Army Welfare Education Society New Delhi vs Sunil Kumar Sharma & Ors. Etc.

Constitution of India – In the instant case, even if it is assumed that the appellant Army Welfare Education Society is a body performing public duty amenable to writ jurisdiction, whether all its decisions are subject to judicial review or only those decisions which have public law element therein can be judicially reviewed under the writ jurisdiction: Held: It was held in St. Mary’s Education Society & Anr. v. Rajendra Prasad Bhargava & Ors. that merely because a writ petition can be maintained against the private individuals discharging the public duties and/or public functions, the same should not be entertained if the enforcement is sought to be secured under the realm of a private law – It would not be safe to say that the moment the private institution is amenable to writ jurisdiction then every dispute concerning the said private institution is amenable to writ jurisdiction – It largely depends upon the nature of the dispute and the enforcement of the right by an individual against such institution – The right which purely originates from a private law cannot be enforced taking aid of the writ jurisdiction irrespective of the fact that such institution is discharging the public duties and/or public functions – The scope of the mandamus is basically limited to an enforcement of the public duty and, therefore, it is an ardent duty of the court to find out whether the nature of the duty comes within the peripheral of the public duty – There must be a public law element in any action – In the instant case, the relationship between the respondents herein and the appellant society is that of an employee and a private employer arising out of a private contract – If there is a breach of a covenant of a private contract, the same does not touch any public law element – The school cannot be said to be discharging any public duty in connection with the employment of the respondents. [Paras 38, 39, 40, 42] Doctrine/Principles – Doctrine of Legitimate Expectation – The respondents contended that they were under a legitimate expectation that their service conditions and salary would not be unilaterally altered by the appellant society to their disadvantage – Thus, as the respondents were neither consulted with nor taken in confidence by the appellant society before effecting the changes in their service conditions, it amounted to a breach of their legitimate expectation, thereby making it a fit case for the exercise of writ jurisdiction by the High Court:

Held: The following are features regarding the doctrine of legitimate expectation: First, legitimate expectation must be based on a right as opposed to a mere hope, wish or anticipation; Secondly, legitimate expectation must arise either from an express or implied promise; or a consistent past practice or custom followed by an authority in its dealings; Thirdly, expectation which is based on sporadic or casual or random acts, or which is unreasonable, illogical or invalid cannot be treated as a legitimate expectation; Fourthly, legitimate expectation operates in relation to both substantive and procedural matters; Fifthly, legitimate expectation operates in the realm of public law, that is, a plea of legitimate action can be taken only when a public authority breaches a promise or deviates from a consistent past practice, without any reasonable basis; Sixthly, a plea of legitimate expectation based on past practice can only be taken by someone who has dealings, or negotiations with a public authority – It cannot be invoked by a total stranger to the authority merely on the ground that the authority has a duty to act fairly generally – It is clear that legitimate expectation, jurisprudentially, was a device created in order to maintain a check on arbitrariness in state action – It does not extend to and cannot govern the operation of contracts between private parties, wherein the doctrine of promissory estoppel holds the field – In the instant case, the relationship between the administration of an institution and its employees remains a contractual one, falling within the ambit of private law – Nothing has been placed on record by the respondents to show that any express or implied promise was made by the appellant regarding keeping their salary and service conditions intact – There is no statutory obligation on the appellant society which requires that the salaries and allowances of the respondents are to be kept at par with what is payable to teachers of Government institutions – Lastly, the appellant society, for the purposes of its relationship with its employees, cannot be regarded as a public or Government authority – For all the aforesaid reasons, the doctrine of legitimate expectation will have no applicability to the facts of the present case. [Paras 48, 49, 50, 51, 52]