The court's order
The closing paragraphs of the judgment, in the court's own words. The reasons are in the full text below.
13. In view of the above, the impugned order is unsustainable and set aside. The appellant was both a necessary and proper party to the writ petition. The impugned order has also been passed without taking into account the subsequent events including the change of law and the appointment of the appellant which is a glaring infirmity in the impugned order.
14. To this extent, both MAT 2113 of 2024 and MAT 2197 of 2024 stand allowed. All connected applications are automatically disposed of. The impugned order dated 20 August 2024 is set aside. WP 431 of 2022 is dismissed. All interim orders are vacated. (Ravi Krishan Kapur, J.) I agree, (Chaitali Chatterjee Das, J.)
Full Judgment Text
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IN THE HIGH COURT AT CALCUTTA
Civil Appellate Jurisdiction
(Appellate Side)
BEFORE:
The Hon’ble Justice Ravi Krishan Kapur
And
The Hon’ble Justice Chaitali Chatterjee (Das)
MAT 2113 of 2024
IA NO: CAN 2 of 2024
SRI BADAL CHANDRA DAS
VS.
SMT. SOMA MAHATO AND ORS.
WITH
MAT 2197 of 2024
IA NO: CAN 2 of 2024
THE STATE OF WEST BENGAL AND ORS.
VS.
SMT. SOMA MAHATO
For the appellant
: Mr. Debabrata Sinha, Advocate
Mr. Tarapada Das, Advocate
For the writ petitioner/
respondent no. 1
: Mr. Shamim ul Bari, Advocate
Ms. Asmita Mitra, Advocate
For the State
: Ms. Manju Agarwal, Advocate
Mr. Brijendra Pratap Singh, Advocate
Mr. Ram Chandra Agarwal, Advocate
Heard on
: 07.08.2026
Judgment on
: 28.08.2026
Ravi Krishan Kapur, J.:
1. Both these appeals arise from a common judgment dated 20 August 2022
disposing of WP 431 of 2022. By consent of the parties, the appeals were
heard together. By the impugned judgment, the appointment of the
appellant (in MAT 2113 of 2024) has been cancelled without impleading him
as a party to the writ petition.
2. Briefly, on 31 December 2003 the West Bengal Public Distribution System
(Maintenance and Control) Order 2003 [Control Order 2003] was introduced.
Subsequently, upon a vacancy being created for a fair price shop at
Ranibandh, Bankura as notified on 18 July 2021 by the Sub-Divisional
Controller (F&S) Khatra, the respondent no. 1/writ petitioner alongwith
other candidates had applied for such vacancy. However, during pendency of
the
selection
process,
the
West
Bengal
Public
Distribution
System
(Maintenance and Control) Order 2013 [Control Order 2013] came into
effect, repealing the prior Control Order 2003. Thereafter, on 10 September
2013, the National Food Security Act 2013 (NFSA 2013) was also
promulgated by the Central Government whereby the concept of Targeted
Public Distribution System was implemented and consumers came to be
identified as eligible households under NFSA 2013.
3. Pursuant thereto in 2015, all the vacancies for Fair Price and MR
Distributors which were awaiting the results of selection process under the
Control Order 2013 were cancelled for implementation of NFSA 2013.
Significantly, the respondent no 1 had filed an earlier writ petition being WP
No 19714 (W) of 2015 for consideration of its application for M R dealership
and for confirming the dealership in view of the fact that the authority had
completed all procedures after spot verification and site enquiry. The writ
petition was disposed of with directions to consider the prayer of the
respondent. On 18 November 2015, the respondent no 2 intimated the
respondent no 1 that all the vacancies of fair price shops all over West
Bengal had been cancelled and withdrawn due to promulgation of NFSA
2013.
4. Being aggrieved by the above communication, the respondent no 1 filed this
writ petition being WPA No 431 of 2016. Subsequently, on or about 5
January 2022, fresh vacancies for fair price shop dealership were notified by
the Sub- Divisional Controller for the village of Ranibandh, Bankura under
Control Order 2013 when the appellant alongwith other candidates had
applied for the same. Subsequently, the appellant was selected as a
successful candidate and was issued a fair price shop license on 7 June
2024 when the appellant his its dealership business.
5. On 20 August 2024, after almost eight years, the writ petition WPA No 431
of 2016 was taken up for hearing and was allowed directing the respondent
authority to grant a fair price shop license to the respondent no 1 and
further cancelled the license of the appellant. During the interregnum,
despite having full knowledge that new vacancies had been issued on 5
January 2022 and that the appellant had already been granted a license
against the said vacancy, the appellant was not made a party to the writ
petitioner. The fact of the NFSA 2013 being introduced and governing the
relationship between the parties was not even brought on record. In such
circumstances, the appellant Badal Chandra Das and the State of West
Bengal have filed separate appeals praying for quashing and setting aside of
the impugned order.
6. It is alleged that the Learned Single Judge failed to consider that the Badal
Chandra Das was a proper and necessary party to the writ petition whose
rights would be adversely affected by any order which may be passed in the
writ petition and hence he should have been impleaded as a party
respondent. The passing of the impugned order in the absence of the
appellant is in gross violation of the principles of natural justice. It is also
contended that the mere participation in the selection process or even
selection does not entitle a participant or the selected person to any rights
unless an appointment letter is issued in his name even more post the
implementation of the Control Order 2013 when all the vacancies under the
Control Order 2003 and all applications stood automatically withdrawn and
cancelled.
7. On behalf of the respondent no 1, it is contended that the appellant’s father
was an existing FPS dealer and thus by the Notification dated 5 January
2022, the appellant was ineligible to apply for dealership since his family
member was an existing licensee. This fact had also been suppressed by the
appellant at the time of making the application for dealership, which was
contrary to the Notification dated 5 January 2022. It is also contended that
despite being aware of the pending writ proceedings, the respondent
authorities published an advertisement for vacancy and selected an
ineligible candidate i.e. the appellant. During the hearing of the writ petition,
the authorities had also failed to disclose that fresh advertisements had
been published for selection against the vacancy. It is contended that unless
the impugned order is set aside all subsequent steps taken during the
pendency of the writ petition would automatically stand nullified.
8. For convenience, section 12 of the National Food Security Act 2013 is set out
below:
“12. (1) Reforms in Targeted Public Distribution System.— The Central and
State Governments shall endeavour to progressively undertake necessary
reforms in the Targeted Public Distribution System in consonance with the role
envisaged for them in this Act.”
Section 12 provides the State with a duty to progressively undertake reforms
necessary in the Targeted Public Distribution System and the same should
be in conformity with prevalent laws. In such circumstances, there had been
no violation in issuing fresh vacancies for Fair Shop Dealers and modified
rationing distributors in accordance with the Control Order 2013.
9. In view of the above, the Learned Single Judge was obliged to have taken
into consideration the fact that against the fresh vacancies issued in terms
of the Control Order 2013, new candidates had already been selected and
that they have been running their business after obtaining the requisite
license. All the subsequent facts have been completely suppressed and were
never brought to the attention of the Learned Single Judge. In such
circumstances, in giving effect to the Control Order 2003 which had been
substituted by the subsequent Control Order 2013 and subsequently by the
NFSA 2013 not only impinges directly on the validity of the subsequent
Control Order but also adversely affects the rights of the candidates selected
in the subsequent selection process. In such circumstances, it was both
proper and necessary to implead the appellant, who would be vitally affected
by any order passed in the writ petition. In Udit Narain Singh Malpaharia v.
Board of Revenue, 1962 SCC OnLine SC 130 it has been held as follows:
“9. The next question is whether the parties whose rights are directly affected are
the necessary parties to a writ petition to quash the order of a tribunal. As we
have seen, a tribunal or authority performs a judicial or quasi-judicial act after
hearing parties. Its order affects the right or rights of one or the other of the parties
before it. In a writ of certiorari the defeated party seeks for the quashing of the
order issued by the tribunal in favour of the successful party. How can the High
Court vacate the said order without the successful party being before it. Without
the presence of the successful party the High Court cannot issue a substantial
order affecting his right. Any or that may be issued behind the back of such a
party can be ignored by the said party, with the result that the tribunal's order
would be quashed but the right vested in that party by the wrong order of the
tribunal would continue to be effective. Such a party, therefore, is a necessary
party and a petition filed for the issue of a writ of certiorari without making him a
party or without impleading him subsequently, if allowed by the court, would
certainly be incompetent. A party whose interests are directly affected is,
therefore, a necessary party.
Similar views have been consistently upheld in Avtar Singh Hit v. Delhi Sikh
Gurdwara Management Committee (2006) 8 SCC 487, Chaman Lal v. State of
Punjab (2014) 15 SCC 715, Kulwant Singh v. Daya Ram (2015) 3 SCC 177
and Ranjan Kumar v. State of Bihar, (2014) 16 SCC 187.
10. In any event, the respondent no. 1 candidate had only been considered and
verified for clearance. However, that selection process had never been
concluded. Mere consideration or participation of the respondent no. 1 in a
selection process does not entitle has to an appointment. The respondent no.
1 in an incomplete selection process has no vested right in her favour to
seek continuation of the notified vacancies. No person can claim a right to
run a fair price shop in perpetuity and any candidate has the right to be
considered for appointment. [Sarkari Sasta Anaj Vikreta Sangh v. State of
M.P. (1981) 4 SCC 471].
11. The doctrine of legitimate expectation in public law is based on the principle
of fairness and non-arbitrariness in the actions taken by governmental
organizations. However, the same would not apply when the legislature
enacts a statute. In any event, legitimate expectation cannot prevail over a
policy introduced by the Government, which does not suffer from any
perversity, unfairness or unreasonableness or which does not violate any
fundamental or other enforceable rights of the respondent no. 1. It is well
settled that the concept of legitimate expectation has no role to play where
the State action is as a public policy or in public interest unless the action
taken amounts to an abuse of power. As far back as in, Food Corporation. of
India v. Kamdhenu Cattle Feed Industries, (1993) 1 SCC 71 it has been held
as follows:
“8. The mere reasonable or legitimate expectation of a citizen, in such a situation,
may not by itself be a distinct enforceable right, but failure to consider and give
due weight to it may render the decision arbitrary, and this is how the
requirement of due consideration of a legitimate expectation forms part of the
principle of non-arbitrariness, a necessary concomitant of the rule of law. Every
legitimate expectation is a relevant factor requiring due consideration in a fair
decision-making process. Whether the expectation of the claimant is reasonable or
legitimate in the context is a question of fact in each case. Whenever the question
arises, it is to be determined not according to the claimant's perception but in
larger public interest wherein other more important considerations may outweigh
what would otherwise have been the legitimate expectation of the claimant. A
bona fide decision of the public authority reached in this manner would satisfy the
requirement of non-arbitrariness and withstand judicial scrutiny. The doctrine of
legitimate expectation gets assimilated in the rule of law and operates in our legal
system in this manner and to this extent.”
12. In State of West Bengal v. Gitashree Dutta (Dey), (2022) 19 SCC 388 it has
also been held as follows:
“32. In the instant case, we have already noticed that the appellants were
reposed with a responsibility of implementing the mandate of the 2013 Act,
and more importantly, to bring about reforms in the existing public distribution
system as stipulated under Section 12 of the said Act. The respondent herein
being a mere applicant in an unfinalised selection process, has no vested right
in his favour to seek continuation of the notified vacancies, when by recalling
the vacancy notification, the appellants endeavoured to enforce the statute.
Moreover, as discussed above, there can be no estoppel against a statute. Even
going by the observations of the Division Bench in the impugned judgment
[Gitashree Dutta (Dey) v. State of W.B., 2019 SCC OnLine Cal 9115] ,that the
State was aware of the 2013 Act while issuing 30-1-2014 vacancy notification,
the said notification cannot be sustained, being contrary to the mandate of the
National Food Security Act, 2013, more importantly of Section 12 thereof as
held in A.P. Dairy Development Corpn. Federation [A.P. Dairy Development
Corpn. Federation v. B. Narasimha Reddy, (2011) 9 SCC 286].”
13. In view of the above, the impugned order is unsustainable and set aside. The
appellant was both a necessary and proper party to the writ petition. The
impugned order has also been passed without taking into account the
subsequent events including the change of law and the appointment of the
appellant which is a glaring infirmity in the impugned order.
14. To this extent, both MAT 2113 of 2024 and MAT 2197 of 2024 stand
allowed. All connected applications are automatically disposed of. The
impugned order dated 20 August 2024 is set aside. WP 431 of 2022 is
dismissed. All interim orders are vacated.
(Ravi Krishan Kapur, J.)
I agree,
(Chaitali Chatterjee Das, J.)
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