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IN THE HIGH COURT OF SIKKIM : GANGTOK
Arb. A. No. 01 of 2019
Mrs. V. Vijaya Lakshmi,
Daughter of Dr. R. Vijayarangam,
Proprietor of
M/s. Kadorganjans Engineering Consultants,
No. 30 (Old No. 18), Second Cross Street,
West C.I.T. Nagar, Chennai-600035.
Through her constituted attorney
Mr. V.V.K. Gajan,
Son of Mr. M. Venkatesan,
Resident of No. 30 (Old No. 18)
Second Cross Street,
West C.I.T. Nagar, Chennai-600035.
…
Appellant
…
Respondent
Versus
The Additional Chief Engineer (S/W),
Roads and Bridges Department
Government of Sikkim,
Nirman Bhavan,
Gangtok, East Sikkim
BEFORE
HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE ARUP KUMAR GOSWAMI, CJ.
For the appellant
:
Ms. Sangita Agarwal, Advocate.
For the respondent :
Mr. Vivek Kohli, Advocate General, Sikkim.
Date of hearing
:
19.11.2020
Date of judgment
:
19.11.2020
JUDGMENT (ORAL)
( Arup Kumar Goswami, CJ )
Heard Ms. Sangita Agarwal, learned counsel for the appellant. Also
heard Mr. Vivek Kohli, learned Advocate General, Sikkim appearing for the
respondent.
Arb. A. No. 01 of 2019
Mrs. V. Vijaya Lakshmi vs. The Addl. Chief Engineer (S/W)
2.
This appeal under Section 37 (1) (c) of the Arbitration and
Conciliation Act, 1996, for short “the Arbitration Act”, is preferred against
the judgment dated 25.10.2018 passed by the learned District Judge,
Special Division-II, Sikkim at Gangtok in Arbitration Case No. 4 of 2017,
dismissing the petition filed by the appellant under Section 34 of the
Arbitration Act not only by holding that the same is time-barred but also
recording a finding that the appellant had failed to make out any ground for
interfering with the Award.
3.
At the very outset, Mr. Kohli submits that in view of the judgment
of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of P. Radha Bai and Ors. vs. P.
Ashok Kumar and Anr., (Civil Appeal Nos. 7710-7713 of 2013),
reported in 2018 SCC Online SC 1620, there is no escape from the
conclusion that the application of the appellant was time-barred.
4.
Ms. Sangita Agarwal, learned counsel for the appellant submits that
she is aware of the aforesaid judgment and contends that in the fact
situation obtaining in the present case, the judgment would not be
applicable and therefore, it cannot be said that application of the appellant
is required to be dismissed as time-barred. She has drawn the attention of
this Court to paragraph 46 of Radha Bai (supra) and contends that the
antecedent facts necessary to pursue a legal proceeding was suppressed by
the respondent from the appellant and the appellant came to learn about
the fraud played by the respondent only on 04.05.2017 and thus, the
application filed by the appellant was within the period of limitation.
Learned counsel for the appellant also drew the attention of the Court to
Section 36 of the Arbitration Act as amended by the Arbitration and
Conciliation (Amendment) Ordinance, 2020, which came into effect from
04.11.2020.
Arb. A. No. 01 of 2019
Mrs. V. Vijaya Lakshmi vs. The Addl. Chief Engineer (S/W)
5.
The appellant offers Engineering Consultancy Service by way of
designing bridges and roads, providing services in the field of topographic
and engineering service, geo-tech investigation, etc. Pursuant to an
Expression of Interest invited by the respondent for carrying out geotechnical investigation, hydrological survey, design and preparation of
detailed estimate for construction of double length bridges along with L.D.
Kazi Bridge, Yangyang University Road, South Sikkim, the appellant had
submitted bid which was accepted by the respondent and accordingly, a
work order dated 29.06.2009 was issued to the appellant. An agreement
dated 10.07.2009 was also executed in between the parties.
6.
The appellant had prepared Detailed Project Report (DPR) for 13
bridges, which were then sent by the respondent to North Eastern Council
(NEC).
7.
A dispute had arisen between the parties with regard to non-
payment by the respondent for the work carried out by the appellant and
accordingly, a legal notice dated 03.09.2014 was issued by the appellant
demanding a sum of Rs.3,52,55,860/-. The notice having failed to elicit any
response,
the
arbitration
clause
reserved
in
the
agreement
dated
10.07.2009 was invoked by the appellant. Subsequently, on an application
filed by the appellant under Section 11 of the Arbitration Act for
appointment of an Arbitrator, this Court, in Arbitration Petition No. 02 of
2014, vide order dated 17.3.2015, had appointed Hon’ble Mr. Justice A.K.
Patnaik, a former Hon’ble Judge of Supreme Court of India as the Sole
Arbitrator to adjudicate the disputes.
8.
The Sole Arbitrator passed an Award on 27.05.2016 awarding a
sum of Rs.65,43,468/- along with interest calculated @ 18% per annum
from the date of Award.
Arb. A. No. 01 of 2019
Mrs. V. Vijaya Lakshmi vs. The Addl. Chief Engineer (S/W)
9.
The appellant had filed an application under Section 34 of the
Arbitration Act on 25.07.2017 in the Court of the learned District Judge,
East Sikkim at Gangtok. Subsequently, the same was transferred to the
Court of learned District Judge, Special Division-II.
10.
Learned District Judge held that in absence of any affidavit and as
the probative value of documents relied on by the appellant was not
proved, therefore, the case of the appellant that the respondent had
obtained the arbitral award by way of fraud is not proved.
11.
On the basis of Section 34 (3) of the Arbitration Act, it was held
that the application for setting aside the Award was time-barred. It was
also held that in view of Section 29 (2) of the Limitation Act, 1963, for
short, the Limitation Act, provisions of Limitation Act shall not apply to the
Arbitration Act, the same being a special law.
12.
Against the statement of facts and claims made by the appellant
before the Sole Arbitrator, in the reply filed by the respondent on
17.06.2015, amongst others, it was stated that out of 13 number of
bridges for which DPR was prepared by the appellant, only 6 number of
bridges were sanctioned by the NEC. It was only after the award was
passed on 27.05.2016, the appellant had taken recourse to Right to
Information Act, 2005, for short, the RTI Act, seeking information from the
Public Information Officer of NEC Secretariat as to why sanction was
granted only in respect of 6 number of bridges. After submitting a number
of applications under RTI Act, it was learnt by the appellant that the
respondent had dropped 7 DPRs without furnishing any clarification or
justification which was sought for by the Ministry of Roads Transport.
Arb. A. No. 01 of 2019
Mrs. V. Vijaya Lakshmi vs. The Addl. Chief Engineer (S/W)
13.
It is the case of the appellant that the said information was
fraudulently withheld by the respondent from the Sole Arbitrator. It was
also pleaded that the limitation period will begin to run from 04.05.2017 as
the appellant came to learn about the fraud played by the respondent only
on 04.05.2017.
14.
It will be relevant to record at this stage that Section 36 of the
Arbitration
Act
as
amended
by
the
Arbitration
and
Conciliation
(Amendment) Ordinance, 2020, relating to enforcement of award is not
applicable to the facts and circumstances of the case.
15.
Section 34 (3) of the Arbitration Act reads as under:
“34. Application
for
setting
aside
arbitral
award:
…………………………………
(3) An application for setting aside may not be made after
three months have elapsed from the date on which the party
making that application had received the arbitral award or, if a
request had been made under section 33, from the date on
which that request had been disposed of by the arbitral
tribunal:
Provided that if the Court is satisfied that the applicant was
prevented by sufficient cause from making the application
within the said period of three months it may entertain the
application within a further period of thirty days, but not
thereafter.”
16.
The question that had fallen for consideration in P. Radha Bai
(supra) was whether Section 17 of the Limitation Act is applicable while
determining the limitation period under Section 34(3) of the Arbitration Act.
Relevant part of Section 17 of the Limitation Act reads as under:
Arb. A. No. 01 of 2019
Mrs. V. Vijaya Lakshmi vs. The Addl. Chief Engineer (S/W)
“17. Effect of fraud or mistake.— (1) Where, in the case of any
suit or application for which a period of limitation is prescribed
by this Act,—
(a) the suit or application is based upon the fraud of the
defendant or respondent or his agent; or
(b) the knowledge of the right or title on which a suit or
application is founded is concealed by the fraud of any
such person as aforesaid; or
(c) the
suit
or
application
is
for
relief
from
the
consequences of a mistake; or
(d) where any document necessary to establish the right
of
the
plaintiff
or
applicant
has
been
fraudulently
concealed from him,
the period of limitation shall not begin to run until plaintiff
or applicant has discovered the fraud or the mistake or
could, with reasonable diligence, have discovered it; or in
the case of a concealed document, until the plaintiff or
the applicant first had the means of producing the
concealed document or compelling its production:
17.
It was held that Section 17 of Limitation Act does not defer the
starting point of the limitation period merely because fraud was committed
and that Section 17 does not encompass all kinds of frauds and mistakes.
In paragraph 46 of P. Radha Bai (supra) it was pointed out that Section
17 (1) (b) and (d) only encompasses those fraudulent conduct or act of
concealment of documents which have the effect of suppressing the
knowledge entitling a party to pursue its legal remedy. Once a party
becomes aware of the antecedent facts necessary to pursue a legal
proceeding, the limitation period commences. Submission of Ms. Agarwal
Arb. A. No. 01 of 2019
Mrs. V. Vijaya Lakshmi vs. The Addl. Chief Engineer (S/W)
that the respondent suppressed antecedent facts necessary to pursue a
legal proceeding is without any merit. As noticed earlier, in the reply to the
statement of facts and claims made by the appellant, respondent had
stated that out of 13 number of bridges for which DPRs were prepared by
the appellant, only 6 number of bridges were sanctioned by the NEC and
therefore, it cannot be said that there was any concealment of material and
relevant facts by the respondent which prevented the appellant from
pursuing legal proceeding.
18.
Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act reads as follows:
“29. Savings.- (1)
……………………………………………
(2) Where any special or local law prescribes for any suit,
appeal or application a period of limitation different from the
period prescribed by the Schedule, the provisions of section 3
shall apply as if such period were the period prescribed by the
Schedule and for the purpose of determining any period of
limitation prescribed for any suit, appeal or application by any
special or local law, the provisions contained in sections 4 to 24
(inclusive) shall apply only in so far as, and to the extent to
which, they are not expressly excluded by such special or local
law.”
19.
The Hon’ble Supreme Court observed that Section 29 of the
Limitation Act has two parts. First part stipulates that the limitation period
prescribed by the special law or local law will prevail over the limitation
period prescribed in the Schedule of the Limitation Act. The Arbitration Act
is a special law which prescribes a specific period of limitation in Section
34(3) for filing objections to an arbitral award passed under the Arbitration
Act and therefore, the provisions of Arbitration Act would apply. It was also
noticed that there is no provision under the Limitation Act dealing with
Arb. A. No. 01 of 2019
Mrs. V. Vijaya Lakshmi vs. The Addl. Chief Engineer (S/W)
challenging of an award passed under the Arbitration Act. The second part
mandates that Sections 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act will apply for
determining the period of limitation only in so far as, and to the extent to
which, they are not expressly excluded by such special or local law. Hon’ble
Supreme Court held that the phrase “expressly excluded” under Section 29
(2) of the Limitation Act can be inferred from the language of the special
law or it can be necessarily implied from the scheme and object of the
special law.
20.
Hon’ble Supreme Court at paragraph 36 of P. Radha Bai (supra)
noted the consequences that will follow if Section 17 of the Limitation Act
were to be applied to determine the limitation period under Section 34 (3)
of the Arbitration Act. Paragraph 36 reads as follows:
“36. If Section 17 of the Limitation Act were to be applied to
determining the limitation period under Section 34(3), it would have
the following consequences:
(a) In Section 34(3), the commencement period for computing
limitation is the date of receipt of award or the date of disposal
of request under Section 33 (i.e. correction/additional award).
If Section 17 were to be applied for computing the limitation
period under Section 34(3), the starting period of limitation
would be the date of discovery of the alleged fraud or mistake.
The starting point for limitation under Section 34(3) would be
different from the Limitation Act.
(b) The proviso to Section 34(3) enables a court to entertain an
application to challenge an award after the three months'
period is expired, but only within an additional period of thirty
dates, “but not thereafter”. The use of the phrase “but not
thereafter” shows that the 120 days' period is the outer
Arb. A. No. 01 of 2019
Mrs. V. Vijaya Lakshmi vs. The Addl. Chief Engineer (S/W)
boundary for challenging an award. If Section 17 were to be
applied, the outer boundary for challenging an award could go
beyond 120 days. The phrase “but not thereafter” would be
rendered redundant and otiose. This Court has consistently
taken this view that the words “but not thereafter” in the
proviso of Section 34(3) of the Arbitration Act are of a
mandatory nature, and couched in negative terms, which
leaves
no
room
Pradesh v. Himachal
for
Techno
doubt.
(State
Engineers,
of
(2010)
Himachal
SCC
210, Assam Urban Water Supply & Sewerage Board v. Subash
Projects & Mktg. Ltd. , (2012) 2 SCC 624 and Anilkumar
Jinabhai
Patel (D)
through
LRs
v. Pravinchandra
Jinabhai,
(2018) SCC Online 276).
21.
It will be also relevant to take note of paragraphs 37, 38, 39 and
40 which read as follows:
“37. In our view, the aforesaid inconsistencies with the language of
Section 34(3) of the Arbitration Act tantamount to an “express
exclusion” of Section 17 of the Limitation Act.
38. This Court in Popular Construction case [Union of India v. Popular
Construction Co., (2001) 8 SCC 470] followed the same approach
when it relied on the phrase “but not thereafter” to hold that Section
5 of the Limitation Act was expressly excluded.
39. As far as the language of Section 34 of the 1996 Act is
concerned, the crucial words are “but not thereafter” used in the
proviso to sub-section (3). In our opinion, this phrase would amount
to an express exclusion within the meaning of Section 29(2) of the
Limitation Act, and would therefore bar the application of Section 5 of
that Act. Parliament did not need to go further. To hold that the court
Arb. A. No. 01 of 2019
Mrs. V. Vijaya Lakshmi vs. The Addl. Chief Engineer (S/W)
could entertain an application to set aside the award beyond the
extended period under the proviso, would render the phrase “but not
thereafter” wholly otiose. No principle of interpretation would justify
such a result.”
40.
(emphasis added)
Further,the exclusion of Section 17 is necessarily implied when
one looks at the scheme and object of the Arbitration Act.”
22.
Thus, the Hon’ble Supreme Court on a scrutiny and analysis of
Section 34 (3) of the Arbitration Act held that the language of Section
34(3) of Arbitration Act amounts to an “express exclusion” of Section 17 of
the Limitation Act. It was further held that the exclusion of Section 17 of
the Limitation Act was also necessarily implied when one looks at the
scheme and object of the Arbitration Act.
23.
In paragraphs 49 and 51 of P. Radha Bai (supra), the Hon’ble
Supreme Court has laid down as follows:
“49. In the context of Section 34, a party can challenge an
award as soon as it receives the award. Once an award is
received, a party has knowledge of the award and the limitation
period commences. The objecting party is therefore precluded
from invoking Sections 17(1)(b) and (d) once it has knowledge
of the award. Sections 17(1)(a) and (c) of the Limitation Act
may not even apply, if they are extended to Section 34, since
they deal with a scenario where the application is “based upon”
the fraud of the respondent or if the application is for “relief
from the consequences of a mistake”. Section 34 application is
based on the award and not on the fraud of the respondent and
does not seek the relief of consequence of a mistake.
***** ***** ******
Arb. A. No. 01 of 2019
Mrs. V. Vijaya Lakshmi vs. The Addl. Chief Engineer (S/W)
51. In view of the above, we hold that once the party has
received the Award, the limitation period under Section 34(3) of
the Arbitration Act commences. Section 17 of the Limitation Act
would not come to the rescue of such objecting party.”
24.
In view of the above position in law, there is no escape from the
conclusion that application of the appellant under Section 34 of the
Arbitration Act was barred by law.
25.
Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed. No order as to costs.
( Chief Justice )
jk
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