Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 – Or. 23, r. 3 A – The appellantplaintiff, stranger to a Compromise decree, filed suit seeking a declaration that the Compromise decree by the High Court on 15.09.1994 in the second appeal was illegal, inoperative and obtained by fraud and misrepresentation – Held: The appellant was not a party to the stated Compromise decree – He was, however, claiming right, title and interest over the land referred to in a stated sale deed dated 06.01.1984 which was purchased by him from one of the party to compromise decree – It is well settled that the compromise decree passed by the High Court in the second appeal would relate back to the date of institution of the suit between the parties thereto – In the suit now instituted by the appellant, at the best, he could seek relief against the person who sold property to him, but cannot be allowed to question the compromise decree passed by the High Court in the partition suit between the other parties – In other words, the appellant could file a suit for protection of his right, title or interest devolved on the basis of the stated sale deed dated 06.01.1984, allegedly executed by one of the party to the proceedings in partition suit, which could be examined independently by the Court on its own merits in accordance with law – That apart, the Trial Court in any case would not be competent to adjudicate the grievance of the appellant herein in respect of the validity of compromise decree dated 15.09.1994 passed by the High Court in partition suit – It must, therefore, follow that suit instituted before the Civil Court by the appellant was not maintainable in view of specific bar u/r. 3A of Or. 23 CPC – Also, findings were recorded by the Trial Court against the appellant in reference to issue regarding the right, title and interest of suit property and said findings were not interfered by the Court of Appeal preferred at the instance of the appellant – Thus, there were concurrent findings of Courts below against the appellant-plaintiff – Consequently, the appeal is dismissed.
Dismissing the appeal, the Court
HELD: 1. In the present case, the partition suit was filed in 1978 and after the decision of the trial Court, the matter went in first appeal and eventually, Second Appeal No. 495/86 before the High Court. During the pendency of first appeal being continuation of the suit as stated, one of the parties to the pending proceedings, allegedly entered into a sale deed with the appellant on 6th January, 1984. Indubitably the issue regarding right, title and interest in respect of the land which was the subject matter of sale deed dated 6th January, 1984, was still inchoate and not finally decided. In that sense, the claim of the appellant was to be governed by the decision in favour of or against the party who entered into a sale deed with him in the pending appeal. It must follow that the alleged transaction effected in favour of the appellant by a sale deed dated 6th January, 1984 ought to abide by the outcome of the said proceedings which culminated with the compromise decree passed by the High Court in Second Appeal No. 495/86 dated 15 th September, 1994. [Para 20][661-G-H; 662-A-C]
2. Indeed, the appellant was not a party to the stated compromise decree. He was, however, claiming right, title and interest over the land referred to in the stated sale deed dated 6th January, 1984, which was purchased by him from judgment debtor and party to the suit. It is well settled that the compromise decree passed by the High Court in the second appeal would relate back to the date of institution of the suit between the parties thereto. In the suit now instituted by the appellant, at the best, he could seek relief against the party who entered into a sale deed, but cannot be allowed to question the compromise decree passed by the High Court in the partition suit. In other words, the appellant could file a suit for protection of his right, title or interest devolved on the basis of the stated sale deed dated 6th January, 1984, allegedly executed by one of the party to the proceedings in the partition suit, which could be examined independently by the Court on its own merits in accordance with law. The trial Court in any case would not be competent to adjudicate the grievance of the appellant herein in respect of the validity of compromise decree dated 15th September, 1994 passed by the High Court in the partition suit. [Para 21][662-C-F]
3. In other words, the appellant can only claim through his predecessor, to the extent of rights and remedies available to her in reference to the compromise decree. Merely because the appellant was not party to the compromise decree in the facts of the present case, will be of no avail to the appellant, much less give him a cause of action to question the validity of the compromise decree passed by the High Court by way of a substantive suit before the civil Court to declare it as fraudulent, illegal and not binding on him. Assuming, he could agitate about the validity of the compromise entered into by the parties to the partition suit, it is only the High Court, who had accepted the compromise and passed decree on that basis, could examine the same and no other Court under proviso to Rule 3 of Order 23 CPC. It must, therefore, follow that the suit instituted before the civil Court by the appellant was not maintainable in view of specific bar under Rule 3A of Order 23 CPC as held in the impugned judgment. [Para 22][662-F-H; 663-A-B]
Pushpa Devi Bhagat (Dead) Through LR Sadhna Rai (Smt) v. Rajinder Singh and Others (2005) 5 SCC 566: [2006] 3 Suppl. SCR 370; R. Rajanna v. S.R.
Venkataswamy and Others (2014) 15 SCC 471 : [2014]
14 SCR 535 – relied on.
As published in the Supreme Court Reports, Supreme Court of India. Text from the Indian Supreme Court Judgments open data set (Dattam Labs), CC BY 4.0.
This page is for informational and research purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. Consult a qualified advocate for advice specific to your situation.