Amish Devgan vs Union of India and Others

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – s.156(1) and s.179 – Conjoint reading of – Penal Code, 1860 – ss. 295A, 153A, 505(2) – Hate speech – Cause of Action – While hosting a debate show, the petitioner had described Pir Hazrat Moinuddin Chishti, as an invader, terrorist and robber who had come to India to convert its population to Islam – Post the telecast as many as seven FIRs concerning the said episode were filed and registered against the petitioner in the States of Rajasthan, Telangana, Maharashtra and Madhya Pradesh – Petitioner contended that criminal proceedings arising from the impugned FIRs ought to be quashed as these FIRs were registered in places where no ‘cause of action’ arose – Held: s.179 of Cr.P.C. provides that an offence is triable at the place where an act is done or its consequence ensues – The audience, including the complainants, were located in different parts of India and were affected by the utterances of the petitioner – Further, clause (1) of s.156 of Cr.P.C. provides that any officer in-charge of a police station may investigate any cognizable case which a court having jurisdiction over the local limits of such station would have the power to inquire into or try – Thus, a conjoint reading of ss.179 and 156 (1) of the Cr.P.C. make it clear that the impugned FIRs do not suffer from this jurisdictional defect.

Penal Code, 1860 – s. 95 – Act causing slight harm – While hosting a debate show, the petitioner had described Pir Hazrat Moinuddin Chishti, as an invader, terrorist and robber who had come to India to convert its population to Islam – The petitioner has relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court in Veeda Menez and the decision of the High Court of Delhi in Neelam Mahajan to plead the defence of trifle u/s. 95 of the Penal Code – Held: The instant case cannot be equated with either Veeda Menez or Neelam Mahajan’s case where the factual matrix was undisputed and admitted – It would be wrong and inappropriate in the present context to prejudge and pronounce on aspects which are factual and disputed – The plea raised by the petitioner cannot be accepted without ascertaining facts and evidence.

Constitution of India – Arts. 19(1)(a), 19(2) and 32 – Hate Speech – Constitutional and statutory treatment of ‘hate speech’ depends on the values sought to be promoted, perceived harm involved and the importance of these harms – Consequently, a universal definition of ‘hate speech’ remains difficult, except for one commonality that ‘incitement to violence’ is punishable. International Law – Hate Speech – The American Framework on hate speech is based on four major philosophical justifications; Justification from democracy, Social contract theory, Pursuit of the truth and Idea of autonomy – The Canadian approach emphasises on multiculturalism and group equality, as it places greater emphasis on cultural diversity and promotes the idea of ethnic mosaic – The Australian approach is substantially aligned with Canada – The South African position regards dignity as paramount constitutional value and the law and the courts are willing to subjugate freedom of expression when the latter sufficiently undermines the former – The position in the United Kingdom has shifted over the years from reinforcing the security of the government to checking incitement to racial hatred among non-target audience with the aim of protecting targets against racially motivated harassment – Germany believes that freedom of expression is one amongst several rights which is limited by principles of equality, dignity and multiculturalism – The French law gives primacy to freedom of expression, which it believes is meaningless without the right to offend, which would to some not only include the right to criticise and provoke but also the right to ridicule when it comes to ideas and beliefs, including religious beliefs.

Penal Code, 1860 – s.295A – Held: Import of s.295A of the Penal Code, Ramji Lal Modi holds, is to curb speech made with ‘malicious intent’ and not ‘offensive speech’ – Criminality would not include insults to religion offered unwittingly, carelessly or without deliberate or malicious intent to outrage the religious feelings – Only aggravated form of insult to religion when it is perpetuated with deliberate and malicious intent to outrage the religious feelings of that group is punishable.

Constitution of India – Art. 19 – Penal Code, 1860 – s.153A and s.505(2) – In Ramji Lal Modi and the later decision in Bilal Ahmed Kaloo, which had examined ss.153A and 505(2) of the Penal Code, had primarily applied the ‘Bad Tendency test’ as propounded by the American jurists – In Dr. Ram Manohar Lohia, referring to the words ‘in the interest of… public order’ in clause (2) to Article 19 had observed that order is a basic need in any organised society – It implies orderly state of society or community in which the citizens can peacefully pursue their normal activities of life .

Words and Phrases – ‘minor breaches’ and ‘security of State’ – discuss and defined.

Constitution of India – Art. 19 – ‘Dignity’ in the context of hate speech – Held: Loss of dignity and selfworth of the targeted group members contributes to disharmony amongst groups, erodes tolerance and open-mindedness which are a must for multi-cultural society committed to the idea of equality – It affects an individual as a member of a group – It is however necessary that at least two groups or communities must be involved; merely referring to feelings of one community or group without any reference to any other community or group does not attract the ‘hate speech’ definition. Constitution of India – Art. 19 – Hate speech – Dignity of individual and unity and integrity of the nation – Held: Dignity of individual and unity and integrity of the nation are linked, one in the form of rights of individuals and other in the form of individual’s obligation to others to ensure unity and integrity of the nation – The unity and integrity of the nation cannot be overlooked and slighted, as the acts that ‘promote’ or are ‘likely’ to ‘promote’ divisiveness, alienation and schematism do directly and indirectly impinge on the diversity and pluralism, and when they are with the objective and intent to cause public disorder or to demean dignity of the targeted groups, they have to be dealt with as per law – The purpose is not to curtail right to expression and speech, albeit not gloss over specific egregious threats to public disorder and in particular the unity and integrity of the nation. Constitution of India – Art. 19 – Hate speech – Analysis and definition of – Held: Three distinct elements that legislatures and courts can use to define and identify ‘hate speech’, namely – contentbased element, intent-based element and harm-based element (or impact-based element) – The content-based element involves open use of words and phrases generally considered to be offensive to a particular community and objectively offensive to the society – The intent-based element of ‘hate speech’ requires the speaker’s message to intend only to promote hatred, violence or resentment against a particular class or group without communicating any legitimate message – The harm or impact-based element refers to the consequences of the ‘hate speech’ that is to harm victim which can be violent or such as loss of self-esteem, economic or social subordination.

Constitution of India – Art. 19 – Distinction between Free speech and Hate speech – Held: A distinction between ‘free speech’ which includes the right to comment, favour or criticise government policies; and ‘hate speech’ creating or spreading hatred against a targeted community or group – The former is primarily concerned with political, social and economic issues and policy matters, the latter would not primarily focus on the subject matter but on the substance of the message which is to cause humiliation and alienation of the targeted group – The object of criminalising the latter type of speech is to protect the dignity and to ensure political and social equality between different identities and groups regardless of caste, creed, religion, sex, gender identity, sexual orientation, linguistic preference etc.– Freedom to express and speak is the most important condition for political democracy.

Words and Phrases – ‘Tolerance’ – discuss and defined. Penal Code, 1860 – s.153A – Held: Deliberate and malicious intent is necessary and can be gathered from the words itselfsatisfying the test of top of Clapham omnibus, the who factor person making the comment, the targeted and non targeted group, the context and occasion factor- the time and circumstances in which the words or speech was made, the state of feeling between the two communities, etc. and the proximate nexus with the protected harm to cumulatively satiate the test of ‘hate speech’ – ‘Good faith’ and ‘no legitimate purpose’ test would apply, as they are important in considering the intent factor.

Penal Code, 1860 – s.153A (b) – Held: In the context of s.153A(b), public tranquillity, given the nature of the consequence in the form of punishment of imprisonment of up to three years, must be read in a restricted sense synonymous with public order and safety and not normal law and order issues that do not endanger the public – It cannot be given the widest meaning so as to fall foul of the requirement of reasonableness which is a constitutional mandate.

Words and Phrases – “Attempt’ in the context of hate speech – Held: An ‘attempt to constitute a crime’, the impugned act should be more than mere preparation and reasonably proximate to the consummation of the offence, which has been interrupted – In the context of ‘hate speech’, including the offences related to promoting disharmony or feelings of enmity, hatred or ill-will, and insulting the religion or the religious beliefs, it would certainly require the actual utterance of words or something more than thought which would constitute the content.

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – Quashing of FIR at an early stage – The Supreme Court has at the initial stage quashed the proceedings arising out of the FIR, namely, Manzar Sayeed Khan, Mahendra Singh Dhoni, Ramesh as well as Balwant Singh – However, the ratio in Balwant Singh has to be applied with caution as the decision had proceeded on failure of prosecution. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – First Information Report (FIR) – Definition and meaning of – Held: Acronym FIR, or the First Information Report, is neither defined in the Criminal Code nor is used therein, albeit it refers to the information relating to the commission of a cognisable offence – This information, if given orally to an officer in-charge of the police station, is mandated to be reduced in writing – Information to be recorded in writing need not be necessarily by an eye-witness, and hence, cannot be rejected merely because it is hearsay – S.154 does not mandate nor is this requirement manifest from other provisions of the Criminal Code – Lalita Kumari held that s.154 of the Criminal Code, in unequivocal terms, mandates registration of FIR on receipt of all cognisable offences, subject to exceptions in which case a preliminary inquiry is required – Tapan Kumar Singh held that the FIR is not an encyclopaedia disclosing all facts and details relating to the offence. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – FIR – Quashing of – FIRs registered against the petitioner for describing Pir Hazrat Moinuddin Chishti, as an invader, terrorist and robber who had come to India to convert its population to Islam – Petitioner sought quashing of FIRs – Held: The petitioner was an equal co-participant, rather than a mere host – Three distinct elements that used to define and identify ‘hate speech’, namely-content-based element, intentbased element and harm-based element (or impact-based element), need to be evaluated before the Court – These have to be evaluated, before the Court form an opinion on whether an offence is made out – Thus, it would not be appropriate at this stage to quash FIRs and stall the investigation into all the relevant aspects. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – Multiple FIRs – In Babubhai v. State of Gujarat and others wherein the test to determine sameness of the FIRs has been elucidated as when the subject matter of the FIRs is the same incident, same occurrence or are in regard to incidents which are two or more parts of the same transaction – If the answer to the question is affirmative, then the second FIR need not be proceeded with.

Words and Phrases – ‘ordre publique’, ‘public tranquillity’ and ‘public order’ – discussed.

Disposing of the writ petition, the Court

HELD: 1. The Section 295A of the Penal Code encapsulates of all three elements, namely; content-based element, intentbased element and harm-based element (or impact-based element), it refers to the content-based element when it refers to words either spoken or written, or by signs or visible representation or otherwise. It also refers to deliberate and malicious intent on the part of the maker to outrage religious feeling of any class of citizens of India. The last portion of the said section refers to the harm-based element, that is, insult or attempt to insult religions or religious belief of that class. Similarly, subsection (2) to Section 505 refers to a person making publishing or circulating any statement or report containing rumour or alarming news. Thereafter, it refers to the intent of the person which should be to create or promote and then refers to the harm-based element that is, feeling of enmity, hatred or illwill between different religions, religious groups or castes or communities, etc. [Para 65][275-E-G]

2. In Bilal Ahmad Kaloo, this Court had drawn a distinction between sub-section (2) to Section 505 and clause (a) to Section 153A of the Penal Code observing that publication is not necessary in the latter while it is sine qua non under clause (2) of Section 505. Clause (2) of Section 505 of the Penal Code cannot be interpreted disjunctively and the words ‘whosoever makes, publishes or circulates’ are supplemented to each other. The intention of the legislature in providing two different sections of the same subject vide single amending act would show that they cover two different fields of same colour. [Para 66][275-H; 276-A-B]

3. Clauses (a) and (b) to sub-section (1) to Section 153A of the Penal Code use the words ‘promotes’ and ‘likely’ respectively. Similarly, Section 295-A uses the word ‘attempts’ and sub-section

(2) to Section 505 uses the words ‘create or promote’. Word ‘likely’ as explained, in opinion of this Court, convey the meaning, that the chance of the event occurring should be real and not fanciful or remote. Instigation must necessarily and specifically be suggestive of the consequences. Sufficient certainty to incite the consequences must be capable of being spelt out to be incitement. Further, it is for the prosecution to show and establish that the standard has been breached by leading evidence, which can be both oral and documentary. ‘Promote’ does not imply mere describing and narrating a fact, or giving opinion criticising the point of view or actions of another person – it requires that the speaker should actively incite the audience to cause public disorder. This active incitement can be gauged by the content of the speech, the context and surrounding circumstances, and the intent of the speaker. However, in case the speaker is merely pointing out why a certain person or group is behaving in a particular manner, what are their demands and their point of view, or when the speaker interviews such person or group, it would be a passive delivery of facts and opinions which may not amount to promotion. [Para 67][276-C-H; 277-A-B]

4. An attempt is short of actual causation of crime and more than mere preparation. In the context of ‘hate speech’, including the offences related to promoting disharmony or feelings of enmity, hatred or ill-will, and insulting the religion or the religious beliefs, it would certainly require the actual utterance of words or something more than thought which would constitute the content. Without actual utterance etc. it would be mere thought, and thoughts without overt act is not punishable. In the case of ‘publication’, again a mere thought would not be actionable, albeit whether or not there is an attempt to ‘publish’ would depend on facts. The impugned act should be more than mere preparation and reasonably proximate to the consummation of the offence, which has been interrupted. The question of intent would be relevant. On the question of the harm’s element, same test and principle, as applicable in the case of ‘likely’ would apply, except for the fact that for intervening reasons or grounds public disorder or violence may not have taken place. [Para 68][277-G-H; 278-A-C]

5. Having interpreted the relevant provisions, this Court is conscious of the fact that primacy has been given to the precept of ‘interest of public order’ and by relying upon ‘imminent lawless action’ principle, not given due weightage to the long-term impact of ‘hate’ speech as a propaganda on both the targeted and nontargeted groups. This is not to undermine the concept of dignity, which is the fundamental foundation on the basis of which the citizens must interact between themselves and with the State. Further, a ‘hate speech’ meeting the criteria of ‘clear and present danger’ or ‘imminent lawless action’ would necessarily have longterm negative effect. Lastly, this Court is dealing with penal or criminal action and, therefore, have to balance the right to express and speak with retaliatory criminal proceedings. This Court is to also prevent abuse and check misuse. It is not just penal threat alone which can achieve and ensure equality between groups. Dignity of citizens of all castes, creed, religion and region is best protected by the fellow citizens belonging to non-targeted groups and even targeted groups. [Para 69][278-C-H]

6. Acronym FIR, or the First Information Report, is neither defined in the Criminal Code nor is used therein, albeit it refers to the information relating to the commission of a cognisable offence. This information, if given orally to an officer in-charge of the police station, is mandated to be reduced in writing. Information to be recorded in writing need not be necessarily by an eye-witness, and hence, cannot be rejected merely because it is hearsay. Section 154 does not mandate nor is this requirement manifest from other provisions of the Criminal Code. Further, FIR is not meant to be a detailed document containing chronicle of all intricate and minute details. [Para 73][280-E-F]

7. This Court respectfully agrees with the ratio laid down in Arnab Ranjan Goswami. Ordinarily, this Court would have relegated the petitioner and asked him to approach the concerned High Court for appropriate relief, albeit in the present case detailed arguments have been addressed by both sides on maintainability and merits of the FIRs in question and, therefore, been dealt with and rejected at this stage. [Para 77][284-F]

8. This Court has already reproduced relevant portions of the transcript of the debate anchored by the petitioner. It is apparent that the petitioner was an equal co-participant, rather than a mere host. The transcript, including the offending portion, would form a part of the ‘content’, but any evaluation would require examination and consideration of the variable ‘context’ as well as the ‘intent’ and the ‘harm/impact’. These have to be evaluated before the court can form an opinion on whether an offence is made out. The evaluative judgment on these aspects would be based upon facts, which have to be inquired into and ascertained by police investigation. The fact, that the petitioner relies upon his apology, which as per the respondents/informants is an indication or implied acceptance of his acts of commission. [Para 78][284-G-H; 285-A-B]

9. It is not the appropriate at this stage to quash the FIRs and thus stall the investigation into all the relevant aspects. However, observations of this Court on the factual matrix of the present case in this decision should not in any manner influence the investigation by the police who shall independently apply their mind and ascertain the true and correct facts, on all material and relevant aspects. Similarly, the competent authority would independently apply its mind in case the police authorities seek sanction, and to decide, whether or not to grant the same. Same would be the position in case charge-sheet is filed. The court would apply its mind whether or not to take cognisance and issue summons. By an interim order, the petitioner has enjoyed protection against coercive steps arising out of and relating to the program telecast on 15.06.2020. Subject to the petitioner cooperating in the investigation, this Court directs that no coercive steps for arrest of the petitioner need be taken by the police during investigation. In case and if charge-sheet is filed, the court would examine the question of grant of bail without being influenced by these directions as well as any findings of fact recorded in this judgment. [Para 79][285-C-F]

10. The decisions of this Court in Bhajan Lal, P.P. Sharma and the earlier decision in R.P. Kapur which held that the High Court, in exercise of inherent jurisdiction, can quash proceedings in a proper case either to prevent abuse of process or otherwise to secure ends of justice. Application of the principles discussed in these cases depends on factual matrix of each case. Strict and restricted as the requirements are, they are at this stage not satisfied in the present case. [Para 80][285-F; 286-B]

11. The second prayer of the petitioner viz. multiplicity of FIRs being registered in the States of Rajasthan, Maharashtra, Telangana, and Madhya Pradesh (now transferred to Uttar Pradesh) relating to the same broadcast. Both the sides agreed that the issue is covered by the decision of this Court in T.T. Antony which has been followed in Arnab Ranjan Goswami’s case. Also, in Babubhai v. State of Gujarat and Others wherein the test to determine sameness of the FIRs has been elucidated as when the subject matter of the FIRs is the same incident, same occurrence or are in regard to incidents which are two or more parts of the same transaction. If the answer to the question is affirmative, then the second FIR need not be proceeded with. [Para 81][286-D; 290-B-C]

12. In the present case, this Court would like to follow the ratio in T.T. Antony which is to the effect that the subsequent FIRs would be treated as statements under Section 162 of the Criminal Code. [Para 82][290-D-E]

13. This Court would also like to clarify that Section 179 of the Criminal Code permits prosecution of cases in the court within whose local jurisdiction the offence has been committed or consequences have ensued. Section 186 of the Criminal Code relates to cases where two separate charge-sheets have been filed on the basis of separate FIRs and postulates that the prosecution would proceed where the first charge-sheet has been filed on the basis of the FIR that is first in point of time. Principle underlying section 186 can be applied at the pre-charge-sheet stage, that is, post registration of FIR but before charge-sheet is submitted to the Magistrate. In such cases ordinarily the first FIR, that is, the FIR registered first in point of time, should be treated as the main FIR and others as statements under Section

162 of the Criminal Code. However, in exceptional cases and for good reasons, it will be open to the High Court or this Court, as the case may be, to treat the subsequently registered FIR as the principal FIR. However, this should not cause any prejudice, inconvenience or harassment to either the victims, witnesses or the person who is accused. This Court has clarified the aforesaid position to avoid any doubt or debate on the said aspect. [Para 84][292-A-D]

14. In view of the findings, this Court accepts the prayer made in the last amended writ petition and transfer all FIRs listed to police station Dargah, Ajmer, Rajasthan, where the first FIR was registered. This Court does not find any good ground or special reason to transfer the FIRs to Noida, Uttar Pradesh. Statement of the complaint/informant forming the basis of the transferred FIRs would be considered as statement under Section

162 of the Criminal Code and be proceeded with. [Para 85] [292-E-F]

15. This Court declines and reject the prayer of the petitioner for quashing of the FIRs but have granted interim protection to the petitioner against arrest subject to his joining and cooperating in investigation till completion of the investigation. However, the prayer of the petitioner for transfer of all pending FIRs in relation to and arising out of the telecast/episode to P.S. Dargah, Ajmer, where the first FIR was registered is accepted. On the third prayer, this Court has asked the concerned states to examine the threat perception of the petitioner and family members and take appropriate steps as may be necessary. [Para 87][293-A-C]

Ramji Lal Modi v. State of U.P. AIR 1957 SC 620; Kedar Nath Singh v. State of Bihar, (1970) 2 SCC 780 : [1971]

2 SCR 446; Madhu Limaye v. Sub-Divisional

Magistrate, Monghyr and Others,(1970) 3 SCC 746 : [1971] 2 SCR 711 – followed.

Shreya Singhal v. Union of India (2015) 5 SCC 1 : [2015] 5 SCR 963; Anuradha Bhasin v. Union of India and Others (2020) 3 SCC 637; Modern Dental College and Research Centre and Others v. State of Madhya Pradesh and Others (2016) 7 SCC 353 : [2016] 3 SCR 579; Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India (1978) 1 SCC

248 : [1978] 2 SCR 621; State v. Mohd. Yakub (1980)

3 SCC 57; Lalita Kumari v. Government of Uttar Pradesh and Others (2014) 2 SCC 1; State of H.P. v. Pirthi Chand and Another, (1996) 2 SCC 37 : [1995] 6 Suppl. SCR 29; Arnab Ranjan Goswami v. Union of India and Others (2020) SCC Online SC 462; T.T. Antony v. State of Kerala and Others, (2001) 6 SCC 181: [2001] 3 SCR 942 – relied on.

P.K. Chakravarty v. The King AIR 1926 Cal.1133 – approved.

Her Majesty the Queen v. James Keegstra, (1990) 3 SCR 697; Balwant Singh and Another v. State of Punjab (1995) 3 SCC 214 : [1995] 2 SCR 411; Bilal Ahmed Kaloo v. State of A.P., (1997) 7 SCC 431 : [1997] 3 Supp. SCR 327; Brij Bhushan and Another v. State of Delhi, AIR 1950 SC 129; Lalai Singh Yadav v. State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1962 SC 955; Mahendra Singh Dhoni v. Yerraguntla Shyamsundar and Another, (2014)

2 SCC 1 : [2013] 14 SCR 713; Manzar Sayeed Khan v. State of Maharashtra and Another, (2017) 7 SCC

760 : [2017] 3 SCR 763; Queen-Empress v. Bal

Gangadhar Tilak, (2014) 11 SCC 477 : [2014] 4 SCR 446; Ramesh S/o Chhotalal Dalal v. Union of India and Others, (1988) 1 SCC 668 : [1988] 2 SCR 1011; Romesh Thappar v. State of Madras, AIR 1950 SC 12; State of Bihar and Another v. P.P. Sharma, IAS and Another, 1992 Supp. (1) SCC 222; State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1991 Supp (1) SCC 335; State of U.P. v. O.P. Sharma, (1996) 7 SCC 705 : [1996] 2 SCR 236; Superintendent of Police, CBI and Others v. Tapan Kumar Singh, (2003) 6 SCC 175: [2003] 3 SCR 485; Superintendent, Central Prison, Fatehgarh and Another v. Dr. Ram Manohar Lohia, AIR 1960 SC 633; Virendra/K.Narendra v. State of Punjab and Another AIR 1957 SC 896; State of Orissa v. Saroj Kumar Sahoo (2005)

13 SCC 540 : [2005] 5 Suppl. SCR 548; Chintaman Rao v. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1951 SC 118; State of Madras v. V.G. Row, AIR 1952 SC 196; N.B. Khare (Dr.) v. State of Delhi AIR 1950 SC 211; Mohammed Faruk v. State of Madhya Pradesh and Others (1969) 1 SCC 853 : [1970] 1 SCR 156; Arun Ghosh v. State of West Bengal (1970) 1 SCC 98 : [1979]

1 SCR 955; Justice K. S. Puttasamy v. Union of India (2017) 10 SCC 1 : [2017] 10 SCR 569; Subramanian Swamy v. Union of India and Others (2016) 7 SCC 221 : [2016] 3 SCR 865; Rustom Cowasjee Cooper v. Union of India (1970) 2 SCC 298 : [1971] 1 SCR 512; Bennett Coleman & Co. v. Union of India (1972) 2 SCC 788 : [1973] 2 SCR 757; A.K. Gopalan v. State of Madras AIR 1950 SC; Charu Khurana and Others v. Union of India and Others (2015) 1 SCC; India Young Lawyers Association and Others (Sabarimala Temple, In RE.) v. State of Kerala and Others (2019) 11 SCC 1; Ram Jethmalani and Others v. Union of India and Others (2011) 8 SCC 1 : [2011] 8 SCR 725; Noise Pollution (V), In Re. (2005) 5 SCC 733 : [2005] 1 Suppl. SCR 624; Indira Sawhney v. Union of India, (1992) Supp. 3 SCC 217; Amita v. Union of India, (2005) 13 SCC 721; Ebrahim Suleiman Sait v. M.Mohammed and Another (1980) 1 SCC 398; Aman Kumar v. State of Haryana (2004) 4 SCC 379; Dharma Rama Bhagare v. State of Maharashtra,(1973) 1 SCC 537; Babubhai v. State of Gujarat and Others, (2010) 12 SCC 254; Prakash Kumar Alias Prakash Bhutto v. State of Gujarat, (2005)

2 SCC 409:[2005] 1 SCR 408 – referred to.

Bhagwati Charan Shukla s/o. Ravishankar Shukla v. Provincial Government, C.P. & Berar, AIR 1947 Nagpur 1; Devi Sharan Sharma v. Emperor, AIR 1927 Lah 594; Emperor v. Sadashiv Narayan Bhalerao, AIR 1947 PC 82; Gopal Vinayak Godse v. Union of India, AIR 1971 Bom 56; Pravasi Bhalai Sangathan v. Union of India and Others, AIR 1926 Calcutta 1133; R. v. Zundel, 21 R. P. Kapur v. State of Punjab, ILR (1898) 22 Bombay 112; Veeda Menez v. Yusuf Khan and Another, 1966 SCR 123; Neelam Mahajan v. Commissioner of Police and Others, 1993 (27) DRJ 357; Lalai Singh Yadav and Another v. State of Uttar Pradesh 1971 Cri LJ 1773 (FB) (Allahabad); P.K. Chakravarty v. The King, AIR 1926 Cal. 1133 – referred to.

Niharendu Dutt Majumdar v. The King-Emperor, 1942 FCR 38; K.A. Abbas v. Union of India and Another 1942 FCR 38; Saskatchewan (Human Rights

Commission) v. Whatcott, [2013] 1 SCR 467; Canada (Human Rights Commission) v. Taylor, (1990) 3 SCR 892; Pat Eatock v. Andrew Bolt (2011) FCA 1103; Mr. Justice Holmes in Schenek v. United States, 249 U.S.

47 (52); Brandenburg v. Ohio 395 U.S. 444 (1969); Dennis v. United States 341 U.S. 494 O’Neill at (160) – (161) and Hill v. Church of Scientology of Toronto, (1995) 2 S.C.R. 1130 (117) and (120); Beauharnais v. Illinois,343 U.S. 250 (1952); Tillmanns Butcheries Pty Ltd. v. Australasian Meat Industry Employees’ Union (1979) 27 ALR 380 – referred to.

Hate Speech in Constitutional Jurisprudence: A Comparative Analysis’ by Michel Rosenfeld, 24 Cordozo L. Rev. 1523 2002-2003; ‘Hate Speech in

Constitutional Jurisprudence: A Comparative Analysis’ by Michel Rosenfeld, 24 Cordozo L. Rev. 1523 20022003; Andrew F. Sellers, Defining Hate Speech, published by Berkman Klein Center for Internet & Society at Harvard University; Words that Wound: A tort Action for Racial Insults, Epithets, and NameCalling’, 17 Harv. C.R.- C.L.L.rev. 133 (1982);‘Public Response to Racist Speech: Considering the Victim’s Story’, 87 Mich.L.Rev. 2320 (1989); Free Speech and the Development of Liberal Virtues: An Examination of the Controversies Involving Flag Burning and Hate Speech’, 52 U.Miami K. Rev. 733 (1998); Hate Speech in Constitutional Jurisprudence: A Comparative Analysis by Michel Rosenfeld, 24 Cardozo L. Rev. 1523 2002-2003; Myra Mrx Ferree, William A. Gamson, Jurgen Gerhards and Dieter Rucht, ‘Four Models of the Public Sphere in Modern Democracies,’ published in THEORY AND SOCIETY, Vol. 31, No. 3 (June, 2002), pp. 289-324;George Bernard Shaw, Socialism off Millionaires, 16(1901); Joseph Blocher, ‘Free Speech and Justified True Belief ’, Harvard Law Review, Vol. 133, No.2, December 2019; Internet Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, Toleration by Andrew Fiala, ISSN 21610002; Marjoka Van Doorn, the Nature of Tolerance and the Social Circumstances in Which it

Emerges,Current Sociology Review, 2014, Vol. 62(6) 905-927; Sam Hariss, The End of Faith; Michael Sandel Democracy’s Discontent (1998); John Rawls, Theory of Justice (1971); The Wounded Vanity of Governments in ‘Republic of Rhetoric: Free Speech and the Constitution of India’ by Abhinav Chandrachud, Penguin Books India (2017) – referred to.