V. Prakash @ G.N.V. Prakash vs M/s. P.S. Govindaswamy Naidu & Sons’ Charities Represented by Its Managing Trustee & Ors.

1.1 The High Court seems to have approached the case from an altogether wrong angle and has proceeded on irrelevant considerations while ignoring the relevant factors and material considerations. The High Court seems to have picked up the residential requirement in the qualification for trusteeship in the Scheme of Administration as being of strict physical presence, de hors the context and de hors the purpose.The overwhelming evidence produced by the plaintiff-appellant in the form of Aadhaar Card issued by the Government of India as also his Income Tax assessments in India based on the certification of Chartered Accountant of his fulfilling the requirement of ‘resident’ in terms of Section 6 of the Income Tax Act, 1961 has been taken to be of little value by the High Court after counting the number of days of the appellant’s stay in India and then questioning that the certificates were not showing as to for how many days he was in Madras Presidency. Even in that regard, the High Court, though referred to the decision in Mst Jagir Kaur but failed to take note of the ratio therein. The appellant’s ownership and possession of property in India, including residential property; having bank accounts in India; being assessed as resident forthe purpose of Income Tax Act, 1961 have all been brushed aside by the High Court by mere count of number of days of stay in India. This Court is unable to endorse this approach.[Paras 23 and 24][980A-E]

Mst Jagir Kaur &Anr. v. Jaswant Singh [1964] 2 SCR 73– referred to.

1.2 In paragraph 21 of the impugned judgment, the High Court has observed that the spirit of the provisions prescribing qualification ought to be respected. With respect, it appears that the High Court in the first place seems to have missed out the fundamentals on the spirit of formation of trust and its Scheme of Administration. As noticed, the trust was established in the year 1926 by the sons of Shri P.S. Govindaswamy Naidu and the trust was actually named as “M/s. P.S. Govindaswamy and Sons’ Charity”. The Scheme of Administration, while envisaging nine trustees, specifically provided for the four sons of Shri P.S. Govindaswamy as the founder trustees. Office of founder trustee has been made a heritable one with the concept of having the hereditary trustee in the line of each of the founder trustee. Until 01.01.1994, the appellant’s father Shri G.N. Venkatapathy remained a founder trustee after the demise of his father Shri P.S.G. Narayanaswami Naidu, one of the original founder trustees, who died in the year 1938. The hereditary trusteeship, in the spirit of Scheme of Administration, has continued in relation to the lines of other original founder trustees too as the respondent Nos. 2, 3 and 4 are respectively representing the branches of Shri P.S. Venkatapathy, Shri P. Rangaswami Naidu and Shri P.S. Ganga Naidu. Reverting to the branch of Shri P.S.G. Narayanaswami Naidu who died in the year 1938 and was substituted by his son Shri G.N. Venkatapathy, it is noticed that after the death of Shri G.N. Venkatapathy, his brother Shri V. Rajan was taken as the founder trustee to represent this branch. As noticed above, there had been internal disputes, which cropped up after resignation of Shri V. Rajan and which led to litigations and appointment of Shri Naren Rajan and later appointment of Shri V. Rajan again as founder trustee. As already noticed, with the demise of Shri Naren Rajan on 21.05.2015 and of Shri V. Rajan on 21.06.2017, it is the appellant alone who remains to be the male descendant to represent the branch of Shri P.S.G. Narayanaswami Naidu.When looking at the spirit of the Scheme of Administration of Trust, it would be a travesty of the Scheme itself if in the presence of the appellant, the representation of this branch of the founder trustee is annulled or the position is shifted to someone else. Of course, this could happen if it is established beyond doubt that the appellant has incurred one or more of the disqualifications. In this suit, no other disqualification has been alleged by the respondents against the appellant except his want of residence in Madras Presidency. This suggestion has been effectively repelled by the appellant by production of cogent evidence and with specific assertion that he was residing in India since 2010. When examining the matter from the point of view of spirit of Scheme of Administration, the concept of representation of the branch of founder trustee needs to be respected and, in that regard, claim of the descendant like the appellant cannot be lightly brushed aside by a mere count ofnumber of days of stay in India while ignoring all other features and factors showing his choice of staying in India.[Paras 25 and 25.1][980-E-H; 981-A-F]

1.3 As observed by this Court in Mst Jagir Kaur, ultimately, the question of residence in every case depends on the facts, but the word ‘reside’ usually means something more than a flying visit or a casual stay. The appellant who has continuously been in India, apart from holding property and bank accounts in India and also holding an Aadhaar Card, could least be said to be a person visiting India casually or as a transit tourist.The High Court has posed a question that certificates do not disclose that out of 979 days in seven years, how many days the appellant was in Madras Presidency? Again, the approach of the High Court does not commend to us. It has not been shown if the appellant had not been available in the area in question so as to effectively participate in the administration and management of the Trust. Mere holding of Green Card of the United States of America cannot be treated as decisive of the matter in the present case.The High Court has made adverse comments on the justified observations of the Trial Court that in view of the scientific advancements, the word ‘reside’ should not be given that meaning as was understood a century back. With respect, such observations of the High Court are again, not in conformity with the principles of construction of a document.[Paras 25.2-27][981F-H; 982-A-C]

1.4 If at all the rule of literal construction is applied literally, the term in question about residing within “Madras Presidency” would itself be treated as redundant for the simple reason that geographically or demographically, there does not exist any location as of today which could be termed as “Madras Presidency”. Obviously, such an approach would be incorrect and the area that was known as “Madras Presidency” at the time of drafting of the document in the year 1926 and framing of the Scheme of Administration in the year 1936 would be taken note of and whatever area is now referable to the said erstwhile “Madras Presidency” area would be relevant; and the residence has to be with reference to the said area. The point relevant for the present purpose is that the expression “Madras Presidency” is not being construed in its literal sense and is construed with reference to its present meaning.Taking cue from the aforesaid, when the verb “reside” is taken up to understand its meaning and purport with reference to the object of the document, its present day meaning and connotation cannot be lost sight of. Of course, if a person has given up his residence and has permanently settled at some other place, the question may arise about his fulfilment of the condition but, at the same time, the expression “resides” cannot be given a literal meaning as if a person like the plaintiff-appellant having multiple places of residence would incur disqualification for the purpose of the deed in question if not permanently located at a particular place.While not approving the approach of the High Court in this matter, particularly in relation to the construction of the terms of SOA, a little furthermay be observed. The words and expressions in the deeds or statutes are preferably provided their contextual and contemporary meaning. In this process of construction, the words and expressions are not viewed as fossil remains; rather they retain the organic character and do take their meaning from all the surroundings. For that matter, a particular word like “resides” could carry multiple different connotations with reference to the time or period of its interpretation; and connotations may be different than those understood about 100 years back. When a particular word or expression in any document is to be operated and applied, all the relevant characteristics available in praesenti have to be kept in view for a meaningful and purposeful construction. Of course, that meaning should not do violence to the real intent and purpose.The question at hand is of assigning a logical, contextual and contemporary meaning to a particular expression. It is one thing to alter the term of a document and cannot be equated with the process of assigning a purposeful meaning to a particular expression. In the true rules of construction, the words are always assigned the meaning which stand in tandem with their context, while assuring that the assigned meaning serves the purpose.The requirements of physical residence, with the rapid advancement of the means of communication and transport cannot be ignored particularly when the purpose of the term ‘residence’ in document in question is to ensure participation in the affairs of the trust effectively, as and when required. The intent of the Trial Court in its observations had been only this much that in view of the present-day advancement, literal meaning of residence, by requiring actual physical presence every day and every moment is not correct. There is no hesitation in endorsing the views and findings of the Trial Court. [Paras 27.1-29.1][982-C-H; 983-A-F; 984-A-B]

Directorate of Enforcement v. Deepak Mahajan (1994)

3 SCC 440 : [1994] 1 SCR 445 – referred to.

1.5 Prima facie, the principle of estoppel may not operate against the contesting respondents. The plaintiff-appellant seeks to invoke the principle of estoppel essentially with reference to the fact that after the judgment dated 16.04.2013 in O.S. No. 631 of 2012, he was unanimously chosen as the founder trustee on 18.04.2013. The said decision of the continuing founder trustees to induct the appellant to represent his branch was essentially pursuant to the order of the Trial Court but, ultimately the decision of the Trial Court did not sustain itself and was reversed by the High Court in its judgment dated 30.06.2014 in A.S. No. 178 of 2013. In that position, the said decision of thefounder trustees to induct the appellant on 18.04.2013 could not have operated as estoppel against them.However, prima facie, what is applicable to the question of estoppel would not directly apply to the question of res judicata. The entitlement of the rival claimants to the office of founder trustee representing Shri P.S.G. Narayanaswami Naidu branch was a matter innate and interwoven with the question as raised before the High Court in A.S. No. 178 of 2013. The High Court distinctly recorded in its judgment dated 30.06.2014 that there was no dispute about qualification of the rival claimants which included the present appellant in his capacity as 10th defendant in the said matter. The present contesting respondents were indeed parties to the said proceedings and particularly the Trust was a party thereto and was duly represented by the Managing Trustee. When the question of qualification or disqualification could have been raised and was not raised by the present contesting respondents, it is difficult to say that the principles of res judicata and at any rate, those of constructive res judicata in terms of Explanation IV to Section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 would not apply.However, these aspectsare not being elaboratedfor the reason that in the present suit, the plaintiff-appellant has categorically established the fact that he was indeed eligible and was not suffering from the alleged disqualification.Viewed from any angle, the judgment of the High Court remains unsustainable. The Trial Court had rightly analysed the evidence on record and arrived at a just conclusion in upholding the claim of the appellant to the office of founder trustee in the respondent-Trust as the representative of the branch of Shri P.S.G. Narayanaswami Naidu. Impugned judgment and order dated 04.03.2021 is set aside; and the judgment and decree of the Trial Court dated 12.10.2020 are restored. Consequently, the appointment of respondent No. 10 in the Trust shall stand annulled and the appellant shall be entitled to hold the office of founder trustee representing P.S.G. Narayanaswami Naidu branch. As a necessary consequence of findings and conclusions, the claim of the applicant of I.A. No. 80383 of 2021 is rendered redundant. That application also stands rejected.[Paras 32.1-34][984-E-H; 985-A-F]

Yogesh Bhardwaj v. State of U.P. & Ors. (1990) 3 SCC

355 : [1990] 2 SCR 666, Inder Singh Ahluwalia v. Prem Chand Jain & Ors. 1993 SCC OnLine Del 12; Makhija Construction & Engg. (P) Ltd. v. Indore Development Authority & Ors.: (2005) 6 SCC 304–referred to.