National Highways Authority Act, 1956: s. 3H – Deposit and payment of amount – Compulsory acquisition – Apportionment of compensation – Land of the appellants acquired for public purpose – Determination of the compensation payable to landowners by the Special Land Acquisition Officer-SLAO – Dispute by respondents regarding the apportionment of the compensation between themselves and the appellants – Competent authority, SLAO determined the shares of parties in the subject land and the appellants were satisfied with the same – However, the respondents challenged the same before the District Magistrate by invoking s.3G
(5) – District Magistrate granted higher shares in favour of the respondents – Writ application by the appellants – Dismissed by High Court – Correctness of – Held : When it comes to resolving the dispute relating to apportionment of the amount determined towards compensation, it is only the Principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction which can do so – Principal Civil Court means the Court of the District Judge – Dispute being of the nature triable by the Civil Court that the law steps in to provide for that to be referred to the decision of the Principal Civil Court – Thus, the order passed by the District Magistrate is quashed and set aside – SLAO to refer the dispute to the Principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction in accordance with sub-clause (4) of s. 3H of the Act.
Interpretation of Statutes – Rule of interpretation – Literal rule – Explained.
Allowing the appeal, the Court
HELD: 1.1 In the instant case, the High Court seems to have completely misread the provisions of the National Highways Authority Act, 1956. It fell into error as it failed to apply the well settled principle of law that for construing a legal provision, the first and foremost rule of construction is the literal construction. All that the Court has to see at the very outset is what does the provision state. If the provision is unambiguous and from the provision the legislative intent is clear, the Court need not call into aid the other rules of construction of statute. The other rules of construction are called into aid only when the legislative intent is not clear. [Para 24][402-B-C]
1.2. The first and foremost principle of interpretation of a statute in every system of interpretation is the literal rule of interpretation. The other rules of interpretation, the mischief rule/purposive construction, etc. can only be resorted to when the plain words of a statute are ambiguous or lead to no intelligible results or if read literally would nullify the very object of the statute. Where the words of a statute are absolutely clear and unambiguous, recourse cannot be had to the principles of interpretation other than the literal rule. The language employed in a statute is the determinative factor of the legislative intent. The legislature is presumed to have made no mistakes. The presumption is that it intended to say what it has said. Assuming there is a defect or an omission in the words used by the legislature, the Court cannot correct or make up the deficiency. [Para 25][402-C-F]
1.3. There is a fine distinction between determining the amount to be paid towards compensation and the apportionment of the amount. The legislature has thought fit to confer powers upon the Principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction to determine the dispute arising as to the apportionment of the amount. There is a reason, why the legislature has thought fit to confer such power to the Principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction within the limits of whose jurisdiction is land is situated. [Para 26][402F-G]
1.4. The question of apportionment of compensation is not free from difficulties. In apportioning the compensation, the Court has to give to each claimant the value of the interest which he has lost by compulsory acquisition. So stated, the proposition may appear simple, but in its practical application numerous complicated problems arise in apportioning the compensation ORS.
awarded. The difficulty experienced is due to the nature of a variety of interests, rights and claims to land which have to be valued in terms of money. The compensation awarded for compulsory acquisition is the value of all the interests which are extinguished and that compensation has to be distributed equitably amongst persons having interest therein and the Court must proceed to apportion the compensation so that the aggregate value of all interests is equal to the amount of compensation awarded. But in the valuation of competing interests, which from its very nature is dependent upon indefinite factors and uncertain data, considerable difficulty is encountered. Indisputably, in apportioning compensation the Court cannot proceed upon hypothetical considerations but must proceed as far as possible to make an accurate determination of the value of the respective interests which are lost. The Court must, in each case, having regard to the circumstances and the possibility of a precise determination of the value having regard to the materials available, adopt that method of valuation which equitably distributes the compensation between the persons entitled thereto. [Para 27][402-H; 403-A-D]
1.5. The only general principle is that apportionment under sub clause (4) of Section 3H of the Act 1956 is not a revaluation but a distribution of the value already fixed among the several persons interested in the land acquired in accordance with the nature and quantum of the respective interests. In ascertainment of those interests, the determination of their relative importance and the manner in which they can be said to have contributed to the total value fixed are questions to be decided in the light of the circumstances of each case and the relevant provisions of law governing the rights of the parties. The actual rule for apportionment has to be formulated in each case so as to ensure a just and equitable distribution of the total value or compensation among the persons interested in the land. [Para 28][403-E-F]
1.6. In the said circumstances, the legislature thought fit to assign such function to none other than the Principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction. [Para 29][403-G]
1.7. The submission that the dispute between the parties is not one of apportionment but the same is with regard to giving effect to the order passed by the Civil Court in the Civil Suit cannot be accepted. What is perhaps sought to be argued is that the shares in the land acquired should be determined on the basis of some order passed by the Civil Court. Thus, if the private respondents want to rely upon the order passed by the Civil Court, they can do so before the Court of the Principal Judge of original jurisdiction. The District Magistrate has no power or jurisdiction in regard to the apportionment of the amount. [Para 30][403-H; 404-A-B]
1.8. It cannot be understood on what basis the High Court in its impugned order observed that the District Magistrate is competent to examine the order passed by the Special Land Acquisition Officer and decide the dispute as to the apportionment of the amount. When it comes to resolving the dispute relating to apportionment of the amount determined towards compensation, it is only the Principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction which can do so. Principal Civil Court means the Court of the District Judge. [Paras 31 and 33][404-C; 409-C]
1.9 If any dispute arises as to the apportionment of the amount or any part thereof or to any person to whom the same or any part thereof is payable, then, the competent authority shall refer the dispute to the decision of the Principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction within the limits of whose jurisdiction the land is situated. The competent authority possesses certain powers of the Civil Court, but in the event of a dispute of the said nature, the summary power, vesting in the competent authority of rendering an opinion in terms of sub section (3) of Section 3H, would not serve the purpose. The dispute being of the nature triable by the Civil Court that the law steps in to provide for that to be referred to the decision of the Principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction. The dispute regarding apportionment of the amount or any part thereof or to any person to whom the same or any part thereof is payable, would then have to be decided by that Court. [Para 34][409-D-F]
1.10 The order passed by the District Magistrate is quashed and set aside. In view of the dispute between the parties as regards apportionment of the amount of compensation, the Special Land Acquisition Officer would now refer the dispute to the ORS.
Principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction in accordance with sub clause (4) of Section 3H of the Act 1956. [Para 35][409-G]
Dossibai Nanabhoy Jeejeebhoy v. P.M. Bharucha, (1956) 60 Bom LR 1208 – approved.
Sharda Devi v. State of Bihar 2003 MhLJ Online (S.C.)
23 : AIR 2003 SC 942 – referred to.
As published in the Supreme Court Reports, Supreme Court of India. Text from the Indian Supreme Court Judgments open data set (Dattam Labs), CC BY 4.0.
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