Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958:
s.14(1)(e) – Provision under – Providing for eviction of residential premises on the ground of bonafide requirement – Held violative of Art.14 of the Constitution in *Satyawati Sharma case making the provision applicable also to non-residential premises – In the present case application u/s.14(1)(e) filed seeking eviction of non-residential premises – Rent Controller followed summary procedure – Procedure when challenged, was confirmed by High Court – In appeal to Supreme Court, tenant sought reference of *Satyawati Sharma case for reconsideration to larger Bench – The grounds for reference were that *Satyawati Sharma case was contrary to Constitution Bench Judgment in **Gian Devi Anand case; that it was per incuriam Three Judge Bench judgment in #Gauri Shanker case; that without adverting to s.25-B, s.14(1)(e) could not have been made applicable for non-residential premises and that it was not open to the Court to read down the provisions of s.14(1)(e) in *Satyawati Sharma case – Held: Judgment in *Satyawati Sharma case cannot be said to be per incuriam or contrary to the judgment of Constitution Bench in **Gian Devi Anand case or three Judgment Bench judgment in #Gauri Shanker case – Gauri Shanker case being on different provision and premise, is distinguishable and cannot be said to be a binding precedent – In **Gian Devi Anand case it was suggested to legislature to consider making ‘bonafide requirement’ a ground for eviction in respect of commercial premises as well – Rather *Satyawati Sharma case seeks support from **Gian Devi Anand case – In pursuance to the suggestion in **Gian Devi Anand case Delhi Rent Act, 1995 was enacted – The judgment in *Satyawati Sharma case was not a case of reading down of s.14(1)(e), but was a case where a portion of the provision which was discriminatory and violative of Art.14 was struck down – s.25-B being related to only procedure for considering application u/s.14(1)(e), has no bearing on the issue which was considered in *Satyawati Sharma case – Nothing in s. 25-B can be read which runs counter to what is laid down in *Satyawati Sharma case – Therefore, non-consideration of s.25-B in *Satyawati Sharma case cannot be a ground to refer the case to larger Bench – Thus, there is no good ground to refer the judgment in *Satyawati Sharma case for reconsideration by a larger Bench. Legislation:
A legislation is complete, when the Act is passed by the legislature and receives the assent of the President, even if it is not enforced.
Judgments/Orders:
Principle of per incuriam – Meaning and applicability of.
Rejecting the plea to refer the judgment in *Satyawati Sharma case to larger Bench and directing to list the matter for consideration on merits, the Court
HELD: 1.1 The provision of Section 14(1)(e) of Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 confines to the premises let for residential purposes which may be required bonafide by the landlord for occupation as a residence for himself or for any member of his family dependent on him. Part of Section 14(1)(e) was struck down in *Satyawati Sharma case holding that Section 14(1)(e) is violative of the doctrine of equality embodied in Article 14 of the Constitution in so far as it discriminates between the premises let for residential and non-residential purposes when the same are required bonafide by the landlord for occupation for himself or for any member of his family dependent on him and restricts the landlord’s right to seek eviction of the tenant from the premises let for residential purposes only. [Paras 10, 11] [1063B-D]
1.2 Prior to *Satyawati Sharma case, the provisions of Section 14(1)(e) were resorted to, by the landlord for seeking recovery of possession only with regard to residential premises. After the said judgment landlords of non-residential premises started filing application for eviction under Section 14(1)(e) which are dealt with by the Rent Controller as per procedure contained in Chapter III-A of the Act, 1958. Chapter III-A contains ‘Summary Trial of Certain Applications’. [Paras 11 and 12] [1063-C; 1064-A-B]
2.1 The principle of per incuriam has been developed by the English Courts in relaxation of the rule of stare decisis. In practice per incuriam is per ignoratium. The above principle has been developed, accepted, approved and adopted by this Court while interpreting Article 141 of the Constitution which embodies the doctrine of precedent as a matter of law. When a Court delivers judgment ignoring the binding precedent of a larger Bench, the judgment so delivered is held to be per incuriam and has no precedential value. [Paras 22 and 24] [1069-D-E; 1071-C-D]
V. Kishan Rao v. Nikhil Super Specially Hospital and Another (2010) 5 SCC 513 : [2010] 5 SCR 1 –
relied on.
Punjab Land Development and Reclamation
Corporation Ltd., Chandigarh v. Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Chandigarh and Another (1990) 3 SCC
682 : [1990] 3 SCR 111 – followed.
2.2 *Satyawati Sharma case judgment cannot be said as per incuriam. The ratio in **Gian Devi Anand case has neither been ignored nor any contrary view has been taken by *Satyawati Sharma case. **Gian Devi Anand case in paragraphs 32 and 34 has noticed the provisions of Section 14(1) specifically Section 14(1)(e) as existed in the Act, 1958. There was no challenge for the classification in Section 14(1)(e) in the above case, hence neither **Gian Devi Anand case was required to pronounce on the classification in Section 14(1)(e) nor was required to consider striking down of the provisions. In any view of the matter, the observation in paragraph 39, **Gian Devi Ananad case justified that there is ground to seek eviction on bona fide need. The observation in paragraph 39 of **Gian Devi Anand’s case suggests that the Constitution Bench was satisfied that a ground for eviction of tenant of commercial premises on bona fide requirement of landlord should also be provided for. The basis for what has been done in *Satyawati Sharma case was clearly laid down in **Gian Devi Anand case for striking down the unconstitutional part in Section 14(1)(e). Thus, *Satyadevi Sharma case seeks support of what has been done in **Gian Devi Anand’s case. [Para 30] [1077-C-E]
2.3 #Gauri Shanker case was not a case in which provision of Section 14(1)(e) came for consideration nor any observation had been made with regard to ground of eviction available to landlord with regard to commercial premises. #Gauri Shanker case had dealt with entirely different provision, certain limitation which was attached to residential premises itself to heritability. The case of #Gauri Shanker case being on different provision and premise, it cannot be said that #Gauri Shanker case was a binding precedent to be followed by *Satyawati Sharma case. Therefore, the judgment of *Satyawati Sharma case cannot be held to be per incuriam. [Para 32] [1079-D-F] **Gauri Shanker and Others v. Union of India and Others (1994) 6 SCC 349 : [1994] 3 Suppl. SCR 244 – distinguished.
2.4 The ratio in *Satyawati Sharma case that a Legislation which may be quite reasonable and rational at the time of its enactment may with the lapse of time and due to change of circumstances become arbitrary, unreasonable and violative of the doctrine of equality has been affirmed in ##Super Max International Pvt. Ltd. case, a three Judge Bench judgment. The three-Judge Bench in ##Super Max International Pvt. Ltd. case approved limited ratio in *Satyawati Sharma case. [Paras 39 and 40] [1083-D-E; 1084-A-B]
3.1 Non-reference of Section 25B in *Satyawati Sharma case does not render the judgment per incuriam. Nothing in Section 25B can be read which runs counter to what has been laid down in *Satyawati Sharma case. *Satyawati Sharma case was considering the challenge to provisions of Section 14(1)(e) in so far as the ground of bona fide need of landlord is also available for commercial premises. Section 25B being related to only procedure for considering the application under Section 14(1)(e) has no bearing on the issue which had propped up before this Court in *Satyawati Sharma case. [Para 35] [1081-D-E]
3.2 It was contended that in so far as applicability of the procedure under Section 25B is concerned, the issue needs to be revisited to save the tenants from hardship. This cannot be a ground for referring the judgment in *Satyawati Sharma case to larger Bench for reconsideration. *Satyawati Sharma case having not said about the procedure, there is nothing in the judgment which needs to be revisited on the above aspect. It is for the Legislature to take stock of situation and if it so decides, it can make necessary changes in the procedure for considering the application under Section 14(1)(e) with regard to eviction of commercial tenants on the ground of bona fide need of the land lord. [Para 45] [1090-D-F]
3.3 In sofaras submission of the appellant that under Section 14(1)(e) in respect of commercial tenancy leave to defend is generally rejected, it is suffice to say that rejection of leave for a particular case is matter to be examined in each case and no general observation can be made in this regard. [Para 45] [1091-F-G]
4. In *Satyawati Sharma case, this Court did not read down the provision of Section 14(1)(e). This Court held that Section 14(1)(e) is not intra vires the doctrine of equality enshrined in Article 14 of the Constitution. After considering all the aspects of the matter, this Court in *Satyawati Sharma case had held that Section 14(1)(e) is violative of the doctrine of equality embodied in Article 14 of the Constitution. This Court, thus, struck down the discriminatory portion of Section 14(1)(e). The judgment of *Satyawati Sharma case was, thus, not a case of reading down of Section 14(1)(e) rather it was a case where portion of Section 14(1)(e) was struck down as discriminatory and violative of Article
14 of the Constitution. [Paras 52, 53 and 54] [1094-E, F-H; 1095-A, D-E]
5.1 In **Gian Devi Anand case in paragraph 39 the Constitution Bench observed that bona fide need of the landlord stands very much on the same footing in regard to either class of premises, residential or commercial. Therefore, it is suggested that Legislature may consider the advisability of making the bona fide requirement of the landlord a ground of eviction in respect of commercial premises as well. After more than a decade of the above observation, a comprehensive Legislation, namely, Delhi Rent Act, 1995 has been enacted to provide for the regulation of rents, repairs and maintenance and evictions relating to premises and of rates of hotels and lodging houses in the National Capital Territory of Delhi. [Para 46] [1090-G-H; 1091-A-B]
Subramanian Swamy and Others v. Raju through Member, Juvenile Justice Board and Another (2014) 8 SCC 390 : [2014] 9 SCR 283 – distinguished.
5.2 The Legislature itself notices the need for providing a ground for eviction to landlord on bona fide need with regard to residential as well as non-residential premises. Thus, what was said in **Gian Devi Anand case in paragraph 39 was duly accepted by Legislature. It is another matter that Delhi Rent Act, 1995 even though it received assent of the President could not be enforced. Even though the said Act could not be enforced, the Legislation is complete when the Act is passed by the Legislature and receives the assent of the President. The Parliament in enacting Act, 1995 accepts the suggestion of Constitution Bench in **Gian Devi Anand case and hence what has been held by *Satyawati Sharma case was felt both by this Court and Legislature. Thus, there is no good ground to refer the judgment of this Court in *Satyawati Sharma case for reconsideration by a larger Bench. [Paras 55 and 57] [1095-F; 1096-A; 1097-A-B] Malpe Vishwanath Acharya and Others v. State of Maharashtra and Another (1998) 2 SCC 1 : [1997] 6 Suppl. SCR 717; Anuj Garg and Others v. Hotel Association of India and Others (2008) 3 SCC 1 : [2007] 12 SCR 991; Saradamani Kandappan v.
S. Rajalakshmi & Ors. (2011) 12 SCC 18 : [2011] 8 SCR 874; Modern Dental College and Research Centre and Others v. State of Madhya Pradesh and Others (2016) 7 SCC 353; Subramanian Swamy and Others v. Raju through Member, Juvenile Justice Board and Another (2014) 8 SCC 390 – relied on.
State of Kerala and Others v. Mar Appraem Kuri Company Limited and Another (2012) 7 SCC 106 : [2012] 4 SCR 448 – distinguished.
H.C.Sharma v. LIC of India (1973) ILR 1 Del 90; Satyawati Sharma (Dead) by LRs. v. Union of India and Another (2008) 5 SCC 287 : [2008] 6 SCR 566; Gian Devi Anand v. Jeevan Kumar and Others (1985)
2 SCC 683 : [1985] 1 Suppl. SCR 1 ; Harbilas Rai Bansal v. State of Punjab and Another (1996) 1 SCC
1 : [1995] 6 Suppl. SCR 178 ; Rakesh Vij v. Raminder Pal Singh Seth and Others (2005) 8 SCC 504 : [2005]
3 Suppl. SCR 777; State of Maharasthra and Anr. v. Super Max International (P) Ltd. and Ors. (2009) 9 SCC 772 : [2009] 13 SCR 801 – referred to..
As published in the Supreme Court Reports, Supreme Court of India. Text from the Indian Supreme Court Judgments open data set (Dattam Labs), CC BY 4.0.
This page is for informational and research purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. Consult a qualified advocate for advice specific to your situation.