilst in custody, volunteer services offered, job/work done, jail conduct, whether they were engaged in any socially aimed or productive activity, and the overall development as a human being – The Board should not entirely rely either on the presiding judge, or the report prepared by the police – It would also serve the ends of justice if the appropriate government had the benefit of a report contemporaneously prepared by a qualified psychologist after interacting/interviewing the convict that has applied for premature release. [Paras 20 and 21]

Adminstration of Criminal Justice – Sentencing – Balancing societal interests with the rights of the convict:

Held: The majority view and the minority view in Sriharan underlined the need to balance societal interests with the rights of the convict (that in a given case, the sentence should not be unduly harsh, or excessive) – The court acknowledged that it lies within the executive’s domain to grant, or refuse premature release; however, such power would be guided, and the discretion informed by reason, stemming from appropriate rules.[Para 22] Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – Remission – Different policies on the date of conviction and on the date of consideration for premature release:

Held: This court had grappled with the situation of different remission policies/rules prevailing at different points of the convict’s sentence- i.e., when the policy on the date of conviction, and on the date of consideration for premature release, are different – It has been held that the policy prevailing on the date of the conviction20 , would be applicable – However, in Jagdish it was also recognised that if a more liberal policy exists on the date of consideration, the benefit should be provided – In the present case, on the date of conviction (24.05.2001), it is the pre-2002 policy that was applicable – In the old pre-2002 policy, there is no mention of any ineligibility criteria, much less one that is analogous to Rule 529(iv)(b) of the 2002 policy, which was cited by the Remission Board in its rejection of the petitioner’s application on 20.04.2023. [Paras 23 and 24]

LIST OF CITATIONS AND OTHER REFERENCES

Union of India v. V. Sriharan [2015] 14 SCR 613 – followed. State of Haryana v. Jagdish [2010] 3 SCR 716; Laxman Naskar v. State of W.B (2000) 2 SCC 595 : [2000] 1 SCR 796 – relied on. Sangeet v. State of Haryana [2012] 13 SCR 85; Gopal Vinayak Godse v. State of Maharashtra [1961] 3 SCR 440; Maru Ram v. Union of India [1981] 1 SCR 1196; Sarat Chandra Rabha v. Khagendranath Nath [1961] 2 SCR 133; Kehar Singh v. Union of India [1988] Supp. 3 SCR 1102; State of Haryana v. Mohinder Singh [2000] 1 SCR 698; Sangeet v. State of Haryana [2012] 13 SCR 85; Rajan v. The Home Secretary, Home Department of Tamil Nadu [2019] 6 SCR 1035; Ram Chander v. State of Chhattisgarh [2022] 4 SCR 1103; Union of India v. V. Sriharan [2015] 14 SCR 613; Laxman Naskar v. State of W.B. (2000) 7 SCC 626 : [2000] 3 Suppl. SCR 62; Jaswant Singh v. State of Chhattisgarh, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 35; Swamy Shraddananda

(2) @ Mural Manohar Mishra v. State of Karnataka [2008] 11 SCR 93; Santosh Kumar Satishbhushan Bariyar v. State of Maharashtra [2009] 9 SCR 90; Chhannu Lal Verma v. State of Chattisgarh [2018] 14 SCR 355; Rajendra Pralhadrao Wasnik v. State of Maharashtra [2018] 14 SCR 585; and Manoj v. State of Madhya Pradesh [2022] 9 SCR 452; Maru Ram v. Union of India [1981] 1 SCR 1196; State of Haryana v. Raj Kumar, (2021)

9 SCC 292 – referred to.

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