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2026:JHHC:29378-DB
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI
L.P.A. No. 480 of 2025
1. The State of Jharkhand
2. The Deputy Commissioner, Bokaro, P.O. & P.S.- Bokaro, DistrictBokaro
3. The Additional Collector (Establishment), Bokaro, P.O. & P.S.Bokaro, District- Bokaro
4. The Deputy Collector (Establishment), Bokaro, P.O. & P.S.Bokaro, District- Bokaro
...
Appellants
Versus
Adhirath Mahatha, Son of Late Govind Mahatha, about 55 year,
resident of Village Savara, P.O. Chandra, P.S.- Chandankyari,
District- Bokaro, Jharkhand
...
Respondent
--------CORAM:
HON’BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE
HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE MANOJ PRASAD
--------For the Appellants:
Mr Sahbaj Akhtar, AC to AAG-III
For the Respondent:
Mr Amit Kumar Das, Sr. Advocate
Mrs Rinku Bhakat, Advocate
--------05/Dated: 30.09.2026
1.
Heard Mr Sahbaj Akhtar, learned AC to AAG-III for the
appellants, and Mr Amit Kumar Das, learned senior counsel,
who appears along with Mrs Rinku Bhakat, learned counsel for
the respondent.
2.
This appeal challenges the learned Single Judge’s order dated
29.08.2024 allowing respondent’s W.P.(S) No. 6570 of 2023
and directing his reinstatement with all consequential benefits.
3.
Mr Akhtar submitted that the order terminating the respondent’s
services was set aside only on the ground of breach of the
principles of natural justice. He submitted that in such a
situation, the matter should have been remanded to the
disciplinary authority to proceed from the stage of irregularity in
2026:JHHC:29378-DB
accordance with law. He submitted that such a contention was
precisely raised before the learned Single Judge but without
giving any good reasons, this contention has been rejected and
to that extent, the appellants are aggrieved.
4.
Mr Akhtar submitted that the respondent secured employment
based on a fraudulent certificate stating that he had passed
Standard 8th, and upon detection, disciplinary proceedings were
initiated against the respondent. He submitted that, in such
circumstances, the disciplinary authority ought to have been
given an opportunity to proceed in accordance with law, and
that failing to do so warrants interference.
5.
Mr Amit Kumar Das defended the impugned order based upon
the reasoning reflected therein. He submitted that while it is
normally true that a fresh opportunity should be given to the
disciplinary authority, the facts and circumstances of the
present case are so gross that, upon due consideration, the
learned Single Judge rejected the plea of virtually a third
opportunity to the disciplinary authority.
6.
Mr Das pointed out that in an earlier round of litigation, a fresh
opportunity was in fact granted to the disciplinary authority, but
it was not availed of. He pointed out how in 2006, the
respondent was placed under suspension until his unlawful
termination in 2010. He pointed out that only in 2026 was the
respondent reinstated and submitted that, to date, the
consequential benefits and salaries are not being paid to him on
the specious plea of pendency of this appeal.
2026:JHHC:29378-DB
7.
Mr Akhtar submitted that once the respondent filed a contempt
petition, the appellants reinstated the respondent and paid all
consequential benefits.
8.
The rival contentions now fall for our determination.
9.
In this case, the record shows that the enquiry officer virtually
exonerated the respondent after verifying the certificate of 8 th
pass
produced
by
him
at
the
time
of
his
appointment/regularisation in 2005. Before the respondent was
regularised/ appointed in 2005, the respondent had put in 16
years
of
service
appointment/regularisation
as
a
followed
daily
the
wager.
issue
of
The
a
due
advertisement and all prescribed procedures.
10.
In 2006, the respondent was suspended on the ground that
there was a problem with the Standard 8th pass certificate he
produced. Disciplinary proceedings followed, during which the
enquiring officer exonerated the respondent. However, the
disciplinary authority, without recording or communicating
reasons for disagreement, dismissed the respondent.
11.
The respondent then challenged his dismissal by instituting
W.P.(S) No. 6064 of 2010. This petition was allowed; the
termination order dated 28.09.2010 was quashed and set aside.
It was further clarified that the appellants could pass a fresh
order in the matter in accordance with law, after following the
principles of natural justice. Thus, the opportunity that the
appellants now claim was already given.
12.
The above is evident from paragraphs 16 and 17 of this Court’s
judgment and order dated 13.10.2020 allowing respondent’s
2026:JHHC:29378-DB
W.P.(S) No. 6064 of 2010, and therefore, their contents are
transcribed below for the convenience of reference: “16.
The aforesaid judgment will not be helpful for the
Respondent State inasmuch as in the instant case the
first enquiry was not found bad in law. As per the
Respondents, the same was vague and perverse. As
such, the correct procedure would have been to issue
show cause notice to the petitioners indicating the
grounds on which the disciplinary authority decided to
disagree with the findings recorded in the departmental
proceeding and then pass appropriate order but cannot
appoint a fresh Inquiry Officer and take his opinion that
too without any notice to the petitioners.
17.
In view of the aforesaid facts and the judicial
pronouncement referred to herein above, the instant writ
application is allowed and the impugned orders as
contained in Memo Nos. 757, 753 & 755 dated
28.09.2010 (Annexure-8 series), are hereby, quashed
and set aside. It would be open to the Respondents to
pass a fresh order in the matter in accordance with
law after following principles of natural justice”.
13.
From the aforesaid, it is evident that this Court not only granted
the appellants herein an opportunity to pass a fresh order in
accordance with law and after following the principles of natural
justice, but also indicated the correct procedure in such matters.
In paragraph 16 quoted above, the learned Single Judge of this
Court observed that the correct procedure would have been to
issue a show cause notice to the respondent herein indicating
the grounds on which the disciplinary authority decided to
disagree with the findings recorded in the departmental
proceedings and then pass an appropriate order.
2026:JHHC:29378-DB
14.
Instead of availing of the fresh opportunity granted by the
learned Single Judge, a Committee comprising several highlevel officers simply called upon the respondent and two others
who were placed in the same predicament to answer a set of
questions. The respondent was posed four questions, which
were allegations made against him by no less than nine highranking officials whom the respondent was called upon to face.
The respondent denied such allegations. This high-level
committee, without assigning any reasons whatsoever and
without perhaps realising the distinction between prosecution
and persecution, once again terminated the respondent's
services by order dated 23.08.2021.
15.
Although the Single Judge issued clear and definitive directions,
no show-cause notice was given to the respondent on the
points of disagreement or the reasons for contesting the enquiry
officer’s findings. Additionally, no other proper procedure seems
to have been followed. It is also uncertain whether appointing
such a high-level Committee can replace the disciplinary
authority’s lawful responsibility to act in accordance with the
law.
16.
The respondent challenged the second termination order dated
23.08.2021 by instituting W.P.(S) No. 6570 of 2023, in which
the learned Single Judge passed the impugned order dated
29.08.2024. The learned Single Judge has quite correctly set
aside the second termination order dated 23.08.2021 on the
ground of gross breach of the principles of natural justice and
2026:JHHC:29378-DB
fair play. Fortunately, this setting aside was not contested in this
appeal, and rightly so.
17.
On the aspect of yet another opportunity, i.e. a 3rd opportunity,
the learned Single Judge, in paragraph 8 of the impugned order
dated 29.08.2024, has observed as follows: “8.
Having regard to the facts and circumstances of
the case and the discussions made hereinabove, the
impugned order of termination does not have any legs to
stand in the eye of law; as accordingly, the impugned
order as contained in Memo No. 360 dated 23.08.2021,
passed by the Deputy Commissioner, Bokaro; whereby
he has rejected the application of the petitioner to
reinstate him in service, is quashed and set aside.
Normally, in such circumstances where there is
procedural irregularity; matter should have been remitted
to the disciplinary authority to proceed from the stage of
irregularity in accordance with law. However, in the
instant case, it appears that the concerned respondent
has no understanding of law and to understand the order
passed by this court. As such, this court refrains from
giving 3rd chance to the respondents by again giving
liberty to proceed in accordance with law.”
18.
Therefore, Mr Akhtar’s contention that the learned Single
Judge, without assigning any reasons, has denied the
appellants a 3rd opportunity cannot be accepted. This is a case
where the appellants, despite being granted an opportunity for
course correction, deliberately squandered it and prolonged the
misery of a daily wager who had secured regular employment
after 16 years of service.
19.
The Hon’ble Supreme Court, in Allahabad Bank and others
Vs. Krishna Narayan Tewari, (2017) 2 SCC 308, has held that
2026:JHHC:29378-DB
while there is no quarrel with the proposition that, in cases
where the High Court finds the enquiry to be deficient, either
procedurally or otherwise, the proper course is always to
remand the matter to the authority concerned to conduct the
enquiry afresh, that course may not have been the only course
open in a given situation. There may be situations where,
because of a long time-lag or other supervening circumstances,
the writ court considers it unfair, harsh, or otherwise
unnecessary to direct a fresh enquiry or a fresh order by a
competent authority.
20.
In
this
case,
as
noted
earlier,
the
respondent
was
appointed/regularised in 2005 after following due process of
law, after he had worked as a daily wager for 16 years. In 2006,
he was suspended, and in 2010, despite the enquiry officer
exonerating him, the respondent's services were terminated.
This Court set aside the termination by order dated 13.10.2020,
granting the appellants a fresh opportunity to make a course
correction. For a long time, the appellants neither reinstated the
respondent nor issued him a fresh show cause notice, thereby
forcing the respondent to file a contempt proceeding.
21.
At that stage, the appellants virtually required the respondent,
who was a Class-IV employee, to face what could figuratively
be described as a firing squad of some nine top-ranking
officials. These officials asked him only four questions and, by
ignoring his answers, once again terminated his services. The
procedure adopted by this high-level committee defied all
canons of fair procedure and natural justice. The committee’s
2026:JHHC:29378-DB
competence to act as a substitute for the disciplinary authority
was also doubtful.
22.
The respondent was forced to file W.P.(S) No. 6570 of 2023 to
have this 2nd termination, which was in gross violation of all
canons of natural justice and fair play, set aside. The learned
Single Judge correctly turned down the appellants' plea for yet
another opportunity, given the above gross and unfortunate
facts and circumstances.
23.
Considering all the above facts and circumstances, in our
judgment, the learned Single Judge correctly exercised
discretion and did not accede to the appellants’ prayer for yet
another opportunity. If such an opportunity were granted, we
believe it would result in a travesty of justice, where the mighty
State would have succeeded in crushing a Class-IV employee,
despite such state having acted most unfairly against him.
24.
At this stage, we do not wish to go into whether there has been
full compliance with the directions issued in the impugned order
or the previous orders. However, even assuming compliance,
we believe the appellants have succeeded in prolonging the
respondent’s misery unreasonably and disproportionately.
25.
For the above reasons, we not only dismiss the appeal, but also
impose costs of Rs. 10,000/- (rupees ten thousand) on the
appellants, which the appellants should pay to the respondent
within two weeks of uploading this order.
26.
If the appellants have not paid all dues and consequential
benefits, they must clear the same within two weeks from the
2026:JHHC:29378-DB
date of uploading of this order, without requiring the respondent
to institute fresh proceedings, which he can hardly afford.
27.
However, if such a situation is forced by the appellants, the
appellants are directed to pay interest at the rate of 7% per
annum on all monetary dues from the date they became
payable until actual payment; thereafter, hold an enquiry into
the officers involved in the entire episode of delaying payments
to a Class-IV employee, fix responsibility, and recover the
interest components from such officers. Besides, the competent
authority must consider making entries in the confidential rolls
of such officers so that there is a record of their conduct in
treating a Class-IV employee who was forced to file several
litigations to secure what was legitimately due to him.
28.
The appeal is dismissed with costs of Rs. 10,000/- (rupees ten
thousand) and the above directions. All concerned must act on
an authenticated copy of this order.
(M. S. Sonak, C.J.)
(Manoj Prasad, J.)
September 30, 2026
N.A.F.R.
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