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HIGH COURT OF TRIPURA
AGARTALA
Crl.P. No.23 of 2025
Union of India,
Represented by Shri Sumanta Chowdhury,
Sr. Intelligence Officer, Directorate of Revenue Intelligence,
Agartala Regional Unit, Agartala, Tripura
Under Ministry of Finance, Department of Revenue,
Govt. of India.
….Petitioner(s).
Versus
1. Shri Rahul Ghosh,
S/O- Shri Hridoy Ghosh of Phultali Bazar,
P.O.- Pandavpur, P.S.- Amtali,
West Tripura, Pin-799130.
2. Shri Mohammed Dawit,
S/O- Md. Abdul Gaffar of Mantriphukri Muslim Colony,
Heingang, village- Mantriphukri,
P.S. & Sub-Division Porampat, Imphal East,
Manipur, Pin- 795002.
…..Accused-Respondents.
For Petitioner(s)
:
Mr. Arindam Ray, Adv.
For Respondent(s)
:
Mr. Sankar Lodh, Adv,
Mr. Subham Majumder, Adv.
Date of Hearing
:
16.02.2026
Date of delivery of
Judgment and Order :
23.02.2026
Whether fit for
Reporting
YES
:
HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE BISWAJIT PALIT
Judgment & Order
This
petition
under
Section
of
Cr.P.C.
corresponding to Section 528 of BNSS read with Section 37 of
NDPS Act is filed by the Union of India being represented by its
Officer as petitioner against the respondent-accused person
who were granted bail by Learned Special Judge, Court No.1,
West
Tripura,
Agartala
on
30.11.2024
No.03/CL/NDPS/DRI/AGT/2024-25
passed
in
case
corresponding
to
Spl.
A.
Ray
NDPS.
02.
Heard
Learned
Standing
Counsel,
Mr.
appearing on behalf of the petitioner and also heard Learned
Counsel, Mr. S. Lodh representing the respondent-accused
persons.
03.
At the time of hearing, Learned Standing Counsel
for the Union of India submitted that the petitioner-Union of
India has challenged the order dated 30.11.2024 passed by
Learned Special Judge, Court No.1, West Tripura, Agartala in
the aforenoted case. The Learned Special Judge at the time of
passing of order did not consider the provision of Section 37 of
NDPS Act and passed the order because according to Learned
Standing Counsel, until and unless the twin conditions as
mentioned in Section 37 of NDPS Act are fulfilled, in that case
there is very least scope to grant any order of bail in a case of
this nature and furthermore, in this case before completion of
statutory period of detention of 180 days, Learned Special
Judge granted bail to the accused which was totally illegal and
beyond the mandate of law.
Learned Standing Counsel further submitted that
Learned Trial Court on completion of 179 days granted bail to
the respondent-accused persons without any cogent reasons
which were totally impermissible and contrary to the law
because in view of the regors of the provision of Section 37 of
NDPS Act, there is no scope to grant bail in a case of this
nature. So, the order passed by Learned Special Judge was
beyond jurisdiction and the same needs to be interfered with.
It was further submitted that in the case at hand
there was allegation of possession of contraband items of
commercial quantity by the accused persons, so, the order
suffers from infirmity and further, Learned Special Judge on
the ground of illness of one of the accused, Rahul Ghosh
allowed bail is not a justified and legal ground to consider bail
to the said accused. It was further submitted that for medical
exigency to the extent Learned Trial Court could grant bail for
interim period but that was not being done and in respect of
another accused nothing has been explained in the order as to
why he was given bail. So, Learned Standing Counsel, Mr. Ray
urged for setting aside the order passed by Learned Special
Judge with direction to the accused persons to surrender
before the Learned Trial Court.
04.
On the other hand, Learned Counsel, Mr. S. Lodh
first of all drawn the attention of the Court referring the
contents of the complaint filed before the Court initially,
wherein the name of the present respondent-accused persons
were there and thereafter, again on 30.11.2024 another
complaint was filed by one, Mr. Sumanta Chowdhury, Senior
Intelligence Officer involving another accused, Moudad Ahmed
Choudhury. But the complaint was filed by Union of India not
represented by any Authorized Officer. So, the filing of initial
complaint was without jurisdiction and in this regard, Learned
Counsel
for
the
respondent-accused
persons
drawn
the
attention of the Court referring sub-clause-(d) of Section 36-A
of the NDPS Act and further submitted that in view of the
judgment of the Hon’ble the Apex Court in Tofan Singh vs
State of Tamil Nadu reported in (2021) 4 SCC 1 wherein
Hon’ble the Apex Court in para Nos.137 & 140 observed as
under:
“137. The language of Section 53(1) of the
NDPS Act is crystal clear, and invests the
officers mentioned therein with the powers of
“an officer in charge of a police station for the
investigation of the offences under this Act”.
The expression “officer is defined in the CrPC
as follows:
“2. (o) officer in charge of a police
station” includes, when the officer in
charge of the police station is absent
from the station house or unable from
illness or other cause to perform his
duties, the police officer present at the
station house who is next in rank to such
officer and is above the rank of constable
or, when the State Government so
directs, any other police officer so
present;”
The expression “police report” is defined
in Section 29r) CrPC as follows:
“2. (r) “police report” means a report
forwarded by a police officer to a
Magistrate under sub-section (2) of
Section 173;”
140. What is clear, therefore, is that the
designated officer under Section 53 of the
NDPS Act, invested with the powers of an
officer in charge of a police station, is to
forward a police report stating the particulars
that are mentioned in Section 173(2) CrPC.
Because of the special provision contained in
Section 36-A(1) of the NDPS Act, this police
report is not forwarded to a Magistrate, but
only to a Special Court under Section 36A(D)(d). Raj Kumar Karwal case, when it
states that the designated officer cannot
submit a police report under Section 36A(1)(d), but would have to submit a
“complaint” under Section 190 CrPC misses
the importance of the non obstante clause
contained in Section 36-A(1) of the NDPS Act,
which makes it clear that the drill of Section
36-A is to be followed notwithstanding
anything contained in Section 2(d) CrPC.
140.1. It is obvious that Section 36A(1)(d) is inconsistent with Section 2(d)
and Section 190 CrPC and therefore, any
complaint that has to be made can only
be made under Section 36-A(1)(d) to a
Special Court, and not to a Magistrate
under
Section
190.
Shri
Lekhi's
argument, that the procedure under
Section 190 has been replaced only in
part, the police report and complaint
procedure under Section 190 not being
displaced by Section 36-A(1)(d), cannot
be
accepted.
Section
36-A(1)(d)
specifies a scheme which is completely
different from that contained in the CrPC.
Whereas under Section 190 CrPC it is the
Magistrate who takes cognizance of an
offence, under Section 36-A(1)(d) it is
only
a
Special
Court
that
takes
cognizance of an offence under the NDPS
Act.
140.2.
Secondly,
the
“complaint”
referred to in Section 36-A(1)(d) is not a
private complaint that is referred to in
Section 190(1)(a) CrPC, but can only be
by an authorised officer.”
Referring the same, Learned Counsel submitted that
in view of the aforesaid observation of the Hon’ble Supreme
Court, the complaint filed by the Union of India was a defective
one and on the basis of that there was no scope to entertain
the petition filed by the Union of India and urged for quashing
of the proceeding. It was further submitted by Learned Counsel
for the respondent-accused persons that admittedly another
accused Moudad Ahmed Choudhury was later on impleaded in
this case and by a judgment dated 27.11.2025 of this Court he
was granted bail and the Learned Trial Judge considering the
materials on record rightly granted bail to the respondentaccused persons and finally, Learned Counsel submitted that
there is no merit in the petition filed by the petitioner-Union of
India and as such the same is liable to be dismissed
henceforth.
To counter the reply, Learned Standing Counsel for
the Union of India also referred few citations of the Hon’ble
Supreme Court of India:
(i)State of Kerala Etc. vs Rajesh Etc. arising out of SLP(Crl.)
No(s). 7309-7312 of 2019 dated 24.01.2019,
(ii)Sujit Tiwari vs State of Gujarat & Anr. arising out of Criminal
Appeal No.1897 of 2019 dated 28.01.2020,
(iii)Union of India vs. Ajay Kumar Singh @ Pappu arising out of
SLP (Crl.)No.2351 of 2023,
(iv)Union of India through Narcotics Control Bureau, Lucknow
vs. Md. Nawaz Khan arising out of SLP (Crl.) No.1771 of 2021
dated 22.09.2021,
(v)State
through
Narcotics
Control
vs.
Kulwant
Singh
Intelligence arising out of SLP (Crl.) No.3816 of 2002 dated
11.02.2003.
Referring all the aforesaid cases, Learned Standing
Counsel for the Union of India submitted that in view of the
observation
of
the
Hon’ble
the
Supreme
Court
in
the
aforenoted cases, there was no scope to grant bail to the
respondent-accused persons by the Learned Trial Court but the
Learned Trial Court ignoring the spirit of the provision of
Section 37 of NDPS Act granted bail to the respondent-accused
persons within the stipulated period of filing of final report
illegally which was contrary to the mandatory provision of law
and as such Learned Standing Counsel urged for allowing this
petition by setting aside the order of the Learned Special
Judge.
Considered.
05.
Admittedly, in this case, initially a complaint was
filed by the Intelligence Officer on behalf of Union of India i.e.
the Directorate of Revenue Intelligence on 05.06.2024 when at
the time of filing the complaint, the I.O. forwarded the present
respondent-accused
persons
under
arrest.
They
were
in
custody for a considerable period of time but in the meantime,
on 30.11.2024 the final complaint was submitted by one Sri
Sumanta Chowdhury, Senior Intelligence Officer, Directorate of
Revenue
Intelligence
Moudad
Ahmed
involving
Choudhury
and
another
from
accused
the
order
person,
dated
30.11.2024, it appears that the Learned Special Judge by the
said order admitted that the final complaint was submitted by
the I.O. of this case. Later on by order dated 05.12.2024
cognizance of offence was taken by Learned Special Judge
against the respondent-accused persons including said Moudad
Ahmed Choudhury and accordingly, cognizance of offence
punishable under Section 21(c)/22(c)/23(c)/25/25A/28/29 of
the NDPS Act was taken by the Learned Special Judge.
In this regard, I would like to refer herein below the
relevant provision of Sub-clause-d of Section 36-A of NDPS Act
which provides as under:
Sub-clause-(d) of Section 36-A of NDPS Act:
(d) a Special Court may, upon perusal of
police report of the facts constituting an
offence under this Act or upon complaint
made by an officer of the Central Government
or a State Government authorised in his
behalf, take cognizance of that offence
without the accused being committed to it for
trial.
From the aforesaid provision of law, it appears that
the Special Court based upon the report of police or upon
complaint made by an officer of the Central Government or a
State
Government
authorized
in
his
behalf
may
take
cognizance of offence.
06.
So, here in the case at hand the Learned Special
Judge upon the complaint submitted by the Senior Intelligence
Officer
of
the
Department
of
Directorate
of
Revenue
Intelligence took cognizance of offence. So, regarding taking of
cognizance of offence, I find no infirmity in the order passed by
Learned Special Judge. Now, here in the case at hand, the
main challenge of the petitioner-complainant was that the
Learned Trial Judge at the time of passing order on 30.11.2024
did not follow the spirit of the provision of Section 37 of NDPS
Act.
Now for the sake of convenience, let us reproduce
herein below the relevant provision of Section 37 of NDPS Act
which provides as under:
“[37. Offences to be cognizable and nonbailable.—(1)
Notwithstanding
anything
contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure,
1973 (2 of 1974),—
(a) every offence punishable under this Act
shall be cognizable;
(b) no person accused of an offence
punishable for 3 [offences under section 19
or section 24 or section 27A and also for
offences involving commercial quantity]
shall be released on bail or on his own bond
unless—
(i) the Public Prosecutor has been given
an opportunity to oppose the application
for such release, and
(ii) where the Public Prosecutor opposes
the application, the court is satisfied that
there
are
reasonable
grounds
for
believing that he is not guilty of such
offence and that he is not likely to
commit any offence while on bail.
(2) The limitations on granting of bail
specified in clause (b) of sub-section (1) are
in addition to the limitations under the Code
of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974) or
any other law for the time being in force on
granting of bail.].”
From the aforesaid provision, it appears to this
Court that until and unless the twin conditions as mentioned in
the aforesaid provisions are complied with, there is no scope to
pass any order of bail in a case involving commercial quantity
under NDPS Act.
07.
Here in the case at hand, the allegation of the
complainant was that on 04.06.2024 at about 1315 hours the
Officers of DRI received one secret information that huge
quantum of Yaba tablets were being transported in a Maruti
Suzuki SL6 bearing Reg. No.AS-11-AB-3690 from Silchar to
Agartala via Khowai-Sidhai Mohanpur-Agartala Road. It was
the information that the said vehicle will pass near Kamalghat
bridge at about 1600 hours to 1800 hours. The officer upon
received the said information reduced the same into writing in
compliance with the provisions of Section 42(1) of the NDPS
Act and immediately, the information was communicated to his
superior officer and upon receiving the said information, the
superior officer gave authorization to the Intelligence Officer to
proceed for the interception of the vehicle in-accordance-with
the provision of NDPS Act. After that the Intelligence Officer of
DRI then formed a team consisting of other staff of DRI and
personnel of 42 Bn. Of BSF and G. Branch of Gokulnagar sector
and proceeded to the spot of seizure. The officer near Salbagar
Bazar approached two persons and introduced himself to them
informed about the secret information and requested them to
become witnesses of the whole operation to which both the
witnesses agreed. The officer then along with other staff of DRI
and BSF and witnesses proceeded towards the Kamalghat
Bridge
on
Khowai-Agartala
roadand
upon
reaching
near
Kamalghat Bridge at about 16:30 hours on 04.06.2024 started
waiting for the targeted vehicle to arrive. At around 17:00
hours on 04.06.2024, one silver colour four wheeler vehicle of
Maruti Suzuki XL6 model bearing No.AS-11-AB-3690 was
spotted coming towards Agartala from Khowai side and on
spotting the said vehicle, the officer of DRI signaled it to stop.
But the said vehicle instead of stopping tried to accelerate its
speed with the intention to flee away from the spot but the
officers of DRI and personnel of BSF were able to intercept
before it could flee away from the spot and upon interception,
it could found that two male persons were sitting in the driver
seat and passenger seat of the front side of the vehicle bearing
No.AS-11-AB-3690 and after observing all formalities, search
was carried out and the complainant party found 07 nos. of
plastic packets wrapped with adhesive tapes inside the in-build
box on the left side of the back side of the vehicle and also
found 08 nos. of plastic packets with adhesive tapes from the
front side of the vehicle and after examination of all the plastic
packets containing pink coloured tablets believed to be
Metamphetamine in a digital weighing scale, it was found 15
kgs (net) and 17.032 Kgs (gross). Accordingly, the seizure was
made and on 05.06.2024, the seizing officer arrested both the
accused persons under Section 43(b) of the NDPS Act and after
that forwarded them to the Court on the same day with a
forwarding report.
This was the sums and substance of the case of the
prosecution/complainant.
08.
Now, regarding authorization at the time of hearing,
Learned Standing Counsel for the Union of India produced
notifications, Ministry of Finance issued in this aspect:
NOTIFICATION
New Delhi, the 30th October, 2019
S.O. 3900(E).-In exercise of the powers
conferred by clause (d) of sub-section (1) of
section 364 of the Narcotics Drugs and
Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (61 of
1985) and in supersession of the notification
of the Government of India in the Ministry of
Finance, Department of Revenue number S.O.
763(E), dated the 27th September, 1989,
published
in
the
Gazette
of
India,
Extraordinary, Part II, Section 3, Sub-section
(ii), except as respects things done or omitted
to be done before such supersession the
Central Government, hereby authorises the
officers of and above the rank of inspectors in
the Central Board of Indirect Taxes and
Customs,
Central
Bureau
of
Narcotics,
Directorate of Revenue Intelligence, Central
Economic Intelligence Bureau and of and
above the rank of Junior Intelligence Officer
in Narcotics Control Bureau for filling of
complaints relating to an offences under the
said Act, before Special Courts.
F.No.N/11011/1/2019-NC-II]
BISWAJIT SARKAR, Under Secy.
NOTIFICATION
New Delhi, the 30th October, 2019
S.O. 3901(E)-ln exercise of the powers
conferred by sub-section (1) of section 42 and
section 67 of the Narcotic Drugs and
Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (61 of
1985), and in supersession of the S.O. 822(E),
dated the 14th November, 1985, published in
the Gazette of India. Extraordinary, Part II,
Section 3, Sub-section (ii), except as respects
things done or omitted to be done before such
supersession the Central Government hereby
empowers the officers of and above the rank
of sub-inspector in Central Bureau inspectors
in the Central Board of Indirect Taxes and
Customs, Directorate of Revenue Intelligence.
Central of Narcotic and Junior Intelligence
Officer in Narcotics Control Bureau and of and
above the rank of Economic Intelligence
Bureau to exercise the powers and perform
the duties specified in section 42 within the
area of their respective jurisdiction and also
authorise the said officers to exercise the
powers conferred upon them under section
67.
[F. No. N/11011/1/2019-NC-II)
BISWAJIT SARKAR, Under Secy.
09.
From the aforesaid notifications, it appears that the
Government
of
India,
Ministry
of
Finance
by
the
said
notifications duly authorized the officers of the Customs and
DRI or Revenue Intelligence to file complaints relating to an
offence, i.e. under NDPS Act before the Learned Special Court
and by the subsequent notification the Ministry of Finance
authorized the officers of the Revenue Intelligence and others
to perform the duties as required under Section 42 of the NDPS
Act. From the aforesaid notifications of the Government of
India, Ministry of Finance, it appears that there was no
illegality to file the complaint submitted by the officers of the
Revenue
Intelligence
before
the
Special
Court.
So,
the
submission of Learned Counsel for the respondent-accused
persons that the same was not filed in-accordance-with law is
cannot be accepted as valid submission as per law.
At the time of hearing, Learned Standing Counsel
for the Union of India also referred few citations as indicated
above. For the sake of convenience, all the judgments are
referred herein below:
Hon’ble the Apex Court in State of Kerala & Ors.
versus Rajesh and Ors. reported in (2021) 4 SCC 1 wherein
Hon’ble the Apex Court in para Nos.11, 17, 19, 20, 21 & 25
observed as under:
“11. The learned Senior Counsel further
submits that the conditions for granting bail,
specified in Section 37(1)(4)() are in addition
to the limitations provided under CrPC, or any
other law for the time being in force
regulating the grant of bail. Liberal approach
in the matter of bail under the NDPS Act is
uncalled for. In support of his submission, the
learned Senior Counsel has placed reliance on
the judgment of the three-Judge Bench of this
Court in Saipal Singh v. State of Punjab:
2018(13) SCC 813
17. The jurisdiction of the court to grant bail
is circumscribed by the provisions of Section
37 of the NDPS Act. It can be granted in case
there are reasonable grounds for believing
that the accused is not guilty of such offence,
and that he is not likely to commit any offence
while on bail. It is the mandate of the
legislature which is required to be followed.
At this juncture, a reference to Section 37 of
the Act is apposite. That provision makes the
offences under the Act cognizable and nonbailable. It reads thus:
“37. Offences to be cognizable and nonbailable.—(1) Notwithstanding anything
contained in the Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974)—
(a) every offence punishable under
this Act shall be cognizable;
(b) no person accused of an offence
punishable
for
offences
under
Section 19 or Section 24 or Section
27-A and also for offences involving
commercial
quantity
shall
be
released on bail or on his own bond
unless—
(i) the Public Prosecutor has
been given an opportunity to
oppose the application for such
release, and
(ii) where the Public Prosecutor
opposes the application, the
court ts satisfied that there are
reasonable grounds for believing
that he is not guilty of such
offence and that he is not likely
to commit any offence while on
bail.
(2) The limitations on granting of bail
specified in clause (b) of sub-section (1) are
in addition to the limitations under the Code
of Criminal Procedure, 1973 @ of 1974), or
any other law for the time being in force on
granting of bail.”
19. The scheme of Section 37 reveals that the
exercise of power to grant bail is not only
subject to the limitations contained under
Section 439 CrPC, but is also subject to the
limitation placed by Section 37 which
commences with non obstante clause. The
operative part of the said section is in the
negative form prescribing the enlargement of
bail to any person accused of commission of
an offence under the Act, unless twin
conditions are satisfied. The first condition is
that the prosecution must be given an
opportunity to oppose the application; and the
second, is that the court must be satisfied
that there are reasonable grounds for
believing that he is not guilty of such offence.
If either of these two conditions is not
satisfied, the ban for granting bail operates.
20. The expression “reasonable grounds”
means something more than prima facie
grounds. It contemplates substantial probable
causes for believing that the accused is not
guilty of the alleged offence. The reasonable
belief contemplated in the provision requires
existence of such facts and circumstances as
are sufficient in themselves to justify
satisfaction that the accused is not guilty of
the alleged offence. In the case on hand, the
High Court seems to have completely
overlooked the underlying object of Section
37 that in addition to the limitations provided
under the CrPC, or any other law for the time
being in force, regulating the grant of bail, its
liberal approach in the matter of bail under
the NDPS Act is indeed uncalled for.
21. We may further like to observe that the
learned Single Judge has failed to record a
finding mandated under Section 37 of the
NDPS Act which is a sine qua non for granting
bail to the accused under the NDPS Act.
25. In the result, the appeals are allowed and
the impugned order passed by the High Court
releasing the respondents on bail is hereby
set aside. Bail bonds of the respondentaccused stand cancelled and they are directed
to be taken into custody. The trial court is
directed to proceed and expedite the trial.
Further, Hon’ble the Apex Court in Sujit Tiwari vs.
State of Gujarat & Anr. reported in (2020) 13 SCC 447
wherein Hon’ble the Apex Court in para Nos.8, 11, 13, & 14
observed as under:
“8. On the other hand, Mr K.M. Nataraj,
learned ASG appearing for the respondents
submits that keeping in view the bar of
Section 37 of the NDPS Act, no bail can be
granted to the appellant. As far as default bail
is concerned,
he submits that since the complaint was filed
within time, the appellant cannot get benefit
of Section 167 CrPC read with Section 36-A of
the NDPS Act, even if investigation has not
been completed. While deciding this bail
application,
we
are
conscious
of
the
provisions of Section 37 of the NDPS Act
which lays down two limitations: one, that the
court is prima facie of the view that the
appellant is not guilty of the offence and
secondly, that he is not likely to commit any
offence while on bail.
11. At this stage, without going into the
merits, we feel that the case of the appellant
herein is totally different from the other
accused. Reasonable possibility is there that
he may be acquitted. He has been behind bars
since his arrest on 4-8-2017 i.e. for more than
2 years and he is a young man aged about 25
years. He is a BTech graduate. Therefore,
under facts and circumstances of this case,
we feel that this is a fit case where the
appellant is entitled to bail because there is a
possibility that he was unaware of the illegal
activities of his brother and the other crew
members. The case of the appellant is
different from that of all the other accused,
whether it be the Master of the ship, the crew
members or the persons who introduced the
Master to the prospective buyers and the
prospective buyers.
13. We direct that the appellant Sujit Tiwari
be released on bail upon furnishing a bail
bond in the sum of Rs 10,00,000 (ten lakhs
only), with two sureties of the like amount to
the satisfaction of the Special Judge, NDPS
Court
at
Porbandar
on
the
following
conditions:
13.1. The appellant shall deposit his
passport, if any with the court.
13.2. The appellant shall either stay in
Porbandar or Kolkata. He shall not go to
any other place.
13.3. The appellant shall give his
cellphone
number
to
the
police
authorities and shall not change his
cellphone number without permission of
the trial court.
13.4. Whether the appellant remains in
Porbandar or Kolkata, in Kolkata he shall
report to the Entally police station daily
at 9.00 a.m., and in Porbandar he shall
report to the investigating officer of NCB
at 9.00 a.m. everyday.
13.5. The appellant shall join the
investigation as and when called upon to
do so before the authorities of NCB.
13.6. The appellant shall not in any
manner hamper or try to interfere in the
investigation.
13.7. Once the trial begins, the appellant
shall not in any manner try to delay the
trial.
14. If the appellant violates any of these
terms, NCB shall be entitled to straightaway
apply to the Special Judge for cancellation of
his bail.”
Hon’ble the Apex Court in Union of India vs. Ajay
Kumar Singh @ Pappu vs Ajay Kumar Singh alias Pappu
reported in (2023) SCC OnLine SC 346 in para Nos.16, 17, &
18 observed as under:
“16. In view of the above provisions, it is
implicit that no person accused of an offence
involving trade in commercial quantity of
narcotics is liable to be released on bail
unless the court is satisfied that there are
reasonable grounds for believing that he is
not guilty of such an offence and that he is
not likely to commit any offence while on bail.
17. The quantity of “ganja” recovered is
admittedly of commercial quantity. The High
Court has not recorded any finding that the
respondent-accused is not prima facie guilty
of the offence alleged and that he is not likely
to commit the same offence when enlarged on
bail rather his antecedents are indicative that
he is a regular offender. In the absence of
recording of such satisfaction by the court, we
are of the opinion that the High Court
manifestly erred in enlarging the respondentaccused on bail.
18. In view of the aforesaid facts and
circumstances and considering the role
assigned to the respondent-accused and the
illegality committed in releasing him on bail,
we set aside the impugned final order dated
17.10.2022 passed by the High Court of
judicature at Allahabad and allow the appeal.”
Again, Hon’ble the Apex Court in Union of India
through Narcotics Control Bureau, Lucknow vs. Md.
Nawaz Khan reported in (2021) 10 SCC 100 in para Nos.32,
33, 34, 36, 37 & 39
observed as under:
“32. Further, it was held that the issue of
whether there was compliance of the
procedure laid down under Section 42 of the
NDPS Act is a question of fact. The decision in
Karnail Singh': (2009) 8 SCC 539 : (2009) 3
SCC (Cri) 887 was recently followed by this
Court in Boota Singh vy. State of Haryana":
(2021) 19 SCC 606 : 2021 SCC OnLine SC 324.
33. In the complaint that was filed on 16-102019 it is alleged that at about 1400 hours on
26-3-2019, information was received that
between 1500-1700 hours on the same day,
the three accused persons would be reaching
Uttar Pradesh. The complaint states that the
information was immediately reduced to
writing. Therefore, the contention that
Section 42 of the NDPS Act was not
complied with is prima facie misplaced. The
question is one that should be raised in the
course of the trial.
34. The following circumstances are crucial to
assessing whether the High Court has
correctly evaluated the application for bail,
having regard to the provisions of Section 37:
34.1. The respondent was travelling in
the vehicle all the way from Dimapur in
Nagaland to Rampur in Uttar Pradesh
with the co-accused.
34.2. The complaint notes that the CDR
analysis of the mobile number used by
the
respondent
indicates
that
the
respondent was in regular touch with the
other accused persons who were known
to him.
34.3. The quantity of contraband found
in the vehicle is of a commercial
quantity.
34.4. The contraband was concealed in
the vehicle in which the respondent was
travelling with the co-accused.
36. The High Court has clearly overlooked
crucial requirements and glossed over the
circumstances which were material to the
issue as to whether a case for the grant of
bail was established. In failing to do so, the
order
of
the
High
Court
becomes
unsustainable. Moreover, it has emerged,
during the course of the hearing that after the
respondent was enlarged on bail he has
consistently remained away from the criminal
trial resulting in the issuance of a nonbailable warrant against him. The High Court
ought to have given due weight to the
seriousness and gravity of the crime which it
has failed to do.
37. For the above reasons, we allow the
appeal and set aside the impugned judgment
and order of the High Court dated 1-10-2020
in Mohd. Nawaz Khan y. Union of India: 2020
SCC OnLine All 1838.
38. The application for bail filed by the
respondent
shall
stand
dismissed.
The
respondent
shall
accordingly
surrender
forthwith. Pending application(s), if any,
stand disposed of.”
In State through Narcotics Control Bureau v.
Kulwant Singh reported in (2003) 9 SCC 193, wherein in
para No.29, the Hon’ble Apex Court observed as under:
29. This Court in Jasbir Singh v. Vipin Kumar
Jaggi [(2001) 8 SCC 289 : 2001 SCC (Cri)
1525] expressed a similar view when it
observed: (SCC p. 302, paras 24-25)
“24. Under Section 4(1) of the Act, the
Central Government is obliged to take all
such measures as are deemed necessary
for the purpose of preventing and
combating the abuse of narcotic drugs
and psychotropic substances and the
illicit traffic therein. By Notification SO
No. 96(E) dated 17-3-1985, the Central
Government constituted the Narcotics
Control Bureau (NCB) in exercise of its
powers under Section 4(3) of the Act to
discharge the powers and functions of
the Central Government under the Act
subject to the superintendence and
control of the Central Government.
25. It is, in the circumstances, clear that
when cases are started on the complaint
of NCB, it is not a mere complainant but
is the executive and it must act in
discharge of a mandate statutorily cast
upon it to effectively check among other
activities, the illegal dissemination and
smuggling of drugs.”
I
have
also
perused
the
aforesaid
judgments
referred by Learned Standing Counsel for the Union of India
and it appears that in a case of this nature until the twin
conditions as mentioned in Section 37 of NDPS Act are being
followed then there is no scope to grant bail to an accused in a
case whether there is allegation of possession of contraband
items of commercial quantity.
From the order dated 30.11.2024, it appears that
the
Learned
Special
Judge
at
the
time
of
delivery
of
judgment/order of the bail application failed to consider the
mandatory provision of Section 37 of NDPS Act rather came to
the observation that the accused persons were in custody for
179 days and the final report was submitted within the
stipulated period which in the considered opinion of this Court
the order dated 30.11.2024 suffers from infirmity and the
same is liable to be interfered with.
10.
In view of the above the order dated 30.11.2024
passed by Learned Special Judge, Court No.1, West Tripura,
Agartala stands aside. The respondent-accused persons are to
surrender
before
the
Learned
Trial
Court
on
or before
05.03.2026 failing which the Learned Trial Court shall make all
endeavour to ensure presence of the respondent-accused
person before the Court in-accordance-with law. From the
record, further, it appears that the case is at the stage of
framing of charge, so, the Trial Court shall make all endeavour
to dispose of the case on top priority in-accordance-with law. It
is also necessary to be mentioned here that the petitionerUnion of India has challenged the order dated 30.11.2024
before this High Court on 07.05.2025 after a considerable long
period and in this regard, no satisfactory explanation was
given. However, at the time of hearing, Learned Standing
Counsel for the complainant could not give any specific reasons
for such delay, however, such type of practice is deprecated
and the officers of the department should be more vigilant and
cautious in dealing with such type of matter in future.
Learned Standing Counsel for the complainant is
asked to take up the matter with the authority of the
department immediately.
Send down the record to the Learned Trial Court
along with a copy of this order. Also supply a copy of this order
to the Learned Standing Counsel for the Union of India.
With this observation, this petition stands disposed
of on contest.
Pending application(s), if any, also stands disposed
of.
JUDGE
Purnita
AMRITA
DEB
AMRITA DEB
Date: 2026.02.26
13:53:06 +05'30'
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