Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 – ss.6(1), 8(1),(4), 10(1), (3),(6), 42 – Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Repeal Act, 1999 – ss.3(1)(a), (2), 4, 5 – Joint family property of two sisters under various Survey Nos. including Survey No.53/3A – Partition of the property alleged in 1984 between their children, one of whom filed statement u/s.6(1) declaring the particulars of the joint family property – Competent Authority issued a draft statement to the declarant to surrender excess vacant land including land falling within Survey No.53/3A – Objection filed – Eventually, land in inter alia Survey No.53/3A was declared as excess land – Appellant claims to have purchased a portion of Survey No.53/3A comprising a house (suit property) in 1994 from the daughter of one of the sisters who had allegedly acquired it by virtue of the aforesaid partition – Appellant filed petition under the Repeal Act, 1999 for his name to be restored in the records instead of the government’s – Petition rejected by Competent Authority – Appellant’s writ petition and appeal dismissed in High Court – Held: Determination of excess land is to be made considering the status of the land at the time of commencement of the Principal Act and not at the time of filing of the declaration – Since, admittedly the partition, if any, was only effected after the Principal Act’s commencement, the Division Bench correctly held that the partition deed of 1984 would not affect the validity of the Competent Authority’s determination of excess land owned by the joint family at the time of commencement of the Act – To this limited extent, findings of the Division Bench concurred with – However, there is nothing on record to conclusively establish possession of the suit property either by the Competent Authority or the appellant – Conflicting averments made by parties – It was incumbent on the Division Bench to enquire into and settle the questions of fact – Impugned judgment set aside – Matter remitted to the Division Bench to consider the case afresh.
Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 – ss. 6, 8, 9,
10 – Held: ss.8 and 9 make it incumbent on the Competent Authority to issue notice to or provide an opportunity to be heard only to the ‘person concerned’, i.e., the person who has filed the statement u/s.6 – Claims of all other persons interested in the vacant land are to be considered through issuing a Gazetted notification as per s.10(1) – Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Repeal Act, 1999. Disposing of the appeal, the Court
HELD: 1.1 The Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 (Principal Act) came into force in Karnataka on 17.02.1976. Section 6 of the Principal Act requires that a statement be filed before the Competent Authority by ‘every person holding vacant land in excess of the ceiling limit at the commencement of the Act…’. Thus, the determination of ‘excess land’ is to be made considering the status of the land at the time of commencement of the Principal Act, and not at the time of filing of the declaration. Since it is an admitted fact that the partition, if any, was only effected after the Principal Act’s commencement, the Division Bench was correct in holding that the partition deed dated 9.01.1984 would not affect the validity of the Competent Authority’s determination of excess land owned by the joint family at the time of commencement of the Act. Hence, to this limited extent, this Court concurs with the findings of the Division Bench. [Paras 3, 13][896-H; 901-A-C]
1.2 Section 8 and Section 9 of the Principal Act make it incumbent on the Competent Authority to issue notice to or provide an opportunity to be heard only to the ‘person concerned’, i.e., the person who has filed the statement under Section 6 of the Principal Act. The claims of all other persons interested in the vacant land are to be considered through issuing a Gazetted notification to that effect as per Section 10(1) of the Principal Act. The Competent Authority had duly issued such notification on 27.10.1995. [Para 14][901-D-E]
1.3 It is the Appellant’s contention that, subsequent to the declaration, he acquired the suit property from ‘Smt. LS’ (appellant’s vendor), by sale agreement dated 26.03.1994, and continues to be in possession of it. That ‘Smt. LS’ was competent to sell the suit property, as it was a portion of the 1,983 sq. mts. of the joint family property she acquired by virtue of the partition deed dated 9.01.1984. This argument is relevant in light of the passage of the Repeal Act, with effect from 8.07.1999. Section 3(1)(a) of the Repeal Act, which provides for a savings clause states that the repeal shall not affect the vesting of any vacant land in the State Government by the Principal Act, the possession of which has been taken over by the concerned State Government. This is further qualified in Section 3(2) which states that vacant land vested in the State Government by the Principal Act, the possession for which has not been taken over, shall be restored only once any compensation paid to the land-holder has been returned. It is thus clear that the question of current possession of the suit property is absolutely material to a full adjudication of the controversy. This is because, if the Appellant does enjoy possession, as claimed by him, any proceedings for any excess land under the Principal Act are liable to abate, as per Section 3 and Section 4 of the Repeal Act, and the Appellant would be entitled to ownership and possession over the suit property. However, neither the partition deed dated 9.01.1984 that is alleged to have conferred title on ‘Smt. LS’, nor the sale deed dated 26.03.1994 that purportedly passed on the title to the Appellant, have been produced before this Court. There is, thus, nothing on record to establish Appellant’s purchase of, possession of, or interest in the suit property. There is nothing on record, that conclusively establishes possession of the suit property either by the Competent Authority or the Appellant. Given the conflicting averments made by the parties, this is a pure question of fact. [Paras 15-17][901-F-G; 902-B-F, G]
1.4 The impugned judgment is set aside. It was incumbent on the Division Bench to enquire into and settle the questions of fact arising from the present controversy, such as whether the Appellant’s claim over the suit property was valid, whether he was in actual physical possession of the suit property, and resultantly, whether he had the locus standi to pray for abatement of the proceedings under the Repeal Act. Since the Single Judge has already given a definite factual finding as to the question of the Appellant’s ownership and possession of the suit property, it is not appropriate to remit the matter to the Single Judge. The matter is remitted to the Division Bench to consider the case afresh. [Paras 19-21][903-D-H]
As published in the Supreme Court Reports, Supreme Court of India. Text from the Indian Supreme Court Judgments open data set (Dattam Labs), CC BY 4.0.
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