Veena Singh (Dead) through Lr vs The District Registrar/Additional Collector (F/R) and Another

HELD: 1.1 From the objections filed before the SubRegistrar by the appellant, it is clear that she did not deny having signed the sale deed. The essence of her grievance was that her signatures were taken forcibly; the sale deed did not reflect the intent of the parties in terms of the area which was intended to be sold; the sale consideration was undervalued; the consequence of the sale deed was that even the residential house of the appellant would be sold, contrary to her understanding; and the sale deed had been procured by fraud. The order of the SubRegistrar makes it abundantly clear that the appellant was not ready to register the sale deed, which was claimed to have been executed in a fraudulent manner and whose execution was thus being denied. Registration was, therefore, refused by the SubRegistrar in terms of Section 35(3)(a) of the Registration Act. [Para 32][765-A-C]

1.2 If a person by whom the document is purported to be executed denies its execution and registration is refused on those grounds, an appeal against the order of the Sub-Registrar denying execution would not be maintainable under Section 72 of the Registration Act. Section 72 clearly stipulates that an appeal will lie against an order of Sub-Registrar refusing to admit a document to registration “except where the refusal is made on the ground of denial of execution”. [Para 33][765-C-E]

1.3 In the instant case, the Sub-Registrar having specifically denied registration in terms of Section 35(3)(a), the order was not amenable to an appeal under Section 72. However, the Registrar, in the course of entertaining the appeal, instead took recourse to the powers entrusted under Section 73. Section 73 empowers the Registrar where the Sub-Registrar has refused to register a document on denial of its execution by a person purporting to have executed it. Subsequently, the Registrar appears to have followed the procedure which is emphasized in Section 74. Upon such an enquiry under Section 74, Section 75 enables the Registrar to order the document to be registered if it is found that: (i) the document has been executed; and (ii) the requirements of the law have been complied with. Section 75(4) also allows the Registrar to summon and enforce the attendance of witnesses to properly conduct the enquiry under Section 74. [Para 34][765-E-H]

1.4 Undoubtedly, the power of the Registrar while dealing with an application under Section 73 are wider than the powers which are entrusted to the Sub-Registrar under Section 35. Under Section 35(1)(a), the registering officer shall register the document if all the persons executing the document appear in person before the officer and admit the execution of the document. Section 35(2) empowers the registering officer to examine anyone present in the office, for the purpose of satisfying himself that the persons appearing before him are the persons they represent themselves to be. In contrast to sub-Section (1) of Section 35, sub-Section stipulates that once execution is denied by the person who purports to have executed the document, the registering officer shall refuse to register it. On the other hand, under Sections 73 and 74, the Registrar is entrusted with the duty to enquire whether the document has been executed and whether all the requirements of the law for the time being have been complied with. For the purposes of this enquiry, Section 75(4) provides the Registrar with the power to summon and enforce the attendance of witnesses. Thus, while the SubRegistrar under Section 35(3)(a) has to mandatorily refuse registration when the execution of a document is denied by the person purported to have executed the document, the Registrar is entrusted with the power to conduct an enquiry on an application under Section 73 by following the procedure under Section 74. [Para 35][766-A-E]

1.5 In the instant case, the appeal before the Registrar was not maintainable under Section 72. Indeed, the appellant, in response to the memo of appeal filed by the second respondent, specifically pleaded in her objections that “hearing the appeal under Section 72 of the Registration Act or to deliver any judgment will be against law”. At the same time, however, the appellant also pleaded that she “had full right for argument under Section 75(4) of the Registration Act and under the CPC from the witnesses and the appellant”. The Registrar is empowered to summon witnesses under Section 75(4) for the purpose of an enquiry under Sections 73 and 74. It thus, emerges that the parties proceeded on the basis that the proceedings would be decided on the basis of an enquiry under Section 73, and the enquiry was conducted with reference to the provisions of Section

74. The appellant herself understood this to be the position in her objections filed to the appeal filed by the second respondent, since she invoked her rights under Section 75(4), which applies to enquiry proceedings under Section 74. The appeal against the Sub-Registrar‘s order was not maintainable under Section 72. The remedy of the second respondent, where the Sub-Registrar refused registration on the ground that the appellant denied execution of the document, was under Section 73. The Registrar conducted an enquiry under the provisions of sections 73 and

74. Both parties participated in the enquiry. [Para 36][766-E-H; 767-A-B]

1.6 The mis-labelling of an application under Section 73 as an appeal under Section 72 would by itself not vitiate the proceedings before the Registrar. This becomes especially true when proceedings before the Registrar, in substance, were proceedings under Section 73 itself and both the parties acknowledged them to be so, explicitly or by their conduct. This is clearly what has happened in the present case as well, as is evident from the appellant‘s reference to Section 75(4) and her participation in the enquiry proceedings before the District Registrar. Therefore, the second respondent’s mis-labelling of their application as an appeal under Section 72 will not vitiate the proceedings which led to the District Registrar‘s order. [Para 38][767-F-G; 768-A-B]

1.7 Section 35(1)(a) of the Registration Act uses the expression “admit the execution of the document”, while Section 35(3)(a) uses the expression “denies its execution”. Similarly, Section 72(1) has adopted the expression “denial of execution”, while Section 73(1) uses the expression “denies its execution”. However, the word “execution” itself is not defined by the Registration Act. [Para 39][768-C-D]

Bryan A Garner, Black’s Law Dictionary (Thomson Reuters, 2009) pgs 649-650; Words and Phrases (Permanent Edition) (Thomson Reuters, 2020); Justice K Kannan, Mulla’s The Registration Act (LexisNexis, 2012) pg 416 – referred to.

1.8 “Execution” happens when a person’s signature on the document is accompanied by their full consent to the contents of the document,which they have understood before signing it. This understanding of the phrase “execution” is also adopted by textbooks in relation to the law of evidence. Section 68 of the Evidence Act 1872 prescribes the requirement for proving that a document has been executed. The proviso to s. 68 stipulates that it shall not be necessary to call an attesting witness to prove the execution of a document if it has been registered under the Act, provided that its execution is not specifically denied by the person who is purported to have executed it. The “execution” of a document does not stand admitted merely because a person admits to having signed the document. Such an interpretation accounts for circumstances where an individual signs a blank paper and it is later converted into a different document, or when an individual is made to sign a document without fully understanding its contents. Adopting a contrary interpretation would unfairly put the burden upon the person denying execution to challenge the registration before a civil court or a writ court, since registration will have to be allowed once the signature has been admitted. In giving meaning to the expression “execute” in the provisions of the Registration Act, it is necessary to adopt a purposive construction to protect, facilitate and achieve the object of registration. [Paras 42, 43, 57, 58][771-A-B, B-C; 772B; 780-C-E] Suraj Lamps and Industries Private Limited v. State of Haryana & Another (2009) 7 SCC 363 : [2009] 9 SCR 1048; Bharat Indu and Ors. v. Hakim Mohammad Hamid Ali Khan 1920 SCC OnLine PC 37 – referred to. S P Sen Gupta, Commentaries on the Registration Act, 1908 (Kamal Law House, 2017) pgs 617-618; Sudipto Sarkar and Dr. H R Jhingta, Sarkar: Law of Evidence– In India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Burma, Ceylon, Malaysia & Singapore: Volume 1 (LexisNexis, 2016); N Vijayraghavan and Sharath Chandran, Ratanlal & Dhirajlal: The Law of Evidence (LexisNexis, 2021) – referred to.

1.9 The Registration Act exists so that information about documents can be put into the public domain, where it can be accessed by anyone in order to prevent forgeries and fraud, and so that individuals can be aware of the status of properties. If the interpretation conflating signing with execution is adopted, it would ensure that the Sub-Registrars/Registrars will continuously end up registering documents whose validity will inevitably be then disputed in a civil suit or a writ petition. While the suit or writ proceedings continue, the document would remain on the public records as a registered instrument, which has the potential to cause more disruption. Hence, such an interpretation should not be adopted. However, while adopting the current interpretationthat the admission of one‘s signature on a document is not equivalent to admission of its execution- it is important to consider the power of the Sub-Registrar/Registrar and their procedures under the Registration Act. [Paras 60, 61][781-E-H]

1.10 The decision of the Registrar in ordering document to be registered, or for that matter in refusing to register a document, is not conclusive and is amenable to judicial review. Therefore, in a situation where an individual admits their signature on a document but denies its execution, the Sub-Registrar is bound to refuse registration in accordance with Sections 35(3)(a) of the Registration Act. Subsequently, if an application if filed under Section 73, the Registrar is entrusted with the power of conducting an enquiry of a quasi-judicial nature under Section

74. If the Registrar passes an order refusing registration under Section 76, the party presenting the document for registration has the remedy of filing a civil suit under Section 77 of the Registration Act, where a competent civil court will be able to adjudicate upon the question of fact conclusively. [Para 63, 64][784-G-H; 785-A-C]

1.11 In the instant case, where Sub-Registrar had in the first instance declined to order the registration of the document and the order of the Sub-Registrar was questioned in an appeal under Section 72 filed by the second respondent. The Registrar, in the course of the appellate proceedings, purported to hold an enquiry of the nature contemplated under Section 74 of the Registration Act and concluded that the execution of the sale deed had been established and it was liable to be registered. The Registrar was evidently seized of a case where the Sub-Registrar had declined to order registration on the ground that the execution of the document was denied by the appellant under Section 35(3)(a). While exercising the jurisdiction pursuant to the invocation of the remedy under Section 72, the Registrar relied on the statements of the scribe of the sale deed and the attesting witnesses to the effect that the sale deed had been signed by the appellant and that the appellant had also affixed her fingerprints on it. However, as rightly pointed out by the appellant, the signing of the sale deed by her and the affixation of her fingerprints is not in dispute. The real issue is whether there was due execution of the sale deed by the appellant. The appellant in the course of her objections specifically pleaded fraud. The plea of the appellant, that the purported sale deed though signed by her was procured by fraud and undue influence, was a matter which raised a serious substantive dispute. In support of her contentions, the appellant has also adduced the inspection report by the Sub-Registrar and the Naib Tahsildar. However, this court cannot decide on the merits of the dispute at this stage, since the Registrar clearly exceeded his jurisdiction by adjudicating on the issue of fraud and undue influence. [Para 67][788-E-H; 789-A-B, D-F]

Satya Pal Anand v. State of M.P. (2016) 10 SCC 767 : [2016] 12 SCR 26 – distinguished.

1.12 The Registrar purported to exercise the powers conferred under Section 74 and arrived at a finding that the sale deed had been duly signed by the appellant and was therefore liable to be registered. However, the objections of the appellant raised serious issues of a triable nature which could only have been addressed before and adjudicated upon by a court of competent civil jurisdiction. As a matter of fact, during the course of the hearing, this Court has been apprised of the fact that in respect of the remaining area of 1000 square meters in the front portion of the land, a suit for specific performance has been instituted by the second respondent, resulting in a decree for specific performance. As regards the subject matter of the sale deed, the second respondent instituted a suit for possession before the Civil Judge, where certain proceedings are pending. In view thereof, the Registrar acted contrary to law by directing the sale deed to be registered. [Para 68][789-F-H; 790-A-B]

1.13 In the impugned judgment, the Single Judge of the High Court observed that registration does not depend upon the consent of the executant but on the Registrar‘s finding that the executant had actually signed the document. The High Court held that having found in the course of the enquiry that the sale deed was duly prepared by a scribe, that the attesting witness had stated that the sale deed was signed by the appellant and she also placed her fingerprints in their presence, it was open to the Registrar to direct registration in spite of a denial of its execution by the appellant. In doing so, the Single Judge of the High Court has, with respect, conflated the mere signing of the sale deed with its execution. Such an approach is completely erroneous and cannot be upheld. The impugned judgment and order of the Single Judge of the High Court as also the order passed by the District Registrar is set aside. [Paras 69, 70][790-B-E] Rajendra Pratap Singh v. Rameshwar Prasad (1998) 7 SCC 602 : [1998] 2 Suppl. SCR 444; N.M.

Ramachandraiah v. State of Karnataka 2007 SCC OnLine Kar 192; Banasettappa Laljichikkanna v. District Registrar 1965 SCC OnLine Kar 132;

Sayyapparaju Surayya v. Ramchandar Prasad Singh and Others 1949 SCC OnLine Mad 227; Jogesh

Prasad Singh & Others v. Ramchandar Prasad Singh and Others 1950 SCC OnLine Pat 31; Ebadut Ali v. Muhammad Fareed AIR (3) 1916 Pat 206:35 Ind. Cas. 56; Mohima Chunder Dhur v. Jugul Kishore Bhutta Charji, ILR Volume VII Calcutta; Smt. Uma Devi v. Narayan Nayak 1984 SCC OnLine Ori 94; Bhutkani Nath v. Smt. Kamaleswari Nath, AIR 1972 Assam and Nagaland 15; Puran Chand Nahatta v. Monmotho Nath Mukherji and Others 1927 SCC OnLine PC 100;

Ghasita Ram Bajaj v. Raj Kamal Radio Electronic 1973 SCC OnLine Del 109; Kamlabai v. Shantirai 1980 SCC OnLine Bom 152; S. Ramamurthy v. Jayalakshmi

Ammal 1990 SCC OnLine Mad 501; Union Bank of

India v. Dhian Pati 1996 SCC OnLine HP 90; In Re Kuttadan Velayudhan 2001 SCC OnLine Ker 14; Bank of Baroda v. Shree Moti Industries 2008 SCC OnLine Bom 486; Smt. Raisa Begam v. District Registrar, Saharanpur and Anr. 2011 SCC OnLine All 2335 – referred to.