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HIGH COURT OF TRIPURA
AGARTALA
WP(CRL.) NO.02 OF 2021
1.TRIPURA PEOPLE'S FRONT (TPF),
Having its office at Mohar Kami, North Pulinpur, Teliamura,
Khowai Tripura, Pin- 799203
Represented by its Secretary General, Sri. Kantilal
Debbarma.
2.Raghubir Jamatia,
S/o. Late Ratna Sadhan Jamatia Vill- Krishna Bhakta, P.O.
South Maharani, PS - RK Pur, Udaipur, District- Gomati,
Tripura.
3.Birendra Kishore Jamatia,
S/o. Rabi Kumar Jamatia Vill-Brajanandra Para, Korbook
Division, Tripura.
4.Jimbu Jamatia,
S/o. Ananta Kishore Jamatia Vill- Ratna Sadhan Para, PS Korborook, Tripura.
5.Uday Tripura,
S/o. Nipendra Tripura Vill-Gosaimani Para, Korbook Division,
Tripura.
6.Bir Bahadur Jamatia,
S/o. Daibya Sadhan Jamatia Vill-Baidhya Bari, PS Natun
Bazar, District- Gomati, Tripura.
7.Apolo Kalai,
S/o. Nagendra Kalai Vill-Baidhya Bari, PS- Natun Bazar,
District- Gomati, Tripura.
8.Makra Joy Reang,
S/o. Kambolya Reang Vill-Ram Bhadra Para, PS- Natun
Bazar, District- Gomati, Tripura.
9.Partha Kumar Tripura,
S/o.Girendra Tripura, R/o. East Pilak, PS- Baikhora, South
Tripura, Tripura.
10.Hari Mohan Tripura,
S/o. Hachukrai Tripura R/o. East Pilak, PS- Baikhora, South
Tripura, Tripura.
11.Gol Mohan Tripura,
S/o.Kamini Mohan Tripura R/o. Taikumba, PS- MNB, Tripura.
12. Charai Ham Reang
S/o. Late Minajoy Reang, Vill. Dhanuram Para, PS. Ganga
Nagar, Dist. Dhalai, Tripura.
13.Binode Bihari Debbarma,
S/o. Late Rajmoni Debbarma Vill- Katalotma, Santir Bazar,
PS Salema, District- Dhalai, Tripura.
14.Binoy Kumar Jamatia,
S/o. Nabadeep Jamatia Vill-Chechua, PS-Ompi, Tripura.
15.Raj Kumar Jamatia,
S/o.Kirtee Kr. Jamatia Vill-Dalak Jamatia Para, PS-Birganj,
Tripura.
16.Pushpa Sadhan Jamatia,
S/o. Jaharlal Jamatia Vill-Chankhala, PS-Ompi, Tripura.
17.Sarba Mohan Jamatia,
S/o. Padma Mohan Jamatia Of Vill-New Kachima, PS-Birganj,
Tripura.
18.Chaitanya Sadhan Jamatia,
S/o. Sonacharan Jamatia Of Vill-Christian Para, Sarbang, PSBirganj, Tripura.
19.Smt. Subhya Kanya Jamatia,
W/o. Dayaram Jamatia Vill-Toisa Kachak, PS-Birganj, Tripura.
20.Kartik Sadhan Jamatia,
S/o. Bijay Pada Jamatia Of Vill-Duluma, PS-Birganj, Tripura.
21.Krishna Sadhan Jamatia,
S/o. Chandra Sadhan Jamatia Vill-Gopinanda Para, Sarbang,
PS-Birganj, Tripura.
22.Subash Debbarma,
S/o.Niranjan Debbarma f Vill- Saidacharra, PO-Rajkandi, PSFatikroy, Unakoti, Tripura.
23.Rahul Jamatia,
S/o. Jagat Palan Jamatia Vill-Paradise Para, PS-Rasyabari,
Dhalai, Tripura.
24.Khasrang Jamatia,
S/o.Jagat Palan Jamatia Vill-Paradise Para, PS-Rasyabari,
Dhalai, Tripura.
25.Chandra Manik Jamatia,
S/o.Sabda Kumar Jamatia Vill-Dinaram Para, PS-Rasyabari,
Dhalai, Tripura.
26.Kakurai Jamatia,
S/o. Sabda Kumar Jamatia, Vill-Dinaram Para, PS-Rasyabari,
Dhalai, Tripura.
27.Bishwa Hari Jamatia,
S/o. Late Shakti Kumar Jamatia Vill-Duluma, PS-Birganj, POMalbasa, Amarpur, District- Gomati, Tripura
28.Sanjib Kumar Jamatia @ Banti Jamatia,
S/o. Lt. Gaya Nanda Jamatia, Vill-Waimuli Panchayet, Purba
Dakshin Maharani ADC Village, Suv-Div- Udaipur, P/S-RK
Pur, Dist.-Gomati, Pin-799013
29.Amrit Sadhan Jamatia,
S/o. Bilash Mohan Jamatia, Vil-Birrahul Manu, P/S- Santir
Bazer, P/O- Manpathar, Tripura.
30.Amar Jamatia,
S/o. Renu Mohan Jamatia, Vil-Dasa Chandra Para, P/OHadrai, P/S- Teliamura, Dist- Khowai Tripura -799205.
31.Rabi Jamatia,
S/o. Lt,Krishna Sankar Jamatia, Vil- Wathwi Lwng Kami, P/OGillatali, P/S-Kailyanpur, Tripura, Pin-799203.
32.Patal Kanya Jamatia,
D/o Lt. Brahma Pada Jamatia, Vil-Mohar Bari, PO- North
Pulinpur, PS- Teliamura, Dist- Khowai, Tripura-799203.
33.Jagat Sadhan Jamatia,
S/o Surjya Sadhan Jamatia, Vill- Dulukma Kami, P/OMalbasa, P/S-Birganj, Tripura-799101.
34.Bipad Mohan Jamatia,
S/o Nagri Mohan Jamatia, Vil- Dalak, P/O and P/S-Dalak
Tripura.
35.Chandra Jamatia,
S/o Ananta Gopal Jamatia, Vil-Devbari, P/O and P/S-Devbari
Tripura.
36.Dharmendra Reang,
S/o Lt,Sarada Reang, Vill-Bhakta Mohan Para, P/O-Satnala,
P/S-Kanchanpur, Tripura-799270.
37.Chandra Hari Jamatia.
S/o Rabi Rai Jamatia, Vill-Nalani Para, P/O-Raima, P/SRaishya Bari, Dist- Dhalai Tripura.
38.Mangal Sing Jamatia,
S/o Satya Brata Jamatia, Vill- Sabha Mani Para, P/O-Raima,
P/S- Raishya Bari, Dist- Dhalai Tripura
39.Raj Mohan Jamatia,
S/o Raj Pada Jamatia, Vil-Sabha Mani Para, P/O- Raima, P/SRaishya Bari, Dist- Dhalai Tripura.
40.Habal Jamatia,
S/o Bir Shakti Jamatia, Vil- Sabha Mani Para, P/O-Raima,
P/S-Raishya Bari, Dist- Dhalai Tripura.
41.Bidhya Prasad Jamatia,
S/o. Hari Charan Jamatia, Vil- Sadhan Para, P/O-Raima, P/SRaishya Bari, Dist- Dhalai Tripura.
42.Jayanta Sadhan Jamatia,
S/o Ashan Bhakta Jamatia, Vill- Nalani Para, P/O-Raima, P/SRaishya, Dist- Dhalai Tripura.
43.Sanjoy Jamatia,
S/o Amar Jamatia, Vill- Dina Ram Para, P/O-Raima, P/SRaishya, Dist- Dhalai Tripura.
44.Josua Jamatia,
S/o Suklal Jamatia, Vill-Druna Hari Para, P/O-Raima, P/SRaishya, Dist- Dhalai Tripura.
45.Surendra Jamatia,
S/o Surya Pada Jamatia, Vill-Sharat Kumar Para, P/O-Raima,
P/S-Raishya Bari, Tripura.
46.Joy Chandra Debbarma,
S/o Manuranjan Debbarma, Vill-Saidachara, P/S-Unakuti
Tripura.
47.Kanti Lal Debbarma,
S/o Khirode Debbarma, R/o Bilash Manipara, PS Kumarghat,
District Unakoti, Tripura.
48.Subash Debbarma,
S/o Niranjan Debbarma, Vill- Saidacharra, PO Rajkandi, PSFatikroy, Unakoti, Tripura.
49.Rabi Ranjan Jamatia @ Tarana Jamatia
Vill Baidhya Bari, PS Nutan Bazar, Dist- Gomati, Tripura.
50.Barna Kumar Jamatia@ Madhu Jamatia,
Vill Baidhya Bari, PS Nutan Bazar, Dist- Gomati Tripura.
51.Subash Debbarma,
S/o Niranjan Debbarma, Vill-Saidacharra, PO Rajkandi, PSFatikroy, Unakoti, Tripura.
52.Dhan Babu Debbarma,
S/o Lt,Biswa Chandra Debbarma, Vil-Saidachara, P/ORajkandi, Tripura-799290.
53.Subash Debbarma,
S/o Niranjan Debbarma, Vill-Saidacharra, PO Rajkandi, PSFatikroy, Unakoti, Tripura/
54.Dhan Babu Debbarma,
S/o Lt,Biswa Chandra Debbarma, Vil-Saidachara, P/ORajkandi, Tripura- 799290.
55.Tarun Sing Debbarma,
S/o Ramesh Debbarma, Vill- Pancham Nagar, P/S-Kailasahar,
Tripura.
56.Mujibar Debbarma,
S/o Lab Sing Debbarma, Vill-Fatikchara, P/S-Fatikroy,
Tripura.
57.Sukuram Debbarma,
S/o Lt,Daniram Debbarma, Vil-Saidachara, P/S-Fatikroy,
Tripura.
58.Khulajoy Reang,
S/O- Tinsarai Reang, Village- Krishnadhan Malik Para, PS Gandacherra, Tripura.
59.Charaihum Renag,
S/O-Late Minajoy Reang, Village-Dhanuram Para, PSGanganagar Tripura, Tripura.
60.Charaihum Renag,
S/O-Late Minajoy Reang, Village-Dhanuram Para, PSGanganagar Tripura.
61.Kalijoy Reang,
S/O-Late Ratanjoy Reang, Village-Dhanuram Para, PSGanganagar Tripura.
62.Nakuljoy Reang,
S/O- Krishnajoy Reang, Village-22 Miles, Ganganagar, PSGanganagar Tripura.
63.Amit Kr. Debbarma,
S/O-Tiwari Debbarma, Village-Debicherra, PS-Kachucherra
Tripura.
64.Partha Halam,
S/O-Manindra Halam, Village-Kanai Lal Halam Para, PSKachucherra Tripura.
65.Sumit Debbarma,
S/O-Kamal Debbarma, Village-Kamaranga, PS-Kachucherra
Tripura.
66.Debratan Debbarma
S/O-Sachi Kumar Debbarma, Village-Kamaranga, PSKachucherra Tripura.
67.Amal Debbarma,
S/O-Jagat Mohan Debbarma, Village-Kamaranga, PSKachucherra Tripura.
68.Sami Ranjan Debbarma,
S/O-Jayonto Moni Debbarma, Village-Kamaranga, PSKachucherra Tripura.
69.Bikas Debbarma,
S/O-Mohanlal Debbarma, Village-Kamaranga, PSKachucherra Tripura.
70.Rinku Debbarma,
S/O-Late Joycharan Debbarma, Village-Kamaranga, PSKachucherra Tripura.
71.Smritimoy Debbarma,
S/O-Binoy Debbarma, Village-Nalia Bari, PO and PSChampahour, Tripura.
72.Radha Debbarma,
S/O-Karnaram Debbarma, Village-Demdung, Ward No-01,
PS-Fatikroy Tripura.
……… Petitioner(s)
Vs.
1. The State of Tripura,
Represented by the Secretary,
Home Department, Government of Tripura,
New Secretariat Complex, Agartala
District- West Tripura, Tripura.
2. Director General of Police,
Tripura Akhaura Rd. Jay Nagar, Agartala,
Tripura-799001.
……. Respondent(s)
For the Petitioner(s)
: Mr. Manish Goswami, Advocate.
Ms. S. Debbarma, Advocate.
For the Respondent(s)
: Mr. S. Kar Bhowmik, Sr. Advocate.
Mr. R. Datta, P.P.
Mr. S. Bal, Advocate.
Date of hearing and delivery of
Judgment & Order
: 02.02.2023.
Whether fit for reporting : YES/NO.
HON’BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE(ACTING)
HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE ARINDAM LODH
JUDGMENT AND ORDER(ORAL)
C.J(Acting)
The petitioners herein have filed this present writ
petition
for
issuance
of
writ
in
the
nature
of
Mandamus/Certiorari or any other appropriate writ, order, or
direction of like nature read with Section 482 of the Criminal
Procedure Code, 1973 assailing the legality and sanctity of
several criminal proceeding instituted against them by the
State-respondents. Hence, the petitioners have prayed for the
following reliefs:“ In the premises as aforesaid it is therefore
most respectfully prayed that your lordships may be graciously
pleased
to
admit
the
petition
and
call
for
the
records(FIR/compliant/Charge sheet) from the respective police
stations and issue Rule upon the Respondents to show cause as to
why the criminal proceeding instituted against the petitioners vide
(1) R.S. Pur P.S. case No.191/2020 dated 25.11.2020 & Charge
Sheet No.68/2021 dated 23/04/2021;(2) Baikhora P.S. Case
No.2020/BKR/084 dated 25.11.2020 & charge sheet No.30/2021
dated 18.05.2021; (3) Ompi P.S. case No.2020OMP014 dated
23.12.2020 & Charge Sheet No.3/2021 dated 31/01/2021; (4)
Fatikroy P.S. case No.2020 FTK 029 dated 24.12.2020 & Charge
Sheet No.2/2021 dated 23.04.2021; (5) Birganj P.S. Case
No.2020/BRG/070 dated 23.12.2020 & Charge Sheet No.9/2021
dated 28.02.2021;(6) Teliamura PS Case No.2020 TLM129 &
Charge Sheet No.28/2021 dated 18.05.2021; (7) Raishyabari PS
Case No.2020/TSB/008 dated 24.12.2020 & Charge Sheet No___
dated 18/01/2021;(8) Fatikroy PS Case No.2020FTK015 dated
15/06/2020 & Chargesheet No.15/2021 dated 29.04.2021; (9)
Fatikroy PS Case No.2020FTK026 dated 26.11.20220 &
Chargesheet No.1/2021 dated 30.01.2021; (10) Kanchanpur PS
Case No.2020KCP048 dated 25.11.2020 & Charge Sheet
No.28/2021
dated
23.05.2021;
(11)
KBK
PS
Case
No.2020/KBK/023 dated 23.12.2020 & Charge Sheet No.7/2021
dated 18.05.2021; (12) Gandacherra PS Case No.2020GNC026
dated 23.12.2020 & Charge Sheet No.12/2021 dated 13.05.2021;
(13) Ganganagar PS Case No.2020GNR003 dated 25.11.2020 &
Charge Sheet No.02/2021 dated 12.05.2021; (14) Ganganagar
P.S. Case No.2020ABS058 dated 23.12.2020; (15) Kanchucheera
PS Case No.2018KCR017 dated 24.12.2020; (16) Champahour PS
Case No.TLMPS129/2020 dated 25.11.2020.(17) Fatikroy PS Case
No.2020 FTK025 dated 29.01.2021 (18) Ambassa PS Case
No.2020ABS058 & Charge Sheet No.18/2021 dated 13.05.2021;
(19) Dhalai PS Case No.003/2020 & Charge Sheet No.2/2021,
dated 12.05.2021 should not be quashed and set aside being
illegal, arbitrary and an abuse of the process of law and after
hearing the parties may be pleased to make the Rules absolute
and/or pass such order/s as to your Lordships may deem fit and
proper.
AND
Pending disposal of the case, your Lordships in the Interim may
be pleased to pass an order, directing the Respondents not to
proceed any further in respect of the aforesaid cases and/or may
be pleased to pass any such further order/orders as Your
Lordships may deem fit and proper.”
2.
Heard
Mr.
Manish
Goswami,
learned
counsel
assisted by Ms. S. Debbarma, learned counsel representing the
petitioners and Mr. S. Kar Bhowmik, learned Sr. counsel assisted
by Mr. S. Bal, learned counsel appearing for the respondents.
3.
It is the case of the petitioners that one Sri Biswajit
Debbarma, Fire Fighter succumbed to the injuries caused due to
an attack by members of Nagarik Suraksha Manch and Mizo
Convention on 21.11.2020 while he was on his way to home in
the afternoon at Agnipassa on NH-08.
4.
On 23.11.2020 the wife of the deceased-Biswajit
Debbarma filed a complaint and an FIR was registered. But no
satisfactory action was initiated by the respondents. Thereafter,
firstly on 23.11.2020 they have taken up the agitation by calling
a bandh and again on 25.11.2020, they all assembled on the
National Highway to protest and blocked the Highway. It was
peak COVID-19 period.
5.
On such action of the petitioners herein, the Police
registered several FIRs in several Police Stations under Sections
34, 143, 145, 149, 151, 157, 186, 188, 269, 270, 283, 341,
353, 436, 506, IPC read with Section 8-B of the National High
Way Act, 1956 and also under various sections of Disaster
Management Act 2005, Epidemic Diseases Act 1987, Tripura
Police Act, 2007 and Prevention of Damage to Public Property
Act, 1984 Subsequently, the investigation is completed and the
charge-sheets have also been filed.
Mr. Manish Goswami, learned counsel appearing for
the petitioners in his argument on fundamental rights envisaged
in Constitution of India has put the main emphasis on Article
19.(1)(a) and(b) of the Constitution of India which is extracted
herein-under:“19. Protection of certain rights regarding freedom of speech
etc.-(1) All citizens shall have the right—
(a) to freedom of speech and expression;
(b) to assemble peaceably and without arms;”
6.
He further
contended that
the
1st
petitioner-
Organization has taken up the cause of the death of the victim
and the injustice caused to the wife of the deceased person,
Late Sri Biswajit Debbarma. Despite having video graphic and
visual evidence, no action has been initiated by the Staterespondents in the manner in which it was supposed to.
7.
To strengthen his argument, he relied upon several
judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court.
7.1.
In Himat Lal K. Shah Vs. Commissioner of
Police, Ahmedabad, and anr., reported in (1973) 1 SCC 227
“Para-69- Freedom of assembly is an essential element of any
demo- cratic system. At the root of this concept lies the citizens'
right to meet face to face with others for the discussion of their
ideas and problems-religious, political,, economic or social.
Public debate and discussion take many forms including the
spoken and the printed word, the radio and the screen. But
assemblies face to face perform a function of vital significance in
our system, and are no less important at the present time for
the education of the public and the formation of opinion than
they have been in our past history. The basic assumption in a
democratic polity is that Government shall be based on the
consent of the governed. But the consent of the governed
implies not only that the consent shall be free but also that it
shall be grounded on adequate information and discussion.
Public streets are the 'natural' places for expression of opinion
and dissemination of ideas. Indeed it may be argued that for
some persons these places are the only possible arenas for the
effective exercise of their freedom of speech and assembly.”
7.2.
In Anita Thakur and ors., Vs. Government of
Jammu and Kashmir and ors., reported in (2016) 15 SCC
525 “Para-12- We can appreciate that holding peaceful
demonstration in order to air their grievances and to see that
their voice is heard in the relevant quarters is the right of the
people. Such a right can be traced to the fundamental freedom
that is guaranteed under Articles 19(1)(a), 19(1)(b) and
19(1)(c) of the Constitution. Article 19(1)(a) confers freedom of
speech to the citizens of this country and, thus, this provision
ensures that the petitioners could raise slogan, albeit in a
peaceful
and
orderly
manner,
without
using
offensive
language. Article 19(1)(b) confers the right to assemble and,
thus, guarantees that all citizens have the right to assemble
peacefully and without arms. Right to move freely given
under Article 19(1)(d), again, ensures that the petitioners could
take out peaceful march. The 'right to assemble' is beautifully
captured in an eloquent statement that “an unarmed, peaceful
protest procession in the land of 'salt satyagraha', fast-untodeath and 'do or die' is no jural anathema”. It hardly needs
elaboration that a distinguishing feature of any democracy is the
space offered for legitimate dissent. One cherished and valuable
aspect of political life in India is a tradition to express grievances
through direct action or peaceful protest. Organised, non-violent
protest marches were a key weapon in the struggle for
independence,
and
the
right
to
peaceful
protest
is
now
recognised as a fundamental right in the Constitution.”
7.3.
In Mazdoor Kisan Shakti Sangathan Vs. Union
of India and anr., reported in (2018) 17 SCC 324 wherein
the Hon’ble Apex Court has given reference to some of its earlier
judgments
“Para-49- In
Babulal
Parate
v.
State
of
Maharashtra, this Court observed:
31. The right of citizens to take out processions or to hold public
meetings flows from the right in Art. 19(1)(b) to assemble
peacably and without arms and the right to move anywhere in
the territory of India.”
51. The Supreme Court has also gone beyond upholding the
right to protest as a fundamental right and has held that the
State must aid the right to assembly of the citizens. In the
Constitution Bench Judgment, Himat Lal K. Shah v. Commr. of
Police, Ahmedabad , while dealing with the challenge to the
Rules framed under the Bombay Police Act regulating public
meetings on streets, held that the Government has power to
regulate which includes prohibition of public meetings on streets
9 (1962) Supp 3 SCR 369 10 (1973) 1 SCC 227 or highways to
avoid nuisance or disruption to traffic and thus, it can provide a
public meeting on roads, but it does not mean that the
government can close all the streets or open areas for public
meetings, thus denying the fundamental right which flows
from Article 19(1)(a) and (b). The Court held:
“33. This is true but nevertheless the State cannot by law
abridge or take away the right of assembly by prohibiting
assembly on every public street or public place. The State can
only make regulations in aid of the right of assembly of each
citizen and can only impose reasonable restrictions in the
interest of public order.
59.
We may reproduce the following discussion from the
judgment of this Court in Subramanian Swamy v. Union of
India, Ministry of Law & Ors.11:
“Balancing of fundamental rights 11 (2016) 7 SCC 221 136. To
appreciate what we have posed hereinabove, it is necessary to
dwell upon balancing the fundamental rights. It has been argued
by the learned counsel for the petitioners that the right
conferred under Article 19(1)(a) has to be kept at a different
pedestal
than
the
individual
reputation
which
has
been
recognised as an aspect of Article 21 of the Constitution. In fact
the submission is that right to freedom of speech and expression
which includes freedom of press should be given higher status
and the individual's right to have his/her reputation should yield
to the said right. In this regard a passage from Sakal Papers (P)
Ltd. has been commended to us. It says: (AIR pp. 313- 14, para
36) “36. … Freedom of speech can be restricted only in the
interests of the security of the State, friendly relations with
foreign State, public order, decency or morality or in relation to
contempt of court, defamation or incitement to an offence. It
cannot, like the freedom to carry on business, be curtailed in the
interest of the general public. If a law directly affecting it is
challenged, it is no answer that the restrictions enacted by it are
justifiable under clauses (3) to (6). For, the scheme of Article
19 is to enumerate different freedoms separately and then to
specify the extent of restrictions to which they may be subjected
and the objects for securing which this could be done. A citizen
is entitled to enjoy each and every one of the freedoms together
and clause (1) does not prefer one freedom to another. That is
the plain meaning of this clause. It follows from this that the
State cannot make a law which directly restricts one freedom
even for securing the better enjoyment of another freedom.”
(emphasis supplied)
137. Having bestowed our anxious consideration on the said
passage, we are disposed to think that the above passage is of
no assistance to the petitioners, for the issue herein is
sustenance
and
balancing
of
the
separate
rights,
one
under Article 19(1)(a) and the other, under Article 21. Hence,
the concept of equipoise and counterweighing fundamental
rights of one with other person. It is not a case of mere better
enjoyment
of
another
freedom. In
Acharya
Maharajshri
Narendra Prasadji Anandprasadji Maharaj v. State of Gujarat, it
has been observed that a particular fundamental right cannot
exist in isolation in a watertight compartment. One fundamental
right of a person may have to coexist in harmony with the
exercise of another fundamental right by others and also with
reasonable and valid exercise of power by the State in the light
of the directive principles in the interests of social welfare as a
whole. The Court's duty is to strike a balance between
competing claims of different interests. In DTC v. Mazdoor
Congress
the
Court
has
ruled
that
articles
relating
to
fundamental rights are all parts of an integrated scheme in the
Constitution and their waters must mix to constitute that grand
flow of unimpeded and impartial justice; social, economic and
political, and of equality of status and opportunity which imply
absence of unreasonable or unfair discrimination between
individuals or groups or classes. In St. Stephen's College v.
University of Delhi this Court while emphasising the need for
balancing the fundamental rights observed that: (SCC p. 612,
para 96)
“96.
…
It
is
necessary
to
mediate
between Article
29(2) and Article 30(1), between letter and spirit of these
articles, between traditions of the past and the convenience of
the present, between society's need for stability and its need for
change.”
7.4.
In Arnab Manoranjan Goswami Vs. State of
Maharashtra and ors., reported in (2021) 2 SCC 427 “Para67……… The public interest in ensuring the due investigation of
crime is protected by ensuring that the inherent power of the
High Court is exercised with caution……. On the other hand, the
misuse of the criminal law is a matter of which the High Court
and the lower Courts in this country must be alive……. Courts
must be alive to the need to safeguard the public interest in
ensuring that the due enforcement of criminal law is not
obstructed….”
7.5.
He also referred to the judgment of the Hon’ble
Supreme Court of United States passed in De Jonge Vs. State
of Oregon reported in 1937 SCC Online US SC 2
“Para-3-
We are concerned with but one of the described offenses and
with the validity of the statute in this particular application. The
charge is that appellant assisted in the conduct of a meeting
which was called under the auspices of the Communist Party, an
organization advocating criminal syndicalism. The defense was
that the meeting was public and orderly and was held for
a lawful purpose; that, while it was held under the auspices of
the Communist Party, neither criminal syndicalism nor any
unlawful conduct was taught or advocated at the meeting either
by appellant or by others. Appellant moved for a direction of
acquittal, contending that the statute as applied to him, for
merely assisting at a meeting called by the Communist Party at
which nothing unlawful was done or advocated, violated the due
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution
of the United States.”
7.6.
Another Judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of
United States passed in Thomas Vs. Collins, Sheriff, reported
in 1945 SCC Online US SC 18 “ Para-21-The case confronts
us again with the duty our system places on this Court to say
where the individual's freedom ends and the State's power
begins. Choice on that border, now as always delicate, is
perhaps more so where the usual presumption supporting
legislation is balanced by the preferred place given in our
scheme to the great, the indispensable democratic freedoms
secured by the First Amendment. Cf. Schneider v. State of New
Jersey, 308 U.S. 147, 60 S.Ct. 146, 84 L.Ed. 155; Cantwell v.
Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 60 S.Ct. 900, 84 L.Ed. 1213, 128
A.L.R. 1352; Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 64 S.Ct.
438. That priority gives these liberties a sanctity and a sanction
not permitting dubious intrusions. And it is the character of the
right, not of the limitation, which determines what standard
governs the choice. Compare United States v. Carolene Products
Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152, 153, 58 S.Ct. 778, 783, 784, 82 L.Ed.
1234.
22. For these reasons any attempt to restrict those liberties
must be justified by clear public interest, threatened not
doubtfully or remotely, but by clear and present danger.19 The
rational connection between the remedy provided and the evil to
be curbed, which in other contexts might support legislation
against attack on due process grounds, will not suffice. These
rights rest on firmer foundation. Accordingly, whatever occasion
would restrain orderly discussion and persuasion, at appropriate
time and place, must have clear support in public danger, actual
or impending. Only the gravest abuses, endangering paramount
interests, give occasion for permissible limitation. It is therefore
in our tradition to allow the widest room for discussion, the
narrowest range for its restriction, particularly when this right is
exercised in conjunction with peaceable assembly. It was not by
accident or coincidence that the rights to freedom in speech and
press were coupled in a single guaranty with the rights of the
people peaceably to assemble and to petition for redress of
grievances. All these, though not identical, are inseparable. They
are cognate rights, cf. De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 364,
57 S.Ct. 255, 259, 81 L.Ed. 278, and therefore are united in the
First Article's assurance. Cf. 1 Annals of Congress 759—760”.
7.7.
He also referred to Sections 1 and 2 of the
Article 20 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights:“1. Every one has the right to freedom of
peaceful assembly and association.
2. No one may be compelled to belong to an
association.”
7.8.
He
also
referred
to
Article
of
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights:-
the
“Article-21
The right of peaceful assembly shall be
recognized. No restriction may be placed on the exercise
of the right other than those imposed in conformity with
the law and which are necessary in a democratic society
in the interests of national security or public safety, public
order(ordre public) the protection of public health or
morals or the protection of the rights and freedoms of
others.”
Stating
this,
Mr.
Goswami,
learned
counsel
appearing for the petitioners prayed that the cases registered
against the petitioners herein need to be quashed as they were
exercising their fundamental rights in accordance with law.
8.
Mr. S. Kar Bhowmik, learned Sr. counsel assisted
by Mr. S. Bal, learned counsel appearing for the respondents
contended that many cases have been registered against
individual petitioners and several other persons. In pursuance of
the investigation in 3(three) cases, final report has been filed
and in other cases, charge-sheet has been filed. Accordingly, he
has contended that the present petition filed under Section 482
of the Code of Criminal Proceeding needs to be dismissed.
Further the exercising of their fundamental rights during COVID19 period by blocking National Highway is a gross violation of
Section 8B of National Highway Act causing hardship to
Ambulance, Public, daily need supplies etc. Further they have
not obtained any permission for such assembly and have given
call for Bandh. This is against Constitution of India and
infringement to public rights and liberties. In so far as the FIR of
wife of the deceased-Biswajit Debbarma is concerned, action has
been taken as per law.
9.
Now, in order to appreciate the contention of the
petitioners under Article 19 of the Constitution of India, this
Court feels that it is relevant to identify the place where the said
agitation has taken place. As submitted by the learned counsel
appearing for the petitioners and as well as it is evident from the
record, the cause of action and unlawful assembly was at
National Highway-08. In this regard, it is pertinent to extract
Section 8B of the National Highway Act, 1956 which is
reproduced herein under:“ 8B- Punishment for mischief by injury to national
highway.- whoever commits mischief by doing any act which
renders or which he knows to be likely to render any national
highway referred to in sub-section (1) of section 8A impassable
to less safe for travelling or conveying property, shall be
punished with imprisonment of either description for a term
which may extend to five years, or with a fine, or with both.”
10.
In view of the specific prohibition under
Section 8B of the National Highway Act, 1956, the action of the
petitioners in the manner in which they have blocked the
National Highway cannot be appreciated. It is not for this Court
to enter into the disputed question of facts on the point of
investigation of whether the protest which was made was with
arms and whether any injuries have been caused or not and to
go into other provisions of IPC under which FIRs have been
registered. It is for the Trial Court to go into the merits of the
factual aspect in respect of each individual case as per
procedure.
11.
In the broader aspect with regard to Article
19 of the Constitution of India is concerned, there is no doubt
that the petitioners are having their full fundamental rights and
liberty to express their freedom of speech and as well as
assemble peacefully without arms. The said fundamental right is
granted by way of reasonable restrictions. In view of the said
restrictions, Section 8B of the National Highway Act comes into
play. Whether any violence has taken place and whether it was
an unlawful assembly is immaterial but once the National
Highway itself has been blocked by the petitioners it amounts to
a clear violation of Section 8B of the National Highway Act and
the petitioners cannot claim immunity under Article 19(1)(a)(b)
of the Constitution of India. Further, no document is placed
before this Court to say that in order to exercise their rights
under Article 19 of the Constitution of India, the petitioners have
approached any competent authority seeking permission to
exercise their fundamental right by identifying the place, time,
and date for their assembly. In absentia, any assembly in
contravention to Section 8B of the National Highway Act and
also unlawful assembly at any public place, this Court feels that
it is a gross violation of Article (19)(1)(a)(b) and misconceiving
the fundamental rights. Further the citations relied by the
petitioners-counsel do not support the case of the petitioners to
appreciate under Article 19 of the Constitution of India.
12.
In so far as the quashing of the petition is
concerned, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioners has
relied upon the Hon’ble Supreme Court Judgment passed in the
State of Haryana and ors Vs. Bhajan Lal and ors reported in
1992 Supp.(1) SCC 335 wherein in Para-102 of the said
Judgment, certain guidelines have been framed which is
reproduced herein-under:“(1) Where the allegations made in the First Information Report
or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and
accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or
make out a case against the accused.
(2) Where the allegations in the First Information Report and other
materials, if any, accompanying the F.I.R. do not disclose a
cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers
under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a
Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code.
(3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or
'complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not
disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against
the accused.
(4) Where the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable
offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation
is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as
contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code.
(5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd
and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person
can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for
proceeding against the accused.
(6) where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the
provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal
proceeding is instituted) to the institu- tion and continuance of the
proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or
the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of
the aggrieved party.
(7) where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide
and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior
motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to
spite him due to private and personal grudge.
13.
In pursuance of the said guidelines, the petitioners
have not stated in their pleadings with regard to any malafide
intention against any particular officer in registering a particular
FIR against any particular individual and more so no specific
argument is advanced in relation to the guidelines framed in
Bhajan Lal(supra). In view of the absence of a specific
allegation against any person, an omnibus argument on this
issue cannot be appreciated.
14.
The petitioners have not placed on record any
documentary evidence like the registration certificate of the 1st
petitioner-organization, its aims, objectives and by-laws to say
that it is competent to get filed this present quash petition on
behalf of and along with the accused persons in all criminal
cases. This Court feels that the petitioner organization is not an
accused person and has no locus standi to seek for quashing the
FIRs and the charge sheets registered against individual accused
persons.
15.
However, it is made clear that this Court is not
going into the other provisions, under which the FIRs have been
registered since the disputed question of facts would come into
play wherein conducting a proper trial would give a clear scope
to decide whether the accused persons are guilty or not. This
Court for the present is only deciding on the point of Article 19
of the Constitution of India, Section 8B of The National Highway
Act, and Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code seeking
quashing of various cases filed against the petitioners and the
relief sought is rejected. This Court further holds that the 1 st
petitioner in this case has no locus standi. The accused column
reflects the names of the individuals.
16.
Here it is also pertinent to note that the period in
which the incident has taken place, relates to the international
issue of the COVID-19 pandemic period. Though it is on record,
presently, in this writ petition, this Court is not taking
cognizance of statement of the Officer made under Section 161
of Cr.P.C. who has suo moto registered the case, wherein he has
categorically stated that because of the blockade of the National
Highway, movement of the
public, ambulance and other
essential commodity vehicles etc., were obstructed.
17.
This Court cannot ignore the fact of the killing of a
Government Servant, Late Mr. Biswajit Debbarma(Fire Fighter)
by the members of
Nagarik Suraksha Manch and Mizo
Convention on 21.11.2020. In the said crime, FIR has been
registered and the Police Department appears to have given an
impression to the petitioners that the matter is not given proper
importance and thus the said cause of action of unlawful
assembly on National Highway has taken place. This Court do
not appreciate the manner in which the petitioners have acted
during the peak of COVID-19 situation blocking the National
Highway and causing inconvenience and hardship to public,
passengers, Ambulance, daily medicine supplies etc. In so far as
the issue of deceased-Biswajit Debbarma is concerned, this
Court expresses its concern and observes that the Police
Department is to take all measures and to assist the prosecution
effectively to arrest all concerned if not arrested and complete
the investigation and further to meet the goal of justice to the
wife of late-Biswajit Debbarma.
18.
In view of the above discussion, there is no merit
in the petition and, accordingly it fails and the same is dismissed
with a cost of Rs.10,000/-(Rupees ten thousand only) to be paid
by the 1st petitioner in favour of the Tripura High Court Bar
Association.
19.
However, it is made clear that the Court below
while conducting the trial will act independently without being
influenced by the observations made herein.
20.
Accordingly, this present writ petition is dismissed
with costs and as a sequel, interlocutory application(s), if any
also stands disposed.
JUDGE
suhanjit
CHIEF JUSTICE (ACTING)
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