Maharashtra Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948 – s.32-F(1)(a) – Amendment made in s. 32 F(1)(a) by Act 49 of 1969 – Object and purpose of – Relevancy and applicability of the object of Amendment made in s. 32-F(1)(a) by Act of 1969 for exercise of right to purchase by a tenant of a landlord who was a widow or suffering from mental or physical disability on Tillers’ day – Held: Object of the Amendment Act of 1969 is relevant and applicable in deciding the scope of the right to purchase by a tenant of a landlord who was a widow or suffering from mental or physical disability on Tillers’ day – Successor-in-interest of a widow is obliged to send an intimation to the tenant of cessation of interest of the widow to enable the tenant to exercise his right of purchase.
Maharashtra Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948 – s. 32-F(1)(a) – Interpretation of – Literal interpretation or golden rule of interpretation – By introduction of s 32-F by the Amendment Act of 1956, tenant was given right to purchase where landlord was minor or a widow or a person subject to mental or physical disability within one year from the expiry of the period during which such landlord was entitled to terminate the tenancy u/s. 31 – However, number of tenants holding land from landlords who were minors lost right to purchase land for their failure to give intimation within the period laid down in sub-section (1-A) of s.
32 – Thus, to give the tenants fresh opportunity to purchase land, s.32-F amended by Amendment Act 49 of 1969 – Words “and for enabling the tenant to exercise the right of purchase, the landlord shall send an intimation to the tenant of the fact that he has attained majority, before the expiry of the period during which such landlord is entitled to terminate the tenancy u/s. 31, inserted into sub section (1)(a) – Amendment to s.32-F(1)(a) expressly covered a case of landlord who was minor and has attained majority, but other two categories ‘widow or a person subject to mental or physical not expressly included – Held: Literal reading of s. 32F(1)(a) would lead to absurd situation – Draftsman forgot that when the addition to s. 32-F(1)(a) was made, s. 32F(1)(a) referred to three categories of landlords and not only one – Law may recognise degrees of harm, but in so doing the classification should never be arbitrary, artificial or evasive – Classification made in favour of tenants of minor landlords as opposed to tenants of landlords of the other two categories is arbitrary in nature – Thus, such classification would ordinarily have to be struck down as being violative of Art. 14 – However, instead of striking down such classification as a whole, the words “..of the fact that he has attained majority..”, can be striked down, as a result s. 32-F(1)(a) now ceases to be discriminatory, since it is applicable to tenants of all three categories of landlords – Thus, in order to read s. 32F(1)(a) in conformity with Art. 14, the words “..of the fact that he has attained majority..” is eliminated so that the intimation that is to be made by the landlord has to be made to tenants of all the three categories of landlords covered by the provision – Interpretation of statutes – Constitution of India – Art.14. Maharashtra Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948 – s. 32-F(1)(a) – Right of tenant to purchase where landlord is minor, etc. – Construction of s. 32 F(1)(a) – Held: Cultivating tenant in all cases where the landlord is a minor, a widow or a person subjected to a disability, does not statutorily become owner of the agricultural land cultivated personally by him on Tillers’ Day – These three categories of landlords are deemed to cultivate personally through such tenant – In any of these three cases, the moment the disability ceases, the land no longer belongs to a minor, as he has become major, or to a widow, as she has died or transferred her share with permission u/s.63, or to a person whose mental or physical disability ceases – Such persons are granted one year to apply for resumption of the land on the ground that such persons wish to personally cultivate the said land, pursuant to which an application for possession of land u/s. 29 may then be made – In case this is done within the time prescribed, the tenant’s right to purchase does not fructify – Right of the tenant is postponed, only when this is not done within the period of one year. MAHADEV SAWANT (D) THR. LRS.
Allowing the appeals, the Court
HELD: 1. The object of the Amendment Act of 1969 is relevant and applicable in deciding the scope of the right to purchase by a tenant of a landlord who was a widow or suffering from mental or physical disability on Tillers’ day. The successorin-interest of a widow is obliged to send an intimation to the tenant of cessation of interest of the widow to enable the tenant to exercise his right of purchase. [Para 50] [630-C-E]
2.1 The Scheme of the Maharashtra Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948, and in particular, the 1956 Amendment, which introduced Tillers’ Day, is that an absentee landlord’s rights in the land must give way to a cultivating tenant. Statutorily, on Tillers’ Day, the landlord is divested of title and the tenant is vested with title to agricultural land which he cultivates by dint of his own effort. It is only in three cases that such purchase becomes ineffective-if the tenant fails to appear within the time prescribed after notice is given to him, or appears and declines purchase, or if the tenant fails to pay the entire purchase price. The widow, the minor and the person subject to a disability are placed on the same pedestal, and throughout their widowhood, minority or period of disability are deemed to cultivate the land personally through their tenants – the Explanation - I to Section 2(6) makes this clear. In the vast majority of cases, the landlord is divested of his title on a fixed date i.e. 1st April, 1957. It is only in exceptional cases where the landlord is a widow, minor or a person subjected to disability that this right of the tenant is postponed. It is important to note that it is to the knowledge of both landlord and tenant that the tenant becomes the owner statutorily on a fixed date i.e. 1st April, 1957. Even otherwise, on postponed dates that are mentioned under Section 32, the tenant shall be deemed to have purchased the land on such postponed date under the first proviso to subsection (1) of Section 32 when an application for possession made by the landlord under Section 29 is finally rejected – a date that is to the knowledge of both landlord and tenant. Also, under the circumstances prescribed under Section 32(1A), again the tenant shall be deemed to have purchased the land on a date on which a final order is passed by the Tribunal in the circumstances mentioned in the said sub-section. Again, under sub-section (1B), in the circumstances mentioned in the said subsection, land gets restored to the tenant upon which deemed purchase takes place. Statutorily, therefore, in all cases covered by s. 32, the landlord is divested of his title either on Tillers’ Day or on a postponed date which is to the knowledge of the tenant, as the said date is on and from a final order of a Tribunal or a Tahsildar, as the case may be. [Para 13] [600-H; 601-A-F]
2.2 Section 32-G is a very important pointer to the fact that a tenant must be put on notice in order that the purchase price of land be determined by the Tribunal. This notice under Section 32-G(1) is in the form of a public notice in the prescribed form in each village. Apart from this, the Tribunal shall also issue a notice individually to each tenant calling upon him to appear before it on the date specified in the notice. The same is the case of a tenant who is deemed to have purchased the land on the postponed date under Section 32-G(5). Under Section 32-O in respect of tenancies created after Tillers’ Day, a tenant cultivating personally shall be entitled, within one year from the commencement of such tenancy, to purchase such land within the ceiling area. Under sub-section (1A), this right is to be exercised by giving an intimation in that behalf to the landlord and the Tribunal in the prescribed manner within the period of one year. This again is a date which is within the knowledge of the tenant as the period of one year is calculated from the commencement of his tenancy. It can thus be seen that in the case of postponed dates under Section 32 and the right of a tenant in respect of tenancies created after Tillers’ Day, the tenant is to exercise his statutory right knowing fully well that if he does not do so within the prescribed period or does not pay purchase price, the purchase either becomes ineffective or the right cannot be exercised. In all these cases, the tenant knows of the time within which he must exercise his rights. [Para 14] [601-G-H; 602-A-D]
2.3 Section 32-F was introduced by the Amendment Act of 1956 as part of a scheme of agrarian reform. The reason for the non-obstante clause, with which the Section begins, is that the cultivating tenant in all cases where the landlord is a minor, a widow or a person subjected to a disability, does not statutorily become owner of the agricultural land cultivated personally by MAHADEV SAWANT (D) THR. LRS.
him on Tillers’ Day. This is for the reason that under Section 2(6) Explanation- I, these three categories of landlords are deemed to cultivate personally through such tenant. The entitlement of terminating a tenancy under any one of these three categories is contained in Section 31(3). In any of these three cases, the moment the disability ceases i.e. that the land in question no longer belongs to a minor, as he has become major, or to a widow, as she has died or transferred her share with permission under Section 63, or to a person whose mental or physical disability ceases, one year is granted for such persons to apply for resumption of the land on the ground that such persons wish to personally cultivate the said land, pursuant to which an application for possession of land under Section 29 may then be made. In case this is done w ithin the time prescribed, the tenant’s right to purchase does not fructify. It is only when this is not done within the period of one year, the postponed right of the tenant springs into being. [Para 15] [602D-H]
2.4 Prior to the Amendment Act of 1969, on a plain literal reading of Section 32-F(1)(a), it is true that a tenant had to exercise this right within a period of one year from the expiry of the one year spoken of in Section 31(3) of the Act. Literally speaking, therefore, even if the tenant does not know when the minor became major or when the widow died or transferred her share, this right would cease on the expiry of one year. Realising that this would cause immense hardship for want of knowledge of a special fact which is only within the landlord’s ken, the legislature stepped in and amended Section 32-F. [Para 16 and 17] [603-A-C]
2.5 Paragraph 2 of the Statement of Objects and Reasons indicates that an amnesty scheme is necessary, in that a large number of tenants in the Bombay area who are minors have lost the right to purchase as they have failed to give the necessary intimation within the period laid down by statute. Under this amnesty scheme, if a tenant held land from a landlord who was a minor and who had obtained majority before the commencement of the 1969 Amendment and no intimation had been given, two years extra was given from the date of commencement of that Act in which such intimation may be given. This statutory object, reflected in paragraph 2 of the Statement of Objects and Reasons, is carried out by the proviso to sub-section (1A) inserted by the 1969 Amendment Act into Section 32-F. The words ‘and for enabling the tenant to exercise the right of purchase, the landlord shall send an intimation to the tenant of the fact that he has attained majority, before the expiry of the period during which such landlord is entitled to terminate the tenancy under Section 31, were inserted into sub section (1)(a). The addition of these words into Section 32-F(1)(a) would show that the legislature, in keeping with the object sought to be achieved statutorily divesting the landlord of his title and handing over the land to the cultivating tenant, cannot possibly be achieved unless a special fact within the knowledge of the landlord alone is first intimated to the tenant, so that he may then, with knowledge that the minor landlord has now turned major, meaningfully exercise his right of purchase under the Act. [Para 18, 19] [604-A-F]
2.6 The vast majority of cases which came to the notice of the legislature were cases of landlords who were minor at the time of the 1956 Amendment Act and who turned major only thereafter. The amnesty scheme contained in sub-section (1A), was, therefore, limited only to such cases. Unfortunately, the legislature, when it inserted words into sub-section (1)(a) of Section 32-F, appears to have forgotten that these words will govern the right of tenants which has been postponed on account of a landlord’s disability. What appears to have been missed is the fact that, apart from minors, there are two other categories mentioned in Section 32-F(1)(a), all of whom would stand on the same footing insofar as the tenant is concerned. It would be wholly anomalous for a tenant to be told that if his landlord happened to be a minor who has attained majority later, he must first be intimated of this fact before he can meaningfully exercise his right of purchase; whereas to a tenant who is similarly situate when the landlord is a widow, in which case no such intimation need be made, the tenant would suffer for no fault of his as the tenant would have no knowledge of the date of death of the widow (which is a special fact known only to her family), such tenant’s right of purchase being extinguished by time. It seems that the draftsman of the 1969 Amendment was MAHADEV SAWANT (D) THR. LRS.
overwhelmed with the amnesty scheme laid down in Section 32F (1A), which then spilled over to the amendment made in Section 32-F(1)(a), thereby unintentionally leaving out the two other categories of landlords, where the same intimation needs to be made to the tenant, as the death of the widow and/or the ceasing of disability are special facts known only to the landlord and his family, just as in the case of a minor turning major. [Para 20] [604-G-H; 605-A-C]
2.7 An absurd situation would be created by a literal reading of Section 32-F(1)(a). The landlord being a widow is protected until her death. After her death, one year is given to her successors in interest to exercise the right of resumption. When this does not take place one year is granted from the expiry of this first one year to the tenant to exercise his statutory right. This cannot be done because the tenant does not know of the death of the widow. As a result, this very land which was not required by the landlord’s successors in interest for personal cultivation, goes back to the landlord under Section 32-P in cases in which the landlord either has no land within the ceiling limit or some land which does not exhaust the ceiling limit. This anomaly indeed turns the entire scheme of agrarian reform on its head. Thus, it is to be seen whether the language of Section 32-F can be added to or subtracted from, in order that the absurdity mentioned and the discrimination between persons who are similarly situate be obviated. [Para 21] [605-D-F]
3. Given the fact that the object of the 1956 Amendment, which is an agrarian reform legislation, and is to give the tiller of the soil statutory title to land which such tiller cultivates; and, given the fact that the literal interpretation of Section 32-F(1)(a) would be contrary to justice and reason and would lead to great hardship qua persons who are similarly circumstanced; as also to the absurdity of land going back to an absentee landlord when he has lost the right of personal cultivation, in the teeth of the object of the 1956 Amendment, the words “.. of the fact that he has attained majority..” are deleted. Without these words, therefore, the landlord belonging to all three categories has to send an intimation to the tenant, before the expiry of the period during which such landlord is entitled to terminate the tenancy under Section 31. [Para 36] [622-C-D]
Tirath Singh v. Bachittar Singh & Ors. [1955] 2 SCR
457 ; Ramaswamy Nadar v. State of Madras [1958] SCR 739 ; State of Madhya Pradesh v. Azad Bharat Finance Co. & Anr. [1966] Supp. SCR 473 ; Budhan Singh v. Nabi Bux [1970] 2 SCR 10 ; Commissioner of Income Tax, Central Calcutta v. National Taj Traders (1980) 1 SCC 370 : [1980] 2 SCR 268 ; K.P. Verghese v. ITO (1981) 4 SCC 173 : [1982] 1 SCR
629 ; CIT v. J.H. Gotla (1985) 4 SCC 343 : [1985] 2 Suppl. SCR 711 ; State of Tamil Nadu v. Kodaikanal Motor Union (P) Ltd. (1986) 3 SCC 91 : [1986] 2 SCR
927 ; Hameedia Hardware Stores v. B. Mohanlal (1988) 2 SCC 513 : [1988] 3 SCR 384 ; Surjit Singh Kalra v. Union of India (1991) 2 SCC 87 : [1991] 1 SCR 364 ; C.W.S. (India) Limited v. Commissioner of Income Tax (1994) Supp. 2 SCC 296 : [1994] 2 SCR
247 ; Molar Mal v. Kay Iron Works (P) Ltd. (2000) 4 SCC 285 ; Union of India v. Hansoli Devi (2002) 7 SCC 273 : [2002] 2 Suppl. SCR 324 – referred to. Grey v. Pearson (1857) LR 6 HL Cas 61 ; Salmon v. Duncombe (1886) 11 AC 627 – referred to.
4. The law may recognise degrees of harm, but in so doing the classification should never be arbitrary, artificial or evasive. The Statement of the Objects and Reasons for the 1969 Amendment have been referred. Paragraph 2 thereof stated that a large number of cases involving minor landlords had come to the notice of the legislature, for which reason the amnesty scheme mentioned in sub-section (1A) of Section 32-F was enacted. However, what was forgotten by the draftsman when the addition to Section 32-F(1)(a) was made was the fact that Section 32F(1)(a) referred to three categories of landlords and not only one. The words added by the 1969 amendment thus gave relief to tenants only qua minor landlords and not the other two categories. Obviously, the classification made in favour of tenants of minor landlords as opposed to tenants of landlords of the other two categories is a classification which is arbitrary in nature. This being the case, such classification would ordinarily have to be struck down as being violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. However, instead of striking down such MAHADEV SAWANT (D) THR. LRS.
classification as a whole, what can be done is to strike down the words “..of the fact that he has attained majority..”, as a result of which, what is added by the 1969 Amendment to Section 32F(1)(a) now ceases to be discriminatory, as it is applicable to tenants of all three categories of landlords. Thus, in order to read Section 32-F(1)(a) in conformity with Article 14, the words “..of the fact that he has attained majority..” is eliminated so that the intimation that is to be made by the landlord has to be made to tenants of all the three categories of landlords covered by the provision. [Para 39, 40, 44] [624-G-H; 627-A-D; 627-H; 628A]
Appa Narsappa v. Akubai Ganapati (1999) 4 SCC 453 – overruled.
Tukaram Maruti Chavan v. Maruti Narayan Chavan (2008) 9 SCC 358 : [2008] 13 SCR 508 – partly overruled.
Anna Bhau Magdum v. Babasaheb Anandrao Desai
(1995) 5 SCC 243 : [1995] 2 Suppl. SCR 259 ; Sudam Ganpat Kutwl v. Shevantabai Tukaram (2006) 7 SCC
200 : [2006] 4 Suppl. SCR 682 – distinguished. Hiralal P. Harsora v. Kusum Narottamdas Harsora (2016) 10 SCC 165 : [2016] 9 SCR 515 ; Secretary, Mahatama Gandhi Mission v. Bhartiya Kamgar Sena (2017) 4 SCC 449 ; D.S. Nakara v. Union of India (1983) 1 SCC 305 : [ 1983] 2 SCR 165 – relied on.
5. The submission made based on Section 14(1)(a) that since a tenant is bound to pay the rent every year before the 31st May thereof, the tenant is bound to know that the person to whom he is paying rent has since died and that, therefore, knowledge cannot be brought in to the construction of Section 32-F need not detain this Court. On facts in the instant case, the landlady was actually at Mumbai, whereas the tenant was at Ratnagiri. Also, Section 14(1)(b) makes it clear that in case the tenant fails to pay rent before the 31 st May of every year, the landlord must first give a three months’ notice in writing informing the tenant that he has not so paid the rent, within which period the tenant is given time to remedy the breach. On facts, there is nothing to show that any such notice was given. The other submission that in the agricultural village world everyone knows about everybody else and that, therefore, it may be assumed that a villager at Ratnagiri will know about his landlord’s death equally cannot apply on the facts of this case as the landlord lived and died in Mumbai. The other submission about the reverse situation obtaining today as opposed to the situation obtaining in 1956, namely, that it is tenants who are now well off and landlords who are poor is again a perception which has no bearing either on the facts of this case or the law that needs to be laid down. [Para 49] [629-G-H; 630-A-C]
6. The judgment of the High Court is set aside. As a result, the tenant’s intimation of purchase of 2008 will now be taken on record by the authorities under the Act, who may now proceed under the Act to determine purchase price and its payment consequent upon which the postponed right of the tenant in this case to own the land will then come into being upon the statutory conditions being met. [Para 50] [630-F-G]
R.L. Arora v Union of India [1964] 6 SCR 784 ; Shri Ram Krishna Dalmia v. Shri Justice S.R. Tendolkar [1959] SCR 279 ; In Re Special Courts Bill 1978 (1979) 1 SCC 380 : [1979] 2 SCR 476 ; Shayara Bano v. Union of India (2017) 9 SCC 1 : [ 2017] 7 SCR 797 ; Sri Ram Ram Narain Medhi v. State of Bombay AIR 1959 SC 459 : [1959] Suppl. SCR 489 ; Amrit Bhikaji Kale v. Kashinath Janardhan Trade (1983) 3 SCC 437 : [1983] 3 SCR 237 – referred to.
As published in the Supreme Court Reports, Supreme Court of India. Text from the Indian Supreme Court Judgments open data set (Dattam Labs), CC BY 4.0.
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