Thiru K. Palaniswamy vs M. Shanmugam & Ors.

Disposing of the appeals, the Court

HELD: 1. The Division Bench also referred to the principles governing the grant or refusal of temporary injunction and pointed out that the directions given by the learned Single Judge for convening the meeting only with the joint consent of Co-ordinator and Joint Co-ordinator was leading to a situation where the party as a whole would undergo irreparable hardship because there was no possibility of the appellant and the respondent No.1 – OPS and EPS – acting jointly to convene the meeting. The Division Bench pointed out that the directions of the learned Single Judge would only further the “functional deadlock” already existing in the party. [Para 26.2][1191-B-D]

2. The facts of the case make it abundantly clear that so far as convening of the meeting dated 23.06.2022 is concerned, the same had never been in doubt or in any dispute. The said meeting was indeed convened by the Co-ordinator and Joint Co-ordinator jointly. They had been working in tandem until that stage. However, they seem to have fallen apart immediately thereafter, particularly when a proposition for amendment of the byelaws and reverting to the system of single leadership was in the offing. In any case, the meeting dated 23.06.2022 was duly convened and the efforts to prevent the same did not meet with success in the Court. Even if the slated business was not transacted in the meeting dated 23.06.2022, all that had happened in that meeting could not have been ignored. It remains undeniable that the plaintiff OPS and the persons standing with him were also very much present in the said meeting. The General Council is said to be consisting of 2665 members. If 2190 members out of these 2665 gave a requisition on 23.06.2022 for convening the General Council meeting and the Presidium Chairman announced the date of this requisitioned meeting as 11.07.2022, in the given set of facts and circumstances, such announcement, at least at the present stage, cannot be dubbed as wholly redundant. At that point of time, when Co-ordinator and Joint Co-ordinator were shown to be not functioning jointly (for whatsoever reason), a functional deadlock came into existence for the party and a workable solution was required to be found. In the given scenario, the actions and steps taken by the requisitioning members as also by the Presidium Chairman cannot be declared as unwarranted or illegal at this stage. That being the position, convening of meeting dated 11.07.2022 could not have been taken as an act unauthorised. The learned Single Judge while passing the order dated 17.08.2022 seems to have fallen in serious error and said order was clearly suffering from perversity when convening of the meeting dated 11.07.2022 was taken as an act unauthorised. The Division Bench of the High Court, has rightly looked at the substance of the matter and realities of the situation. [Para 28.1][1192-A-G]

3. The other alleged infirmity about want of clear 15 days’ notice has also been rightly dealt with by the Division Bench of the High Court in the impugned order dated 02.09.2022. Such an internal matter of the party, approach of the Court and that too, while considering the prayer for interim relief, cannot be of finding technical faults and flaws detached from the substance of the matter. Even as regards technicalities, the Division Bench appears to have rightly analysed the frame of the said Rule 19(vii), where the requirement of 15 days’ notice is referable to the regular meeting and not as such to a requisitioned or special meeting. [Para 28.2][1192-G-H; 1193-A]

4. The Single Judge of the High Court in the present matter did not examine the questions relating to balance of convenience and irreparable injury in the correct perspective and particularly failed to weigh the competing possibilities and risk of injustice if ultimately the decision of main matter would run counter to the course being adopted and suggested in the order granting temporary injunction in the manner and form it was being granted. It gets perforce reiterated that if the order as passed by the learned Single Judge was to remain in force until decision of the suits, it would have been drastically detrimental to the interest of political party in question, which is a recognised political party with the Election Commission of India. In the matters of the present nature, the simple and precise view, as stated by the learned Single Judge at the initial stage on 22.06.2022 while declining the prayer for interim relief, had been on the correct statement of law that ordinarily the Court would not interfere in the internal issues of an association/party and would leave it open to the association/party and its members to take a particular decision for better administration; and that had been the correct approach towards the facts of the case. In the present case, when General Council is shown to be the apex body of the party, taking any exception to the meeting of the General Council could have neither been countenanced nor interfered with by way of temporary injunction. In the given set of facts and circumstances, the hyper-technical suggestions as sought to be made about the want of valid notice with reference to date, time and place of meeting i.e., with reference to Chapter 5 from Shackleton on the Law and Practice of Meetings do not further the cause of the appellants, particularly when it is noticed that the date, time and place of the meeting in question were duly declared in the meeting dated 23.06.2022. [Para 30][1193-H; 1194-A-F]

5. The submission on behalf of the appellants based on the decision in S. Thirunavukkarasu that the scheme of byelaws does not envisage the requisitionists to convene the General Council meeting; and if the Co-ordinator and the Joint Co-ordinator jointly fail to convene the meeting, the only option is to seek intervention of the Court has its own shortcomings. As rightly noticed by the Division Bench in the order impugned, in the said case, an expelled member of the party called for a General Council meeting, parallel to the meeting called by the then General Secretary. In the given fact situation, the Court granted interim injunction in favour of the General Secretary against convening of the parallel meeting. In the present matter, no parallel meeting of General Council has been called for or requisitioned by any of the Members. The Division Bench of the High Court has rightly observed that as a general rule, it cannot be laid down that the requisitionists have no option but only to go to the Court if the meeting is not convened. It has also been pointed out that in the past, when the interim General Secretary could not act in the year 2017, the Office Bearers stepped in and convened the meeting based on a requisition received. The present situation too, where the position as occupied earlier by the General Secretary was assigned to the Co-ordinator and the Joint Coordinator in their jointness and it remains beyond a shadow of doubt that Co-ordinator and the Joint Co-ordinator do not stand in jointness and cannot act jointly, is akin to the situation when the apex position holder was not in a position to act. Obviously, a workable solution was to be found; and when the solution as found and applied, does not otherwise appear offending the spirit of byelaws as also the norms of functioning of an association or a party, it cannot be said that declaration of the Presidium Chairman for the meeting of the General Council on 11.07.2022 and the follow-up notice by the Office Bearers at Party Headquarters had been wholly unauthorised. [Para 31][1194-F-H; 1195-A-D]

6. It is also noteworthy that the ultimate injunction issued by the Single Judge had been that of restoring status quo ante as on 23.06.2022 and further to that, the learned Single Judge directed that the Co-ordinator and Joint Co-ordinator would have to function jointly; meetings have to be called with their joint consent; and on being properly requisitioned, they would not refuse to convene the General Council meeting and that they could approach the Court for necessary directions for conducting the General Council meeting. Apart from the fact that the injunction as issued by the learned Single Judge had been far away and beyond the scope of applications before him, the said injunction could have only perpetuated the functional deadlock in the party. The order passed by the learned Single Judge could not have been countenanced from any angle and thus, the Division Bench, has rightly interfered with the same. [Para 33][1196-B-D]

Skyline Education Institute (India) Private Limited v. S.L. Vaswani and Anr. (2010) 2 SCC 142; Nilkantha Sidramappa Ningashetti v. Kashinath Somanna

Ningashetti and Ors. AIR 1962 SC 666 : [1962] SCR 551; Union of India and Ors. v. M/s. Raj Grow Impex LLP and Ors. 2021 SCC OnLine SC 429 – relied on. S. Thirunavukkarasu and Anr. v. Selvi J. Jayalalitha and Anr. 1997 (III) CTC 229; Wander Ltd. and Anr. v. Antox India (P) Ltd. (1990) Supp SCC 727; State of Karnataka v. State of A.P. and Ors. (2000) 9 SCC 572 : [2000] 3 SCR 301; Surya Nath Singh and Ors. v. Khedu Singh (Dead) by LRS and Ors. (1994) 3 Supp SCC 561; Assistant Collector of Central Excise, Chandan Nagar, West Bengal v. Dunlop India Ltd. and Ors. (1985) 1 SCC 260 : [1985] 2 SCR 190; Dalpat Kumar and Anr. v. Prahlad Singh and Ors. (1992) 1 SCC 719 : [1991] 3 Suppl. SCR 472; American Express Bank Ltd. v. Calcutta Steel Co. and Ors. (1993) 2 SCC

199 : [1992] 3 Suppl. SCR 833; Seema Arshad Zaheer and Ors. v. Municipal Corpn. of Greater Mumbai and Ors. (2006) 5 SCC 282 : [2006] 1 Suppl. SCR 865; K. Rajendran and Ors. v. State of Tamil Nadu and Ors. (1982) 2 SCC 273 : [1982] 3 SCR 628; B. N.

Viswanathan and Anr. v. Tiffin’s Barytes, Asbestos and Paints Ltd. (1953) 66 LW 124; T.P. Daver v. Lodge Victoria No. 363 S.C. Belgaum and Ors. (1964) 1 SCR 1– referred to.

“Shackleton on the Law and Practice of Meetings” Edited by Madeleine Cordes, John Pugh-Smith, 13th ed., Thomson Reuters at p. 41 (Para 17.2) – referred to.