Service Law – United Bank of India (Employees’) Pension Regulations, 1955 – Regn 22 – Resignation of an employee, who is not a pension optee – Benefit of pension on basis of the circular – Entitlement – Resignation tendered by the respondent no.1-employee citing mental depression, after 36 years of service – Bank accepted the same and the employee relieved from service – Few years later, based on bipartite settlement, Bank issued a Circular extending ‘another option for pension’ for the employees who had not opted for the pension scheme under the 1955 Regn – On basis thereof, the employee claimed pension, however, the Bank returned the application stating that employees who had left the service by opting for voluntary retirement/compulsory retirement/resignation not eligible to opt for pension – Single Judge held that the employee was entitled to opt for pension – Division Bench set aside the order and issued certain directions to the Bank, directing the Board of Directors of the Bank to consider amending Regn 22 – Correctness:
Held: Employee must be held to have resigned from service and not retired voluntarily so as to enable him secure the benefit of a further opportunity to opt for pension in terms of the circular – Employee while in service had the opportunity to opt for pension in terms of the 1995 Regulations, however, he opted for provident fund – Having served the Bank for over 35 years and in service for more than a decade after introduction of the 1995 Regulations, he is presumed to have been aware of the same together with the consequences of tendering resignation instead of seeking voluntary retirement – Presumption can also be legitimately drawn that respondent no.1 was satisfied with whatever he received on account of provident fund dues while demitting office – Respondent no.1 was suffering from mental depression but that did not prevent him from being coherent while writing the resignation letter – Not the case of employee that he signed without being aware of its contents – Terms of the bipartite settlement are binding on all the employees of the public sector banks, which were parties thereto, and such terms cannot be read in a manner to extend its coverage dehors the statutory regulations – Reg 22 not found to be so manifestly arbitrary, so as to call for interference – Reg 22 could have been held to violate Art.14, if employee, upon resigning from service, were denied dues on account of provident fund – Since by 2006, when he resigned, respondent no.1 had not shown any inclination to opt for pension instead of provident fund, Reg 22 did not affect him at all – To have an entitlement to pension, futuristically speaking, employee was required to adhere to the 1995 Regulations, which he did not – Although the Division Bench required the Board of Directors of the Bank to ‘consider’ an amendment to Regn 22, in the light of stipulation of a timeline and the other directions for determining whether resignation tendered by respondent no.1 could be treated as voluntary retirement and to process his claim for pension upon such determination, user of the word ‘consider’ is really a mandate on the Bank to amend Regn 22, which could not have been issued – Division Bench overstepped its bounds by directing the Board of Directors to consider amending Regn 22 even when the vires of such a regulation was not under challenge – Order passed by the Division Bench upheld and the directions to ‘consider’ an amendment to Regn 22 set aside – In exercise of power u/Art.142, some relief extended to the employee to assist him survive in the winter years of his life with a fair measure of dignity. [Paras 64, 65, 72, 73]
Service Law – Expression ‘voluntary retirement’ and ‘resignation’ – Distinction between:
Held: “Resignation” and “voluntary retirement” are two distinct concepts with varying consequences on severance of relationship and that substitution of the two for each other based solely on the duration of an employee’s service would run counter to the intendment of statutory regulations and, thus, is improper – Employees resigning from service and employees retiring from service voluntarily constitute two different classes – Treating the two classes differently may not offend Art.14 – Resignation, being a voluntary relinquishment of employment, is an implied term of employer-employee relationship – Resignation can be exercised anytime while the employee is in service – But unless specified otherwise, resignation is unilateral, majorly, resignation is bilateral which, to be effective, requires acceptance by the employer – On the other hand, an employee may seek voluntary retirement if an option is provided by the employer as a condition of service to such employee to retire from service on fulfilment of the specified terms and conditions – Any employee may, thus, offer to retire voluntarily upon completion of the requisite period of service and upon fulfilling other requirements – An offer to retire voluntarily, made by an employee, is normally accepted by the employer unless, of course, there is any debilitating factor – Importantly, when a provision for voluntary retirement does exist, yet, an employee elects to resign, such resignation (irrespective of the length of service) cannot be treated as voluntary retirement unless, in a given case, the employee also satisfies the conditions for voluntary retirement – What is applicable in a case of voluntary retirement ex proprio vigore may not apply to resignation in all cases. [Paras 47, 52, 53]
Judicial Review – Legislative policies – Scope of interference: Held: Judicial review courts should refrain from assessing the merits of policies formulated by legislative or regulatory authorities which are codified in statutes/regulations – Any shortcomings in the policy do not render the regulation ultra vires – Courts cannot invalidate a regulation merely because in its opinion the policy is unwise or ineffective – Scrutiny has normally to be restricted to the process of policy making – As long as the policy is not beyond the scope of the regulation-making power or does not transgress the bounds of the parent enactment or is in violation of any of the limitations imposed by the Constitution, there is little or no scope for interference by the Courts – Power u/Art.226 cannot be exercised by a High Court to direct the legislature/executive to enact a law (primary or subordinate) or frame a regulation/bye-law – These are executive functions which are to be performed based on policy decisions taken at the appropriate level – Constitution of India – Art.226. [Paras 57, 58, 67]
As published in the Supreme Court Reports, Supreme Court of India. Headnotes prepared by: Nidhi Jain. Text from the Indian Supreme Court Judgments open data set (Dattam Labs), CC BY 4.0.
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