Virendrasing vs The Additional Commissioner and Ors.

Zilla Parishads with the execution of works and developmental schemes of the State Government. It is in this conspectus that the said Act provides for the disqualification of elected representatives. Having been conferred with major financial responsibilities, the statute maintains a system of checks and balances to ensure transparency in local contracts and to obviate the possibility of elected representatives exercising undue influence. It is no doubt true that elected representatives should not be disqualified on flimsy grounds. However, the statutory mandate is equally binding, whereby activities which tend to defeat the objective of transparency should not be permitted to prevail. [Para 15][799-C-D]

1.2 The legislature in its wisdom has defined the grounds for disqualification in expansive terms under Section 16(1)(i) of the Act. Thus, the use of the terminology - ‘directly or indirectly’, ‘by himself or by his partner’, ‘any share or interest in any work done’, ‘by order of Zilla Parishad or in any contract with’, and ‘by or on behalf of the Zilla Parishad’. All eventualities where the councillor can be said to have any financial connection with the work of the Zilla Parishad were sought to be included, with the object of discouraging the practice of financial patronage that is inherently beneficial to the elected representatives. [Para 16][799E-F]

1.3. This was not even a situation where the appellant’s son was carrying on any existing contractual work. It was only soon after the election of the appellant that his son was registered as a contractor. He had no other contracts in that area or otherwise. The only contract awarded to him was the one where the funds flowed to the Gram Panchayat from the Zilla Parishad of which the appellant was a member. The appellant had attempted to justify this situation by claiming that his son was registered as a contractor soon after the appellant’s election as he had just completed his studies. This fact raises further suspicions about the appellant’s interest in his son’s business. [Para 20][800-E-G]

1.4. The Zilla Parishad, Dhule issued a work order to the Aarave Gram Panchayat for the repair of roads on 09.06.2020. This document, and the Zilla Parishad’s counter affidavit, reveal that the funds flowed from the State Government to the Zilla Parishad, and in turn to the Gram Panchayat. This is notwithstanding the translation of the resolution dated 26.01.2020 adduced by the appellant, whereby an impression is sought to be given as if the Gram Panchayat was willing to spend its own funds on the project. In any case, this translation has been seriously disputed by respondent no. 3. The issuance of the work order dated 09.06.2020 by the Zilla Parishad itself shows the Zilla Parishad’s supervisory and sanctioning role in the contract, which falls within the wide ambit of Section 16(1)(i) of the said Act. [Para 21][800-G; 801-A-B]

1.5. Probity in such financial transactions should be the rule rather than the exception. The appellant had a greater responsibility as a father to make sure that his son does not enter into a contract that is sanctioned by the Zilla Parishad itself. The finding of fact by courts below that nothing had been placed on record to show even a separation of residence between the son and the father, other than a ration card purporting to show that the son was living with his grandmother. This was neither here nor there, more so when the son had just completed his education. [Para 22][801-C-D]

1.6. That sufficient opportunities were made available to the appellant to present his arguments. There cannot be a birthright to seek adjournments, especially when the Divisional Commissioner was mandated to decide the issue of appellant’s disqualification within a period of ninety days from respondent no.3’s application, as per Section 40(2) of the said Act. The Divisional Commissioner thus rightly treated the appellant’s written submissions as his defence. [Para 23][801-E]

1.7. The consequential disqualification would take effect from the date of the judgment. [Para 24][801-F-G]

Dharampal Satyapal Ltd. v. Deputy Commissioner of Central Excise, Gauhati & Ors. (2015) 8 SCC 519 : [2015] 6 SCR 437; Gulam Yasin Khan v. Shri Sahebrao Yashwantrao Walaskar & Ors. AIR 1966 SC 1339 : [1966] SCR 339; Ravi Yashwant Bhoir v. District ORS.

Collector, Raigad & Ors. (2012) 4 SCC 407 : [2012] 3 SCR 775; Zelia M. Xavier Fernandes E. Gonsalves v. Joana Rodrigues & Ors. (2012) 3 SCC 188 : [2012] 3 SCR 258 – referred to.