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HIGH COURT OF TRIPURA
AGARTALA
Crl. Rev. P. No.53 of 2025
Union of India
represented by the Senior Intelligence Officer,
Directorate of Revenue Intelligence, Agartala Regional Unit,
under Ministry of Finance, Department of Revenue, Govt. of India.
----Petitioner
Versus
1. Sri Rajib Das,
S/O Jyoti Ranjan Das, resident of Village & P.O.-Resham Bagan,
P.S.-East Agartala, District-West Tripura, Pin-799001
(presently under Judicial Custody)
2. Smt. Suchitra Datta Das,
W/O Sri Rajib Das,
resident of Village & P.O.-Resham Bagan,
P.S.-East Agartala, District-West Tripura, Pin-799001.
---- Respondents
3. Sri Uttam Das,
S/O Ramani Das, resident of Trinath Ashram, Purba Pratapgarh,
P.S.-East Agartala, District-West Tripura, Pin-799001
(presently under Judicial Custody).
Presently, the family of Sri Uttam Das is residing at the house
premises of Sri Prahaladh Mukherjee, situated at Baldakhal,
Chandrapur, near Agartala Public School P.S.-East Agartala, West
Tripura, Pin-799008 on rent.
4. Sri Abhijit Bhowmik,
S/o Krishnagopal Bhowmik,
Resident of Village-Harinmura, Purba Naichara, P.S.-Ambassa,
District-Dhalai, Pin-799289(Absconding)
---- Proforma Respondents
For Petitioner(s)
:
Mr. Paramartha Datta, Adv.
For Respondent(s)
:
Mr. Sankar Lodh, Adv.
Date of hearing
:
13.02.2026
Date of delivery of
Judgment & Order
:
16.02.2026
Whether fit for
reporting
:
YES
HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE BISWAJIT PALIT
Judgment & Order(Oral)
Heard Learned standing Counsel, Mr. Paramartha Datta
representing the petitioner-Union of India and also heard
Learned
Counsel,
Mr.
Sankar
Lodh
representing
the
respondents.
2.
This criminal revision petition is filed challenging the
order dated 19.05.2025 passed by Learned Special Judge
(Court
No.2),
West
Tripura,
Special(NDPS)/57/2025
arising
Agartala
out
of
in
connection
with
departmental
case
No.07/CL/NDPS/DRI/AGT/2024-25. By the said order, Learned
Trial Court has released the seized vehicle bearing No.TR01-BP0663(Maruti WagonR) on bail in favour of the respondent No.1registered owner who is also the prime accused of this case to
his wife.
3.
At the time of hearing, Learned Counsel for the
petitioner has drawn the attention of this Court that the
respondent No.1 is one of the prime accused of the case
bearing
No.
departmental
Special(NDPS)/57/2025
case
which
arose
out
No.07/CL/NDPS/DRI/AGT/2024-25,
of
now
pending before the Learned Special Judge (Court No.2), West
Tripura, Agartala. The said respondent No.1 was caught in red
hand with the offending vehicle on the alleged date and time
and accordingly, the respondent No.1 was arrested and the
vehicle was seized. Before the Learned Trial Court, a petition
was filed by the wife of the said respondent No.1 for release of
the vehicle but knowing the fact that the respondent No.1 is the
prime accused, the Learned Trial Court has released the said
vehicle on bail to the wife of the respondent No.1 based upon
the judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court of Sundarbhai
Ambalal Desai Vs. State of Gujarat reported in 2003 SC
638. Learned Standing Counsel further submitted that in this
case contraband items of commercial quantity was recovered
from the accused and there was no scope on the part of the
Learned Trial Court to release the vehicle on bail but since the
Learned Trial Court has released the vehicle on bail, so, being
aggrieved with the said order the Union of India has preferred
this revision petition before this Court.
In support of his contention, Learned Counsel relied
upon one judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court in Criminal
Appeal No.87 of 2025 arising out of Special Leave
Petition (Crl.) No.13370 of 2024) [titled as Bishwajit Dey
vs. State of Assam] wherein in para Nos.33 and 34, Hon’ble
the Apex Court observed as under:
“Broadly speaking there are four scenarios
33. Though seizure of drugs/substances from
conveyances can take place in a number of
situations, yet broadly speaking there are
four scenarios in which the drug or substance
is seized from a conveyance. Firstly, where
the owner of the vehicle is the person from
whom
the
possession
of
contraband
drugs/substance is recovered. Secondly,
where the contraband is recovered from the
possession of the agent of the owner i.e. like
driver or cleaner hired by the owner. Thirdly,
where the vehicle has been stolen by the
accused and contraband is recovered from
such stolen vehicle. Fourthly, where the
contraband is seized/recovered from a thirdparty
occupant
(with
or
without
consideration) of the vehicle without any
allegation by the police that the contraband
was stored and transported in the vehicle
with the owner's knowledge and connivance.
In the first two scenarios, the owner of the
vehicle and/or his agent would necessarily be
arrayed as an accused. In the third and fourth
scenario, the owner of the vehicle and/or his
agent would not be arrayed as an accused.
34. This Court is of the view that criminal law
has not to be applied in a vacuum but to the
facts of each case. Consequently, it is only in
the first two scenarios that the vehicle may
not be released on superdari till reverse
burden of proof is discharged by the accused
owner. However, in the third and fourth
scenarios, where no allegation has been made
in the charge-sheet against the owner and/or
his agent, the vehicle should normally be
released in the interim on superdari subject
to the owner furnishing a bond that he would
produce the vehicle as and when directed by
the Court and/or he would pay the value of
the vehicle as determined by the Court on the
date of the release, if the Court is finally of
the opinion that the vehicle needs to be
confiscated.”
Relying
upon
the
said
citation,
Learned
Counsel
submitted that in view of the aforesaid judgment of the Hon’ble
Supreme Court, there was no scope to release the seized
vehicle on bail. Hence, the order dated 19.05.2025 passed by
Learned Trial Judge be quashed/set aside.
Learned Counsel for the petitioner also referred another
judgment of the Hon’ble Gauhati High Court in Crl. Rev. P.
No.268/2025 dated 29.01.2026 and further submitted that in
similar situation, revision petition was filed.
4.
On
the
other
hand,
Learned
Counsel
for
the
respondents first of all drawn the attention of the Court the
provision of Section 397(1) of Cr.P.C. read with Section 401 of
Cr.P.C corresponding to Section 438 and 442 of BNSS wherein
it was specifically stated that there is no scope to entertain any
revision
application
against
the
interlocutory
order.
So,
according to Learned Counsel this petition is not maintainable
since the order passed by Learned Trial Court was interlocutory
order.
In support of his contention, Learned Counsel relied
upon one citation of Hon’ble Apex Court reported in AIR 2017
SC 3620 [Girish Kumar Suneja v. C.B.I] wherein in para
Nos.16, 21, Hon’ble the Apex Court observed as under:
“16. While the text of sub-section (1) of
Section 397 of the Cr.P.C. appears to confer
very wide powers on the court in the exercise
of its revision jurisdiction, this power is
equally severely curtailed by sub-section (2)
thereof. There is a complete prohibition in a
court exercising its revision jurisdiction in
respect of interlocutory orders. Therefore,
what is the nature of orders in respect of
which a court can exercise its revision
jurisdiction?
21. The concept of an intermediate order was
further elucidated in Madhu Limaye v. State of
Maharashtra by contra distinguishing a final
order and an interlocutory order. This
decision lays down the principle that an
intermediate
order
is
one
which
is
interlocutory in nature but when reversed, it
has the effect of terminating the proceedings
and thereby resulting in a final order. Two
such intermediate orders immediately come
to mind - an order taking cognizance of an
offence and summoning an accused and an
order for framing charges. Prima facie these
orders are interlocutory in nature, but when
an order taking cognizance and summoning
an accused is reversed, it has the effect of
terminating the proceedings against that
person resulting in a final order in his or her
favour. Similarly, an order for framing of
charges if reversed has the effect of
discharging the accused person and resulting
in a final order in his or her favour. Therefore,
an intermediate order is one which if passed
in a certain way, the proceedings would
terminate but if passed in another way, the
proceedings would continue.”
Learned Counsel further relied upon another citation of
Hon’ble Supreme Court reported in (2000) 6 SCC 195 [titled
as K.K. Patel and another Vs. State of Gujarat and
another] wherein in para No.11, Hon’ble the Apex Court
observed as under:
“11. That apart, the view of the learned Single
Judge of the High Court that no revision was
maintainable on account of the bar contained
in Section 397(2) of the Code, is clearly
erroneous. It is now well-nigh settled that in
deciding whether an order challenged is
interlocutory or not as for Section 397(2) of
the Code, the sole test is not whether such
order was passed during the interim stage
(vide Amar Nath v. State of Haryana:(1977) 4
SCC 551, Madhu Limaye v. State of
Maharashtra:(1977) 4 SCC 551, V.C. Shukla v.
State through CBI:1980 Supp SCC 92 and
Rajendra
Kumar
Sitaram
Pande
v.
Uttam:(1999) 3 SCC 134). The feasible test is
whether by upholding the objections raised
by a party, it would result in culminating the
proceedings, if so any order passed on such
objections would not be merely interlocutory
in nature as envisaged in Section 397(2) of
the Code. In the present case, if the objection
raised by the appellants were upheld by the
Court the entire prosecution proceedings
would have been terminated. Hence, as per
the said standard, the order was revisable.”
Referring the same, Learned Counsel submitted that
since the order passed is an interlocutory one, so, there is no
scope to entertain the petition filed by the petitioner-Union of
India and as such, according to Learned Counsel for the
respondents, this petition is liable to be dismissed. Considered.
5.
This petition is filed under Section 438 read with
Section 442 of BNSS. For the sake of convenience, I would like
to reproduce herein the relevant provision of Section 438 read
with Section 442 of BNSS as under:
“438. Calling for records to exercise powers
of revision.-(1) The High Court or any
Sessions Judge may call for and examine the
record of any proceeding before any inferior
Criminal Court situate within its or his local
jurisdiction for the purpose of satisfying itself
or himself as to the correctness, legality or
propriety of any finding, sentence or order,
recorded or passed, and as to the regularity
of any proceedings of such inferior Court, and
may, when calling, for such record, direct that
the execution of any sentence or order be
suspended, and if the accused is in
confinement that he be released on his own
bond or bail bond pending the examination of
the record.
Explanation.All
Magistrates,
whether
Executive or Judicial, and whether exercising
original or appellate jurisdiction, shall be
deemed to be inferior to the Sessions Judge
for the purposes of this sub-section and of
section 439.
(2) The powers of revision conferred by subsection (1) shall not be exercised in relation
to any interlocutory order passed in any
appeal, inquiry, trial or other proceeding.
(3) If an application under this section has
been made by any person either to the High
Court or to the Sessions Judge, no further
application by the same person shall be
entertained by the other of them.
442. High Court's powers of revision.-(1) In
the case of any proceeding the record of
which has been called for by itself or which
otherwise comes to its knowledge, the High
Court may, in its discretion, exercise any of
the powers conferred on a Court of Appeal by
sections 427, 430, 431 and 432 or on a Court
of Session by section 344, and, when the
Judges composing the Court of revision are
equally divided in opinion, the case shall be
disposed of in the manner provided by section
433.
(2) No order under this section shall be made
to the prejudice of the accused or other
person unless he has had an opportunity of
being heard either personally or by advocate
in his own defence.
(3) Nothing in this section shall be deemed to
authorise a High Court to convert a finding of
acquittal into one of conviction.
(4) Where under this Sanhita an appeal lies
and no appeal is brought, no proceeding by
way of revision shall be entertained at the
instance of the party who could have
appealed.
(5) Where under this Sanhita an appeal lies
but an application for revision has been made
to the High Court by any person and the High
Court is satisfied that such application was
made under the erroneous belief that no
appeal lies thereto and that it is necessary in
the interests of justice so to do, the High
Court may treat the application for revision as
a petition of appeal and deal with the same
accordingly.”
From the aforesaid provisions of law, it appears that it
is the settled law that against an interlocutory order, there is no
scope to entertain any revision petition.
6.
Here
in
the
case
at
hand,
by
the
order
dated
19.05.2025, Learned Trial Court has finally released the vehicle
on bail although with certain terms and conditions. So, after
going through the citations referred by Learned Counsel for the
respondents, it appears to this Court that the order impugned
cannot be termed as an interlocutory order rather it appears to
this Court as a final order. So, the submission of Learned
Counsel
for
the
respondents
that
the
petition
is
not
maintainable is not legally sustainable at this stage.
7.
Now, regarding the legality of the order, it appears to
this Court that the respondent No.1 is one of the prime accused
of this case and he is also the owner of the said seized vehicle
bearing
No.TR-01BP-0663(Maruti
WagonR),
which
is
also
revealed from the order of the Learned Trial Court. Further,
from the relevant prosecution papers, it appears that on the
alleged date and time the respondent No.1 along with another
was caught in red hand by I/O along with the seized vehicle
from which the contraband items was seized/recovered. Even at
the time of hearing, the said fact has not been disputed by
Learned Counsel for the respondents.
8.
I have also gone through the judgment of the Hon’ble
Supreme Court as relied upon by the petitioner in Bishwajit
Dey(supra) wherein Hon’ble the Supreme Court has very
specifically stated that where the owner of the vehicle is the
person
from
whom
the
possession
of
contraband
was
recovered, in that case, the seized vehicle may not be released
till reverse burden of proof is discharged by the accused person.
Thus, it appears that the order dated 19.05.2025 suffers from
infirmity and the same needs to be interfered with.
9.
Accordingly, the order dated 19.05.2025 to the extent
of releasing of the aforenoted seized vehicle bearing No.TR-01BP-0663(Maruti WagonR) on bail stands set aside/quashed. The
respondent No.2 shall hand over the vehicle to the IO of this
case.
10.
With this observation, this present petition stands
disposed of.
Send
down
the
LCR
along
with
a
copy
of
the
order/judgment.
Also, a copy of this order be supplied to Learned
Counsel for the petitioner-Union of India for information and
compliance.
Pending application(s), if any, also stands disposed of.
JUDGE
signed by
MOUMITA Digitally
MOUMITA DATTA
Date: 2026.02.23
DATTA
11:51:44 -08'00'
Deepshikha
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