Full Judgment Text
Text read from the judgment PDF published on the High Court's eCourts portal, through the
Indian High Court Judgments open data set (Dattam Labs,
CC BY 4.0).
The court's own copy is the authoritative text.
SHAMURAILATPAM
SUSHIL SHARMA
SUSHIL SHARMA
Date: 2025.10.10 10:13:19 +05'30'
IN THE HIGH COURT OF MANIPUR
AT IMPHAL
Sl. No. 19
WP(Crl.) No. 26 of 2025
Wairakpam Ibochouba Singh
Petitioner
Vs.
State of Manipur and 2 others
Respondents
BEFORE
HON’BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE MR. M. SUNDAR
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE A. GUNESHWAR SHARMA
ORDER
(Order of the Court was made by M. Sundar, CJ)
09.10.2025
[1]
Captioned writ petition has been filed with a habeas corpus
plea.
[2]
In the captioned writ petition, a preventive detention order
dated 13.05.2025 bearing Reference No. Cril-2/NSA/DM-BPR/2025 made by
3rd respondent has been assailed.
[3]
In this order, for the sake of convenience, 3rd respondent shall
be referred to as ‘detaining authority’ and the afore-referred preventive
detention order shall be referred to as ‘impugned preventive detention
order’.
[4]
To be noted, impugned preventive detention order has been
made under the ‘National Security Act, 1980 (Act No. 65 of 1980)’ (‘NSA’ for
the sake of brevity).
1|Page
[5]
Mr. N. Mahendra, learned counsel for the writ petitioner,
predicated his campaign against impugned prevention detention order, on 4
(four) points and the four points are as follows :
i)
Normal criminal law is sufficient in the circumstances of
the case and therefore, impugned preventive detention
order is unwarranted;
ii)
There is non-application of mind on the part of the
detaining authority making the impugned preventive
detention as the clear distinction between sub-sections
(3) and (2) of Section 3 of NSA having been overlooked;
iii)
Instances of bail in similar cases have not been cited in
the impugned preventive detention order or grounds;
iv)
The State Government has not communicated the
impugned preventive detention order to the Central
Government as required under sub-section (5) of Section
3 of NSA.
[6]
On the aforesaid points, we heard Mr. Y. Ashang, learned
senior counsel appearing for on behalf of all the three respondents.
[7]
We consider the submissions of the writ petitioner on the
above points in the light of the submissions to the contrary made by the
learned State counsel and set out our discussion and dispositive reasoning
on the same infra :
2|Page
i) As regards the first point that normal criminal law is sufficient and
resort to Preventive Detention Act is not necessary,we find that this
principle which was laid down in Rekha reported in (2011) 5 SCC
244 was held to be not the correct exposition of law in Ameena
Begum reported in (2023) 9 SCC 587. In Ameena Begum,
Hon’ble Supreme Court made it clear that Rekha does not consider
the declaration of law made by Constitution Bench in Haradhan
Saha reported in (1975) 3 SCC 198 and therefore, is not correct
exposition of law. In Haradhan Saha, maintenance of Internal
Security Act, 1971 (Act No. 26 of 1971) vires was challenged and
while dealing with vires, Hon’ble Supreme Court declared the law
(Constitutional Bench) by saying that the purposes of preventive
detention and punitive proceedings under ordinary criminal law are
completely different and therefore, comparing the two would be not
an ideal principle. As regards Ameena Begum, where this part of
Rekha was held to be not the correct exposition of law, the relevant
paragraphs are paragraphs 24, 25 and 26 and the same read as
follows :
“24. In Rekha vs. State of Tamil Nadu, this Court observed that:
"21. It is all very well to say that preventive detention
is preventive not punitive. The truth of the matter,
though, is that in substance a detention order of one
year (or any other period) is a punishment of one year's
imprisonment. What difference is it to the detenu
whether his imprisonment is called preventive or
punitive?
3|Page
*
*
*
29. Preventive detention is, by nature, repugnant to
democratic ideas and an anathema to the Rule of law. No such law
exists in the USA and in England (except during war time). Since,
however, Article 22(3)(b) of the Constitution of India permits
preventive detention, we cannot hold it illegal but we must confine
the power of preventive detention within very narrow limits,
otherwise we will be taking away the great right to liberty guaranteed
by Article 21 of the Constitution of India which was won after long,
arduous and historic struggles. It follows, therefore, that if the
ordinary law of the land (the Penal Code and other penal statutes) can
deal with a situation, recourse to a preventive detention law will be
illegal."
(emphasis in original)
25.
There could be little doubt with the thought process that
although the executive would pass an order under the preventive
detention laws as a preventive or a precautionary measure, its effect
viewed strictly from the stand point of the detenu is simply and
plainly punitive. Significantly, an order of detention is not relatable
to an alleged commission of offence which a court is seized of and,
thus, the conduct of the accused complained of is yet to be found
blameworthy; on the contrary, since it relates to an anticipated
offence based on past conduct, the detenu could well feel that he is
at the receiving end of a subjective satisfaction of the executive
despite he not being proved to be on the wrong side of the law on any
previous occasion. If someone loses his liberty and lands up in prison
not having a semblance of a chance to resist or protest, the very
circumstance of being put behind bars for such period as specified in
the order of detention based on an anticipation that an offence is
likely to be committed by him seems to be an aspect which does not
sync with the norms and ethos of our very own Constitution and the
decisions of this Court in which the concept of 'LIFE' has been
explained in such a manner that 'LIFE' has been infused in the letters
4|Page
of Article 21 (see Common Cause vs. Union of India).Nonetheless,
so long clause (3) of Article 22 of the Constitution itself authorises
detention as a preventive measure, there can be no two opinions that
none can take exception to such a measure being adopted and it is
only a limited judicial review by the Constitutional Courts that can
be urged by an aggrieved detenu wherefor too, in examining
challenges to orders of preventive detention, the Courts would be
loath to interfere with or substitute their own reasoning for the
subjective satisfaction arrived at by the detaining authority. Since the
object of a preventive detention law is not punitive but preventive
and precautionary, ordinarily it is best left to the discretion of the
detaining authority.
26. We, however, hasten to observe here that though the decision in
Rekha reflects on an important aspect of loss of liberty without trial
by taking recourse to preventive detention laws, the decision of the
Constitution Bench in Haradhan Saha still holds the field and to the
extent the learned Judges in Rekha sound a note discordant with the
law laid down in Haradhan Saha ought not to be construed as
acceptance by us as the correct exposition of law.”
(underlining made by this Court for ease of reference)
In the light of the aforementioned obtaining position of law,
the first point on sufficiency of criminal law does not find favour with us.
[8]
This takes this Court to the next point. As regards Section 3
(2) and 3 (3) of NSA and non-application of mind we find that 3(2) is the
power to clamp preventive detention orders and 3 (3) is the power of the
State Government to confer powers make preventive detention order on
either District Magistrates or Commissioners of Police. The only limiting
5|Page
factor is proviso to sub-section 3 which says that when the State Government
confers such powers on the District Magistrate or Commissioner of Police,
the same shall not exceed a period of 3 (three) months at any one time. In
the case on hand, learned State counsel has placed before us proceedings
of the State Government dated 01.04.2025 bearing reference No. H1701/86/2020-HD-HD wherein powers under Section 3(2) have been
conferred by the State Government on the District Magistrates of all the
districts in the State of Manipur for a period of 3 (three) months. A scanned
reproduction of this order is as follows :-
6|Page
It is seen that the 3 (three) months period of inherent powers
is from 03.04.2025 to 02.07.2025 and the impugned preventive detention
order has been made on 13.05.2025. This Court is acutely conscious that
the 3rd respondent is Additional District Magistrate, Bishnupur but in the light
of District Magistrate, Bishnupur having been nominated for participating in
Mid-Career Training Programme (MCTP) for IAS Officers to be held between
12.05.2025 to 06.06.2025 in Mussoorie, State Government has vide
proceedings dated 08.05.2025 bearing reference No. TRNGE-1/12021-DPDP conferred the powers of District Magistrate, Bishnupur on Additional
District Magistrate. We also find that the Additional District Magistrate is not
lower in hierarchy. This aspect came up for consideration before this very
Division Bench in Tongbram Ichan Devi case and vide order dated
06.10.2025 in WP(Crl.) No. 21 of 2025, this Bench dealt with this aspect vide
paragraph 7 and 9 of 06.10.2025 order in Tongbram Ichan Devi and the
same reads as follows :
“[7]
The affidavit-in-opposition, in Para – 11, no doubt says that
there is no delegation in favour of second respondent. Nonetheless,
today learned State counsel drew our attention to an order of State
Government dated 08.05.2025 bearing reference No. TRNGE1/12021-DP-DP. This order has been placed by the learned State
counsel as Annexure, X-1 before us. A careful perusal of this
08.05.2025 order, made by the State Government, makes it clear
that duties of certain officers who have been deputed to participate
in 22nd Round of Phase – III training of Mid-Career Training
Programme (MCTP) for IAS Officers schedule from 12.05.2025 to
06.06.2025 at LBSNAA, Mussoorie have been conferred on certain
other officers for ‘looking after’ (‘L/A’ is the abbreviation used by
State) the affairs. It has been mentioned that 7 (seven) officers would
be attending MCTP. Out of 7 (seven) officers, duties of 3 (three)
7|Page
officers have been conferred/assigned on 3 (three) other officers to
look after their work. A careful perusal of Annexure, X-I makes it
clear that second respondent is one of the officers who has been
conferred/assigned powers of District Magistrate, Bishnupur who
undisputedly is an officer to whom detention powers have been
conferred by State Government.
[9]
To be noted, second respondent is Additional District
Magistrate, Bishnupur, he is looking after (L/A) duties of the District
Magistrate, Bishnupur and second respondent is not lower in
hierarchy qua District Magistrate. As there is no contestation as
regards Annexure X-I, it is not necessary to dilate on definition of
State Government. In this view of the matter, the argument that the
second respondent has not been vested with powers to make the
impugned preventive detention order pales into insignificance.
Therefore, the first point does not find favour with us.”
[9]
This Court deems it appropriate to record that learned counsel
for the writ petitioner submitted that the term ‘State Government’ has not
been correctly construed with regard to the distinction between 3(2) and
3(3) of NSA. In support of his argument, learned counsel drew our attention
to sub-section 60 of Section 3 of the General Clause Act, 1897 (GC Act).
This Court is of the considered view that it is not necessary to resort to the
definition under the GC Act as ‘State Government’ has been defined in NSA
itself. In NSA, ‘State Government’ has been defined vide Section 2(1) (e)
which reads as follows :
“(e) “State Government”, in relation to a Union territory,
means the administrator thereof.”
[10]
Besides defining State Government, ‘appropriate government’
has also been defined vide Section 2(1)(a) of NSA and the same reads as
8|Page
follows :
“2. Definitions.—In this Act, unless the context otherwise
requires,— (a) “appropriate Government” means, as
respects a detention order made by the Central Government
or a person detained under such order, the Central
Government, and as respects a detention order made by a
State Government or by an officer subordinate to a State
Government or as respects a person detained under such
order, the State Government.”
[11]
The principle regarding reading of a Statute is clear and resort
to GC Act would be made only when a particular term has not been defined
in the Statue concerned itself. In the case on hand, the term State
government has been defined in NSA itself and therefore, resort to subsection 60 of Section 3 of GC Act is really not necessary. As regards the the
definition of ‘State Government’ within the meaning of 2(1) (e) of NSA, we
find that there is no infirmity with regard to 3(2) and 3(3) particularly, in
the light of proceedings dated 01.04.2025 wherein there is conferment of
power. In this view of the matter, the arguments predicated on 3(60) of
GC Act is also a non-starter.
This means that the second point urged on the basis of
distinction between sub-sections (2) and (3) of Section 3 of NSA also pale
into insignificance. In other words, it does not cut ice with us i.e., it does
not find favour with us.
[12]
This takes this court to the next point of instances of bail not
being cited. The law is well settled that subjective satisfaction recorded by
9|Page
a detaining authority with regard to imminent possibility of a detenu being
enlarged on bail is no doubt justifiable but justiciability is limited to certain
aspects of the matter. In the case on hand, as we find this argument to
tread upon an area of examining the subjective satisfaction in terms of
articulation as done while sitting in appeal and therefore, it does not find
favour with us. This means that this point also fails and it does not come to
the aid of the petitioner in his campaign against the impugned preventive
detention order.
[13]
This takes this court to the last point which turns on sub-
section (5) of Section 3 of NSA. Sub-section (5) of Section 3 of NSA makes
it clear that the State Government whenever it makes any order of approval,
the same shall be communicated to the Central Government within 7
(seven) days.
The language in which Sub-section (5) of Section 3 is
couched makes it clear that it is either an ‘order’ or an ‘approval’. In the
case on hand, State counsel has placed before us the entire file pertaining
to the impugned preventive detention order. A careful perusal of the file
placed before us by learned State Counsel brings to light that approval of
the impugned preventive detention order has been made by the State
Government on 23.05.2025 vide an order of even date bearing reference
No. Cril-2/NSA/DM-BPR/2025. This 23.05.2025 approval has been duly
communicated to the Central Government under cover of electronic mail
dated 24.05.2025. Therefore, the approval of the State Government has
been communicated to the Central Government the very day, well within 7
(seven) days from the date of approval.
10 | P a g e
[14]
As already alluded to supra, Sub-section (5) of Section 3 talks
about an ‘order’ or an ‘approval’. In the instant case it is approval made on
23.05.2025 which has been communicated to the Central Government on
24.05.2025 itself. Therefore, this court is of the considered view that the
arguments regarding Section 3 (5) of NSA is also a non-starter and therefore
the same does not find favour with us.
[15]
Ergo, sequitur, is all the 4 (four) points raised by the learned
counsel for the writ petitioner in the campaign against the impugned
preventive detention order file and the further section is captioned further
is dismissed. There shall be no order as to cost.
Sushil
JUDGE
CHIEF JUSTICE
Upload forthwith
11 | P a g e
This page is for informational and research purposes only and does not constitute legal advice.
Consult a qualified advocate for advice specific to your situation.
Is your name in this judgment and should it be masked, or is something on this page wrong?
Request a review