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W.A. No. 01 of 2018
The Principal Secretary, Department of Commerce & Industries v. M/s Snowlion Automobile Pvt. Ltd.
THE HIGH COURT OF SIKKIM: GANGTOK
(Civil Extraordinary Jurisdiction)
-------------------------------------------------------------------------D.B. : THE HON’BLE MRS. JUSTICE MEENAKSHI MADAN RAI, ACTING CHIEF JUSTICE
THE HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE BHASKAR RAJ PRADHAN, JUDGE
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------W.A. No. 01 of 2018
The Principal Secretary,
Department of Commerce & Industries,
Government of Sikkim,
Gangtok, East Sikkim.
.… Appellant.
versus
M/s Snowlion Automobile Pvt. Ltd.
A Company having its registered office at
Tadong, P.O. Tadong & P.S. Gangtok,
East Sikkim.
.… Respondent.
An Appeal under Rule 148 of the Sikkim High Court
(Practice and Procedure) Rules, 2011.
Appearance:
Mr. Tarun Johri, Additional Advocate General with
Mr. Ankur Gupta, Ms. Sabina Chettri and Ms.
Sachina P. Y. Subba, Advocates for the Appellant.
Mr. Pabitra Pal Chowdhury and Mr. B. K. Gupta,
Advocates for the Respondent.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------JUDGMENT
(28.08.2018)
Bhaskar Raj Pradhan, J.
1.
This is a Writ Appeal preferred by the Appellant under
Rule 148 of the Sikkim High Court (Practice and Procedure)
Rules, 2011 (the said Rules) against the judgment dated
26.02.2018 (the impugned judgment) passed by the learned
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Single Judge in W.P. (C) No. 69 of 2016 (the Writ Petition). The
impugned judgment dismissed the Writ Petition filed by the
Petitioner under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India
wherein the Appellant had inter-alia prayed for setting aside the
order dated 10.06.2016 passed by the learned District Judge in
Petition bearing No.01 of 2015 in Arbitration Case No. 01 of
2015 (the said order) as well as the award dated 12.05.2015
passed by the learned Arbitrator (the arbitral award).
2.
Mr. Pabitra Pal Chowdhury, learned Advocate for the
Respondent would raise a preliminary objection on the
maintainability of the present Writ Appeal and thus we propose
to deal with it before examining its merits. It is his contention
that the present Writ Appeal does not fall within the boundaries
of Rule 148 of the said Rules.
3.
Rule 148 of the said Rules prescribes:
“148. Letter Patent Appeals: (1) An appeal shall lie to the
Division Bench from the judgment (not being a judgment passed
in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction in respect of a decree or
order made by a Court subject to the superintendence of the
High Court, and not being an order made in the exercise of
revisional jurisdiction, and not being sentence or order passed
or made in exercise of Criminal jurisdiction) of a Judge of the
High Court sitting singly.
(2) The period of limitation for an appeal under this rule
shall be thirty days from the date of the Judgment, decree or
final order, as the case may be.”
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The Principal Secretary, Department of Commerce & Industries v. M/s Snowlion Automobile Pvt. Ltd.
4.
Mr. Pabitra Pal Chowdhury, would submit that the
Appellant had preferred the Writ Petition invoking Article 226 as
well as Article 227 of the Constitution of India. It is submitted
that Article 227 of the Constitution of India is the power of
superintendence of the High Court. The Writ Petition having
been preferred under Article 227 of the Constitution of India
and dismissed as not maintainable vide the impugned judgment
it is submitted that the present Writ Appeal falls within the
exception to the Rule 148 of the said Rules. It is also submitted
that the perusal of the record of orders passed in the Writ
Petition would reflect that the said Writ Petition was not even
admitted and therefore the rejection of the Writ Petition as not
maintainable would take the impugned judgment beyond the
purview of Rule 148 of the said Rules.
5.
A perusal of the order dated 23.02.2017 passed by the
learned Single Judge in the Writ Petition reflects that the
learned Single Judge had framed a singular question to be
answered in this manner:
“5.
Mr. J. B. Pradhan, learned Additional Advocate General
appearing for the petitioner canvassed that this Court is
competent to entertain a petition under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India, if there is miscarriage of justice or
erroneous application of law while passing the award. Thus, the
question which arise for consideration is as to whether the High
Court is competent to exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction
under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, when the alternate
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The Principal Secretary, Department of Commerce & Industries v. M/s Snowlion Automobile Pvt. Ltd.
statutory remedy as provide is availed by the party, however,
belatedly and the case could not be considered on merit.”
6.
Thereafter, on 06.07.2017 the learned Single Judge
directed the matter to be listed for final hearing. On 22.09.2017
the learned Single Judge recorded that the matter was listed for
admission. On a request made, 11.10.2017 was fixed for
admission
hearing.
On
11.10.2017
the
learned
Counsel
appearing for the Respondent was given two weeks time to file a
reply and two weeks thereafter to the Petitioner to file rejoinder
if any after recording that this Court had framed the aforequoted question of law while taking cognizance of the matter.
On 23.02.2018 the matter was heard and judgment reserved.
On 26.02.2018 the impugned judgment was pronounced by
which the Writ Petition was dismissed as not maintainable.
7.
The aforesaid orders make it evident that the learned
Single Judge had decided to examine whether the Writ Petition
was maintainable before delving upon its merits. Ultimately vide
the impugned judgment the learned Single Judge held the Writ
Petition as not maintainable.
8.
A perusal of Rule 148 of the said Rules makes it clear that
an Appeal would lie to the Division Bench from the judgment of
a Judge of the High Court sitting singly. The exception to this
Rules are:
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The Principal Secretary, Department of Commerce & Industries v. M/s Snowlion Automobile Pvt. Ltd.
9.
(i)
Judgments not being judgment passed in the exercise
of Appellate jurisdiction in respect of a decree or
order made by
a Court subject
to the
superintendence of the High Court.
(ii)
Not being an order made in the exercise of revisional
jurisdiction.
(iii)
Not being sentence or order made in exercise of
criminal jurisdiction
The impugned judgment passed by the learned Single
Judge is not a judgment passed in exercise of Appellate
Jurisdiction in respect of a decree or order made by a Court
subject to the superintendence of the High Court. The
contention raised by Mr. Pabitra Pal Chowdhury that the
exceptions to those judgments appealable under Rule 148
would include a judgment passed by the High Court in exercise
of the Article 227 of the Constitution of India emphasizing only
on the words “superintendence of the High Court” therein must
be straightaway rejected. The said words cannot be read in
isolation and must necessarily be read in the context of the
sentence it is used in. It is also not a sentence or order made in
exercise of Criminal Jurisdiction. An order made in the exercise
of revisional jurisdiction also falls within the exception of Rule
148 of the said Rules and therefore, no Appeal would lie from
such orders.
10. Article 226 of the Constitution of India relates to the power
of High Court to issue certain writs. Article 227 of the
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The Principal Secretary, Department of Commerce & Industries v. M/s Snowlion Automobile Pvt. Ltd.
Constitution
of India
however,
relates
to
the
power of
superintendence over all Courts by the High Court in relation to
which it exercised jurisdiction. As quoted in paragraph 20 of
the impugned judgment of the learned Single Judge the scope of
Article 227 of the Constitution of India has been succinctly
enunciated by the Supreme Court in re: Surya Dev Rai v. Ram
Chander
Rai
&
Ors.1.
It has been held that supervisory
jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India is
exercised for keeping the Subordinate Court within the bounds
of their jurisdiction. When the Subordinate Court has assumed
a jurisdiction which it does not have or has failed to exercise a
jurisdiction which it does have or the jurisdiction though
available is being exercised by the Court in a manner not
permitted by law and failure of justice or grave injustice has
occasion thereby, the High Court may step in to exercise its
supervisory jurisdiction.
11. Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 provides
for revisional jurisdiction of the High Court in Civil matters.
Section 397 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 on the
other hand deals with the revisional jurisdiction of the High
Court in criminal matters. The Writ Petition sought to challenge
the arbitral award passed by the learned Arbitrator as well as
the said order passed by the learned District Judge. The arbitral
(2003) 6 SCC 675
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The Principal Secretary, Department of Commerce & Industries v. M/s Snowlion Automobile Pvt. Ltd.
award determined the dispute between the Appellant and the
Respondent referred by this Court vide order dated 25.02.2014
appointing the Sole Arbitrator with consent of the parties in
terms of Arbitration clause 8 of the Lease Agreement dated
15.02.1989 on the question of valuation of the development
made on the leasehold land by the Respondent. Against the
arbitral award the Appellant preferred an application under
Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (the
said Act). A preliminary objection was taken by the Respondent
that the said application was barred by time. The said order
passed by the learned District Judge without going into the
merits of the case would hold that time cannot be extended
beyond the permissible limit provided under Section 34(3) of the
said
Act
and
consequently
the
Court
would
not
have
jurisdiction to entertain the application preferred by the
Appellant as it had been filed beyond the period of limitation.
12. It is quite clear that the Appellant while preferring the Writ
Petition sought to invoke both Article 226 as well as Article 227
of the Constitution of India. However, the learned Single Judge
did not exercise the power of superintendence under Article 227
of the Constitution of India while passing the impugned
judgment. The learned Single Judge examined the law relating
to exercise of the extraordinary jurisdiction of the High Court
and in the facts and circumstances of the case declined to
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The Principal Secretary, Department of Commerce & Industries v. M/s Snowlion Automobile Pvt. Ltd.
exercise
its
writ
jurisdiction
under
Article
of
the
Constitution of India. In such circumstances, it is quite evident
that the impugned judgment does not fall within the exception
carved out for the exercise of Letter Patent Appeals under Rule
148 of the said Rules as it is not an order made in exercise of
revisional jurisdiction also.
13. In view of the aforesaid the preliminary objection raised by
Mr. Pabitra Pal Chowdhury on behalf of the Respondent is
rejected. Consequently the Writ Appeal is being considered on
merits.
14. Heard Mr. Tarun Johri, learned Additional Advocate
General for the Appellant and Mr. Pabitra Paul Chowdhury for
the Respondent.
15. Mr. Tarun Johri would submit that the arbitral award of
the learned Arbitrator is patently erroneous and ought to be set
aside. As such the said order of the learned District Judge
which was also impugned in the Writ Petition filed before this
Court was liable to be set aside along with the arbitral award.
Mr .Tarun Johri would submit that arbitral award suffered from
patent illegality as there was no proof produced evidencing the
cost
incurred.
He
would
submit
that
the
order
dated
25.02.2014 passed by this Court in the Review Petition would
make it evident that the learned Arbitrator was directed to
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decide the question and differences between the parties on the
valuation of the development on the land and that would mean
that the question as whether the Respondent was entitled to
receive any compensation at all for the development. He would
submit that there was patent irregularity in the arbitral award
in as much as the learned Arbitrator had awarded a sum of
₹3,34,43,444/- (Rupees three crore thirty four lakhs forty three
thousand four hundred forty four) to the Respondent without
even appreciating the fact that the Respondent had paid only
₹2,10,119.15/- (Rupees two lakhs ten thousand one hundred
nineteen and fifteen paisa) as rent for the entire period of 30
years to the Appellant and further that as per the valuation of
the Junior Engineer of the Building & Housing Department of
the Government of Sikkim the valuation of the lease property
raised by the Respondent in the demised premises was only
₹71,87,891/- (Rupees seventy one lakhs eighty seven thousand
eight hundred ninety one) which after deduction worked out to
₹71,87,891/-. He would thus submit that the impugned
judgment passed by the learned Single Judge has resulted in
huge financial losses to the State. He would seek to rely upon
the judgment of the Supreme Court in re: Rohtas Industries Staff
& Anr. v. Rohtas Industries Staff Union and Ors.2 and submit that
the arbitral award made by the learned Arbitrator is not only
not invulnerable but more sensitively susceptible to the writ
(1976) 2 SCC 82
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lancet being a quasi-statutory body’s decision and that such an
award can be upset if an apparent error of law stains its face.
Mr. Tarun Johri would take us to the letter of allotment, the
lease deed and its various clauses, the award dated 12.06.2015
and its various paragraphs and findings on various issues as
well as the order dated 10.06.2016 passed by the learned
District Judge dismissing the application filed by the Appellant
under Section 34 of the said Act. He would submit that the
learned Arbitrator while coming to the conclusion that both the
valuation reports filed by the parties were not acceptable had
grossly erred in applying the principles embodied in Section
28(2) of the said Act and thereafter toning down the rates
applied by the Appellant by not less than 30 to 40 percent and
arriving at a figure on his understanding of what is reasonable
which however did not have any legal basis.
16. Per contra Mr. Pabitra Pal Chowdhury while reiterating the
points taken in the counter-affidavit would submit that the
application for setting aside the arbitral award was preferred by
the Appellant after a lapse of more than 45 days from the
prescribed date, on 27.11.2015 before this Court and later
withdrawn. The Respondent further states that the Appellant
thereafter on 04.12.2015, after a lapse of 54 days beyond the
prescribed period of limitation filed an application for setting
aside the arbitral award under Section 34 of the said Act before
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the learned District Judge. It is also stated that on 19.09.2016
an Appeal under Section 37 of the said Act along with an
application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 was
preferred by the Appellant before this Court. On 25.10.2016
this Court condoned the delay in preferring the Appeal on
consent.
On
13.12.2016
the
Appellant,
on
instructions,
withdrew the Appeal with liberty to take proper recourse and
thereafter on 21.12.2016 the Writ Petition was filed. The
Respondent would submit that in the circumstances the
Learned Single Judge had rightly framed the afore-quoted
question of law while taking cognizance of the Writ Petition
regarding its maintainability. It was submitted that the
Appellant had filed an Appeal on 19.09.2016 as efficacious
alternative remedy as per the statutory provisions of Section 37
of the said Act but however, choose to withdraw the same and
file the Writ Petition instead which is not maintainable. It is also
submitted that the said Act is a special law and that Section 34
thereof provides for a period of limitation different from that
prescribed under the Limitation Act, 1963. The use of the words
“but not thereafter” in the proviso to sub-section 3 of Section 34
of the said Act would amount to an express exclusion within the
meaning of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, 1963. The
Respondent would rely upon the judgment of the Supreme
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Court in re: Union of India v. Popular Construction Co.3 which
would hold:
“7. There is no dispute that the 1996 Act is a “special law” and
that Section 34 provides for a period of limitation different from that
prescribed under the Limitation Act. The question then is — is such
exclusion expressed in Section 34 of the 1996 Act? The relevant
extract of Section 34 reads:
“34. Application for setting aside arbitral award.—(1)-(2)***
(3) An application for setting aside may not be made after three
months have elapsed from the date on which the party making that
application had received the arbitral award or, if a request had been
made under Section 33, from the date on which that request had been
disposed of by the Arbitral Tribunal:
Provided that if the court is satisfied that the applicant was
prevented by sufficient cause from making the application within the
said period of three months it may entertain the application within a
further period of thirty days, but not thereafter.”
8. Had the proviso to Section 34 merely provided for a period
within which the court could exercise its discretion, that would not
have been sufficient to exclude Sections 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act
because “mere provision of a period of limitation in howsoever
peremptory or imperative language is not sufficient to displace the
applicability of Section 5” [Mangu Ram v. Municipal Corpn. of Delhi,
(1976) 1 SCC 392 at p. 397, para 7 : 1976 SCC (Cri) 10] .
9. That was precisely why in construing Section 116-A of the
Representation of the People Act, 1951, the Constitution Bench in
Vidyacharan Shukla v. Khubchand Baghel [AIR 1964 SC 1099]
rejected the argument that Section 5 of the Limitation Act had been
excluded: (AIR p. 1112, para 27)
“27. It was then said that Section 116-A of the Act
provided an exhaustive and exclusive code of limitation for the
purpose of appeals against orders of tribunals and reliance is
placed on the proviso to sub-section (3) of that section, which
reads:
‘Every appeal under this Chapter shall be preferred
within a period of thirty days from the date of the order of the
Tribunal under Section 98 or Section 99.
Provided that the High Court may entertain an appeal
after the expiry of the said period of thirty days if it is satisfied
that the appellant had sufficient cause for not preferring the
appeal within such period.’
(2001) 8 SCC 470
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The Principal Secretary, Department of Commerce & Industries v. M/s Snowlion Automobile Pvt. Ltd.
The contention is that sub-section (3) of Section 116-A of
the Act not only provides a period of limitation for such an
appeal, but also the circumstances under which the delay can
be excused, indicating thereby that the general provisions of the
Limitation Act are excluded. There are two answers to this
argument. Firstly, Section 29(2)(a) of the Limitation Act speaks
of express exclusion but there is no express exclusion in subsection (3) of Section 116-A of the Act; secondly, the proviso
from which an implied exclusion is sought to be drawn does not
lead to any such necessary implication.”
10. This decision recognises that it is not essential for the
special or local law to, in terms, exclude the provisions of the
Limitation Act. It is sufficient if on a consideration of the language of
its provisions relating to limitation, the intention to exclude can be
necessarily implied. As has been said in Hukumdev Narain Yadav v.
Lalit Narain Mishra [(1974) 2 SCC 133] : (SCC p. 146, para 17)
“If on an examination of the relevant provisions it is clear
that the provisions of the Limitation Act are necessarily
excluded, then the benefits conferred therein cannot be called in
aid to supplement the provisions of the Act.”
11. Thus, where the legislature prescribed a special limitation
for the purpose of the appeal and the period of limitation of 60 days
was to be computed after taking the aid of Sections 4, 5 and 12 of the
Limitation Act, the specific inclusion of these sections meant that to
that extent only the provisions of the Limitation Act stood extended
and the applicability of the other provisions, by necessary implication
stood excluded [Patel Naranbhai Marghabhai v. Dhulabhai Galbabhai,
(1992) 4 SCC 264] .
12. As far as the language of Section 34 of the 1996 Act is
concerned, the crucial words are “but not thereafter” used in the
proviso to sub-section (3). In our opinion, this phrase would amount to
an express exclusion within the meaning of Section 29(2) of the
Limitation Act, and would therefore bar the application of Section 5 of
that Act. Parliament did not need to go further. To hold that the court
could entertain an application to set aside the award beyond the
extended period under the proviso, would render the phrase “but not
thereafter” wholly otiose. No principle of interpretation would justify
such a result.
13. Apart from the language, “express exclusion” may follow
from the scheme and object of the special or local law:
“[E]ven in a case where the special law does not exclude
the provisions of Sections 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act by an
express reference, it would nonetheless be open to the court to
examine whether and to what extent the nature of those
provisions or the nature of the subject-matter and scheme of the
special law exclude their operation.” [(1974) 2 SCC 133] (SCC p.
146, para 17)
xxxxxxxxxxxx
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The Principal Secretary, Department of Commerce & Industries v. M/s Snowlion Automobile Pvt. Ltd.
16. Furthermore, Section 34(1) itself provides that recourse to a
court against an arbitral award may be made only by an application
for setting aside such award “in accordance with” sub-section (2) and
sub-section (3). Sub-section (2) relates to grounds for setting aside an
award and is not relevant for our purposes. But an application filed
beyond the period mentioned in Section 34, sub-section (3) would not
be an application “in accordance with” that sub-section. Consequently
by virtue of Section 34(1), recourse to the court against an arbitral
award cannot be made beyond the period prescribed. The importance
of the period fixed under Section 34 is emphasised by the provisions
of Section 36 which provide that
“where the time for making an application to set aside the
arbitral award under Section 34 has expired … the award shall
be enforced under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 in the
same manner as if it were a decree of the court”.
This is a significant departure from the provisions of the
Arbitration Act, 1940. Under the 1940 Act, after the time to set aside
the award expired, the court was required to “proceed to pronounce
judgment according to the award, and upon the judgment so
pronounced a decree shall follow” (Section 17). Now the consequence
of the time expiring under Section 34 of the 1996 Act is that the award
becomes immediately enforceable without any further act of the court.
If there were any residual doubt on the interpretation of the language
used in Section 34, the scheme of the 1996 Act would resolve the
issue in favour of curtailment of the court's powers by the exclusion of
the operation of Section 5 of the Limitation Act.”
[Emphasis supplied]
17. Section 34 of the said Act provides:“34. Application for setting aside arbitral award.—(1)
Recourse to a Court against an arbitral award may be made only by
an application for setting aside such award in accordance with subsection (2) and sub-section (3).
(2) An arbitral award may be set aside by the Court only if—
(a) the party making the application furnishes proof that—
(i) a party was under some incapacity; or
(ii) The arbitration agreement is not valid under the law to
which the parties have subjected it or, failing any
indication thereon, under the law for the time being in
force; or
(iii) the party making the application was not given proper notice
of the appointment of an arbitrator or of the arbitral proceedings
or was otherwise unable to present his case; or
(iv) the arbitral award deals with a dispute not contemplated by
or not falling within the terms of the submission to arbitration,
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or it contains decisions on matters beyond the scope of the
submission to arbitration:
Provided that, if the decisions on matters submitted to
arbitration can be separated from those not so submitted, only
that part of the arbitral award which contains decisions on
matters not submitted to arbitration may be set aside; or
(v) the composition of the arbitral tribunal or the arbitral
procedure was not in accordance with the agreement of the
parties, unless such agreement was in conflict with a provision
of this Part from which the parties cannot derogate, or, failing
such agreement, was not in accordance with this Part; or
(b)
the Court finds that—
(i) the subject-matter of the dispute is not capable of settlement
by arbitration under the law for the time being in force, or
(ii) the arbitral award is in conflict with the public policy of
India.
[Explanation 1.— For the avoidance of any doubt, it is clarified
that an award is in conflict with the public policy of India, only if,—
(i) the making of the award was induced or affected by fraud or
corruption or was in violation of Section 75 or Section 81; or
(ii) it is in contravention with the fundamental policy of Indian
law; or
(iii) it is in conflict with the most basic notions of morality or
justice.
Explanation 2.— For the avoidance of doubt, the test as to
whether there is a contravention with the fundamental policy of
Indian law shall not entail a review on the merits of the dispute.]
[(2-A) An arbitral award arising out of arbitrations other than
international commercial arbitrations, may also be set aside by the
Court, if the Court finds that the award is vitiated by patent illegality
appearing on the face of the award:
Provided that an award shall not be set aside merely on the
ground of an erroneous application of the law or by reappreciation of
evidence.]
(3) An application for setting aside may not be made after three
months have elapsed from the date on which the party making that
application had received the arbitral award or, if a request had been
made under Section 33, from the date on which that request had been
disposed of by the arbitral tribunal:
Provided that if the Court is satisfied that the applicant was
prevented by sufficient cause from making the application within the
said period of three months it may entertain the application within a
further period of thirty days, but not thereafter.
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(4) On receipt of an application under sub-section (1), the Court
may, where it is appropriate and it is so requested by a party,
adjourn the proceedings for a period of time determined by it in order
to give the arbitral tribunal an opportunity to resume the arbitral
proceedings or to take such other action as in the opinion of arbitral
tribunal will eliminate the grounds for setting aside the arbitral
award.
(5) An application under this section shall be filed by a party
only after issuing a prior notice to the other party and such application
shall be accompanied by an affidavit by the applicant endorsing
compliance with the said requirement.
(6) An application under this section shall be disposed of
expeditiously, and in any event, within a period of one year from the
date on which the notice referred to in sub-section (5) is served upon
the other party.]”
18. Mr. Pabitra Pal Chowdhury would also submit that the
admitted facts reveal that it was on the consent of the parties
that the matter was referred to Arbitration by this Court. He
would further submit that the mode of valuation adopted by the
learned Arbitrator was also on consent of the parties. He would
counter the submissions made on behalf of the Appellant that
the direction of this Court to the learned Arbitrator to decide the
questions and differences between the parties on the valuation
of the development on the land would mean that the question
as to whether the Respondent was entitled to receive any
compensation at all was also open. He would submit that a bare
perusal
of
the
lease
agreement
would
reflect
that
the
construction of the building thereon made by the Respondent
was acknowledged by the Appellant in the recital to the lease
agreement and therefore there was no question that the learned
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Arbitrator could decide not to grant any compensation at all for
admitted development.
19. The said order passed by the learned District Judge would
decide the fate of the application under Section 34 of the said
Act filed by the Appellant herein on the preliminary point of
limitation raised by the Respondent herein. The learned District
Judge would record a finding that the arbitral award was dated
12.06.2015 which was signed and pronounced in the presence
of the learned Counsel for both the parties. It was also recorded
that the matter was listed on 13.06.2015 for making over
signed copies of the arbitral award to them on the plea of the
learned Counsel for the parties that the parties could not be
present on 12.06.2015 because of their preoccupation. The
learned District Judge has further extracted the record of
proceedings dated 13.06.2015 of the learned Arbitrator in which
the presence of the respective Counsels along with the
respective representatives of the parties would be shown. In
view of the aforesaid the learned District Judge would come to a
categorical finding that the signed copy of the award was
received by the Appellant on 13.06.2015. There is no quarrel
with regard to this fact. The learned District Judge would hold
that since the arbitral award was received by the Appellant on
13.06.2015 the application under Section 34 of the said Act
ought to have been filed within 13.09.2015 and that even
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considering the extended period of 30 days thereafter the
Appellant
was
required
to
file
the
application
within
13.10.2015. The learned District Judge would further hold that
even presuming that the Appellant had been contesting the case
in the wrong forum the filing of the application on 04.12.2015
was beyond the stipulated period provided under Section 34(3)
of the said Act. Accordingly the application under Section 34 of
the said Act would be rejected by the learned District Judge as
being filed beyond the period of limitation. In doing so the
learned District Judge would rely upon the ratio in State of Goa
v. Western Builders 4, State of West Bengal v. Afcons Infrastructure
Limited5. In re: Western Builders (supra) the Supreme Court would
hold:
“10. We are primarily concerned with sub-section (3) of Section
34 read with the proviso. Reading of sub-section (3) along with the
proviso of Section 34, it clearly transpires that the application for
setting aside the award on the grounds mentioned in sub-section (2)
of Section 34 should be made within 3 months and the period can be
further extended on sufficient cause by another period of 30 days and
not thereafter that means so far as application for making or setting
aside the award is concerned the period of limitation has been
prescribed in sub-section (3) i.e. 3 months but it can be extended for
another period of 30 days on sufficient cause being shown to the
satisfaction of the court. Therefore, the applicability of Section 5 of the
Limitation Act stands excluded and the application for condonation of
delay up to a period of 30 days can be made by the court and not
beyond that. Therefore, it was submitted that there is no scope for
applicability of Section 14 of the Limitation Act in these proceedings
by virtue of sub-section (2) of Section 29 of the Limitation Act.
xxxxxxxxxxxx
15. Therefore, general proposition is by virtue of Section 43 of
the Act of 1996 the Limitation Act, 1963 applies to the Act of 1996 but
by virtue of sub-section (2) of Section 29 of the Limitation Act, if any
other period has been prescribed under the special enactment for
4 (2006) 6 SCC 239
5 AIR 2008 Cal 6
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The Principal Secretary, Department of Commerce & Industries v. M/s Snowlion Automobile Pvt. Ltd.
moving the application or otherwise then that period of limitation will
govern the proceedings under that Act, and not the provisions of the
Limitation Act. In the present case under the Act of 1996 for setting
aside the award on any of the grounds mentioned in sub-section (2) of
Section 34 the period of limitation has been prescribed and that will
govern. Likewise, the period of condonation of delay i.e. 30 days in
the proviso.
xxxxxxxxxxxx
17. Therefore, by virtue of sub-section (2) of Section 29 of the
Limitation Act what is excluded is the applicability of Section 5 of the
Limitation Act and under Section 3 read with the Schedule which
prescribes the period for moving application.
xxxxxxxxxxxx
19. There is no provision in the whole of the Act which prohibits
discretion of the court. Under Section 14 of the Limitation Act if the
party has been bona fidely prosecuting his remedy before the court
which has no jurisdiction whether the period spent in that
proceedings shall be excluded or not. Learned counsel for the
respondent has taken us to the provisions of the Act of 1996: like
Section 5, Section 8(1), Section 9, Section 11, sub-sections (4), (6), (9)
and sub-section (3) of Section 14, Section 27, Sections 34, 36, 37,
39(2) and (4), Section 41, sub-section (2), Sections 42 and 43 and tried
to emphasise with reference to the aforesaid sections that wherever
the legislature wanted to give power to the court that has been
incorporated in the provisions, therefore, no further power should lie
in the hands of the court so as to enable to exclude the period spent in
prosecuting the remedy before other forum. It is true but at the same
time there is no prohibition incorporated in the statute for curtailing
the power of the court under Section 14 of the Limitation Act. Much
depends upon the words used in the statute and not general
principles applicable. By virtue of Section 43 of the Act of 1996, the
Limitation Act applies to the proceedings under the Act of 1996 and
the provisions of the Limitation Act can only stand excluded to the
extent wherever different period has been prescribed under the Act of
1996. Since there is no prohibition provided under Section 34, there is
no reason why Section 14 of the Limitation Act should not be read in
the Act of 1996, which will advance the cause of justice. If the statute
is silent and there is no specific prohibition then the statute should be
interpreted which advances the cause of justice. Our attention was
invited to various decisions of this Court but we shall refer to a few of
them which have some relevance.
xxxxxxxxxxxx
25. Therefore, in the present context also it is very clear to us
that there are no two opinions in the matter that the Arbitration and
Conciliation Act, 1996 does not expressly exclude the applicability of
Section 14 of the Limitation Act. The prohibitory provision has to be
construed strictly. It is true that the Arbitration and Conciliation Act,
1996 intended to expedite commercial issues expeditiously. It is also
clear in the Statement of Objects and Reasons that in order to
recognise economic reforms the settlement of both domestic and
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The Principal Secretary, Department of Commerce & Industries v. M/s Snowlion Automobile Pvt. Ltd.
international commercial disputes should be disposed of quickly so
that the country's economic progress be expedited. The Statement of
Objects and Reasons also nowhere indicates that Section 14 of the
Limitation Act shall be excluded. But on the contrary, intendment of
the legislature is apparent in the present case as Section 43 of the
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 applies the Limitation Act, 1963
as a whole. It is only by virtue of sub-section (2) of Section 29 of the
Limitation Act that its operation is excluded to that extent of the area
which is covered under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. Our
attention was also invited to the various decisions of this Court
interpreting sub-section (2) of Section 29 of the Limitation Act with
reference to other Acts like the Representation of the People Act or the
provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code where separate period of
limitation has been prescribed. We need not overburden the judgment
with reference to those cases because it is very clear to us by virtue of
sub-section (2) of Section 29 of the Limitation Act that the provisions of
the Limitation Act shall stand excluded in the Act of 1996 to the extent
of area which is covered by the Act of 1996. In the present case under
Section 34 by virtue of sub-section (3) only the application for filing
and setting aside the award a period has been prescribed as 3
months and delay can be condoned to the extent of 30 days. To this
extent the applicability of Section 5 of the Limitation Act will stand
excluded but there is no provision in the Act of 1996 which excludes
operation of Section 14 of the Limitation Act. If two Acts can be read
harmoniously without doing violation to the words used therein, then
there is no prohibition in doing so.
26. As a result of the above discussion we are of the opinion
that the view taken by the court below excluding the applicability of
Section 14 in this proceeding is not correct. We hold that Section 14 of
the Limitation Act, 1963 is applicable in (sic to) the Arbitration and
Conciliation Act, 1996. We set aside all the judgments/orders and
remand all these cases back to the trial court/District Court for
deciding the application under Section 14 of the Limitation Act on
merit after hearing both the parties and in case the delay is condoned
then the case should be decided on merits after hearing all the parties
concerned. All the appeals are allowed. No order as to costs.”
[Emphasis supplied]
20. The Appellant preferred the Writ Petition before this Court
on 15.12.2016. The Writ Petition sought to challenge the
arbitral award as well as the said order passed by the learned
District Judge on merits of the matter without even a solitary
explanation on the evident delay in filing the application before
the learned District Judge under Section 34 of the said Act. The
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The Principal Secretary, Department of Commerce & Industries v. M/s Snowlion Automobile Pvt. Ltd.
said Writ Petition was contested by the Respondent by filing a
counter-affidavit taking various pleas as enumerated above.
21.
The pleading in the Writ Petition however, discloses that
being aggrieved by the said order of the learned District Judge
the Appellant had filed an appeal under Section 37 of the said
Act before this Court.
22. Section 37 of the said Act provides:
“37. Appealable orders.—(1) An appeal shall lie from the
following orders (and from no others) to the Court authorised by law to
hear appeals from original decrees of the Court passing the order,
namely:—
(a) refusing to refer the parties to arbitration under section 8;
(b) granting or refusing to grant any measure under section 9;
(c) setting aside or refusing to set aside an arbitral award under
section 34.]
(2) An appeal shall also lie to a Court from an order granting of the
arbitral tribunal.—
(a) accepting the plea referred in sub-section (2) or sub-section
(3) of section 16; or
(b) granting or refusing to grant an interim measure under
section 17.
(3) No second appeal shall lie from an order passed in appeal under
this section, but nothing in this section shall affect or take away any
right to appeal to the Supreme Court.”
23. Section 37 of the said Act thus makes it evident that an
appeal shall lie from an order setting aside or refusing to set
aside an arbitral award under Section 34 of the said Act. The
said order passed by the learned District Judge had in effect
refused to set aside the arbitral award passed by the learned
Arbitrator. However, the Appeal was subsequently withdrawn
on 13.12.2016 with liberty to take recourse to an appropriate
forum, if so advised. In re: Chief Engineer of BPDP/REO, Ranchi v.
W.A. No. 01 of 2018
The Principal Secretary, Department of Commerce & Industries v. M/s Snowlion Automobile Pvt. Ltd.
Scoot Wilson Kirpatrick India (P) Ltd.6 the Supreme Court relying
upon its judgment in re: Essar Constructions v. N.P. Rama Krishna
Reddy7; Union of India v. Manager Jain and Associates8 would hold
that an Appeal under Section 37 of the said Act from an order
refusing to condone delay is maintainable.
24. The impugned judgment passed by the learned Single
Judge dated 26.02.2018 examined the contours of Article 226
of the Constitution of India and dismissed the Writ Petition as
not maintainable.
25. A perusal of the impugned judgment in the Writ Petition
makes it evident that the Appellant did not even seek to justify
the apparent delay in approaching the Court of the learned
District Judge against the award of the learned Arbitrator and
instead sought to cleverly focus on the merits of the matter
which had not been examined by the learned District Judge.
The present Writ Appeal also seeks to focus entirely on the
merits of the matter without a semblance of explanation on the
delay.
26. Apparently and admittedly the Appellant received a
certified copy of the arbitral award dated 12.06.2015 on
13.06.2015. Section 34(3) of the said Act permits the making of
(2006) 13 SCC 622
7 (2000) 6 SCC 94
8 (2001) 3 SCC 277
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The Principal Secretary, Department of Commerce & Industries v. M/s Snowlion Automobile Pvt. Ltd.
an application for setting aside an arbitral award within three
months from the date on which the party making the
application had received the arbitral award. The proviso to
Section 34(3) of the said Act allows the Court to condone the
delay beyond the three months if it is satisfied that the
Applicant was prevented by “sufficient cause” from making the
application within the said period of three months. However, the
said proviso also mandates that this power cannot be used to
condone the delay thereafter. The judgments of the Supreme
Court in re: Western Builders (supra) and Popular Construction Co.
(supra) would settle the issue.
The records reveal that the
Appellant had initially approached this Court under Section 34
of the said Act on 27.11.2015 only after expiry of 166 days from
the receipt of the certified copy of the arbitral award on
13.06.2015. The application before the learned District Judge
for setting aside the arbitral award under Section 34 of the said
Act was made on 04.12.2015 after expiry of 173 days from the
receipt of the certified copy of the arbitral award on 13.06.2015.
The maximum time condonable by the Court as per the
provision of Section 34(3) of the said Act is 120 days. In such
circumstances, the learned District Judge had rightly rejected
the application under Section 34 of the said Act as being barred
by limitation. The Supreme Court has held that Section 14 but
not Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 would apply in
proceedings under the said Act. Although it is neither pleaded
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The Principal Secretary, Department of Commerce & Industries v. M/s Snowlion Automobile Pvt. Ltd.
nor argued even if we were to exclude the time during which the
Appellant had sought to prosecute another proceeding it is
quite evident that the Appellant had approached this Court
under Section 34 of the said Act beyond the period of 120 days
as prescribed by Section 34(3) of the said Act and thus even
Section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963 would not come to the
Appellant’s rescue.
27. The power of the High Court under Article 226 of the
Constitution
of
India
is
extraordinary,
equitable
and
discretionary. The Supreme Court in re: K.D. Sharma v. Steel
Authority of India Limited & Ors. 9 would examine the scope of
Article 32 and 226 of the Constitution of India and hold:
“34. The jurisdiction of the Supreme Court under Article 32 and
of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution is
extraordinary,
equitable
and
discretionary.
Prerogative
writs
mentioned therein are issued for doing substantial justice. It is,
therefore, of utmost necessity that the petitioner approaching the writ
court must come with clean hands, put forward all the facts before the
court without concealing or suppressing anything and seek an
appropriate relief. If there is no candid disclosure of relevant and
material facts or the petitioner is guilty of misleading the court, his
petition may be dismissed at the threshold without considering the
merits of the claim.
xxxxxxxxxxxx
“36. A prerogative remedy is not a matter of course. While
exercising extraordinary power a writ court would certainly bear in
mind the conduct of the party who invokes the jurisdiction of the court.
(2008) 12 SCC 481
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The Principal Secretary, Department of Commerce & Industries v. M/s Snowlion Automobile Pvt. Ltd.
If the applicant makes a false statement or suppresses material fact
or attempts to mislead the court, the court may dismiss the action on
that ground alone and may refuse to enter into the merits of the case
by stating, “We will not listen to your application because of what you
have done.” The rule has been evolved in the larger public interest to
deter unscrupulous litigants from abusing the process of court by
deceiving it.”
28. The fact that Section 34(3) of the said Act prohibited the
Court to condone delay beyond the prescribed period as well as
the judgment of the Supreme Court in re: Western Builders
(supra) would be known to the Appellant at least on receipt of
the impugned order passed by the learned District Judge. The
act of the Appellant thereafter does not reflect its bonafides. The
withdrawal of the Appeal filed under Section 37 of the said Act,
the filing of the Writ Petition without even attempting to explain
the apparent delay in approaching the District Court under
Section 34 of the said Act and completely skirting the issue,
the failure to do so even in the present Writ Appeal and in fact
not even attempting to explain the delay beyond prescribed
period does not reflect that the Appellant had approached this
Court under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India with
clean hands and had put forward all the facts before the Court
without
concealing
or
suppressing
anything
and
sought
appropriate relief. The impugned judgment records that an
application was filed for condonation of delay before the learned
District Judge along with the application under Section 34 of
the said Act. The fact was that an application for condonation of
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The Principal Secretary, Department of Commerce & Industries v. M/s Snowlion Automobile Pvt. Ltd.
delay was not preferred before the learned District Judge and it
was only on the objection raised by the Respondent that the
Court examined the delay. This fact was categorically confirmed
by the learned Counsel for the Appellant when a specific query
was raised by this Court during the hearing. In fact even at the
Writ Appeal stage this Court is unable to fathom the reasons for
the delay in approaching the District Court under Section 34 of
the said Act. Nevertheless since the Appellant sought to press
the judgment of the Supreme Court in re: Rohtas Industries Staff
(supra) this Court sought to know from the Appellant as to what
was the apparent error of law which stained the face of the
impugned award. The learned Counsel would submit that the
valuation done by the learned Arbitrator was erroneous. He
would rely upon three judgments of the Supreme Court in
support of his submission. In re: Prabhakar Raghunath Patil &
Ors. v. State of Maharashtra10 was a case under the Land
Acquisition Act, 1894 regarding determination of compensation
under Section 23 thereof. Evidence of an expert witness was
sought to relied upon which had been considered unreliable by
the reference Court. As the Counsel appearing for the
Appellant’s therein sought to justify the increase as sought for
by the Appellant’s therein, the Supreme Court looked into the
evidence of the expert as also a notification and gave its reasons
as to why the expert opinion was not reliable. In re: Dr. K. C.
10 (2010) 13 SCC 107
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The Principal Secretary, Department of Commerce & Industries v. M/s Snowlion Automobile Pvt. Ltd.
Nambiar v. Rent Controller, Madras & Ors.11 was a case in which
the
Supreme
Court
would
interpret
the
word
“cost
of
construction” and “market value” in sub-section (3) (b) (i) and
sub-section (3) (b) (2) of the Madras Building (Lease and Rent
Control) Act, 1960 in the paragraph sought to be relied upon. In
re: Commissioner of Income Tax, Ajmer v. Sunita Mansingha12 the
Supreme Court would examine a judgment passed by the High
Court and the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal and hold that in
view of the finding recorded by the Tribunal that the local
Public Works Department rates are to be applied in place of
Central Public Works Department rates there was no good
ground to interfere. We are unable to appreciate as to how the
aforesaid three judgments would assist the Appellant in their
submission that the valuation arrived at by the learned
Arbitrator was an error of law which stained the face of the
arbitral award to compel this Court to exercise its extraordinary
and discretionary powers in the facts of the present case.
Admittedly, it was with the consent of the parties that this
Court
in
an
earlier
proceeding
referred
the
matter
for
arbitration. The order of this Court passed in the earlier Writ
Petition is recorded in the arbitral award. The said order clearly
recorded that the Appellant in their counter-affidavit had not
denied that the Petitioner was entitled to a reasonable
1962 (2) SCC 465
(2018) 12 SCC 296
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The Principal Secretary, Department of Commerce & Industries v. M/s Snowlion Automobile Pvt. Ltd.
compensation. This order was not assailed by the Appellant.
The order dated 25.02.2014 passed by this Court in Review
Petition No.01 of 2014 by which the matter was referred to
arbitration with the further direction to the learned Arbitrator to
draw up an inventory of the developments that had been made
by the Respondent on the leasehold property by making a visit
personally has also not been assailed by the Appellant. The
arbitral award clearly records that the learned Arbitrator
examined the valuation put forth by both the parties and found
both wanting. The arbitral award clearly records that faced with
the situation the learned Arbitrator put the question to the
learned Counsel for the parties as to what should be the way
out in such an event and both the learned Counsels of the
parties submitted that in such an eventuality, it shall be open
for the tribunal to decide according to what is just and fair. The
arbitral award reveal that the method of valuation thus arrived
at by the learned Arbitrator was also on the consent of the
parties.
29. The ostensible reason as stated in the Writ Petition is the
illegality of the said order and arbitral award. The real hurdle
the Appellant seeks to get over by filing the Writ Petition was
the mandatory provision contained in Section 34(3) of the said
Act which does not permit the Court to condone the delay
beyond the prescribed period. The question is whether the
Appellant could do so by merely filing a Writ Petition on the
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The Principal Secretary, Department of Commerce & Industries v. M/s Snowlion Automobile Pvt. Ltd.
merits without even an attempt to explain the delay and
skirting the procedure prescribed under the said Act? The
answer, we are certain, is a definite no. The extraordinary and
discretionary relief cannot be obtained in this manner. The
impugned judgment which holds that there is no gross failure of
justice or grave injustice warranting the exercise of the
extraordinary jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of
the Constitution of India, even while appreciating that the scope
of jurisdiction of the High Court in exercise of power under
Article 226 of the Constitution, is not affected in spite of
alternative statutory remedies cannot be faulted.
30. The Writ Appeal is dismissed. No order as to costs.
( Bhaskar Raj Pradhan )
Judge
28.08.2018
to.
Approved for reporting: yes.
Internet: yes.
( Meenakshi M. Rai )
Acting Chief Justice
28.08.2018
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