Assurance Co. Ltd. vs Hilli Multipurpose Cold Storage Pvt. Ltd.

Consumer Protection Act, 1986 – s. 13 – Limitation of 30 days u/s. 13 of the 1986 Act – Commencing point of – Held: Sub-sections(2) (a) and (2)(b) of s. 13 of the Consumer Protection Act specify that it is a copy of the complaint which is to be given to the opposite party directing him to give his version of the case within a period of 30 days or such extended period, not exceeding 15 days – As such, from the aforesaid provision itself, it is clear that it is the copy of the admitted complaint which is to be served, after which the period to file the response would commence – Further, Regulation

10 of the Consumer Protection Regulations, 2005 also specified the procedure of issuing notice, which should be accompanied by copy of the complaint – Therefore, the commencing point of limitation of 30 days u/s. 13 of the Consumer Protection Act would be from the date of receipt of the notice accompanied with the complaint by the opposite party, and not mere receipt of the notice of the complaint.

Answering the reference, the Court

HELD: Whether the District Forum has power to extend the time for filing of response to the complaint beyond the period of 15 days, in addition to 30 days, as envisaged under Section 13(2)(a) of the Consumer Protection Act?

1. A bare reading of Section 13(2)(a) of the Act makes it clear that the copy of the complaint which is to be sent to the opposite party, is to be with the direction to give his version of (or response to) the case (or complaint) within a period of 30 days. It further provides that such period of 30 days can be extended by the District Forum, but not beyond 15 days. [Para 8][447-C-D]

2. Sub-Section (2)(a) of Section 13 of the Consumer Protection Act provides for the opposite party to give his response ‘within a period of 30 days or such extended period not exceeding

15 days as may be granted by the District Forum’. The intention of the legislature seems to be very clear that the opposite party would get the time of 30 days, and in addition another 15 days at the discretion of the Forum to file its response. No further discretion of granting time beyond 45 days is intended under the Act. [Para 13][448-D-E]

3. The legislature in its wisdom has provided for filing of complaint or appeals beyond the period specified under the relevant provisions of the Act and Regulations, if there is sufficient cause given by the party, which has to be to the satisfaction of the concerned authority. No such discretion has been provided for under Section 13(2)(a) of the Consumer Protection Act for filing a response to the complaint beyond the extended period of 45 days (30 days plus 15 days). Had the legislature not wanted to make such provision mandatory but only directory, the provision for further extension of the period for filing the response beyond

45 days would have been provided, as has been provided for in the cases of filing of complaint and appeals. To carve out an exception in a specific provision of the statute is not within the jurisdiction of the Courts, and if it is so done, it would amount to legislating or inserting a provision into the statute, which is not permissible. [Para 17][449-G-H; 450-A]

4. By specifically enacting a provision under sub-Section

(3) of Section 13, with a specific clarification that violation of the principles of natural justice shall not be called in question where the procedure prescribed under sub-Sections (1) and (2) of Section

13 of the Consumer Protection Act has been followed or complied with, the intention of the legislature is clear that mere denial of further extension of time for filing the response (by the opposite party) would not amount to denial or violation of the principles of natural justice. This provision of Section 13(3) reinforces the time limit specified in Section 13(2)(a) of the Act. [Para 17][450-B-C]

5. It is true that ‘justice hurried is justice buried’. But in the same breath it is also said that ‘justice delayed is justice denied’. The legislature has chosen the latter, and for a good reason. It goes with the objective sought to be achieved by the Consumer Protection Act, which is to provide speedy justice to the consumer. It is not that sufficient time to file a response to the complaint has been denied to the opposite party. It is just that discretion of extension of time beyond 15 days (after the 30 days period) has been curtailed and consequences for the same have been provided under Section 13(2)(b)(ii) of the Consumer Protection Act. It may be that in some cases the opposite party could face hardship because of such provision, yet for achieving the object of the Act, which is speedy and simple redressal of consumer disputes, hardship which may be caused to a party has to be ignored. [Para 20][452-B-D]

6. It has been further contended that the language of Section 13(2) of the Consumer Protection Act is pari materia to Order VIII Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 and if time can be extended for filing of written submission in a suit under the aforesaid provision of the Code, the same would apply to the filing of response to complaint under the Consumer Protection Act as well, and hence the provision of Section 13(2)(a) of the Consumer Protection Act would be directory and not mandatory. In this regard, what is noteworthy is that Regulation

26 of the Consumer Protection Regulation, 2005, clearly mandates that endeavour is to be made to avoid the use of the provisions of the Code except for such provisions, which have been referred to in the Consumer Protection Act and the Regulations framed thereunder, which is provided for in respect of specific matters enumerated in Section 13(4) of the Consumer Protection Act. It is pertinent to note that non-filing of written statement under Order VIII Rule 1 of the Code is not followed by any consequence of such non-filing within the time so provided in the Code. Now, while considering the relevant provisions of the Code, it is noteworthy that Order VIII Rule 1 read with Order VIII Rule 10 prescribes that the maximum period of 120 days provided under Order VIII Rule 1 is actually not meant to be mandatory, but only directory. Order VIII Rule 10 mandates that where written statement is not filed within the time provided under Order VIII Rule 1 “the court shall pronounce the judgment against him, or make such order in relation to the suit as it thinks fit”. A harmonious construction of these provisions is clearly indicative of the fact that the discretion is left with the Court to grant time beyond the maximum period of 120 days, which may be in exceptional cases. On the other hand, sub-Section (2)(b)(ii) of Section 13 of the Consumer Protection Act clearly provides for the consequence of the complaint to be proceeded ex parte against the opposite party, if the opposite party omits or fails to represent his case within the time given. [Para 21][452-E-H; 453-A-B]

7. Once consequences are provided for not filing the response to the complaint within the time specified, and it is further provided that proceedings complying with the procedure laid down under sub Section (1) and (2) of Section 13 of the Consumer Protection Act shall not be called in question in any Court on the ground that the principles of natural justice have not been complied with, the intention of the legislature is absolutely clear that the provision of sub-Section 2(a) of Section

13 of the Act in specifying the time limit for filing the response to the complaint is mandatory, and not directory. [Para 21] [453-F-G]

8. After noticing that there were delays in deciding the complaints by the District Forum, the legislature inserted subSection (3A) of Section 13 of the Consumer Protection Act providing for a time limit for deciding the complaints. From this it is amply clear that the intention of the legislature was, and has always been, for expeditious disposal of the complaints. By providing for extension of time for disposal of the cases filed, for reasons to be recorded, the legislature has provided for a discretion to the Forum that wherever necessary, the extension of the time can be provided for, and where such further extension is not to be granted [as in the case of Section 13(2)(a)], the legislature has consciously not provided for the same, so as to achieve the object of the Act. [Para 22][453-H; 454-A-B] What would be the commencing point of limitation of 30 days under Section 13 of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986?

9. For deciding this question, this Court may first analyse the relevant provisions of the Consumer Protection Act and the Regulations framed thereunder. Sub-Sections (2)(a) and (2)(b) of Section13 of the Consumer Protection Act specify that it is the copy of the complaint which is to given to the opposite party directing him to give his version of the case within a period of 30 days or such extended period, not exceeding 15 days. As such, from the aforesaid provision itself, it is clear that it is the copy of the admitted complaint which is to be served, after which the period to file the response would commence. Further, Regulation

10 of the Consumer Protection Regulations, 2005 also specifies the procedure of issuing notice, which should be accompanied by copy of the complaint. Regulation 10(5) clearly mentions that “along with the notice, copies of the complaint, memorandum of grounds of appeal, petitions as the case may be and other documents filed shall be served upon the opposite party(ies)/respondent(s)”. The same would also make it clear that it is on service of a copy of the complaint that the period of limitation for filing the response by the opposite party shall commence. [Para 37][461-F-H; 462-A]

10. Now reverting to the provisions of the Consumer Protection Act, a conjoint reading of Clauses (a) and (b) of subSection (2) of Section 13 would make the position absolutely clear that the commencing point of limitation of 30 days, under the aforesaid provisions, would be from the date of receipt of notice accompanied by a copy of the complaint, and not merely receipt of the notice, as the response has to be given, within the stipulated time, to the averments made in the complaint and unless a copy of the complaint is served on the opposite party, he would not be in a position to furnish its reply. Thus, mere service of notice, without service of the copy of the complaint, would not suffice and cannot be the commencing point of 30 days under the aforesaid Section of the Act. This Court may, however, clarify that the objection of not having received a copy of the complaint along with the notice should be raised on the first date itself and not thereafter, otherwise if permitted to be raised at any point later would defeat the very purpose of the Act, which is to provide simple and speedy redressal of consumer disputes. [Para 40][463-D-F]

11. To conclude, the answer to the first question is that the District Forum has no power to extend the time for filing the response to the complaint beyond the period of 15 days in addition to 30 days as is envisaged under Section 13 of the Consumer Protection Act; and the answer to the second question is that the commencing point of limitation of 30 days under Section 13 of the Consumer Protection Act would be from the date of receipt of the notice accompanied with the complaint by the opposite party, and not mere receipt of the notice of the complaint. [Para 41][463-G-H; 464-A]

Dr. J.J. Merchant v. Shrinath Chaturvedi (2002) 6 SCC

635 : [2002] 1 Suppl. SCR 469 – held correct law. Rohitash Kumar v. Om Prakash Sharma (2013) 11 SCC

451 : [2012] 13 SCR 47; Laxminarayan R. Bhattad v. State of Maharashtra (2003) 5 SCC 413 : [2003] 3 SCR 409; P.M. Latha v. State of Kerala (2003) 3 SCC

541 : [2003] 2 SCR 653 ; Nasiruddin v. Sita Ram Agarwal (2003) 2 SCC 577 : [2003] 1 SCR 634 ; E. Palanisamy v. Palanisamy (2003) 1 SCC 123 ; India House v. Kishan N. Lalwani (2003) 9 SCC 393 : [2002]

5 Suppl. SCR 522 ; Union of India v. Tecco Trichy Engineers & Contractors (2005) 4 SCC 239 : [2005] 2 SCR 983 – relied on.

Lachmi Narain v. Union of India (1976) 2 SCC 953 : [1976] 2 SCR 785; Bhikraj Jaipuria v. Union of India AIR 1962 SC 113: [1962] 2 SCR 880; Fairgrowth

Investments Ltd. v. Custodian (2004) 11 SCC 472: [2004] 5 Suppl. SCR 505; Popat Bahiru Govardhane v. Special Land Acquisition Officer (2013) 10 SCC 765: [2013] 8 SCR 241 – referred to.

SCG Contracts (India) Private Limited v. K.S Chamankar Infrastructure Private Limited (2019) 12 SCC 210: [2019] 3 SCR 1050; Topline Shoes Ltd. v. Corporation Bank (2002) 6 SCC 33 : [2002] 3 SCR 1167 – referred to.

Kailash v. Nanhku (2005) 4 SCC 480: [2005] 3 SCR 289; Salem Advocate Bar Association v. Union of India (2005) 6 SCC 344 : [2005] 1 Suppl. SCR 929 ; NIA v. Hilli Multipurpose Cold Storage (2015) 16 SCC 22; Nahar Enterprises v. Hyderabad Allwyn Ltd. (2007) 9 SCC 466 : [2007] 2 SCR 413 – referred to.