Virudhunagar Hindu Nadargal Dharma Paribalana Sabai & Ors. vs Tuticorin Educational Society & Ors.

2. The High Court ought to have seen that when a remedy of appeal under Section 104(1)(i) read with Order XLIII, Rule 1(r) of CPC was directly available, the respondents 1 and 2 ought to have taken recourse to the same. It is true that the availability of a remedy of appeal may not always be a bar for the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court. But courts should always bear in mind a distinction between (i) cases where such alternative remedy is available before Civil Courts in terms of the provisions of CPC and (ii) cases where such alternative remedy is available under special enactments and/or statutory rules and the fora provided therein happen to be quasi-judicial authorities and tribunals. In respect of cases falling under the first category, which may involve suits and other proceedings before civil courts, the availability of an appellate remedy in terms of the provisions of CPC, may have to be construed as a near total bar. Otherwise, there is a danger that someone may challenge in a revision under Article 227, even a decree passed in a suit, on the same grounds on which the respondents 1 and

2 invoked the jurisdiction of the High court. “orders of civil court stand on different footing from the orders of authorities or Tribunals or courts other than judicial/civil courts. Therefore wherever the proceedings are under CPC and the forum is the Civil Court, the availability of a remedy under the CPC, will deter the High Court, not merely as a measure of self imposed restriction, but as a matter of discipline and prudence, from exercising its power of superintendence under the Constitution. Hence, the High Court ought not to have entertained the revision under Article

227 especially in a case where a specific remedy of appeal is provided under the Code of Civil Procedure itself. [Paras 12,

13 and 14] [640-B-G; 641-A-B]

3. Another aspect that was overlooked by the High Court was that the second respondent was already restrained by the Sub-Court, from functioning as the Secretary of the first respondent society. It is seen from the records that the civil revision was filed before the High court by the first respondent society as well the second respondent. The second respondent was not only the second petitioner in the Civil Revision Petition filed before the High Court, but he also sought to represent the first respondent-Society as its Secretary, before the High court in the Civil Revision. On the date on which the first respondentSociety filed the Civil Revision before the High court, the second respondent was not the secretary and could not have acted on behalf of the society. This aspect was also overlooked by the High Court. [Paras 15 and 16] [641-C-D; G-H]

4. The observation of the High Court that the trial Court proceeded in great haste, appears to be uncharitable. Order XXXIX Rule 3A of CPC itself mandates the disposal of an application for injunction within 30 days, whenever an injunction was granted without notice to the opposite party. In the present case, the trial Court, without granting an ex-parte order of injunction, chose to allow the opposite parties to file counter affidavit(s) along with documents and then heard the opposite parties before allowing the application for injunction. Finding the line of demarcation between speedy disposal and hurried dispatch, with mathematical precision, is not possible. In any case, even if the High Court was convinced that the trial Court had proceeded hastily, the High Court could have only remanded the matter back. But the High Court allowed the application for injunction without recording any finding on merits. In fact the order of the Trial Court deals with the rival contentions and is one passed on merits after due consideration of the pleadings and documents. The High Court did not even deal with the matter on merits to over turn the decision of the Trial Court. Therefore, the order of the High Court is liable to be set aside and the order of the Trial Court is liable to be restored. [Paras

17 and 18] [642-A-E]

5. It is brought to the notice of the Court that after the High Court allowed the Civil Revision petition by its order dated 28.08.2018, the second respondent proceeded with the meeting of the General Body and the Executive Committee on 25.09.2018 and also conducted elections. Notice was ordered and the interim order of the status quo was passed in the above special leave petition only on 8.10.2018. Normally, in the above circumstances, the appeal could have been held having become infructuous. But in the present case every meeting of the General Body and every attempt at holding elections to the first respondent-Society have created a series of litigation before three different fora namely (i) the Civil Courts (ii) the Registrar of Societies (iii) the High court (in Writ Petitions arising out of orders of the Registrar of Societies). Therefore, the only way to bring to an end all the litigations between the parties before various fora would be to set aside the impugned order and the elections held pursuant thereto and to appoint an Advocate Commissioner to convene the General Body as well as the Executive Committee for the election of office bearers. Accordingly, the order of the High court as well as the elections purportedly held pursuant to the order of the High Court are set aside. [Paras 19, 20 and 21] [642-F-H; 644-C-E]

Venkatasubbiah Naidu v. S. Chellappan & Ors. (2000)

7 SCC 695 : [2000] 3 Suppl. SCR 303 ; Radhey

Shyam v. Chhabi Nath (2015) 5 SCC 423 : [2015] 3 SCR 197 – relied on.

Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai (2003) 6 SCC

675 : [2003] 2 Suppl. SCR 290 – stood overruled.