Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973– s.482 – Noncompoundable offences – Power of High Court to quash proceedings – Respondent no.2 alleged that after the marriage proposal of his daughter was finalised with appellant no.1, he started visiting their house frequently and misleading his daughter that now since the marriage is finalised and only ceremony of ‘feras’ remains to be performed, took her for outings on various occasions – One day he induced her to his room and established physical relationship with her – Subsequently, the appellant started making demand of dowry of Rs. 5 Lakh – Complaint made before Mahila Thana – No action taken – On coming to know that appellant no.1’s marriage was settled with some other girl, FIR was lodged u/ss. 493, IPC r/w ss. 3/4, 1961 Act – Appellants challenged the chargesheet u/s. 482, CrPC and alleged that a demand of Rs.10 Lakhs was made from them with a threat to implicate in false case if the demand was not met – Appellant made application u/s.156(3), CrPC against respondent no.2 and his family members – Meanwhile, respondent no.2 made a complaint in Mahila Thana which was later compromised, in view of which the appellants did not press the application u/s. 156(3), CrPC – Petition u/s. 482, CrPC dismissed by High Court – Held: Though the offences in question are noncompoundable but the power of High Court u/s. 482, CrPC to quash the proceedings in such offences is well recognised – Offences for which the appellants are charged are infact offences against society and not private in nature – In such cases, settlement even if arrived at between the complainant and the accused, the same cannot constitute a valid ground to quash FIR or charge sheet – High Court not unjustified in refusing to quash charge sheet on ground of compromise – Further, the allegations made in FIR, only against one of the appellant, cannot be said to constitute any offence u/s. 493, IPC as they do not cull out any inducement of belief in the victim that she is lawfully married to appellant no.1 and on account of this deceitful misstatement, she co-habited with him – Also, there are no allegations in this regard in respect of other five accusedappellants – However, allegations in FIR clearly show that a demand of Rs. 5 Lakhs as dowry was made by appellants from respondent no.2 thus, it can not be said that no offence under the 1961 Act is made out – Charge sheet insofar as s. 493, IPC is concerned stands quashed – However, in respect of charge sheet u/s.3 r/w s.4, 1961 Act, the appeal is dismissed – Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 – ss. 3,4 & 8(2) – Penal Code, 1860 – s.493.
Penal Code, 1860 – s. 493 – Essence of offence under – Discussed.
Words & Expressions – “deceit” – Meaning of – Held: Deceit can be said to be a false statement of fact made by a person knowingly and recklessly with the intent that it shall be acted upon by another who on believing the same after having acted thereupon suffers an injury – It is an attempt to deceive and includes such declaration and statement that misleads others or causes him to believe which otherwise is false and incorrect – Penal Code, 1860 – s.493.
Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 – ss. 3 and 4 – Essential ingredients of offence under – Discussed.
Disposing of the appeal, the Court
HELD: 1.1 Offences for which the appellants have been charged are infact offences against society and not private in nature. Such offences have serious impact upon society and continuance of trial of such cases is founded on the overridding effect of public interests in punishing persons for such serious offences. It is neither an offence arising out of commercial, financial, mercantile, partnership or such similar transactions or has any element of civil dispute thus it stands on a distinct footing. In such cases, settlement even if arrived at between the complainant and the accused, the same cannot constitute a valid ground to quash the F.I.R. or the charge sheet. Thus the High Court cannot be said to be unjustified in refusing to quash the charge sheet on the ground of compromise between the parties. [Paras 15, 16][716 F-H; 717 A-B]
1.2 A plain reading of the Section 493, IPC goes to show that in order to constitute an offence under this Section, it has to be demonstrated that a man has deceitfully caused any woman, who is not lawfully married to him, to believe that she is lawfully married wife and thereby co-habit with him. In other words, the accused must induce a woman, not lawfully married to him, to believe that she is married to him and as a result of such mis-representation, woman should believe that she was lawfully married to the man and thus there should be co-habitation or sexual intercourse. The essence of an offence under Section 493 IPC is, therefore, practice of deception by a man on a woman as a consequence of which the woman is led to believe that she is lawfully married to him although she is not and then make her cohabit with him. Deceit can be said to be a false statement of fact made by a person knowingly and recklessly with the intent that it shall be acted upon by another who on believing the same after having acted thereupon suffers an injury. It is an attempt to deceive and includes such declaration and statement that misleads others or causes him to believe which otherwise is false and incorrect. [Paras 18, 20 and 21][717 D-F; 718-G, H; 719-A]
1.3 From a perusal of the F.I.R., it is not found that allegations made therein can be said to constitute any offence under Section
493 IPC. The allegations do not even prima-facie, cull out any inducement of belief in the victim that she is lawfully married to the appellant no. 1 and on account of this deceitful misstatement, the victim co-habited with the accused. Also whatever the allegations, in this regard, have been made only against the accused-appellant no. 1 which also do not constitute an offence and there are no allegations in this regard in respect of other five accused-appellants. [Paras 23-25][719 B-H]
1.4 A reading of Section 3/4 of Dowry Prohibition Act shows that essential ingredients of the offence thereunder are that the persons accused should have made demand directly or indirectly from the parents or other relatives or guardians of a bride or a bridegroom as the case may be any dowry and/or abets the giving and taking of dowry. The allegations of the F.I.R. clearly go to show that a demand of dowry of Rs. 5 Lakhs was made by the appellants from the complainants and thus it can not be said that no offence under the Dowry Prohibition Act are made out against the appellants. The charge sheet insofar as Section 493 I.P.C is concerned stands quashed. However, in respect of charge sheet under Section 3 read with Section 4 of Dowry Prohibition Act, the Appeal stands dismissed. [Paras 29, 31][721 C-E; 722-B] Gian Singh v. State of Punjab (2012) 10 SCC 303 : [2012] 8 SCR 753; Parbatbhai Aahir & Others v. State of Gujarat & Others (2017) 9 SCC 641 : [2017] 10 SCR 12; Narinder Singh v. State of Punjab (2014) 6 SCC 466 : [2014] 4 SCR 1012; Ram Chandra Bhagat v. State of Jharkhand (2013) 1 SCC 562 : [2012] 10 SCR 1050 – relied on.
Amrawati & another v. State of U.P. (2004) 57 ALR 290; Lal Kamlendra Pratap Singh v. State of U.P. 2009
(3) ADJ 322 (SC) – referred to.
As published in the Supreme Court Reports, Supreme Court of India. Text from the Indian Supreme Court Judgments open data set (Dattam Labs), CC BY 4.0.
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