Land Acquisition: Karnataka Slum Areas (Improvement and Clearance) Act, 1973 – ss.17, 18, 20 – Constitutional validity of s.20 of 1973 Act – Amount payable in respect of land acquired – Acquisition notification u/s. 17 of 1973 Act issued by the Housing Department of State in 2005 – Writ petition filed before High Court contending that notification was issued without adequately considering the objections taken by the writ petitioners and in excess of the power vested in the authority and second plea was about the lapsing of the acquisition which was in furtherance of the show cause notice issued under the 1973 Act – Single Judge did not set aside the impugned notification, however, held that s.20 of the 1973 Act was ultra vires and opined that the method of determining the amount to be paid to the land losers pursuant to acquisition of land was not just and reasonable – It ought to be as per the prevailing market value of the land; and not on the basis of “three hundred times the property tax payable” in respect of such land, as per s.20 of the 1973 Act – And, until a just method for determination of amount was replaced by a law made by the State Legislature, the land losers ought to be paid amount in accordance with ss.23 and
24 of the 1894 Act – Division Bench upheld the declaration given by the Single Judge about s.20 being unconstitutional, however, modified the operative direction given regarding method of determining the amount payable to the land losers and observed that such a direction would be beyond the purview of the Court’s jurisdiction and that it is always open to the State to bring suitable amendment to s.20 – Division Bench noted that the 1973 Act cannot get any immunity under Art. 31C of Constitution since the present Act has been enacted prior to the 44th Amendment – On appeal, held: High Court disposed of the assail to the validity of s.20 of the 1973 Act in a cryptic manner and more so without analysing all & ORS.
relevant aspects needed to be considered by a Constitutional Court to declare provisions enacted by the State Legislature as ultra vires – High Court ought to have examined the scheme of the 1973 Act, its objects and purposes and also whether the payment of amount specified as three hundred times the property tax payable in respect of such land on the date of publication would be a permissible method of determination of the amount or is per se unjust, unfair or unreasonable – Additionally, if the 1973 Act and the provisions are ascribable to the objective predicated in Art. 39(b) of the Constitution, then it would get protection or immunity from challenge in terms of Arts. 14, 19 or 31 of the Constitution – Also even if the High Court was right in observing that the 1973 Act came into force prior to coming into force of 44th Amendment to the Constitution on 20.06.1979, it would make no difference as Art. 31C was already in force with effect from 20.04.1972 to the extent it has been validated by this Court in Keshavananda Bharti – Matter remitted to High Court for reconsideration of writ petitions including question of constitutional validity of s.20 of the 1973 Act – Land Acquisition Act, 1894 – ss. 23, 24 – Constitution of India – Art.19(1)(f), 31C, 39(b).
Disposing of the appeals, the Court
HELD: 1. The High Court had held that in absence of an express provision regarding lapsing of acquisition in the 1973 Act unlike the 1894 or 2013 Act, it is not open to grant relief of setting aside impugned notification dated 23.6.2005 on account of efflux of time. In that, show cause notice (preliminary notification) is ordinarily issued when the competent authority is satisfied that for the purpose of executing any work of improvement in relation to any “slum area” or any building in such area or for the purpose of redeveloping any “slum clearance area”, or for the purpose of rehabilitating slum dwellers, it is necessary to acquire any land and it has been so decided in pursuance of the said provision. The need to develop the slum area and to rehabilitate the slum dwellers is a continuing obligation of the State until it is fully discharged. The fact that there is some time gap between the preliminary notice to show cause why the land in question should not be acquired and in issuance of the final notification under Section 17, by itself, cannot be a ground to declare the process initiated by valid show cause notice as having lapsed by efflux of time. It was, however, urged by the writ petitioners that the stated power to effectuate a purpose has to be exercised in a reasonable time frame. The exercise of power in a reasonable manner inheres the concept of its exercise within a reasonable time. What would be the length of reasonable time must be then determined by the facts of the case in the context of scheme of the Act and the nature of the power which is to be exercised to prevent miscarriage of justice, misuse or abuse of power. Even this plea will have to be examined by the High Court in the first place. [Paras 20, 20A][462-B-G]
2. In the fact situation of the present case, it is appropriate to relegate the parties before the High Court for reconsideration of the writ petitions afresh including in relation to the question of constitutional validity of Section 20 of the 1973 Act. In the remanded proceedings, it would then be open to the writ petitioners to amend the writ petition to raise a new plea regarding inapplicability of Section 17 to the land in question — which had not been declared as slum area or slum clearance area. That question, if answered in favour of the writ petitioners, would go to the root of the matter and it may then not be necessary to even examine the question regarding the constitutional validity of Section 20 of the 1973 Act.[Para 21][462-G-H; 463-A-B]
3. It will be open to the Single Judge to await the decision of the larger Bench of this Court in reference made in terms of Property Owners’ Association, in the event it becomes necessary to deal with the argument of the expanse of expression “material resources of the community” in Article 39(b) of the Constitution and its applicability to the impugned provision of the 1973 Act. As the High Court’s impugned decisions have been set aside, it must follow that the declaration issued by the High Court regarding Section 20 of the 1973 Act being ultra vires stands effaced and that provision be given full effect until further orders of the High Court in the remanded petitions. [Paras 23, 24][463D-E; 464-A-B] The Deputy Commissioner and Collector, Kamrup & Ors. v. Durganath Sarma AIR 1968 SC 394 : [1968] 1 SCR & ORS.
561; K.T. Plantation Private Limited & Anr. v. State of Karnataka (2011) 9 SCC 1 : [2011] 13 SCR 636; His Holiness Kesavananda Bharati Sripadagalvaru v State of Kerala & Anr. (1973) 4 SCC 225 : [1973] 2 SCR 1089; The State of Karnataka & Anr., etc. v Ranganatha Reddy & Anr., etc., etc. AIR 1978 SC 215 : (1977) 4 SCC 471 : [1978] 1 SCR 641; Maharao Sahib Shri Bhim Singhji v Union of India & Ors. (1981) 1 SCC 166; Rajiv Sarin & Anr. v State of Uttarakhand & Ors. (2011) 8 SCC 708 : [2011] 9 SCR 1012; State of Maharashtra & Anr. v Basantibai Mohanlal Khetan & Ors. (1986) 2 SCC 516 : [ 1986] 1 SCR 707; Property Owners’ Association & Ors. v State of Maharashtra & Ors. (2013) 7 SCC 522 – referred to.
As published in the Supreme Court Reports, Supreme Court of India. Text from the Indian Supreme Court Judgments open data set (Dattam Labs), CC BY 4.0.
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