The State of Rajasthan & Ors. vs Heem Singh

In judicial review over disciplinary matters – Held: Two ends of spectrum - First is a rule of restraint founded on deference to the position of the disciplinary authority as a fact finding authority and autonomy of the employer in maintaining discipline and efficiency of the service – At the other end of the spectrum is the principle that the court has the jurisdiction to interfere when the findings in the enquiry are based on no evidence or when they suffer from perversity – A failure to consider vital evidence is an incident of what the law regards as a perverse determination of fact – Service jurisprudence has recognized the authority of the court to interfere when the finding or the penalty are disproportionate to the weight of the evidence or misconduct.

Allowing the appeal, the Court

HELD: Evidence in the disciplinary enquiry

1. A complete review of the evidence indicates there was a pre-existing hostility between the respondent and the victimdeceased. This hostility initially arose in the context of a land dispute. The hostility between them escalated exponentially after the death of the respondent’s father for which he blamed victim. It evidently rose to an extent where the respondent openly issued a death threat to victim, leading victim to file a police complaint against the respondent apprehending a threat from the respondent to his safety. As regards the incident leading to the death of victim, the respondent and his parked tractor were seen proximate in time and in terms of the location where victim’s dead body was found by both PW1 and PW3. The respondent was found to be together with one of the co-accused proximate in time. These circumstances are coupled with respondent’s movements at and around the time of the murder, commencing with but not confined to his being at the village on leave for two days coinciding with the murder. This may not have been sufficient to sustain a conviction on a charge of murder in the sessions trial. But the State had sufficient material to conclude that the connection of the respondent to the incident would affect the reputation of its police force and that the presence of the respondent as a member of the force was not in the interest of public administration. Whether on the basis of the evidence, the respondent could have been implicated in the conspiracy to commit murder of victim is one aspect of the matter. Evidently direct evidence to sustain a charge of conspiracy is difficult to come by even in the course of a criminal trial. Quite independent of this is the issue whether the connection of the respondent with the circumstances leading to the death of victim affected his ability to continue in the State police force without affecting its integrity and reputation. The latter aspect is the one on which the judgment of the Division Bench is found to be deficient in its reasoning. [Para 28][979-E-H; 980-A-C]

Judicial review over disciplinary matters

2. In exercising judicial review in disciplinary matters, there are two ends of the spectrum. The first embodies a rule of restraint. The second defines when interference is permissible. The rule of restraint constricts the ambit of judicial review. This is for a valid reason. The determination of whether a misconduct has been committed lies primarily within the domain of the disciplinary authority. The judge does not assume the mantle of the disciplinary authority. Nor does the judge wear the hat of an employer. Deference to a finding of fact by the disciplinary authority is a recognition of the idea that it is the employer who is responsible for the efficient conduct of their service. Disciplinary enquiries have to abide by the rules of natural justice. But they are not governed by strict rules of evidence which apply to judicial proceedings. The standard of proof is hence not the strict standard which governs a criminal trial, of proof beyond reasonable doubt, but a civil standard governed by a preponderance of probabilities. Within the rule of preponderance, there are varying approaches based on context and subject. The first end of the spectrum is founded on deference and autonomy – deference to the position of the disciplinary authority as a fact finding authority and autonomy of the employer in maintaining discipline and efficiency of the service. At the other end of the spectrum is the principle that the court has the jurisdiction to interfere when the findings in the enquiry are based on no evidence or when they suffer from perversity. A failure to consider vital evidence is an incident of what the law regards as a perverse determination of fact. Proportionality is an entrenched feature of our jurisprudence. Service jurisprudence has recognized it for long years in allowing for the authority of the court to interfere when the finding or the penalty are disproportionate to the weight of the evidence or misconduct. Judicial craft lies in maintaining a steady sail between the banks of these two shores which have been termed as the two ends of the spectrum. Judges do not rest with a mere recitation of the hands-off mantra when they exercise judicial review. To determine whether the finding in a disciplinary enquiry is based on some evidence an initial or threshold level of scrutiny is undertaken. That is to satisfy the conscience of the court that there is some evidence to support the charge of misconduct and to guard against perversity. But this does not allow the court to re-appreciate evidentiary findings in a disciplinary enquiry or to substitute a view which appears to the judge to be more appropriate. To do so would offend the first principle which has been outlined above. The ultimate guide is the exercise of robust common sense without which the judges’ craft is in vain. [Para 33][982-G-H; 983-A-G]

The effect of an acquittal

3. In the present case, the respondent was acquitted of the charge of murder. The circumstances in which the trial led to an acquittal have been elucidated in detail above. The verdict of the criminal trial did not conclude the disciplinary enquiry. The disciplinary enquiry was not governed by proof beyond reasonable doubt or by the rules of evidence which governed the criminal trial. True, even on the more relaxed standard which governs a disciplinary enquiry, evidence of the involvement of the respondent in a conspiracy involving the death of victim would be difficult to prove. But there are circumstances emerging from the record of the disciplinary proceedings which bring legitimacy to the contention of the State that to reinstate such an employee back in service will erode the credibility of and public confidence in the image of the police force. [Para 35][986-C-E]

M. Siddiq v. Suresh Das (2020) 1 SCC 1 – followed. Suresh Pathrella v. Oriental Bank of Commerce (2006)

10 SCC 572 : [2006] 7 Suppl. SCR 564; Samar

Bahadur Singh v. State of U.P. (2011) 9 SCC 94 : [2011]

11 SCR 136; P. John Chandy and Co. (P) Ltd. v. John P. Thomas (2002) 5 SCC 90 : [2002] 3 SCR 549; Moni Shankar v. Union of India (2008) 3 SCC 484; Southern Railway Officers Association v. Union of India (2009)

9 SCC 24 : [2009] 12 SCR 429; Inspector General of Police v. S. Samuthiram (2013) 1 SCC 598 : [2012] 11 SCR 174 – relied on.