Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – Issuance of summons – Legality of – A complaint was made against the appellant-archbishop and other accused persons for having committed an offense u/s 120B, 406, 409, 418, 420, 423, 465, 467, 468 r/w 34 of IPC alleging that the appellant along with other accused persons had fraudulently disposed of certain immovable property belonging to the church – The first complaint filed by the complainant was dismissed by the court at Maradu on 30.09.2021 without taking cognizance of the complaint as the counsel for complainant did not appear – On 02.04.2019, in another complaint on same set of facts, the trial court (at Kakkanad) dismissed the complaint u/s. 203 of Cr.P.C. with respect to offences u/ss. 409, 418, 420, 465, 467 and 468 of the IPC, however issued summons to the appellants and other accused persons for the offfences u/ss. 120-B, 406, 423 r/w s.34 IPC – The appellant filed the revision application before the Sessions Court but the same was dismissed and the petition u/s 482 Cr.P.C. before the High Court was also dismissed – Before the Supreme Court, appellant contended that the instant complaint after dismissal of the earlier complaint on same facts was not maintainable – Held: Trial Court at Kakkanad in the instant complaint cases, before the dismissal of the previous complaint, had already taken cognizance by issuing summons to the appellant and others – It is true that the complainant, in the instant complaint, should have disclosed the full and correct facts more particularly with regard to the previous complaint filed by him against the appellant and other accused but mere non-disclosure of such facts, would not be a ground to set aside the summons issued by the trial Court which after applying its mind and having been prima facie satisfied about the commission of the alleged offences u/ss. 120B, 406 and 423 r/w. 34 of IPC had issued summons – All the three Courts below have discussed in detail about the prima facie involvement of the appellant in the alleged offences, and having carefully examined the record of the complaints in question, there is no illegality or infirmity in the orders passed by the trial Court issuing summons against the appellant.
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – s. 482 – Restraint on exercise of powers under Judicial Review – Held: Judicial restraint is a virtue, and the predilections of individual judges, howsoever well intentioned, cannot be permitted to be operated in utter disregard of the well-recognized judicial principles governing uniform application of law – Unwarranted judicial activism may cause uncertainty or confusion not only in the mind of the authorities but also in the mind of the litigants.
Disposing of the matters, the Court
HELD: 1. In case of Pramatha Nath Talukdar Vs. Saroj Ranjan Sarkar, it was held with regard to filing of the second complaint that a fresh complaint could be entertained after the dismissal of previous complaint under Section 203 of the Criminal Procedure Code when there was manifest error or manifest miscarriage of justice or when fresh evidence was forthcoming. It was further held that an order of dismissal under Section 203 of the Criminal Procedure Code is no bar to the entertainment of a second complaint on the same facts, but it will be entertained only in exceptional circumstances, e.g. that the previous order was passed on an incomplete record or on a misunderstanding of nature of complaint or it was manifestly absurd, unjust or foolish or where new facts which could not, with reasonable diligence, have been brought on record in the previous proceedings have been adduced. Having regard to the said legal position and various decisions of the Supreme Court, it could not be said that the trial court had committed any error in entertaining the complaints filed by the respondent complainant, when the previous complaint filed by him was pending before the other court, and more particularly when the said court had dismissed the said previous complaint for non- prosecution, without taking cognizance of the alleged offences therein. [Paras 14 and 15][1028-D-F; 1030-D-E]
2. The Sessions Court in the Revision petitions filed by the appellant had also upheld the said orders passed by the trial court issuing summons against the appellant and others after dealing with each and every aspect of the matter including the ingredients of alleged offences for which the summons were issued against the appellant. The High Court in the impugned order has also discussed in detail the submissions made by the counsels for the parties in the petitions filed by the appellant under Section
482 of Cr.P.C. and upheld the order passed by the Sessions Court. In view of the said observations made and prima facie findings recorded by the three courts below as regards the alleged involvement of the appellant in the alleged offences, this Court is not inclined to interfere with the same. [Para 17][1031-A-C]
3. No doubt, summoning of an accused is a serious matter and therefore the Magistrate before issuing the summons to the accused is obliged to scrutinize carefully the allegations made in the complaint with a view to prevent a person named therein as accused from being called upon to face any frivolous complaint, nonetheless one of the objects of Section 202 Cr.P.C. is also to enable the Magistrate to prosecute a person or persons against whom grave allegations are made. Just as it is necessary to curtail vexatious and frivolous complaints against innocent persons, it is equally essential to punish the guilty after conducting a fair trial. In the instant cases, all the three courts below have discussed in detail about the prima facie involvement of the appellant in the alleged offences, and therefore it is not necessary for this Court to reiterate the same. Suffice it to say that having carefully examined the record of the complaints in question, there is no illegality or infirmity in the orders passed by the trial court issuing summons against the appellant-Archbishop for the alleged offences. [Para 18][1031-C-F]
4. The High Court in its overzealous approach had travelled not only beyond the scope and ambit of Section 482 Cr.P.C and of Article 226 of the Constitution of India, but had crossed all the boundaries of judicial activism and judicial restraint by passing such orders under the guise of doing real and substantial justice. The jurisprudential enthusiasm and wisdom for doing the substantial justice has to be applied by the courts within the permissible limits. The belief of self-righteousness or smugness of the High Court in exercise of its powers of judicial review should not overawe the other authorities discharging their statutory functions. The court may not have to remind the High Courts that judicial restraint is a virtue, and the predilections of individual judges, howsoever well intentioned, cannot be permitted to be operated in utter disregard of the well-recognized judicial principles governing uniform application of law. Unwarranted judicial activism may cause uncertainty or confusion not only in the mind of the authorities but also in the mind of the litigants. [Paras 28 and 29][1036-A-D]
S. K. Sinha, Chief Enforcement Officer v. Videocon International Ltd. and Others (2008) 2 SCC 492 : [2008] 2 SCR 36; Ramdev Food Products Private v. State of Gujarat (2015) 6 SCC 439 : [2015] 5 SCR 283; Pramatha Nath Talukdar v. Saroj Ranjan Sarkar AIR 1962 SC 876 : [1962] Suppl. SCR 297 – relied on.
Jatinder Singh and Others v. Ranjit Kaur (2001) 2 SCC
570 : [2001] 1 SCR 707; Ranvir Singh v. State of Haryana and Another (2009) 9 SCC 642; Poonam
Chand Jain and Another v. Fazru (2010) 2 SCC 631 : [2010] 2 SCR 109; Samta Naidu and Another v. State of Madhya Pradesh and Another (2020) 5 SCC 378 : [2020] 2 SCR 1127– referred to.
As published in the Supreme Court Reports, Supreme Court of India. Text from the Indian Supreme Court Judgments open data set (Dattam Labs), CC BY 4.0.
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