Full Judgment Text
Text read from the judgment PDF published on the High Court's eCourts portal, through the
Indian High Court Judgments open data set (Dattam Labs,
CC BY 4.0).
The court's own copy is the authoritative text.
2026:MHC:4056
WA No. 3594 of 2025
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS
Reserved on: 01.09.2026
Pronounced on: 24.09.2026
CORAM
THE HON'BLE DR.JUSTICE ANITA SUMANTH
AND
THE HON'BLE MR.JUSTICE C.KUMARAPPAN
WA No. 3594 of 2025
and CMP.No. 29708 of 2025
CNR:{HCMA012865352025}
1. Union of India,
through Ministry of Finance,
Department of Revenue,
North Block, New Delhi 110001.
2. The Commissioner of Customs,
No. 60, Rajaji Salai,
Chennai-600001.
3. The Directorate of Revenue Intelligence,
Chennai Zonal Unit,
27, G.N.Chetty Road,
T.Nagar,
Chennai-600017.
4. The Intelligence Officer,
Directorate of Revenue Intelligence,
Chennai Zonal Unit,
27, G.N.Chetty Road,
T.Nagar,
Chennai-600017.
5. The Assistant Director,
Ministry of Finance,
Department of Revenue,
__________
https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis
2026:MHC:4056
WA No. 3594 of 2025
Directorate of Revenue Intelligence,
27, G.N.Chetty Road, T.Nagar,
Chennai-600017.
..Appellant(s)
Vs
1. Dhanalaxmi Food Pvt, Ltd.
Having office at Kuleshwar,
Byapar Singh, Kathmandu, Nepal,
Rep.by Power Agent D.S.Hari
2. M/s.Unifeeder Agencies India Pvt. Ltd,
4thFloor, Chalam Tower,
New No.113, Old No. 62,
Dr.Radhakrishnan Salai, Mylapore,
Chennai-600004.
3. M/s.Chennai Container Terminal Pvt. Ltd.,
Chennai Ground,
Chennai Port Trust Administrative Building,
No.1, Rajaji Salai,
Chennai-600001.
..Respondent(s)
Appeal filed under Clause 15 of Letters Patent, to allow the above Writ
Appeal by setting aside the impugned order dated 06.11.2025 passed in
W.P.No.28538 of 2025.
For Appellant(s):
Mr.Sai Srujan Tayi,
Senior Panel Counsel
For Respondent(s):
Ms.Avanti Balachander, (for R1)
Ms.Ashly K.Prakash (for R2)
for M/s.Lloyd & Johnson
R3 - No Appearance.
__________
https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis
2026:MHC:4056
WA No. 3594 of 2025
JUDGMENT
(Judgment of the Court was delivered by Dr.Anita Sumanth J.)
The appellants are the respondents in W.P.No.28538 of 2025, being the
Department of Revenue, Ministry of Finance, Union of India/A1, Commissioner
of Customs/A2 and authorities of Directorate of Revenue Intelligence/A3 to A5.
The Writ Petitioner is R1, the Liner is R2 and the Container Terminal is R3 in
this appeal. The parties are referred to as per the array in this appeal.
2. R1 is an importer of six containers of watermelon seeds that were
being transhipped to Nepal, through Chennai and Kolkata Ports. The supplier is
a company based in Dubai UAE and the consignments were shipped per two
bills of lading bearing Nos.JEA/CCU/25/36931 and JEA/CCU/25/36963, both
dated 26.05.2025. As on that date, Notification No.6/2025-26 dated 02.05.2026
was in force that imposed a prohibition on the import or transit of goods
originating in or exported from Pakistan.
3. Based on intelligence that the containers contained prohibited goods
per Notification No.6/2025-26, the containers were detained at Chennai Port
and examined. The authorities found 4050 bags of raw unshelled watermelon
seeds, out of which 300 bags contained labels indicating that the goods had
originated in Pakistan. The goods were hence seized vide mahazar dated
__________
https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis
2026:MHC:4056
WA No. 3594 of 2025
27.06.2025 that came to be challenged by way of a Writ Petition along with
summons dated 26.03.2025 issued by A3.
4. The Writ Petition has been allowed on 06.11.2025, learned Judge
quashing both the seizure memo and summons and issuing directions to A3 to
release the goods for onward transhipment. Hence this Writ Appeal by the
customs authorities.
5. Mr.Sai Srujan Tayi, learned Senior Panel Counsel for the appellants
argues that the impugned order has not taken note of relevant facts, has
misconstrued the term ‘import’, in holding that there had been no import of
consignment into India, had misinterpreted relevant provisions in the Customs
Act, 1962 (in short ‘Act’), including Sections 11 and 54, had further erred in
deciding questions of fact in relation to the country of origin of consignments,
holding them to be Nigeria and had, in all, erred in allowing the Writ Petition
contrary to the spirit and express terms of Notification No.6/2025-26, in
directing release of the goods for transhipment.
6. The appellants rely on the following judgments to buttress their
submissions as aforesaid.
(i)
Union of India and another v. Mustafa &Najibai Trading Co. and
others1
(1998) 6 SCC 79
__________
https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis
2026:MHC:4056
WA No. 3594 of 2025
(ii)
Gramaphone Company of India Ltd. v. Birendra Bahadur Pandey
and others2
(iii) National Legal Services Authority v. Union of India and others3
(iv) Centre for Public Interest Litigation v. Union of India4
(v) Aabis International v. C.C., Chennai Cus.-II Commissionerate5
(vi) K.R.Ahmed Shah v. Additional Collector of Customs, Madras &
Others6
(vii) Lucas T.V.S. Padi, Madras v. Assistant Collector of Customs, Madras
and Others7
7. Per contra, Ms.Avanti Balachander, learned counsel for R1 and
Mr.Ashly K.Prakash, learned counsel for R2 would argue that there was no
error in the impugned order, having regard to the relevant provisions of the Act
and the Customs (Administration of Rules of Origin under Trade Agreements)
Rules, 2020.
8. They argue that the Writ Court has gone into the supporting
documentation concluding rightly that they are of sterling quality and
unimpeachable since they have been issued by statutory authorities. Drawing
attention to the Treaty for transhipment between Government of India and
Government of Nepal (in short ‘Treaty’), learned counsel would emphasise that
the destination State, i.e, Nepal was land-locked and the purpose of the Treaty is
to promote freedom of transit and international trade. The Treaty has been
extended from time to time and is even now in force. Since the goods were
(1984) 2 SCC 534
(2014) 5 SCC 438
MANU/SC/0057/2026
2021 SCC OnLine Mad 17129
1980 SCC OnLine Mad 401
1980 SCC OnLine Mad 415
__________
https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis
2026:MHC:4056
WA No. 3594 of 2025
destined for Nepal, the prohibition imposed by Notification No.6/2025-26
would not be attracted.
9. Taking us through the following judgments, learned counsel would
argue that the question of import of the goods does not arise as there has been
no intermingling of the subject goods with goods meant for domestic sale and
hence there was no dispute that the consignments were meant only for
transhipment.
(i)
(ii)
(iii)
Collector of Customs, Calcutta v. Narayani Trading Concern (Pvt.)
Ltd.8
Narayani Trading Concern (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Collector of Customs9
Padam Kumar Agarwalla v. Additional Collector of Customs10
10. We have heard learned counsel and perused the records. The admitted
facts are that 4050 bags of raw unshelled watermelon seeds weighing 1,61,490
kgs were packed in six containers under two bills of lading bearing
Nos.JEA/CCU/25/36931 and JEA/CCU/25/36963, both dated 26.05.2025, and
loaded on to SSL Krishna (V.086), the consignee being R1.
11. As on the date of bill of lading, prohibition had been imposed vide
Notification No.6/2025-26 dated 02.05.2025 that reads as follows:
Government of India
Ministry of Commerce & Industry
Department of Commerce
Directorate General of Foreign Trade
Vanijya Bhawan
1995 SCC OnLine Cal 463
1995 SCC OnLine Cal 465
(1972) 4 SCC (N) 32
__________
https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis
2026:MHC:4056
WA No. 3594 of 2025
Notification No.06/2025-26
New Delhi, Dated: 2nd May 2025
Subject: Prohibition on Import or transit of all goods originating
in or exported from Pakistan – Insertion of Para 2.20A of
Foreign Trade Policy (FTP) 2023, - reg.
S.O.(E) In exercise of powers conferred by Section 3 read with
Section 5 of Foreign Trade (Development & Regulation) Act,
1992, read with paragraph 1.02 and 2.01 of the Foreign Trade
Policy (FTP) 2023, as amended from time to time, the Central
Government hereby inserts a new Para 2.20A in Foreign Trade
Policy, 2023 as follows with immediate effect:
Para 2.20A: Prohibition on Import from Pakistan
Direct or indirect Import or transit of all goods originating in or
exported from Pakistan, whether or not freely importable or
otherwise permitted, shall be prohibited with immediate effect,
until further orders. This restriction is imposed in the interest of
national security and public policy. Any exception to this
prohibition shall require prior approval of the Government of
India.”
Effect of the Notification: Para 2.20A of FTP, 2023 is inserted to
prohibit direct or indirect import or transit of all goods
originating in or exported from Pakistan with immediate effects
until further orders.
(Ajay Bhadoo)
Director General of Foreign Trade &
Addl. Secretary to the Government of
India
12. The language of the Notification is clear, in that it refers to import,
both direct and indirect, for the purposes of clearance and transit. Based on
information that the subject consignments contained prohibited goods, the
authorities detained and examined the consignments finding that out of 4050
__________
https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis
2026:MHC:4056
WA No. 3594 of 2025
bags, 300 bags contained labels stating ‘watermelon seeds/40kg/origin:
Pakistan/PROD-Dt:-03/2025/Exp.Dt:-03/2027’. The entire consignment has
been seized under Mahazar dated 27.06.2025.
13. The main grounds on which the Writ Petition had been allowed is that
there has been no ‘import’ of the consignments as there has been no
intermingling of the products for domestic consumption, or, in other words,
there have been no clearances for home consumption, and that the documents
accompanying the shipment established that the goods originated from Nigeria
and not Pakistan.
14. It is a fact that the consignments have not been cleared for home
consumption. Section 2(25) and 2(26) define ‘imported goods’ and ‘importer’.
The definition of ‘imported goods’ is ‘any goods brought into India from a
place outside India but does not include goods which have been cleared for
home consumption.’ An importer, in relation to goods, between their
importation and the time when they are cleared for home consumption, includes
any owner, beneficial owner or any person holding himself out to be an
importer.
15. Section 46 falling under Chapter VII under the head ‘Clearance of
Imported Goods’ reads as follows:
Section 46. Entry of goods on importation. __________
https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis
2026:MHC:4056
WA No. 3594 of 2025
(1) The importer of any goods, other than goods intended for transit
or
transhipment,
shall
make
entry
thereof
by
presenting electronically on the customs automated system to the
proper officer a bill of entry for home consumption or warehousing
in such form and manner as may be prescribed :
…….
(4) The importer while presenting a bill of entry shall make and
subscribe to a declaration as to the truth of the contents of such bill
of entry and shall, in support of such declaration, produce to the
proper officer the invoice, if any, and such other documents relating
to the imported goods as may be prescribed.
(4A) The importer who presents a bill of entry shall ensure the
following, namely:(a) the accuracy and completeness of the information given therein;
(b) the authenticity and validity of any document supporting it; and
(c) compliance with the restriction or prohibition, if any, relating to
the goods under this Act or under any other law for the time being
in force.
(5) If the proper officer is satisfied that the interests of revenue are
not prejudicially affected and that there was no fraudulent
intention, he may permit substitution of a bill of entry for home
consumption for a bill of entry for warehousing or vice versa.
16. Chapter VIII deals with goods in transit comprising Sections 52, 53
and 54 deals with transhipment of goods on payment of duty, reading as
follows:
Section 54. Transhipment of certain goods without payment of
duty. (1) Where any goods imported into a customs station are intended
for transhipment, a bill of transhipment shall be presented to the
proper officer in such form and manner as may be prescribed:
__________
https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis
2026:MHC:4056
WA No. 3594 of 2025
Provided that where the goods are being transhipped under an
international treaty or bilateral agreement between the Government
of India and Government of a foreign country, a declaration for
transhipment instead of a bill of transhipment shall be presented to
the proper officer in such form and manner as may be prescribed .
(2) Subject to the provisions of section 11, where any goods imported
into a customs station are mentioned in the 5 [arrival manifest or
import manifest] or the import report, as the case may be, as for
transhipment to any place outside India, such goods may be allowed
to be so transhipped without payment of duty.
(3) Where any goods imported into a customs station are mentioned
in the 5 [arrival manifest or import manifest] or the import report, as
the case may be, as for transhipment (a) to any major port as defined in the Indian Ports Act, 1908 (15 of
1908), or the customs airport at Mumbai, Calcutta, Delhi or Chennai
or any other customs port or customs airport which the Board may,
by notification in the Official Gazette, specify in this behalf, or
(b) to any other customs station and the proper officer is satisfied
that the goods are bona fide intended for transhipment to such
customs station,
the proper officer may allow the goods to be transhipped, without
payment of duty, subject to such conditions as may be prescribed for
the due arrival of such goods at the customs station to which
transhipment is allowed.
17. There is no dispute on the position that Notification 2/2025 dated
02.05.2025 would apply to transhipments as well. The writ Court has, in
arriving at the conclusion that the subject consignments have not been imported,
proceeded on the theory of incorporation and intermingling of mass of goods in
the Country, relying on the judgments in K.R.Ahmed Shah11 and Lucas T.V.S.
Padi, Madras12.
Foot Note Supra (6)
Foot Note Supra (7)
__________
https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis
2026:MHC:4056
WA No. 3594 of 2025
18. We find these judgments distinguishable as they dealt with the
determination of the stage at which goods may be treated as exported out of the
Country and have been rendered in the context of allowability of drawback
allowance under Section 75 of the Act. Inter alia, there is reference to cases that
have taken a view that the term ‘import’ connotes a point in time after the goods
are off-loaded. However, these decisions have been rendered in different
contexts and will not come to the aid of the respondent.
19. In re : Sea Customs Act13, a Bench comprising nine Hon’ble Judges of
the Supreme Court deliberated on the scope and interpretation of Article 289 of
the Constitution and answered the reference relating to whether sub-section (1)
of Section 20 of the Sea Customs Act, 1878 provided for levy of customs duties
on goods imported or exported by sea to the extent and in the manner specified
in that sub-section, and other allied questions. The definition of ‘import’,
‘importer’ and ‘imported goods’ that are available under the 1962 Act did not
figure in the Sea Customs Act, 1878.
20. A Full Bench of the Bombay High Court in Apar Private Ltd. and
others v. Union of India and others14 dealt with the question of when, under the
Customs Act, 1962, can the event of importation be said to occur, at what point
(1878) (AIR 1963 SC.1760)
1985 (22) ELT 644 (Bom.)
__________
https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis
2026:MHC:4056
WA No. 3594 of 2025
of time or date was the rate of customs duty relatable to imported goods liable
to be determined, and other allied questions.
21. In that case, the goods had entered the territorial waters of India and
were stored in a bonded warehouse. On the date when they entered the
territorial waters, they were exempt under Notification.
However, the
Notification was rescinded by the time the goods were removed from the
bonded warehouse. Hence, while the assessee contended that importation was
complete when the goods entered the territorial waters, the customs authorities
contended that they could be taken to have been imported only when the
process of import was complete.
22. The Bench has noted the definitions of the terms ‘import’, ‘imported
goods’ and ‘India’, the last, as including territorial waters of India. The Bench
concluded that the taxable event occurred at a time when they entered the
territorial waters of India, no sooner and no later. As to the argument of the
process of import was complete only upon finalization of the import procedures,
the Bench made a distinction between ‘chargeability’, which stood triggered the
moment the consignment enters territorial waters, and ‘quantification’, which is
a later event.
23. The judgment of the Supreme Court in In re : Sea Customs Act was
also distinguished noting that that judgment had been rendered in the context of
__________
https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis
2026:MHC:4056
WA No. 3594 of 2025
the earlier enactment that was structured differently, without the benefit of the
definitions available under the 1962 enactment.
24. In the present case, we need hardly labour this point as the
Notification itself proceeds on the basis that goods entering territorial waters for
the purposes of transit shall be taken to be imports. The Notification has not
been challenged and hence the parties are bound by the clear language
employed, and express intention.
25. In Mustafa &Najibai Trading Co.15, the Supreme Court was
concerned with the arrival of a vessel in the Bombay Port without a bonafide
purpose. In that context, the Court dealt with what the term ‘import’ would
mean, and examine various provisions of the Customs Act. That consignment
had been shipped from Dubai to Afghanistan via Karachi, Pakistan and had
been refused arrival in Karachi.
26. The Central Board of Revenue of Pakistan allowed re-shipment back
to Dubai. On re-shipment of the consignment, along with other goods again left
Karachi to Dubai but instead of proceeding to Dubai, arrived in Bombay. The
Indian Customs authorities confiscated both the goods and the Vessel that had
arrived unauthorisedly, imposing various penalties.
Foot Note Supra (1)
__________
https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis
2026:MHC:4056
WA No. 3594 of 2025
27. The facts have been captured in paragraph 2 of the judgment where
the Court records that the Vessel had reached the outer anchorage of Bombay
Harbour and entered the inner anchorage the next date but was sent back to
outer anchorage. On enquiry and inspection, the Customs Officers had found
gunny covered packages bearing the marking ‘In Transit to Afghanistan via
Karachi and Chamman’, kept below other packages.
28. It was noted that no steps had been taken to file Import General
Manifest or other documents for the purposes of voyage to Bombay. The
officers proceeded to seize all the packets found on board and thereafter issued
show cause notices to the owners of the Vessel, followed by confiscation with
an option to redeem on payment of fine and penalties. The importers filed a writ
petition that was accepted by the High Court.
29. The order of the High Court was challenged in appeal by the Union,
and at paragraph 26, the Supreme Court states as follows:
26. Moreover, bonafides of the owners or the master of the
vessel has a bearing only on the applicability of sub- section
(3) of Section 30 which enables the proper officer to permit the
import manifest or import report to be amended or
supplemented if he is satisfied that the said import manifest or
import report is in any way incorrect or incomplete and there
is no fraudulent intention. In the present case, the question of
applicability of sub-section (3) of Section 30 does not arise
because no import manifest was delivered by the Master of the
vessel at any time. The intention of the owners or master of the
vessel has no bearing on the exercise of the power of
confiscation of goods under Section 111 of the Act because, as
__________
https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis
2026:MHC:4056
WA No. 3594 of 2025
laid down by this Court, confiscation of goods is an action in
rem directed against the goods in respect of which the
contravention rendering them liable to be confiscated has
taken place. [See :Shewpujanrai Indrasanrai Ltd. v. The
Collector of Customs & Ors., 1959 SCR 821 at p. 838; and
Collector of Customs, Madras & Ors. v. D. Bhoormall
(supra) ]. In the matter of confiscation of goods under Section
111(d) of the Act intention has, therefore, no bearing. What is
required to be seen is whether the goods had been imported or
attempted to be imported or brought within the Indian customs
water for the purpose of being imported contrary to any
prohibition imposed by or under the Act or any other law for
the time being in force. If it is found that any goods have been
imported or attempted to be imported or brought within the
Indian customs water for the purpose of being imported
contrary to any prohibition imposed by or under the Act or any
other law for the time being in force the said goods would be
liable to confiscation under Section 111(d) and the question
whether the person importing or bringing the said goods
intended to commit violation of the provisions of the Act or any
other law for the time being in force would be of no
consequence. Similarly, clause (f) of Section 111 provided for
confiscation of any dutiable or prohibited goods which are
required to be mentioned under the regulations in any import
manifest, or import report and which are not so mentioned
therein. In the matter of confiscation of goods under Section
111(f) what is required to be seen is whether the goods are
dutiable or prohibited goods and are required to be mentioned
in the import manifest or import report under the regulations
made under the Act and whether they are mentioned in the
import manifest/import report. If it is found that the goods are
dutiable or prohibited goods and are required to be mentioned
under the regulations made under the Act in the import
manifest/import report but have not been so mentioned, the
goods would be liable to be confiscated and the intention of the
default would have no bearing on the exercise of power to
confiscate the goods. Since mens rea is not essential for
invoking the power of confiscation of the goods under Section
111 of the Act, the intention of the master of the vessel or the
owners of vessel and the circumstances under which the vessel
containing the goods came to Bombay has no bearing on the
exercise of the power of confiscation of goods under Sections
111(d) and 111(f) and all that has to be seen is whether the
__________
https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis
2026:MHC:4056
WA No. 3594 of 2025
conditions prescribed under the said provisions were fulfilled
so as to justify the confiscation of the goods.
30. After considering various provisions of the Act, the Supreme Court
concludes that the intention of the Masters of the Vessel would have no bearing
on the power of the authorities to confiscate, and what was required to be seen
is whether the goods have been brought in contrary to any prohibition that was
in force. Paragraph 29 reads as follows:
29.The High Court has held that the goods were obviously in transit to
Dubai which was the port of clearance and the visit to Bombay port was
not illegitimate or illegal. In holding that there was no contravention of
the provisions of clauses (d) and (f) of Section 111, the High Court has
proceeded on the basis that since the vessel had come to Bombay for a
legitimate purpose and there was no lack of bona fides on the part of the
Master and the owners of the vessel in the ship having come to Bombay,
it cannot be said that there was violation of the provisions of Section
111(d) and (f) of the Act. As indicated earlier, the finding of the High
Court that there was no lack of bona fides on the part of the Master of
the vessel and the owners of the ship in the ship having come to Bombay,
has been arrived at by the High Court after reversing the finding of fact
recorded by the Collector and the Tribunal and it cannot be sustained.
We have also indicated that mens rea is not essential for invoking the
power of confiscation under Section 111 of the Act and, therefore, the
intention of the owners of the vessel or the Master of the vessel has no
bearing on the exercise of the power to confiscate the goods under
clauses (d) and (f) of Section 111 of the Act.
31. The above judgments support our view to the effect that the subject
consignments would constitute imports for the purpose of determining
applicability of the Notification.
32. The second test undertaken by the Writ Court is to test the point of
origin of the subject goods for the purpose of which, the documents that
accompanied the consignments have been scrutinized, being:__________
https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis
2026:MHC:4056
WA No. 3594 of 2025
i)
Two commercial invoices dated 14.05.2025 where the country of
origin is stated to be Nigeria and the country of destination,
Nepal. This document states that the cargo is in transit to Nepal.
ii)
Packing lists that mirror the above facts.
iii)
Customs Declaration before the Dubai Customs where Port of
origin is ‘SD’ which is Sudan, and Port of discharge is Kolkata.
There is no reference to Nepal in the customs declaration.
iv)
Certificate issued by the Plant Quarantine and Pesticide
Management Centre, where the country of origin is Nigeria and
final destination is Mechi.
v)
Certificate issued by the Dubai Chamber of Commerce certifying
the Port of origin to be Nigeria.
vi)
Phytosanitary Certificate issued by the Ministry of Climate
Change & Environment, UAE certifying Port of origin - Nigeria
and confirming final destination as Nepal via Kolkata.
vii)
Bill of Lading certifying the Port of Loading as Jabel Ali, Port of
transhipment as Chennai and Port of Discharge as Kolkata.
viii)
The IGM-SEA stating destination port as Kolkata, the import
being for the purpose of transhipment.
33. On an analysis of the above documents, what is clear is that (i) Port of
Loading of the consignment was Jabel Ali, UAE, (ii) the consignments were
__________
https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis
2026:MHC:4056
WA No. 3594 of 2025
transhipped at Chennai Port onwards to Kolkata Port, (iii) on arrival in Kolkata,
the goods would be sent by road to Nepal via road, basis the Treaty, (iv)
However, the point of origin is set out either as Nigeria or in one document, as
Sudan. This is a disputed question of fact, that can be resolved by application of
the Customs (Administration of Rules of Origin under Trade Agreements)
Rules, 2020.
34. This Court had, as early as in December, 2005, suggested that the
process for determination of point of origin could be undertaken even then and
be completed within three weeks. On 11.12.2025, this was the order that was
passed:
6.One aspect that was discussed before us relates to whether a
determination under the Customs (Administration of Rules of Origin
under Trade Agreements) Rules, 2020 (Rules) is necessary.
However, the appellants point out that, those Rules apply to import
of goods to India where the importer has made a claim of
preferential duty.
7.The present case is not a one of import but of transit, which
is also covered under Notification dated 02.05.2025. Hence,
according to Mr.Sai Srujan Tayi, such determination could well be
made by the competent authority, viz., the Commissioner of Customs
(Preventive). We agree.
8.We suggest that the process for determination of point of
origin commence immediately and be completed within three (3)
weeks.
9.List on 15.12.2025 to receive affidavits indicating the time
frame that the parties intend to follow for the above.’
__________
https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis
2026:MHC:4056
WA No. 3594 of 2025
35. When the matter came up thereafter, R1 expressed its intention to
appear before the authority without prejudice to their objection on the
jurisdiction assumed by the DRI to make a determination on the question of
point of origin. According to R1, the proper authority to determine would only
be the Central Board of Indirect Taxes and Customs in terms of the
Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement between the Government of
India and Government of United Arab Emirates. Since the reluctance of R1 was
palpable, the Court did not pursue that suggestion any further.
36. The factual dispute in regard to point of origin is apparent with the
documents revealing origin either from Nigeria, Sudan or Pakistan. Hence, and
in light of the discussion as above, we reiterate our disinclination to embark on
the exercise of determination of a disputed question of fact and the parties are
relegated to the alternate procedures set out under the Statute and the Rules in
this regard.
37. One of the arguments raised by R1 in challenging the seizure is that it
is only the authorities in Kolkata who ought to have inspected/seized the goods,
as the purpose of arrival in Chennai Port was only for transhipment to Kolkata
Port. We reject this contention as the authorities of Directorate of Revenue
Intelligence (DRI) hold All India jurisdiction as may be seen from Notification
No.17/2002-Customs (N.T.) dated 07.03.2002.
Hence, it is open to the DRI
authorities in Chennai Port to undertake the process of inspection, particularly
__________
https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis
2026:MHC:4056
WA No. 3594 of 2025
as the Port in Chennai is the point of first entry/arrival/import of the
consignment in India.
38. The last point relates to the argument of R1 that the Treaty would
override Municipal law. Reliance has been placed on Centre for Public Interest
Litigation16, where the Court was dealing with a challenge to Section 17A of the
Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 relating to enquiry or investigation of
offences relatable to recommendations or decisions taken by a public servant in
discharge of official functions or duties, particularly paragraph 132.5, that states
as follows:
132.5 There are three courses of action that an Indian Court may take
as regards an international legal obligation. In the event of a lacuna
in the municipal law, international legal obligations may be used to
“paper over the cracks”, so to speak, in the form of using them as the
basis to issue guidelines or directions until Parliament enacts a
suitable legislation. In the event of a direct conflict between the
international legal obligation and municipal law, the municipal law
would prevail. However, in instances where there is no direct
contradiction between the municipal law and the international legal
obligation, the provisions of municipal law should be interpreted by
the Court in such a manner that ensures compliance with the
international legal obligation particularly in the case of
Constitutional provisions.
39. In National Legal Services Authority17, R1 has referred to paragraphs
54 and 55 to argue that it is the Notification/Treaty that will have precedence
over Municipal law. Paragraphs 54 and 55 for full appreciation are extracted
below:
Foot Note Supra (4)
Foot Note Supra (3)
__________
https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis
2026:MHC:4056
WA No. 3594 of 2025
‘54. Article 253 of the Constitution of India states that the
Parliament has the power to make any law for the whole or any part
of the territory of India for implementing any treaty, agreement or
convention. Generally, therefore, a legislation is required for
implementing the international conventions, unlike the position in the
United States of America where the rules of international law are
applied by the municipal courts on the theory of their implied
adoption by the State, as a part of its own municipal law. Article VI
clause (2) of the US Constitution reads as follows:
“….. all treaties made, or which shall be made,
under the authority of the United States, shall be
the supreme law of the land, and the Judges in
every State shall be bound thereby, anything in
the Constitution or laws of any State to the
contrary notwithstanding.”
55. In the United States, however, it is open to the courts to
supersede or modify international law in its application or it may be
controlled by the treaties entered into by the United States. But, till
an Act of Congress is passed, the court is bound by the law of
nations, which is part of the law of the land. Such a ‘supremacy
clause’ is absent in our Constitution. Courts in India would apply the
rules of international law according to the principles of comity of
nations, unless they are overridden by clear rules of domestic law.
(See Gramophone Co. of India Ltd. v. Birendra Bahadur
Pandey (1984) 2 SCC 534, V.O. Tractoroexport v. Tarapore&
Co. (1969) 3 SCC 562 and Mirza Ali Akbar Kashani v. United Arab
Republic (1966) 1 SCR 391.
40. In the above case the subject matter of discussion was the rights of the
transgender community to seek gender identity apart from the one assigned to
them at birth.
In that context, the Court, considering the scope of the
fundamental rights guaranteed under the Constitution of India, held that
international law would be applicable where there was silence within Indian law
to deal with the situation. In the absence of any law relating to transgenders
domestically the Municipal Courts were directed to follow international law.
__________
https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis
2026:MHC:4056
WA No. 3594 of 2025
41. We are of the considered view that that reasoning would have no
application in the present case. There is no silence or vacuum in the Customs
Act that would require us to turn to the Treaty in preference to, and overriding
the provisions of the Customs Act. On the contrary, the Indian Customs Act is
clear when it comes to our understanding on what import is and how it should
be dealt with in different situations.
42. Rather, Article 11,‘Exceptions to Convention on Grounds of Public
Health, Security, and Protection of Intellectual Property’, stipulates the
following caveats:
Article 11
Exceptions to Convention on Grounds of Public Health, Security,
and Protection of Intellectual Property.
1. No Contracting State shall be bound by this Convention to afford
transit to persons whose admission into its territory is forbidden, or
for goods of a kind of which the importation is prohibited, either on
ground of public morals, public health or security, or as a
precaution against diseases of animals or plants or against pests.
2. Each Contracting State shall be entitled to take reasonable
precautions and measures to ensure that persons and goods,
particularly goods which are the subject of a monopoly, are really
in transit, and that the means of transport are really used for the
passage of such goods, as well as to protect the safety of the routes
and means of communication.
3. Nothing in this Convention shall affect the measures which a
Contracting State may be called upon to take in pursuance of
provisions in a general international convention, whether of a
world-wide or regional character, to which it is a party, whether
such convention was already concluded on the date of this
Convention or is concluded later, when such provisions relate:
__________
https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis
2026:MHC:4056
WA No. 3594 of 2025
(a) to export or import or transit of particular kinds of articles such
as narcotics, or other dangerous drugs, or arms; or
(b) to protection of industrial, literary or artistic property, or
protection of trade names, and indications of source or appellations
of origin, and the suppression of unfair competition.
4. Nothing in this Convention shall prevent any Contracting State
from taking any action necessary for the protection of its essential
security interests.
43. Thus, even on this score, the argument that Treaty would override
municipal law has no legs to stand and we reject the same.
44. R1 has referred to the judgment of the Calcutta High Court in
Narayani Trading Concern (Pvt.) Ltd18 which related to return of Poppy seeds
imported from Pakistan through Calcutta Port in transit to Nepal. Narayani
Trading Concern had sought a mandamus for return of Poppy seeds which had
been granted by the single Judge, as against which, an appeal had been filed by
the authorities. That does not appear to be a case involving prohibition for
importation from Pakistan, and the circumstances presented by Notification
No.6/2025-26 did not arise in that matter. To that extent, the judgment in
Narayani Trading Concern (Pvt.) Ltd. is of no assistance to R1.
45. One of the arguments advanced is as to whether the extent of seizure
may be restricted to the 300 bags which contain the above labels. However, the
argument of the appellants is that the entire consignment becomes tainted as all
Foot Note Supra (9)
__________
https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis
2026:MHC:4056
WA No. 3594 of 2025
the bags have been placed together in containers. They would argue that there
is no justification in splitting the consignments.
46. We agree that there need be no demarcation at this stage between
those bags containing the offending labels and the other bags. Ultimately all
4050 bags are part of two bills of lading constituting one consignment. We have
also noted that there are other discrepancies in the documents that reinforce our
view that the question of origin of goods is one of fact. Hence, we are not
inclined to bifurcate the consignment.
47. In fine, this Writ Appeal is allowed.
No costs.
Connected
Miscellaneous Petition is closed.
(A.S.M.,J.) (C.K.,J.)
24.09.2026
sl
Index: Yes/No
Speaking/Non-speaking order
__________
https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis
2026:MHC:4056
WA No. 3594 of 2025
DR.ANITA SUMANTH J.
AND
C.KUMARAPPAN J.
sl
WA No. 3594 of 2025
AND
CMP NO. 29708 OF 2025
24.09.2026
__________
https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis
This page is for informational and research purposes only and does not constitute legal advice.
Consult a qualified advocate for advice specific to your situation.
Is your name in this judgment and should it be masked, or is something on this page wrong?
Request a review