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-1NC: 2026:KHC-D:578
RSA No. 5178 of 2008
HC-KAR
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA, AT DHARWAD
DATED THIS THE 20TH DAY OF JANUARY, 2026
BEFORE
THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE HANCHATE SANJEEVKUMAR
REGULAR SECOND APPEAL NO.5178 OF 2008 (SP)
BETWEEN:
Digitally
signed by
MALLIKARJUN
RUDRAYYA
KALMATH
Location: High
Court of
Karnataka,
Dharwad
Bench
1.
TIPPANNA S/O. MARDEPPA KACHARABI,
AGE: 45 YEARS, OCC: COOLIE,
R/O. KARUR, TQ. RANEBENNUR-581115.
2.
NINGAPPA S/O. MARDEPPA KACHARABI,
AGE: 34 YEARS, OCC: COOLIE,
R/O. KARUR, TQ. RANEBENNUR-581115.
3.
GANGAVVA D/O. MARDEPPA KACHARABI,
AGE: 30 YEARS, OCC: COOLIE,
R/O. KARUR, TQ. RANEBENNUR-581115.
4.
VIJAYA D/O. MARDEPPA KACHARABI,
AGE: 25 YEARS, R/O. KARUR,
TQ. RANEBENNUR-581115.
5.
SHANTAVVA @ SHEKKAWWA
D/O. MARDEPPA KACHARABI,
AGE: 20 YEARS, R/O. KARUR,
TQ. RANEBENNUR-581115.
6.
KARIYAPPA S/O. MAILARAPPA SANNABUDIHAL
AGE: 42 YEARS, OCC: AGRICULTURE,
R/O. ASUNDI, TQ. RANEBENNUR-581115.
7.
ANANDAPPA S/O. MAILARAPPA SANNABUDIHAL,
AGE: 44 YEARS, OCC: AGRICULTURE,
R/O. ASUNDI, TQ. RANEBENNUR-581115.
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RSA No. 5178 of 2008
HC-KAR
8.
YALLAWA W/O. SANNAPPA CHAMMIRIYAVAR,
AGE: 40 YEARS, OCC: H/W.
R/O. MAILAR, TQ. HOOVINAHADAGALI.
9.
GANGAVVA W/O. BEERAPPA MADIKOTI,
AGE: 46 YEARS, OCC: H/W.
R/O. ALADAKATTI, TQ. RANEBENNUR-581115.
10. SMT. NEELAVVA
W/O. BASAPPA HOLIYAPPANAVAR,
AGE: 42 YEARS, OCC: H/W.
R/O. DEVARAGUDDA,
TQ. RANEBENNUR-581115.
11. CHANDRAVVA
W/O. FAKIRAPPA AVALAKKIBATTI,
AGE: 50 YEARS, OCC: AGRICULTURE,
R/O. CHITRADURGA.
…APPELLANTS
(BY SRI A. S. PATIL AND SRI SABIL AHMED, ADVOCATES FOR
APPELLANT NO.1 TO 7 AND 9 TO 11)
AND:
1.
SMT. VINODA W/O. HANUMANTAPPA KATIGER,
AGE: MAJOR, OCC: H/W.
R/O. KARUR, TQ. RANEBENNUR-581115.
2.
PUTTAVVA W/O. TIPPANNA KATIGER,
AGE: MAJOR, OCC: AGRICULTURE,
R/O. KARUR, TQ. RANEBENNUR-581115.
DECEASED, HER LR’S.
2A. SMT. JYOTI W/O. HANAMANTAPPA GHANTER,
AGE: MAJOR,
DEVARGUD ROAD, HARALAYYA NAGAR,
NEAR BANGI BASAVESHWAR TEMPLE,
R/O. RANEBENNUR, TAL: RANEBENNUR,
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RSA No. 5178 of 2008
HC-KAR
DIST. HAVERI.
2B. SHRI MAHESH S/O. TIPPANNA KATIGER,
AGE: MAJOR,
R/O. H.NO.1, GURANI CHALA,
VINAYAK NAGAR, RANEBENNUR.
2C. SHRI KRISHNA S/O. TIPPANNA KATIGER,
AGE: MAJOR,
R/O. KUDAREHALA, POST. HARANAGIRI,
TAL: RANEBENNUR.
2D. SHRI ASHOKAPPA S/O. TIPPANNA KATIGER,
AGE: MAJOR,
R/O. IIND CROSS, MRUTHUNJAYA NAGAR,
R/O. RANEBENNUR.
2E.
FAKIRAWWA W/O. SUBHASH KOTAGI,
AGE: MAJOR,
R/O. GURUWANNICHALA,
NEAR ANJANYA DEVASHTAN, RANEBENNUR,
TAL: RANEBENNUR, DIST. HAVERI.
2F.
NANDISH S/O. SUBHASH KOTAGI,
AGE: MAJOR,
R/O. GURUWANNICHALA,
NEAR ANJANYA DEVASHTAN, RANEBENNUR,
TAL: RANEBENNUR, DIST. HAVERI.
2G. SANTOSH S/O. BASAPPA ASUNDI,
AGE: 27 YEARS,
R/O. NEAR SHANKARAPPA JINAPPA
HONNALI MILL, KONABEVU, RANEBENNUR,
TAL: RANBENNUR, DIST. HAVERI.
2H. SURESH S/O. BASAPPA ASUNDI,
AGE: 28 YEARS,
R/O. NEAR SHANKARAPPA JINAPPA
HONNALI MILL, KONABEVU, RANEBENNUR,
TAL: RANBENNUR, DIST. HAVERI.
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RSA No. 5178 of 2008
HC-KAR
2I.
GITA W/O. MAHENDRAPPA HITTALMANE,
AGE: MAJOR, R/O. NELAWAGAL,
TAL: RANEBENNUR, DIST. HAVERI.
2J.
MAHADEVI W/O. DEVENDRAPPA KADEMANI,
AGE: 38 YEARS, OCC: H/W.
R/O. ASHOK NAGAR, 1ST MAIN, 3RD CROSS,
RANEBENNUR, DIST. HAVERI.
2K. PREMA S/O. NAGAPPA DYAMANKOPPA,
AGE: 40 YEARS, R/O. MUGUR,
TAL: SAVANUR, DIST. HAVERI.
2L.
SHAKUNTALA W/O. ASHOK KOPPAD,
AGE: 42 YEARS, R/O. AIRANI,
TAL: RANEBENNUR, DIST. HAVERI.
…RESPONDENTS
(BY SRI JAGADISH PATIL, ADV. FOR R2(A, C AND J);
NOTICE TO R1, R2(D, E, F, L) ARE SERVED;
NOTICE TO R2(B AND K) HELD SUFFICIENT;
V/O.DATED 23.02.2018 R2(G & H) ARE TREATED AS LR’S OF
DECEASED R2(I))
THIS REGULAR SECOND APPEAL IS FILED UNDER SECTION
100 OF THE CODE OF THE CIVIL PROCEDURE, PRAYING TO SET
ASIDE THE JUDGMENT AND DECREE DATED 02.07.2008 PASSED
IN R.A.NO.30/2001 ON THE FILE ADDL. CIVIL JUDGE (SR.DN)
RANEBENNUR REVERSING THE JUDGMENT AND DECREE DATED
28.09.2000 PASSED IN O.S.NO.2/1991 ON THE FILE OF PRL.
CIVIL JUDGE (JR.DN.) AND I ADDL. J.M.F.C, BY ALLOWING THE
APPEAL TO MEET THE ENDS OF JUSTICE AND EQUITY.
THIS APPEAL, COMING ON FOR ADMISSION, THIS DAY,
JUDGMENT WAS DELIVERED THEREIN AS UNDER:
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RSA No. 5178 of 2008
HC-KAR
ORAL JUDGMENT
(PER: THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE HANCHATE SANJEEVKUMAR)
This regular second appeal is filed by defendants
challenging the judgment and decree dated 02.07.2008 in
R.A.No.30/2001
passed
by
the
Additional
Civil
Judge
(Sr.Dn) Ranebennur1 reversing the judgment and decree
dated 28.09.2000 in O.S.No.2/1991 passed by the Principal
Civil Judge (Jr.Dn) and I Additional JMFC, Ranebennur2.
2.
For
the
purpose
of
convenience
and
easy
reference, ranking of the parties is referred to as per their
status before the trial Court.
3.
The plaintiffs filed a suit for specific performance
contending that the defendants are the owners of the suit
schedule property bearing R.S.No.225a/1/141A, measuring
4 acres 8 guntas, and that they entered into an agreement
of sale dated 10.08.1979 for a total sale consideration of
₹4,000/- in respect of the said property. According to the
Hereinafter referred to as “ First appellate Court”
Hereinafter referred to as “trial Court”
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RSA No. 5178 of 2008
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plaintiffs, they paid an advance amount of ₹3,000/- to the
defendants, and the remaining balance of ₹1,000/- was to
be paid at the time of execution of the sale deed. It is
further
contended
that
the
defendants
handed
over
possession of the suit property to them and that they are in
possession thereof.
4.
The
permanent
plaintiffs
injunction
in
had
earlier
filed
O.S.No.149/1982,
a
suit
for
which
was
decreed ex parte on 16.08.1983. Thereafter, the defendants
filed O.S.No.163/1983 challenging the ex parte judgment
and decree dated 16.08.1983 and also filed Civil Misc.
No.36/1983. The said Civil Miscellaneous Petition was
disposed of on 08.10.1984, and O.S.No.149/1982 was
restored to file. Subsequently, the plaintiffs filed a memo
seeking withdrawal of O.S.No.149/1982 on 20.07.1990 with
liberty to file a comprehensive suit for specific performance.
Thereafter, the plaintiffs issued a legal notice and filed the
present suit, O.S.No.2/1991, for specific performance.
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RSA No. 5178 of 2008
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5.
The defendants filed a written statement denying
the execution of the agreement of sale and totally disputing
the plaintiffs’ claim.
6.
The Trial Court dismissed the suit.
Being
aggrieved by the same, the plaintiffs preferred a regular
appeal before the First Appellate Court. The First Appellate
Court reversed the findings of the Trial Court and decreed
the suit for specific performance in O.S.No.2/1991, directing
the defendants to execute a registered sale deed.
7.
Being aggrieved by the same, the defendants
have preferred the instant regular second appeal by raising
various grounds and substantial questions of law.
8.
Heard arguments from both sides.
9.
The following substantial questions of law arise
for consideration.
i)
Whether, the facts and circumstances involved in
the case, the First Appellate Court has correctly
exercised its discretionary power, as per Section
20 of the Specific Relief Act,
while granting
decree of specific performance by reversing the
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RSA No. 5178 of 2008
HC-KAR
judgment and decree passed by the trial Court in
the suit?
ii)
Whether, under the facts and circumstances
involved in the case, the judgment and decree
passed
by
the
first
appellate
Court
in
R.A.No.30/2001 requires interference by this
Court?
10.
The
learned
counsel
for
the
appellants/defendants submitted that the suit filed by the
plaintiffs is barred by limitation on the ground that the
agreement
of
sale
dated
10.08.1979
is
unregistered,
whereas the suit was filed in the year 1991. It is contended
that, as per Article 54 of the Limitation Act, the suit is
barred by limitation. It is further submitted that the
plaintiffs were aware of the appropriate remedy available to
them for enforcing their rights under the agreement of sale,
yet they filed a suit for permanent injunction without issuing
any legal notice to the defendants. Mere pendency of O.S.
No.149/1982 till its withdrawal on 27.08.1989 does not
amount to exclusion of time for the purpose of limitation.
Therefore, the suit is barred by limitation.
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11.
The learned counsel further submitted that the
total sale consideration for 4 acres 8 guntas was only
₹4,000/-, and enforcement of such a decree at present
would amount to arbitrary exercise of discretion and
creating unfair advantage over the defendant by plaintiff.
Hence, the First Appellate Court failed to properly exercise
its discretionary power, warranting interference by this
Court. Accordingly, he prays to allow the appeal and
confirm the judgment and decree passed by the Trial Court.
12.
On the other hand, the learned counsel for the
respondents submitted that the suit is well within the period
of
limitation
as
the
time
spent
in
prosecuting
O.S.
No.149/1982 is liable to be excluded. It is submitted that,
pursuant to the liberty granted by the Trial Court in O.S.
No.149/1982, the plaintiffs filed the present suit for specific
performance. Hence, the suit is not barred by limitation.
13.
It is further contended that the First Appellate
Court has rightly granted the relief of specific performance
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and has exercised its discretionary power. Accordingly,
prays for dismissal of the appeal.
14.
Admittedly, the agreement of sale is dated
10.08.1979 and is unregistered one. The plaintiffs were
aware of the appropriate remedy available for seeking
specific performance but failed to exercise the same at the
earliest opportunity and instead filed a suit for permanent
injunction. Admittedly, the defendants are the owners of the
suit property. Even if the plaintiffs were in possession by
virtue
of
the
unregistered
agreement
of
sale,
such
possession cannot be termed lawful possession under law.
The plaintiffs, despite knowing their rights, did not file a suit
for specific performance within the stipulated time. But the
plaintiffs
have
filed
O.S.No.149/1982
for
permanent
injunction, which was decreed ex parte on 16.08.1983,
against
which,
the
defendants
have
filed
suit
OS
No.163/1983 for recalling the said ex-parte judgments and
decree
and
also
filed
Civil.Misc.No.36/1983,
and
was
allowed on 08.10.1984 and the O.S.No.149/1982 was
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restored. Thereafter, the plaintiffs have filed memo for
withdrawal of the O.S.No.149/1982 and was allowed on
29.08.1989 and the trial Court in the said suit has given
liberty to the plaintiffs to file a suit for specific performance.
Thereafter,
the
plaintiffs
have
filed
the
present
suit
O.S.No.2/1991 for specific performance.
15.
The question that arises for consideration is
whether the time spent in prosecuting O.S.No.149/1982 for
permanent injunction can be excluded while computing
limitation for filing the suit for specific performance.
16.
Article 54 Limitation is as follows.
“As per the Article 54 of limitation act,
the
limitation
for
exercising
specific
performance is 3 years from “the date is fixed
for the specific performance or if no such date
is fixed, when the plaintiff has noticed that
performance is refused”.
17.
In the present case, there is no evidence to
show when the defendants refused to perform the contract.
For the first time, the plaintiffs issued a legal notice only
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after withdrawing O.S.No.149/1982. When the plaintiffs
were aware of their right to seek specific performance, they
were required to exercise that right and seek a decree for
specific performance within a period of three years. Instead
of doing so, they chose to file a suit for permanent
injunction. Therefore, such conduct does not save the
period of limitation in favour of the plaintiffs. This artificial
attempt to seek exclusion of time for the purpose of
limitation is not permissible when the plaintiffs were aware,
at the earliest point of time, of their right to seek specific
performance, as contemplated under Article 54 of the
Limitation Act. Merely because the plaintiffs filed a suit for
permanent injunction without seeking specific performance,
they are not entitled to claim exclusion of time to save
limitation.
18.
Accordingly, the legal notice dated 17.07.1990 is
also barred by limitation, considering that the agreement of
sale is dated 10.08.1979. Consequently, the suit filed by the
plaintiffs is barred by limitation. The First Appellate Court,
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without considering this material aspect, has wrongly
exercised
its
discretionary
power,
resulting
in
grave
injustice to the defendants.
19.
As per Section 20 of the Specific Relief Act, the
grant of a decree for specific performance is discretionary
one. Even if the execution of the agreement of sale is
proved and it is lawful to grant to do so, the Court still has
the discretion to grant or not to grant. However, such
discretion must be guided by the principles enumerated in
Section 20 of the Act. The principles provide that the grant
of a decree for specific performance should not cause
hardship to the defendant-owner. Further, the grant of the
decree should not result in an unfair advantage to the
plaintiff over the defendant. Additionally, the grant of the
decree shall not be arbitrary.
20.
In this regard, reliance is placed upon the
judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, which are as
follows: —
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RSA No. 5178 of 2008
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i)
The
Hon’ble
JAYAKANTHAM
AND
Supreme
OTHERS
Court
v.
in
the
case
of
ABAYKUMAR3,
at
paragraph Nos.7, 8 and 9 has held as follows:
“7. While evaluating whether specific performance
ought to have been decreed in the present case, it would
be necessary to bear in mind the fundamental principles
of law. The court is not bound to grant the relief of
specific performance merely because it is lawful to do so.
Section 20(1) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 indicates
that the jurisdiction to decree specific performance is
discretionary. Yet, the discretion of the court is not
arbitrary but is “sound and reasonable”, to be “guided by
judicial principles”. The exercise of discretion is capable of
being corrected by a court of appeal in the hierarchy of
appellate courts. Sub section (2) of Section 20 contains a
stipulation of those cases where the court may exercise
its discretion not to grant specific performance. Sub
Section (2) of Section 20 is in the following terms:
“20. (2) The following are cases in which the court
may properly exercise discretion not to decree specific
performance(a) where the terms of the contract or the
conduct of the parties at the time of entering into
the contract or the other circumstances under
(2017) 5 SCC 178
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RSA No. 5178 of 2008
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which the contract was entered into are such that
the contract, though not voidable, gives the
plaintiff an unfair advantage over the defendant;
or
(b) where the performance of the contract
would involve some hardship on the defendant
which
he
did
not
foresee,
whereas
its
non
performance would involve no such hardship on
the plaintiff;
(c) where the defendant entered into the
contract under circumstances which though not
rendering
the
contract
voidable,
makes
it
inequitable to enforce specific performance.”
8. However, Explanation 1 stipulates that the mere
inadequacy of consideration, or the mere fact that the
contract is onerous to the defendant or improvident in
its nature, will not constitute an unfair advantage within
the meaning of clause (a) or hardship within the
meaning
of
clause
(b).
Moreover,
Explanation
requires that the issue as to whether the performance
of a contract involves hardship on the defendant has to
be determined with reference to the circumstances
existing at the time of the contract, except where the
hardship has been caused from an act of the plaintiff
subsequent to the contract.
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9. The precedent on the subject is elucidated
below:
9.1. In Parakunnan Veetill Joseph's Son Mathew v.
Nedumbara Kuruvila's Son4, this Court held that: (scc
p. 345, para 14)
“…14. Section 20 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963
preserves judicial discretion of Courts as to decreeing
specific performance. The Court should meticulously
consider all facts and circumstances of the case. The
Court is not bound to grant specific performance merely
because it is lawful to do so. The motive behind the
litigation should also enter into the judicial verdict. The
Court should take care to see that it is not used as an
instrument of oppression to have an unfair advantage
to the plaintiff…”
9.2 A similar view was adopted by this Court in Sardar
Singh v. Krishna Devi4: (SCC p.26, para 14)
“14……. Section 20(1) of the Specific Relief Act,
1963 provides that the jurisdiction to decree specific
performance is discretionary, and the court is not
bound to grant such relief, merely because it is lawful
to do so; but the discretion of the court is not
arbitrary but sound and reasonable, guided by
judicial principles and capable of correction by a
1987 Supp SCC 340 : AIR 1987 SC 2328
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court of appeal. The grant of relief of specific
performance
is
discretionary.
The
circumstances
specified in Section 20 are only illustrative and not
exhaustive. The court would take into consideration
the circumstances in each case, the conduct of the
parties
and
the
respective
interest
under
the
contract.”
9.3. Reiterating the position in K. Narendra v.
Riviera Apartments (P) Ltd5, this Court held thus: (SCC
p.91, para 29)
“29…… Performance of the contract involving
some hardship on the defendant which he did not
foresee while non-performance involving no such
hardship
on
the
plaintiff,
is
one
of
the
circumstances in which the court may properly
exercise
discretion
performance.
The
not
to
doctrine
decree
of
specific
comparative
hardship has been thus statutorily recognized in
India. However, mere inadequacy of consideration
or the mere fact that the contract is onerous to the
defendant or improvident in its nature, shall not
constitute an unfair advantage to the plaintiff over
the defendant or unforeseeable hardship on the
defendant. The principle underlying Section 20 has
been summed up by this Court in Lourdu Mari
(1999) 5 SCC 77
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RSA No. 5178 of 2008
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David v. Louis Chinnaya Arogiaswamy6 by stating
that the decree for specific performance is in the
discretion of the Court but the discretion should
not be used arbitrarily; the discretion should be
exercised on sound principles of law capable of
correction by an appellate court.”
9.4. These principles were followed by this
Court in A.C. Arulappan v. Ahalya Naik7, with the
following observations: (SCC pp.604 & 606, paras
7 & 15)
“7…… The jurisdiction to decree specific relief
is discretionary and the court can consider various
circumstances to decide whether such relief is to
be granted. Merely because it is lawful to grant
specific relief, the court need not grant the order
for specific relief; but this discretion shall not be
exercised in an arbitrary or unreasonable manner.
Certain circumstances have been mentioned in
Section 20(2) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 as to
under what circumstances the court shall exercise
such discretion. If under the terms of the contract
the plaintiff gets an unfair advantage over the
defendant,
the
court
may
not
exercise
its
discretion in favour of the plaintiff. So also, specific
(1996) 5 SCC 589
(2001) 6 SCC 600
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relief may not be granted if the defendant would
be put to undue hardship which he did not foresee
at the time of agreement. If it is inequitable to
grant specific relief, then also the court would
desist from granting a decree to the plaintiff.” ……..
“15…… Granting of specific performance is an
equitable relief, though the same is now governed
by the statutory provisions of the Specific Relief
Act, 1963. These equitable principles are nicely
incorporated in Section 20 of the Act. While
granting a decree for specific performance, these
salutary guidelines shall be in the forefront of the
mind of the court…..”
9.5.
A
Bench
of
three
Judges
of
this
Court
considered the position in Nirmala Anand Vs. Advent
Corporation (P) Ltd8., and held thus : (SCC p.150, para
6)
“6…... It is true that grant of decree of
specific performance lies in the discretion of the
court and it is also well settled that it is not
always necessary to grant specific performance
simply for the reason that it is legal to do so. It
is further well settled that the court in its
discretion can impose any reasonable condition
including payment of an additional amount by
8 (2002) 8 SCC 146
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one party to the other while granting or refusing
decree of specific performance. Whether the
purchaser shall be directed to pay an additional
amount to the seller or converse would depend
upon the facts and circumstances of a case.
Ordinarily, the plaintiff is not to be denied the
relief of specific performance only on account of
the phenomenal increase of price during the
pendency of litigation. That may be, in a given
case, one of the considerations besides many
others
to
be
taken
into
consideration
for
refusing the decree of specific performance. As
a general rule, it cannot be held that ordinarily
the plaintiff cannot be allowed to have, for her
alone, the entire benefit of phenomenal increase
of the value of the property during the pendency
of the litigation. While balancing the equities,
one of the considerations to be kept in view is
as to who is the defaulting party. It is also to be
borne in mind whether a party is trying to take
undue advantage over the other as also the
hardship that may be caused to the defendant
by directing specific performance. There may be
other circumstances on which parties may not
have
any
control.
The
totality
circumstances is required to be seen.”
of
the
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ii)
The
Hon’ble
Parakunnan
Veetill
Supreme
Court
Joseph’s
in
Son
the
case
Mathew
of
Vs.
Nedumbara Kuruvila’s son9, at paragraph No.14, has
held as follows:
”14. Section 20 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963
preserves judicial discretion of courts as to decreeing
specific performance. The court should meticulously
consider all facts and circumstances of the case. The
court is not bound to grant specific performance merely
because it is lawful to do so. The motive behind the
litigation should also enter into the judicial verdict. The
court should take care to see that it is not used as an
instrument of oppression to have an unfair advantage
to the plaintiff. The High Court has failed to consider
the motive with which Varghese instituted the suit. It
was instituted because Kuruvila could not get the estate
and Mathew was not prepared to part with it. The sheet
anchor of the suit by Varghese is the agreement for
sale Exhibit A-1. Since Chettiar had waived his rights
thereunder, Varghese as an assignee could not get a
better right to enforce that agreement. He is, therefore,
not entitled to a decree for specific performance.”
(1987) Supp SCC 340
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iii)
The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Sardar
Singh Vs. Krishna Devi10, at paragraph No.14, has held as
follows:
“14. The next question is whether the courts below
were
justified
in
decreeing
the
suit
for
specific
performance. Section 20(1) of the Specific Relief Act,
1963 provides that the jurisdiction to decree specific
performance is discretionary, and the court is not bound
to grant such relief, merely because it is lawful to do so;
but the discretion of the court is not arbitrary but sound
and reasonable, guided by judicial principles and capable
of correction by a court of appeal. The grant of relief of
specific performance is discretionary. The circumstances
specified in Section 20 are only illustrative and not
exhaustive. The court would take into consideration the
circumstances in each case, the conduct of the parties
and the respective interest under the contract.”
iv)
The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of K.
Narendra
Vs.
Riviera
Apartments
(P)
Ltd.11,
at
paragraph Nos.29, 30, 31, 32, 33 and 34, has held as
follows:
(1994) 4 SCC 18
(1999) 5 SCC 77
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“29. Section 20 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963
provides
that
the
jurisdiction
to
decree
specific
performance is discretionary and the court is not bound to
grant such relief merely because it is lawful to do so; the
discretion of the court is not arbitrary but sound and
reasonable, guided by judicial principles and capable of
correction by a court of appeal. Performance of the
contract involving some hardship on the defendant which
he did not foresee while non-performance involving no
such hardship on the plaintiff, is one of the circumstances
in which the court may properly exercise discretion not to
decree specific performance. The doctrine of comparative
hardship has been thus statutorily recognized in India.
However, mere inadequacy of consideration or the mere
fact that the contract is onerous to the defendant or
improvident in its nature, shall not constitute an unfair
advantage
to
the
plaintiff
over
the
defendant
or
unforeseeable hardship on the defendant. The principle
underlying Section 20 has been summed up by this Court
in Lourdu
Mari
David v. Louis
Chinnaya
Arogiaswamy [(1996) 5 SCC 589 : AIR 1996 SC 2814] by
stating that the decree for specific performance is in the
discretion of the Court but the discretion should not be
used arbitrarily; the discretion should be exercised on
sound principles of law capable of correction by an
appellate court.
30. Chitty on Contracts (27th Edn., 1994, Vol. 1., at
p. 1296) states:
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“Severe hardship may be a ground for refusing
specific
performance
even
though
it
results
from
circumstances which arise after the conclusion of the
contract, which affect the person of the defendant rather
than the subject-matter of the contract, and for which the
plaintiff is in no way responsible.”
31. Very
recently
in K.S.
Vidyanadam v. Vairavan [(1997) 3 SCC 1] this Court has
held: (SCC p. 7, para 10)
“10. It has been consistently held by the courts in
India, following certain early English decisions, that in the
case of agreement of sale relating to immovable property,
time is not of the essence of the contract unless
specifically provided to that effect. The period of limitation
prescribed by the Limitation Act for filing a suit is three
years. From these two circumstances, it does not follow
that any and every suit for specific performance of the
agreement (which does not provide specifically that time
is of the essence of the contract) should be decreed
provided
it
is
filed
within
the
notwithstanding
the
time-limits
period
of
stipulated
limitation
in
the
agreement for doing one or the other thing by one or the
other party. That would amount to saying that the timelimits prescribed by the parties in the agreement have no
significance or value and that they mean nothing. Would it
be reasonable to say that because time is not made the
essence of the contract, the time-limit(s) specified in the
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agreement have no relevance and can be ignored with
impunity? It would also mean denying the discretion
vested in the court by both Sections 10 and 20. As held
by
a
Constitution
Bench
of
this
Court
in Chand
Rani v. Kamal Rani [(1993) 1 SCC 519 : AIR 1993 SC
1742] : (SCC p. 528, para 25)
‘… it is clear that in the case of sale of immovable
property there is no presumption as to time being the
essence of the contract. Even if it is not of the essence of
the contract, the court may infer that it is to be performed
in a reasonable time if the conditions are (evident?): (1)
from the express terms of the contract; (2) from the
nature of the property; and (3) from the surrounding
circumstances, for example, the object of making the
contract.’
In other words, the court should look at all the
relevant
circumstances
including
the
time-limit(s)
specified in the agreement and determine whether its
discretion
to
grant
specific
performance
should
be
exercised. Now in the case of urban properties in India, it
is well-known that their prices have been going up sharply
over the last few decades — particularly after 1973.”
32. Referring to the principle that mere rise in prices
is no ground for denying the specific performance the
Court has emphasized the need for being alive to the
realities of life and inflationary tendencies judicially
noticeable and observed: (SCC p. 9, para 11)
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“Indeed, we are inclined to think that the rigor of the
rule evolved by courts that time is not of the essence of
the contract in the case of immovable properties —
evolved in times when prices and values were stable and
inflation was unknown — requires to be relaxed, if not
modified, particularly in the case of urban immovable
properties. It is high time, we do so.”
33. The Court has further proceeded to hold: (SCC
pp. 9-10, para 11)
“All
this
only
means
that
while
exercising
its
discretion, the court should also bear in mind that when
the parties prescribe certain time-limit(s) for taking steps
by one or the other party, it must have some significance
and
that
the
said
time-limit(s)
cannot
be
ignored
altogether on the ground that time has not been made the
essence
of
the
contract
(relating
to
immovable
properties).”
34. Having noticed the Constitution Bench decision
in Chand Rani [(1993) 1 SCC 519 : AIR 1993 SC 1742]
the Court has further held: (SCC p. 11, para 14)
“Even where time is not of the essence of the
contract, the plaintiff must perform his part of the
contract within a reasonable time and reasonable time
should be determined by looking at all the surrounding
circumstances including the express terms of the contract
and the nature of the property.”
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v)
The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of A.C.
Arulappan Vs. Ahalya Naik12, at paragraph No.7, 8, 9, 10
and 15, has held as follows:
“7. The
discretionary
jurisdiction
to
and
court
the
decree
can
specific
consider
relief
is
various
circumstances to decide whether such relief is to be
granted. Merely because it is lawful to grant specific relief,
the court need not grant the order for specific relief; but
this discretion shall not be exercised in an arbitrary or
unreasonable manner. Certain circumstances have been
mentioned in Section 20(2) of the Specific Relief Act,
1963 as to under what circumstances the court shall
exercise such discretion. If under the terms of the
contract the plaintiff gets an unfair advantage over the
defendant, the court may not exercise its discretion in
favour of the plaintiff. So also, specific relief may not be
granted if the defendant would be put to undue hardship
which he did not foresee at the time of agreement. If it is
inequitable to grant specific relief, then also the court
would desist from granting a decree to the plaintiff.
8. In Damacherla Anjaneyulu v. Damcherla Venkata
Seshaiah [1987 Supp SCC 75 : AIR 1987 SC 1641] the
High Court declined to grant a decree for specific
performance in favour of the plaintiff, even though the
(2001) 6 SCC 600
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defendant was guilty of breach of agreement. That was a
case
where
the
defendant
had
constructed
costly
structures and if a decree for specific performance was
granted, the defendant would have been put to special
hardship. This Court directed the defendant to pay
compensation to the plaintiff.
9. In Parakunnan
Veetill
Joseph's
Son
Mathew v. Nedumbara Kuruvila's Son [1987 Supp SCC
340 : AIR 1987 SC 2328] this Court cautioned and
observed as under: (SCC p. 345, para 14)
“14. Section 20 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963
preserves judicial discretion to courts as to decreeing
specific
performance.
The
court
should
meticulously
consider all facts and circumstances of the case. The court
is not bound to grant specific performance merely
because it is lawful to do so. The motive behind the
litigation should also enter into the judicial verdict. The
court should take care to see that it is not used as an
instrument of oppression to have an unfair advantage to
the plaintiff.”
10. In Lourdu
Mari
David v. Louis
Chinnaya
Arogiaswamy [(1996) 5 SCC 589 : AIR 1996 SC 2814] the
plaintiff, who sought for specific performance of an
agreement to purchase immoveable property, filed a suit
with incorrect and false facts. In the plaint, it was alleged
that the plaintiff was already given possession of Door
No.2/53 as a lessee and he was given possession of Door
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No.1/53 on the date of the agreement itself. But he did
not give any evidence that he had got possession of Door
No.1/53 on the date of the agreement. It was found that
his case as regards Door No.1/53 was false. He also
alleged that he had paid Rs.400 in addition to the sum of
Rs.4000 paid as advance, but this was proved to be an
incorrect statement. He alleged that the third defendant
had
inspected
the
house
during
the
course
of
negotiations, but this also was found to be false. This
Court held that it is settled law that the party who seeks
to avail of the jurisdiction of a court and specific
performance being equitable relief, must come to the
court with clean hands. In other words, the party who
makes false allegations does not come with clean hands
and is not entitled to the equitable relief.
15. Granting of specific performance is an equitable
relief, though the same is now governed by the statutory
provisions of the Specific Relief Act, 1963. These equitable
principles are nicely incorporated in Section 20 of the Act.
While granting a decree for specific performance, these
salutary guidelines shall be in the forefront of the mind of
the court. The trial court, which had the added advantage
of recording the evidence and seeing the demeanour of
the witnesses, considered the relevant facts and reached
a
conclusion.
The appellate court
should
not
have
reversed that decision disregarding these facts and, in our
view, the appellate court seriously flawed in its decision.
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Therefore, we hold that the respondent is not entitled to a
decree of specific performance of the contract.”
vi) The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of
U.N.KRISHNAMURTHY
(SINCE
DECEASED)
AND
OTHERS LRS. vs. A.M.KRISHNAMRTHY, reported in
(2023) 11 SCC 175, at paragraph Nos.32, 33 and 34, has
held as under:
“32. In a suit for specific performance of a
contract, the Court is required to pose unto itself the
following questions, namely:
32.1. Whether there is a valid agreement of sale
binding on both the vendor and the vendee.
32.2. Whether the plaintiff has all along been and
still is ready and willing to perform his part of the
contract as envisaged under Section 16(c) of the
Specific Relief Act, 1963.
33. There is a distinction between readiness and
willingness to perform the contract and both ingredients
are necessary for the relief of specific performance.
In Acharya
Swami
Ganesh
Dassji v. Sita
Ram
Thapar [Acharya Swami Ganesh Dassji v. Sita Ram
Thapar, (1996) 4 SCC 526] cited by Mr Venugopal, this
Court
said
that
there
was
a
difference
between
readiness and willingness to perform a contract. While
readiness means the capacity of the plaintiff to perform
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the contract which would include his financial position,
willingness relates to the conduct of the plaintiff. The
same
view
was
taken
in Kalawati v. Rakesh
by
this
Court
Kumar [Kalawati v.Rakesh
Kumar, (2018) 3 SCC 658 : (2018) 2 SCC (Civ) 609] .
34. Even in a first appeal, the first appellate court
is
duty-bound
to
examine
whether
there
was
continuous readiness and willingness on the part of the
plaintiff to perform the contract. This proposition finds
support
from Balraj
Taneja v. Sunil
Taneja v. Sunil
Madan,(1999)
H.P.Pyarejan v. Dasappa [H.P.
Madan [Balraj
SCC
396]
and
Pyarejan v. Dasappa,
(2006) 2 SCC 496] where this Court approved the
views
taken
Mama v. Flora
by
the
Privy
Council
Sassoon [Ardeshir
in Ardeshir
Mama v. Flora
Sassoon, 1928 SCC OnLine PC 43 : (1927-28) 55 IA
360 at p. 372 : AIR 1928 PC 208] .”
vii)
In
the
case
of
P.Daivasigamani
vs.
S.Sambandan13, at paragraph Nos.21, 22, 23, 24 and 25,
has held as under;
“21.Readiness and willingness are not one, but
two separate elements. Readiness means the capacity
of the plaintiff to perform the contract, which would
include the financial position to pay the purchase price.
(2022) 14 SC 793
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Willingness refers to the intention of the plaintiff as a
purchaser
to
perform
his
part
of
the
contract.
Willingness is inferred by scrutinising the conduct of
the
plaintiff
purchaser,
including
attending
circumstances reported in See para 2 in Ganesh Dassji
V. Sita Ram Thapar, (1996) 4 SCC 52614. Continuous
readiness and willingness on the part of the plaintiff
purchaser from the date the balance sale consideration
was payable in terms of the agreement to sell, till the
decision of the suit, is a condition precedent for grant
of relief of specific performance reported in See para 5
in N.P.Thirugnanam V. R. Jagan Mohan Rao, (1995) 5
SCC 115. Also see Anleshir Manu V. flora Sassoon,
1928 SCC Online PC 43: (1927-28) 55 IA 360: Air
1928 PC 208.
22. The expression “readiness and willingness”
used in Section 16 (c) of the said Act, has been
interpreted in a catena of decisions by this Court, in
the light of facts and circumstances of the cases under
consideration for the purpose of granting or refusing to
grant the relief of Specific Performance of a contract.
The
said
expression
cannot
be
interpreted
in
a
straitjacket formula. In a very apt decision of this Court
in Syed Dastagir vs. T.R. Gopalakrishna Setty (1999) 6
SCC 337, a three-Judge Bench of this Court, construing
a plea of “readiness and willingness to perform” in view
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of
the
requirement
of Section
16(c) and
its
explanation, observed as under: (SCC p. 341, para 9)
“9. So the whole gamut of the issue raised is,
how to construe a plea specially with reference
to Section 16(c) and what are the obligations
which the plaintiff has to comply with in reference
to his plea and whether the plea of the plaintiff
could
not
be
construed
to
conform to
the
requirement of the aforesaid section, or does this
section require specific words to be pleaded that
he has performed or has always been ready and
is willing to perform his part of the contract. In
construing a plea in any pleading, courts must
keep in mind that a plea is not an expression of
art and science but an expression through words
to place fact and law of one's case for a relief.
Such an expression may be pointed, precise,
sometimes vague but still it could be gathered
what he wants to convey through only by reading
the whole pleading, depending on the person
drafting a plea. In India most of the pleas are
drafted by counsel hence the aforesaid difference
of pleas which inevitably differ from one to the
other. Thus, to gather true spirit behind a plea it
should be read as a whole. This does not distract
one from performing his obligations as required
under a statute. But to test whether he has
performed his obligations, one has to see the pith
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and substance of a plea. Where a statute requires
any fact to be pleaded then that has to be
pleaded may be in any form. The same plea may
be stated by different persons through different
words; then how could it be constricted to be
only in any particular nomenclature or word.
Unless a statute specifically requires a plea to be
in any particular form, it can be in any form. No
specific phraseology or language is required to
take
such
a
plea.
The
language
in Section
16(c) does not require any specific phraseology
but only that the plaintiff must aver that he has
performed or has always been and is willing to
perform
his
part
of
the
contract.
So
the
compliance of “readiness and willingness” has to
be in spirit and substance and not in letter and
form. So to insist for a mechanical production of
the exact words of a statute is to insist for the
form rather than the essence. So the absence of
form cannot dissolve an essence if already
pleaded”.
23. It was further observed therein that: (Syed
Dastagir case15,
“11........It is significant that this explanation
carves out a contract which involves payment of
money as a separate class from Section 16(c).
Syed Dastagir V. T. R. Gopalkrishna setty, (1999) 6 SCC 337
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Explanation (i) uses the words “it is not essential
for the plaintiff to actually tender to the defendant
or to deposit in court any money except when so
directed by the court”. (emphasis supplied) This
speaks in a negative term what is not essential for
the plaintiff to do. This is more in support of the
plaintiff that he need not tender to the defendant
or deposit in court any money but the plaintiff
must [as per Explanation (ii)] at least aver his
performance or
readiness and willingness to
perform his part of the contract”.
(emphasis in original)
24. In Sukhbir Singh v. Brij Pal Singh16 this Court
had laid down that law is not in doubt and it is not a
condition that the respondents (Plaintiffs) should have
ready cash with them. It is sufficient for the respondents
to establish that they had the capacity to pay the sale
consideration. It is not necessary that they should always
carry the money with them from the date of the suit till
the date of the decree. The said principle was followed in
A. Kanthamani v. Nasreen Ahmed17, in case of C.S.
Venkatesh v. A.S.C. Murthy18.
(1997) 2 SCC 200
(2017) 4 SCC 654 : (2017) 2 SCC (Civ) 596
(2020) 3 SCC 280 : (2020) 2 SCC (Civ) 90
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25. Section
20 of
the
Specific
Relief
Act
(Pre-
amendment), which confers discretion on the court to
exercise jurisdiction to decree of specific performance,
states that this exercise should not be arbitrary, but
guided
by
sound
and
reasonable
judicial
principles. Interpreting and elucidating on Section 20 of
the Specific Relief Act (pre-amendment) and factors to be
considered, this Court in Kamal Kumar v. Premlata Joshi19
has also referred to Sections 16(c), 22, 23 and 24 of the
Specific Relief Act and Forms 47/48 of Appendix A to C of
the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, to summarise: (SCC
pp.705-706, paras 7-8)
“7. It is a settled principle of law that the grant of relief
of specific performance is a discretionary and equitable
relief. The material questions, which are required to
be gone into for grant of the relief of specific performance
are:
7.1 First, whether there exists a valid and concluded
contract between the parties for sale/purchase of the suit
property;
7.2 Second, whether the plaintiff has been ready and
willing to perform his part of contract and whether he is
still ready and willing to perform his part as mentioned in
the contract.
(2019) 3 SCC 704 : (2019) 2 SCC (Civ) 405
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7.3 Third, whether the plaintiff has, in fact, performed
his part of the contract and, if so, how and to what extent
and in what manner he has performed and whether such
performance was in conformity with the terms of the
contract.
7.4 Fourth, whether it will be equitable to grant the
relief of specific performance to the plaintiff against the
defendant in relation to suit property or it will cause any
kind of hardship to the defendant and, if so, how and in
what manner and the extent if such relief is eventually
granted to the plaintiff.
7.5 Lastly, whether the plaintiff is entitled for grant of
any other alternative relief, namely, refund of earnest
money etc. and, if so, on what grounds.
8. In our opinion, the aforementioned questions are
part of the statutory requirements [See Sections 16
(c), 20, 21, 22, 23 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 and
Forms 47/48 of Appendix A to C of the Code of Civil
Procedure]. These requirements have to be properly
pleaded by the parties in their respective pleadings and
proved with the aid of evidence in accordance with law. It
is only then the Court is entitled to exercise its discretion
and accordingly grant or refuse the relief of specific
performance depending upon the case made out by the
parties on facts.”
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21.
Applying the above principle of law laid down by
the Hon’ble Supreme Court to the present facts and
circumstances of the case, the alleged agreement is dated
10.08.1979 for a total sale consideration of only Rs. 4,000/in respect of 4 acres 8 guntas of land situated at Karur
Village, Ranebennur Taluk. If a decree is now passed for the
said amount, it would certainly cause hardship to the
defendants and also an unfair advantage over the defendant
by the plaintiff. It would also amount to an arbitrary
exercise of discretion.
22.
The escalation in the price of the property over
the passage of time is also a relevant factor to be taken into
consideration while deciding whether to grant the decree for
specific performance. Therefore, in the present case, the
decree for specific performance cannot be granted.
viii)
The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of
J.P.Builders and Another VS. A.Ramdas Rao and
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Another20, at paragraph Nos.20, 21, 23, 24, 25, 26 and
27, it is held as under:
Readiness and willingness
“20. Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963
provides for personal bars to relief. This provision
states that:
“16.Personal bars to relief:--- Specific performance
of a contract cannot be enforced in favour of a person -a)
who
would
not
be
entitled
to
recover
compensation for its breach; or
b) who has become incapable of performing, or
violates any essential term of, the contract that on his
part remains to be performed, or acts in fraud of the
contract, or wilfully acts at variance with, or in
subversion of, the relation intended to be established
by the contract; or
c) who fails to aver and prove that he has
performed or has always been ready and willing to
perform the essential terms of the contract which are to
be
performed
(2011) 1 SCC 429
by
him,
other
than
terms
the
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performance of which has been prevented or waived by
the defendant.
Explanation.- For the purposes of clause (c),(i) where a contract involves the payment of
money, it is not essential for the plaintiff to actually
tender to the defendant or to deposit in court any
money except when so directed by the court;
(ii) the plaintiff must aver performance of, or
readiness and
willingness to perform, the contract
according to its true construction."
21. Among the three clauses, we are more
concerned about clause (c). "Readiness and willingness"
is enshrined in clause (c) which was not present in the
old Act of 1877. However, it was later inserted with the
recommendations of the 9th Law Commission's report.
This clause provides that the person seeking specific
performance must prove that he has performed or has
been ready and willing to perform the essential terms
of the contract which are to be performed by him.
23. In N.P. Thirugnanam vs. Dr. R. Jagan Mohan
Rao21., at SCC para 5, this Court held: (SCC pp. 11718)
(1995) 5 SCC 115
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"5......Section 16(c) of the Act envisages that the
plaintiff must plead and prove that he had performed or
has always been ready and willing to perform the
essential terms of the contract which are to be
performed
by
him,
other
than
those
terms
the
performance of which has been prevented or waived by
the
defendant.
The
continuous
readiness
and
willingness on the part of the plaintiff is a condition
precedent to grant the relief of specific performance.
This circumstance is material and relevant and is
required to be considered by the court while granting or
refusing to grant the relief. If the plaintiff fails to either
aver or prove the same, he must fail. To adjudge
whether the plaintiff is ready and willing to perform his
part
of
the
contract,
the
court
must
take
into
consideration the conduct of the plaintiff prior and
subsequent to the filing of the suit along with other
attending circumstances. The amount of consideration
which he has to pay to the defendant must of necessity
be proved to be available. Right from the date of the
execution till date of the decree he must prove that he
is ready and has always been willing to perform his part
of the contract. As stated, the factum of his readiness
and willingness to perform his part of the contract is to
be adjudged with reference to the conduct of the party
and the attending circumstances. The court may infer
from the facts and circumstances whether the plaintiff
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was ready and was always ready and willing to perform
his part of the contract."
24. In P.D'Souza vs. Shondrilo Naidu22, this Court
observed: (SCC p. 654, paras 19 and 21)
"19. It is indisputable that in a suit for specific
performance of contract the plaintiff must establish his
readiness and willingness to perform his part of
contract. The question as to whether the onus was
discharged by the plaintiff or not will depend upon the
facts and circumstances of each case. No straitjacket
formula can be laid down in this behalf....
21......The readiness and willingness on the part of
the plaintiff to perform his part of contract would also
depend upon the question as to whether the defendant
did everything which was required of him to be done in
terms of the agreement for sale."
25. Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963
mandates "readiness and willingness" on the part of the
plaintiff and it is a condition precedent for obtaining
relief of grant of specific performance. It is also clear
that in a suit for specific performance, the plaintiff must
allege
and
prove
a
continuous
"readiness
and
willingness" to perform the contract on his part from
the date of the contract. The onus is on the plaintiff.
(2004) 6 SCC 649
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26. It has been rightly considered by this Court
in R.C. Chandiok. vs. Chuni Lal Sabharwal23., that
"readiness and willingness" cannot be treated as a
straightjacket formula. This has to be determined from
the entirety of the facts and circumstances relevant to
the intention and conduct of the party concerned.
27. It is settled law that even in the absence of
specific plea by the opposite party, it is the mandate of
the statute that plaintiff has to comply with Section
16(c) of the Specific Relief Act and when there is noncompliance with this statutory mandate, the Court is
not bound to grant specific performance and is left with
no other alternative but to dismiss the suit. It is also
clear that readiness to perform must be established
throughout the relevant points of time. "Readiness and
willingness" to perform the part of the contract has to
be determined/ascertained from the conduct of the
parties.”
ix) The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Zarina
Siddiqui vs. A. Ramalingam Alias R.Amarnathan24 at
paragraph Nos.30, 33, has held as under:
“30. In a recent judgment dated 22.9.2014 in Civil
Appeal No.9047 of 2014 entitled K. Prakash vs. B.R.
(1970) 3 SCC 140
(2015) 1 SCC 705
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Sampath Kumar25, this Court observed that: (SCC
p.605 and paras 16 & 18-19)
“16. The principles which can be enunciated
are that where the plaintiff brings a suit for
specific performance of contract for sale, the law
insists a condition precedent to the grant of
decree for specific performance: that the
plaintiff must show his continued readiness and
willingness to perform his part of the contract in
accordance with its terms from the date of
contract to the date of hearing. Normally, when
the trial court exercises its discretion in one way
or other after appreciation of entire evidence
and materials on record, the appellate court
should not interfere unless it is established that
the discretion has been exercised perversely,
arbitrarily or against judicial principles. The
appellate court should also not exercise its
discretion against the grant of specific
performance on extraneous considerations or
sympathetic considerations. It is true, as
contemplated under Section 20 of the Specific
Relief Act, that a party is not entitled to get a
decree for specific performance merely because
it is lawful to do so. Nevertheless once an
agreement to sell is legal and validly proved and
further requirements for getting such a decree
are established then the Court has to exercise
its discretion in favour of granting relief for
specific performance.
18. Subsequent rise in price will not be
treated as a hardship entailing refusal of the
decree for specific performance. Rise in price is
a normal change of circumstances and,
(2015) 1 SCC 597
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therefore, on that ground a decree for specific
performance cannot be reversed.
19. However, the court may take notice of the
fact that there has been an increase in the price
of the property and considering the other facts
and circumstances of the case, this Court while
granting decree for specific performance can
impose such condition which may to some
extent compensate the defendant owner of the
property. This aspect of the matter is considered
by a three-Judge Bench of this Court in Nirmala
Anand vs. Advent Corporation (P) Ltd…26
33. The equitable discretion to grant or not to
grant a relief for specific performance also depends
upon the conduct of the parties. The necessary
ingredient has to be proved and established by the
plaintiff so that discretion would be exercised
judiciously in favour of the plaintiff. At the same time,
if the defendant does not come with clean hands and
suppresses material facts and evidence and misled
the Court then such discretion should not be
exercised by refusing to grant specific performance.”
x) The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of R.Shama
Naik vs. G.Srinivasaiah27 at paragraph Nos.8, 9, 10 and
11, has held as under:
“8. Section 16(C) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963
(prior to amendment w.e.f. 1.10.2018) bars the relief of
the specific performance of a contract in favour of a
person who fails to aver readiness and willingness to
perform his part of the contract.
(2002) 8 SCC 146
2024 SCC ONLINE 3586
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9. There is a legion of precedents on the subject of
readiness and willingness.
10. The law is well settled. The plaintiff is obliged
not only to make specific statement and averments in
the plaint but is also obliged to adduce necessary oral
and documentary evidence to show the availability of
funds to make payment in terms of the contract in time.
11. There is a fine distinction between readiness
and willingness to perform the contract. Both the
ingredients are necessary for the relief of specific
performance.”
xi) The judgment of the Division Bench judgment of this
Court in Sri. T.N. Arun Kumar and Others Vs. Sri.
Shivanna, S/o. Late Basappa and Another28, which reads
as follows:
16. Therefore, we are of the view that the
findings of the Trial Court is incorrect with regard to the
readiness and willingness of the plaintiffs.
17. Be that as it may, Even if we accept the
contention of the plaintiffs that they were ready and
willing to take the sale deed by paying the balance sale
consideration, atleast it was for the plaintiffs to deposit
the amount of Rs. 15,50,000/- immediately after the
decree, since the Trial Court has directed the plaintiffs
to pay the balance sale consideration and obtain the
sale deed by paying the defendants within three
(2012) 3 KCCR 1757 (DB)
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months to receive the balance sale consideration and to
get the sale deed at their cost and even otherwise
atleast the plaintiffs were required to deposit Rs.
15,50,000/- before the Court below immediately after
completion of three months from the date of decree.
But such an attempt has not been made by the
plaintiffs to deposit the money. Only reason assigned
by
Mr.
Rama
Mohan.
learned
counsel
for
the
respondent is that since the matter was pending before
this Court, they did not deposit the amount. But the
said submission cannot be accepted by this Court
because the matter was listed before this Court on
01.06.2010 and on which date notice was ordered in
regard to consider the application of the appellants for
grant of stay. The Court notice issued by this Court in
this appeal has been received by the respondents on
22.06.2010
Therefore,
the
respondents-plaintiffs
cannot contend that they did not deposit the money on
account of the pendency of this appeal because they
filed the appeal only on 13.05.2010 which date was the
last day for the respondents - plaintiffs to pay the
amount in terms of the decree. Even thereafter it was
open for the plaintiffs-decree holder to deposit the
amount into the Court by filing an execution. Till today
no such execution petition is filed, no amount is
deposited by the plaintiffs. In addition to that the
appeal was dismissed for default on 26.11.2010 Nine
months thereafter on 05.10.2011 the appeal has been
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restored by this Court on an application filed by the
plaintiffs. Atleast on dismissal of this appeal the
respondents could have deposited the amount, with the
permission of the Court, but such an attempt has not
been made.
xii) Further, I place reliance on the judgment of the
Division Bench judgment of this Court in Sri. Punny Akat
Philip Raju, Since dead by his Lrs. Vs. Sri. Dinesh
Reddy29, wherein at paragraphs No.31, 32, 33, 34, 35 and
36, it is held as under:
31.
It
is
in
this
background
of
the
statutory
provisions, we have to find out, when the plaintiff avers
in the plaint that he has performed or is always being
ready and willing to perform the essential terms of the
contract, which deals with payment of money, what is
the proof that is required to prove the said averments.
The explanation to Section 16 clarifies that when a
contract involves payment of money, it is not essential
for the plaintiff to actually tender to the defendant or to
deposit in Court any money except when so directed by
the Court. But none the less, if the plaintiff wants to
prove that he is possessed with the requisite funds to
perform his part of the contract i.e., payment of balance
ILR 2016 KAR 2252
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sale consideration, he should produce such evidence to
substantiate his case. What he has to place before the
Court is his financial ability either to raise the requisite
funds or the possession of the requisite funds in proof of
his readiness and willingness to perform the stipulations
regarding the payment of balance sale consideration.
The rule that in each case best evidence of which the
case in its nature is susceptible should always be given
naturally leads to the division of evidence into primary
and secondary. Primary evidence is the best or highest
evidence, or, in other words, it is that kind of proof
which, in the eye of the law, affords the greatest
certainty of the fact in 29 question. Until it is shown that
the production of this evidence is out of the party’s
power, no other proof of the fact is in general admitted.
It is based on the principle that ‘best evidence’ in the
possession or power of the party must be produced.
What the best evidence is, it depends upon the facts and
circumstances of each case.
PROOF OF READINESS
32.
The
proof
of
readiness
necessarily
means
demonstration of financial ability or capacity to pay the
balance sale consideration and take the sale deed. When
a person on oath states in the witness box that he is
ready with the requisite funds, he must produce some
evidence to prove his possession of the required funds.
The explanation makes it clear that the proof of requisite
funds does not mean he should produce the currency
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before the Court or he should deposit the money in
Court. But at the same time, mere statement on oath in
the witness box that he is possessed of the requisite
funds would also do not prove possession of funds. The
said proof has to be necessarily by way of documentary
evidence. The reason being, if, the payment is to be
made in cash i.e., by handing over currency, currency is
a documentary evidence. The explanation makes it clear
that to prove readiness, the plaintiff need not produce
the
currency
before
the
Court.
If
the
balance
consideration is to be deposited in the Court such a
deposit is also evidenced by documentary evidence,
which is also not necessary by virtue of the explanation.
33. Money does not exist in vacuum. Money has to
be necessarily in the form of physical object. It is in the
nature of document. Money is deposited in banks. Money
is in the nature of securities. Money is capable of being
raised from borrowing. Money could be raised by sale of
properties movable or immovable. When a person claims
that he is possessed of sufficient funds, he has to
produce some documentary evidence, which proves his
capacity to raise the funds or he possess the funds.
What are the documents which, the plaintiff can produce
to prove his capacity? It may be a passbook issued by a
Bank where he has kept the balance sale consideration
ready for payment. If he has invested his money by way
of securities, he has to produce those securities before
Court to show that any time he can encash the same and
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pay the balance consideration. Similarly, if he has kept
the money in Fixed Deposit, in a Bank, that deposit
receipt is the proof of his ability to raise the balance sale
consideration. If he intends to borrow money from a
Nationalized Bank or from his employer or from any
other financial institution, it has to be demonstrated by
producing a request for such financial assistance in
writing, sanctioning of the said loan which has to be
necessarily
in
writing.
These
instances
are
only
illustrative. There may be several other modes by which
the requisite funds are raised. But all of these instances
are evidenced by documentary evidence.
34. Therefore, mere stepping into the witness box
and saying on oath that he is ready with the balance sale
consideration or that he is going to borrow money from
any financial institution or that he has got sufficient
funds in his Bank accounts or that he has kept money in
Fixed
Deposit,
without
that
oral
evidence
being
supported by documentary evidence will not prove the
plaintiff’s
readiness
consideration.
It
is
to
pay
immaterial
the
balance
whether
such
sale
oral
evidence is challenged in cross-examination or not. The
plaintiff has to prove to the satisfaction of the Court that
he possessed the requisite funds. He has to produce
such documentary evidence, which would enable the
Court to come to the conclusion that plaintiff is ready
with the requisite balance sale consideration to complete
the sale transaction. If no evidence is adduced in this
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regard by way of documentary evidence, no prudent
man would come to the conclusion that the person has
proved the possession of funds. In the absence of any
such documentary evidence being produced, it is a case
of plaintiff’s case being not proved. Plaintiff cannot
expect
the
Court
to
pass
a
decree
for
specific
performance of a contract of sale when the plaintiff has
not proved his readiness to perform his part of the
contract.
35. Therefore, in a case arising under Section 16(c)
of the Specific Relief Act, the obligation is cast on the
plaintiff to prove that he was ready with the balance sale
consideration. When the statute requires the plaintiff
must plead and prove his readiness and willingness to
perform his part of the contract and that readiness refers
to the possession of the requisite funds, there is an
obligation cast on that person, who has to prove the
possession of funds to produce documents to show
possession of funds by him. Though he is not expected
to tender or deposit the cash before the Court, he has to
produce such evidence to prove his financial capability.
Only on production of such documentary evidence, on
verification and appreciation of those documents, Court
could come to the conclusion that the plea of readiness
is proved. Mere assertion on oath that he is ready with
the
balance
sale
consideration,
even
if
it
is
not
challenged in the cross-examination; is not the proof of
the
plaintiff’s
readiness
with
the
balance
sale
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consideration. He should produce such evidence to show
either he possess the requisite funds or he is capable of
raising such funds within the time stipulated. If such
evidence is not forthcoming it is a case of, the plaintiff’s
case being not proved.
36. The Apex Court had an occasion to consider the
contention that when there is no denial of readiness and
willingness by the defendant either in the written
statement or in the evidence, there is no obligation on
the part of the plaintiff to produce any documentary
evidence to prove his readiness. The Supreme Court in
the case of J.P. Builders & another –vs- A. Ramadas Rao
reported in (2011)1 SCC 429 after referring to Section
16 of the Specific Relief Act has held at para-21 as
under:
21. Among the three clauses, we are more
concerned about clause (c). ‘Readiness and
Willingness’ is enshrined in clause (c) which was
not present in the old Act of 1877. However, it was
later inserted with the recommendations of the 9th
Law Commission’s Report. This clause provides
that the person seeking specific performance must
prove that he has performed or has been ready
and willing to perform the essential terms of the
contract which are to be performed by him.
At para 22 it is held as under:
The words ‘ready’ and ‘willing’ imply that the
person was prepared to carry out the terms of the
contract. The distinction between ‘readiness’ and
‘willingness’ is that the former refers to financial
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capacity and the latter to the conduct of the
plaintiff wanting performance. readiness is backed
by willingness.
At paras-25, 26 and 27 it is held as under:
Generally, 25. Section 16(c) of the Specific
Relief Act, 1963 mandates “readiness and
willingness” on the part of the plaintiff and it is a
condition precedent for obtaining relief of grant of
specific performance. It is also clear that in a suit
for specific performance, the plaintiff must allege
and prove a continuous “readiness and willingness”
to perform the contract on his part from the date
of the contract. The onus is on the plaintiff.
26. It has been rightly considered by this Court
in R.C. Chandiok V. Chuni Lal Sabharwal that
“readiness and willingness” cannot be treated as a
straitjacket formula. This has to be determined
from the entirety of the facts and circumstances
relevant to the intention and conduct of the party
concerned.
27. It is settled law that even in the absence of
specific plea by the opposite party, it is the 36
mandate of the statute that the plaintiff has to
comply with Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act
and when there is non-compliance with this
statutory mandate, the Court is not bound to grant
specific performance and is left with no other
alternative but to dismiss the suit. It is also clear
that readiness to perform must be established
throughout the relevant points of time. “Readiness
and Willingness” to perform the part of the
contract has to be determined/ascertained from
the conduct of the parties.
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23.
Further, considering the principles of law laid
down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court and applying them to
the facts and circumstances of the present case, there is no
evidence or proof produced by the plaintiff to establish that
he was ever ready and willing to perform his part of the
contract. The mere fact that the plaintiff had earlier filed a
suit for permanent injunction, in which an ex parte decree
was granted, and subsequently filed the present suit for
specific performance, cannot by itself constitute proof of
readiness and willingness to perform his part of the
contract.
24.
Readiness
and
willingness
to
perform
the
contract must be established by cogent and concrete
evidence,
particularly
when
the
transaction
involves
monetary consideration. In the present case, there is
absolutely no evidence to show that the plaintiff was ever
ready and willing to perform his part of the contract.
25.
Considering the chronology of events in the case
from the date of execution of agreement of sale, the market
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value
of
the
property
has
substantially
escalated. If
considerable time is consumed during the legal battle and
the market value of the property escalates, granting a
decree for specific performance at the earlier agreed lower
price would cause hardship over the defendants by the
plaintiffs, as the owner of the property is not be compelled
to sell away the land for lower price. Therefore, escalation
in market value is also a relevant factor to be taken into
consideration by the Court while exercising its discretionary
relief of specific performance, as stipulated by the Hon’ble
Supreme
Court
in
Saradamai
Kandappan
Vs.
S.
Rajalakshmi30, wherein at paragraph Nos.36 and 43, it
has been held as follows:
36. The principle that time is not of the essence of
contracts relating to immovable properties took shape
in an era when market value of immovable properties
were stable and did not undergo any marked change
even over a few years (followed mechanically, even
when value ceased to be stable). As a consequence,
(2011) 12 SCC 18
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time for performance, stipulated in the agreement was
assumed to be not material, or at all events considered
as merely indicating the reasonable period within which
contract should be performed. The assumption was that
grant of specific performance would not prejudice the
vendor-defendant financially as there would not be
much difference in the market value of the property
even if the contract was performed after a few months.
This principle made sense during the first half of the
twentieth century, when there was comparatively very
little inflation, in India. The third quarter of the
twentieth century saw a very slow but steady increase
in prices. But a drastic change occurred from the
beginning of the last quarter of the twentieth century.
There has been a galloping inflation and prices of
immovable properties have increased steeply, by leaps
and bounds. Market values of properties are no longer
stable or steady. We can take judicial notice of the
comparative purchase power of a rupee in the year
1975 and now, as also the steep increase in the value
of the immovable properties between then and now. It
is no exaggeration to say that properties in cities, worth
a lakh or so in or about 1975 to 1980, may cost a crore
or more now.
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43.
Till the issue is considered in an appropriate
case, we can only reiterate what has been suggested
in K.S. Vidyanadam v. Vairavan31 :
(i)
The courts, while exercising discretion in suits
for specific performance, should bear in mind that when
the parties prescribe a time/period, for taking certain
steps or for completion of the transaction, that must
have
some
significance
and
therefore
time/period
prescribed cannot be ignored.
(ii) The courts will apply greater scrutiny and
strictness when considering whether the purchaser was
`ready and willing' to perform his part of the contract.
(iii) Every suit for specific performance need not be
decreed merely because it is filed within the period of
limitation by ignoring the time-limits stipulated in the
agreement. The courts will also `frown' upon suits
which
are
not
filed
immediately
after
the
breach/refusal. The fact that limitation is three years
does not mean a purchaser can wait for 1 or 2 years to
file a suit and obtain specific performance. The three
year period is intended to assist purchasers in special
cases, as for example, where the major part of the
consideration
has
been
paid
to
the
vendor
and
possession has been delivered in part performance,
where equity shifts in favour of the purchaser.
(1997) 3 SCC 1
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xiii)
Further, this Court in Shri. Jay R. Sawant Vs.
Smt. Beena W/o. Raja Sabnis32, in paragraph Nos.18, 19,
20, 21, 22 and 23, has held has follows:
18. Therefore, it is necessary and essential
on the part of the plaintiff to plead his readiness
and willingness and accordingly has to lead
evidence in proving his readiness and willingness,
but that is not the case. Therefore, in this regard,
the plaintiff’s suit cannot be entertained for the
grant of a decree of specific performance of
contract.
19. My above view are fortified by the
Hon’ble
Supreme
Court
in
the
case
of
U.N.Krishnamurthy Vs. A.M.Krishnamurthy33, at
para 46 is reproduced as fallows:
46. It is settled law that for relief of specific
performance, the Plaintiff has to prove that all
along and till the final decision of the suit, he was
ready and willing to perform his part of the
contract. It is the bounden duty of the Plaintiff to
prove his readiness and willingness by adducing
evidence. This crucial facet has to be determined
by
considering
all
circumstances
including
In RSA No.100214/2016 C/w RSA Crob No.100003/2018 decided on
12.08.2024
(2022) SCC 3361
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availability of funds and mere statement or
averment in plaint of readiness and willingness,
would not suffice.
20. The Division Bench of this Court in case of
Punnya Akat Philip Raju and others Vs. Dinesh
Reddy34 at para No.32 to 38 are held as follows:
32.The proof of readiness necessarily means
demonstration of financial ability or capacity to
pay the balance sale consideration and take the
sale deed. When a person on oath states in the
witness box that he is ready with the requisite
funds, he must produce some evidence to prove
his
possession
of
the
required
funds.
The
explanation makes it clear that the proof of
requisite funds does not mean he should produce
the currency before the Court or he should
deposit the money in Court. But at the same
time, mere statement on oath in the witness box
that he is possessed of the e requisite funds
would also do not prove possession of funds. The
said proof has to be necessarily by way of
documentary evidence. The reason being, if, the
payment is to be made sin cash i.e., by handing
over
currency,
currency
is
a
documentary
evidence. The explanation makes it clear that to
prove readiness, the plaintiff need not produce
2016 (3) AKR 836
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the currency before the Court. If the balance
consideration is to be deposited in the Court such
a deposit is also evidenced by documentary
evidence, - which is also not necessary by virtue
of the explanation.
33. Money does not exist in vacuum. Money
has to be necessarily in the form of physical
object. It is in the nature of document. Money is
deposited in banks. Money is in the nature of
securities. Money is capable of being raised from
borrowing. Money could be raised by sale of
properties movable or immovable. When a person
claims that he is possessed sufficient funds, he
has to produce some documentary evidence,
which proves his capacity to raise the funds or he
possess the funds. What are the documents
which, the plaintiff can produce to prove his
capacity? It may be a passbook issued by a Bank
where he has kept the balance sale consideration
ready for payment. If he has invested his money
by way of securities, he has to produce those
securities before Court to show that any time he
can encash the same and pay the balance
consideration. Similarly, if he has kept the money
in Fixed Deposit, in a Bank, that deposit receipt is
the proof of his ability to raise the balance sale
consideration. If he intends to borrow money
from a Nationalized Bank or from his employer or
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from any other financial institution, it has to be
demonstrated by producing a request for such
financial assistance in writing, sanctioning of the
said loan which has to be necessarily in writing.
These instances are only illustrative. There may
be several other modes by which the requisite
funds are raised. But all of these instances are
evidenced by documentary evidence.
34.
Therefore,
mere
stepping
into
the
witness box and saying on oath that he is ready
with the balance sale consideration or that he is
going
to
borrow
money
from
any
financial
institution or that he has got sufficient funds in
his Bank accounts or that he has kept money in
Fixed Deposit, without that oral evidence being
supported by documentary evidence will not
prove the plaintiff's readiness to pay the balance
sale consideration.. It is immaterial whether such
oral evidence is challenged in cross-examination
or
not.
The
plaintiff
has
to
prove
to
the
satisfaction of the Court that he possessed the
requisite
funds.
He
has
to
produce
such
documentary evidence, which would enable the
Court to come to the conclusion that plaintiff is
ready
with
the
requisite
balance
sale
consideration to complete the sale transaction. If
no evidence is adduced in this regard by way of
documentary evidence, no prudent man would
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come to the conclusion that the person has
proved the possession of funds. In the absence of
any such documentary evidence being produced,
it is a case of plaintiff's case being not proved.
Plaintiff can- not expect the Court to pass a
decree for specific performance of a contract of
sale when the plaintiff has not proved his
readiness to perform his part of the contract.
35.
Therefore,
in
a
case arising
under
Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act, the
obligation is cast on the plaintiff to prove that he
was ready with the balance sale consideration.
When the statute requires the plaintiff must plead
and
prove his
perform
his
readiness
part
of
and
the
willingness
contract
and
to
that
readiness refers to the possession of the requisite
funds, there is an obligation cast on that person,
who has to prove the possession of funds to
produce documents to show possession of funds
by him. Though he is not expected to tender or
deposit the cash before the Court, he has to
produce such evidence to prove his financial
capability.
documentary
Only
on
evidence,
production
on
of
verification
such
and
appreciation of those documents, Court could
come to the conclusion that the plea of readiness
is proved. Mere assertion, on other oath that he
is ready with the balance sale consideration, even
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if it is not challenged in the cross-examination; is
not the proof of the plaintiff's readiness with the
balance sale consideration. He should produce
such evidence to show either he possess the
requisite funds or he is capable of raising such
funds within the time stipulated. If such evidence
is not forthcoming it is a case of, the plaintiff's
case being not proved.
36. The Apex Court had an occasion to will
consider the contention that when there is no
denial
of
readiness
and
willingness
by
the
defendant either in the written statement or in
the evidence, there is no obligation on the part of
the
plaintiff
to
produce
any
documentary
evidence to prove his readiness. The Supreme
Court in the case of J.P. Builders & another v. h
A. Ramadas Rao reported in (2011) 1 SCC 429:
(AIR 2011 SC (Civ) 230) Paras 8, 9 & 12) after
referring to Section 16 of the Specific Relief Act
has held at para-21 as under:
21. Among the three clauses, we are more
concerned
about
clause
(c).
'Readiness
and
Willingness’ is enshrined in clause(c) which was
not present in the old Act of 1877. However, it
was later inserted with the recommendations of
the 9th Law Commission’s Report. This clause
provides
that
the
person
seeking
specific
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performance must prove that he has performed
or has been ready and willing to perform the
essential terns of the contract which are to be
performed by him.
At para 22 it is held as under:
The words ‘ready’ and willing’ imply that the
person was prepared to carry out the terms of
the contract. The distinction between ‘readiness’
and ‘willingness’ is that the former refers to
financial capacity and the latter to the conduct of
the
plaintiff
wanting
performance.
Generally,
readiness is backed by willingness.
At paras-25, 26 and 27 it is held as under:
25. Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act,
1963 mandates “readiness and willingness” on
the part of the plaintiff and it is a condition
precedent for obtaining relief of grant of specific
performance. It is also clear that in a suit for
specific performance, the plaintiff must allege and
prove a continuous “readiness and willingness” to
perform the contract on his part from the date of
the contract. The onus is on the plaintiff.
26. It has been rightly considered by this
Court in R.C.Chandiok v.Chuni Lal Sabharwal
(AIR
SC
1238)
that
“readiness
and
willingness” cannot be treated as a straitjacket
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formula. This has to be determined from the
entirety of the facts and circumstance relevant to
the intention and conduct of the party concerned.
27. It is settled law that even in the absence
of specific plea by the opposite party, it is the
mandate of the statute that the plaintiff has to
comply with Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief
Act and when there is non-compliance with this
statutory mandate, the Court is not bound to
grant specific performance and is left with no
other alternative but to dismiss the suit. It is also
clear that readiness to perform the part of the
contract has to be determined. Ascertained from
the conduct of the parties.
37. Order XIV of the Code of Civil Procedure
deals
with
the
settlement
of
issues
and
determination of suit on issues of law or on
issues agreed upon. Order XIV Rule 1(3) states
how the settlement of issue is framed in a suit. It
provides each material proposition affirmed by
one party and denied by the other shall form the
subject of a distinct issue. Issues may be of fact
or of law.
38. Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act is
an exception to this general rule. Unless a person
avers and proves that has performed or has
always being ready and willing to perform the
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essential terms of the contract which are to be
performed by him, he is not entitled to enforce
the specific performance of the contract. In other
words, before a Court can grant a decree for
specific performance, this mandatory requirement
of the status has to be complied with by the
plaintiff irrespective of the defence taken by the
defendant. Only if this mandatory requirement is
complied with, the Civil Court gets jurisdiction to
grant a decree for specific performance. If this
requirement is not met, the Civil Court has no
jurisdiction
to
grant
a
decree
for
specific
performance. Therefore, it is obligatory on the
part of the Court, that, in every suit for specific
performance
to
frame
an
issue
regarding
readiness and willingness to perform the essential
terms of the contract by the plaintiff irrespective
of the fact whether the defendant has specifically
denied the allegations in the plaint regarding
readiness and willingness to perform or not.
Therefore, what follows is that a plaintiff, who
comes to the Court seeking a decree for specific
performance must aver and prove that he has
performed or is always ready and willing to
perform the essential terms of the contract which
are to be performed by him. Whether the
defendant denied those allegations are not in the
written
statement,
the
Court
is
under
an
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obligation to frame an issue regarding readiness
and willingness on the part of the plaintiff to
perform the terms of the contract. Once that
issue is framed, the burden of proving readiness
and willingness is on the plaintiff. It is not
dependent upon the admission of the defendant
either in the written statement or in the evidence.
Unless the plaintiff proves to the satisfaction of
the Court that he was ready and willing to
perform his part of the contract, the Court gets
no jurisdiction to pass a decree for specific
performance. Therefore, the argument of the
learned Counsel for the plaintiff, that, as there
was no serious cross examination of P.W.1
regarding readiness and willingness, the oral
evidence of P.W.1 that he was ready and willing
to perform his part of the contract was sufficient
for the trial Court to decree the suit for specific
performance is unfounded. The plaintiff has not
produced a scrap of paper to show how he
propose to raise the balance sale consideration of
Rs.65 lakhs, where he has kept that money, is it
in any bank or has he formulated a scheme for
raising
the
funds
and
whether
he
actually
possessed of the said funds. In the absence of
such material, which has to be necessarily in the
form of documentary evidence, not place before
the Court, the trial Court committed a serious
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error in holding that the plaintiff was ready and
willing to perform his part of the contract. There
is absolutely no discussion in the entire judgment
on this aspect and the sais finding is not
supported or based on any legal evidence on
record. In that view of the matter, we are of the
view that the finding recorded by the trial Court
that the plaintiff was ready and willing to perform
his part of the contract is vitiated and is hereby
set aside.
21. The above said view is also once again
fortified by the Division Bench of this Court in the
case of C.Vasudevamurthy Vs. S.S.Amarnath
and others35.
22. Further the Supreme court in the case of Kamal
Kumar Vs. Premlata Joshi36, at para 10 is held as
follows:
10. It is a settled principle of law that the
grant of relief of specific relief. The material
questions, which are required to be gone into for
grant of the relief of specific performance, are
First, whether there exists a valid and concluded
contract between the parties for sale/purchase
of the suit property; Second, whether the
2021 (6) KLJ 345 (DB)
2019 AIR SCC (Civil) 1103
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plaintiff has been ready and willing to perform
his part of contract and whether he is still ready
and willing to perform his part as mentioned in
the contract; Third, whether the plaintiff has, in
fact, performed his part of the contract and , if
so, how and to what extent and in what matter
he
has
performed
and
whether
such
performance was in conformity with the terms of
the contract; Fourth, whether it will be equitable
to grant the relief of specific performance to the
plaintiff against the defendant in relation to suit
property or it will cause any kind of hardship to
the defendant and, if so, how and in what
manner
and
the
extend
if
such
relief
is
eventually granted to the plaintiff; and lastly,
whether the plaintiff is entitled for grant of any
other
alternative
relief,
namely,
refund
of
earnest money etc. and, if so, on what grounds.
23. Further in the case of Ramesh Chand (Dead)
through L.Rs Vs. Asruddin (Dead) through LR’s
and another37 at para 8 and 9 are held as follows:
8. Section 20 of Specific Relief Act, 1963,
provides that the jurisdiction to decree specific
performance is discretionary, and the court is
not bound to grant such relief merely because it
is lawful to do so, However, the discretion of the
AIR 2016 SC (Civil) 434
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court is not arbitrary but sound and reasonable,
guided by judicial principles. Sub-section(2) of
Section 20 of the Act provides the three
situations in which the court may exercise
discretion not to decree specific performance.
One of such situation is contained in clause (a)
of sun-section (2) of the Section which provides
that where the terms of the contract or the
conduct of the parties at the time of entering
into the contract of the other circumstances
under which the contract was entered into or
such that the contract though not voidable,
gives the plaintiff unfair advantage over the
defendant, the decree of specific performance
need not be passed. It is pertinent to mention
here that in the present case, though execution
of agreement dated 21.06.2004 between the
parties is proved, but it is no where pleased or
proved by the plaintiff that he got redeemed the
mortgaged land in favour of defendant No.2 in
terms of the agreement, nor is it specifically
pleased that he was ready and willing to get the
property redeemed from the mortgage.
9. In the above facts and circumstances of
the case and the judicial principle discussed
above, we are of the opinion that it is a fit case
where instead of granting decree of specific
performance, the plaintiff can be compensated
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by directing the appellant to pay a reasonable
and sufficient amount to him. We are of the
view that mere refund of rupees four lacs with
interest at the rate of 8% per annum, as
directed by the trial court, would be highly
insufficient. In out considered opinion, it would
be
just
and
appellants(Legal
appropriate
to
Representatives
direct
of
the
original
defendant No.1, since died) to repay rupees four
lacs along with interest at the rate of 18% per
annum from 21.06.2004 till date within a period
of three months from today to the L.Rs. of
respondent No.1 (mentioned in I.A.No.______
of 2015 dated 07.09.2015). If they do so, the
decree of specific performance shall stand set
aside. We clarify that if the amount is not paid
or deposited before the trial court in favour of
the L.Rs. of respondent No.1 within a period of
three months, as directed above, the decree of
specific performance shall stand affirmed. We
order accordingly.
26.
Even otherwise, the total sale consideration fixed
under the agreement was only ₹4,000/- for 4 acres 8
guntas. When the agreement of sale was executed in the
year 1979, the consideration was ₹4,000/-. By the time the
First
Appellate
Court
passed
the
decree
for
specific
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performance,
the
value
of
the
land
had
escalated
substantially. Compelling the defendants to execute sale
deed at the meager price is an arbitrary exercise of power
and creating an unfair advantage over the defendant by
plaintiff. Therefore, the decree passed by the First Appellate
Court is arbitrary in nature, and the discretion under
Section 20 of the Specific Relief Act has not been exercised
judiciously.
27.
Therefore, the suit is barred by limitation and
judgment and decree passed by the first appellate Court is
required to be interfered with.
Accordingly, I answer
substantial question of law No.1 in the negative and
substantial question of law No.2 in the affirmative.
28.
Hence, I proceed to pass the following;
ORDER
i.
The appeal is allowed.
ii.
The judgment and decree dated 02.07.2008
in R.A.No.30/2001 passed by the Additional
Civil Judge (Sr.Dn) Ranebennur is set aside.
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iii.
The judgment and decree dated 28.09.2000
in O.S.No.2/1991 passed by the Principal
Civil Judge (Jr.Dn) and I Additional JMFC,
Ranebennur, is hereby confirmed.
iv.
Registry is directed to transmit the TCR
along with copy of this order to the trial
Court forthwith.
v.
No order as to costs.
Sd/(HANCHATE SANJEEVKUMAR)
JUDGE
ASN /CT-AN
List No.: 1 Sl No.: 45
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