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[2026:JHHC:26530]
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI
C.M.P. No.181 of 2026
-----The Jharkhand State Housing Board through the Secretary namely
Binay Manish R. Lakra, S/o Late Marcus Lakra aged about 54
years, having its office at Harmu Housing Colony, P.O. Harmu &
P.S.: Argora, District- Ranchi 834002.
…
Petitioner
Versus
1. Laxmi Devi W/o Late Kunwar Ram Rajak;
2. Sona Ram Rajak S/o Late Kunwar Ram Rajak;
3. Dinesh Ram Rajak S/o Late Kunwar Ram Rajak;
All residents of Lake Road, Hindpiri, Tilu Nazir Lane P.O. G.P.O.,
P.S. Hindpiri, District- Ranchi-834001.
…
Opposite Parties
-----For the Petitioner
:Mr. Sachin Kumar, Advocate.
For the Opposite Parties : Mr. Vibhor Mayank, Advocate.
Mr. Tarun Kr. Mahato, Advocate.
Mr. Roshan Kr. Singh, Advocate.
PRESENT
HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE ANIL KUMAR CHOUDHARY
By the Court:-
I.A. No.9737 of 2026
Heard the parties.
Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that this interlocutory
application has been filed to permit the petitioner to delete the
opposite party no.1 namely -Laxmi Devi from the array of opposite
parties in C.M.P. No.181 of 2026 arising out of Execution Case No. 26
of 2025 as she has left for her heavenly abode during the pendency of
the proceeding and there are only two remaining opposite parties.
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Learned counsel for the opposite parties has raised no objection.
Considering the aforesaid facts, the prayer is allowed.
Registry is directed to delete the name of the opposite party no.1
namely Laxmi Devi and renumber the opposite party no.2 and 3 as
opposite party nos. 1 and 2 with red ink.
Accordingly, this interlocutory application allowed.
(Anil Kumar Choudhary, J.)
I.A. No.11795 of 2026
Heard the parties.
Learned counsel for the opposite parties submits that this
interlocutory application has been filed with the prayer to dispose of
this C.M.P. 181 of 2026 as the prayer made in same has become
infructuous in light of the order dated 01.08.2026 passed by the
learned Additional Civil Judge, Junior Division, XIII Ranchi in
Execution Case No. 26 of 2025 whereby the execution case has been
disposed of on full satisfaction because of delivery of possession has
been made to the decree-holder.
Learned counsel for the opposite parties further submits
that this C.M.P. has been filed with the prayer for setting aside the
order dated 02.12.2025 passed by the learned Civil Judge, (Junior
Division) Ranchi in M.C.A. No. 478 of 2025 arising out of Execution
Case No. 26 of 2025; but since the learned Additional Civil Judge,
Junior Division, XIII Ranchi in Execution Case No. 26 of 2025
directed the judgment-debtor to put the suit property into the
C. M.P. No.181 of 2026
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possession of the decree holder through, the writ of delivery of
possession and in view of the delivery of possession having already
been effected and the Execution Case No. 26 of 2025, having attained
finality and stood disposed of on full satisfaction vide order dated
01.08.2026, the prayer of the present C.M.P. No. 181 of 2026 has been
rendered infructuous. Hence, it is prayed that the present C.M.P.
1818 of 2026 be disposed of in light of the order dated 01.08.2026
passed by learned Additional Civil Judge (Junior Division)-XIII,
Ranchi in Execution Case No. 26 of 2025.
The learned counsel for the petitioner vehemently opposes the
prayer of the opposite parties and submits that since this Civil
Miscellaneous Petition has been filed with the prayer to set aside the
order dated 02.12.2025 passed by learned Civil Judge (Junior
Divisional), Ranchi in M.C.A. No. 478 of 2025 arising out of
Execution Case No. 26 of 2025 whereby and whereunder the learned
Executing Court has dismissed the petition filed under Order XXI
Rule 97 read with Section 151 of the Code of .Civil Procedure; in case
this Civil Miscellaneous Petition is allowed, then the Execution Case
No. 26 of 2025 is to be reopened, hence the prayer made in this Civil
Miscellaneous Petition has not become infructuous with disposal of
the said Execution Case No. 26 of 2025.
Considering the facts of the case, as the matter is ready for
hearing, this Court is of the considered view that in case the order
dated 02.12.2025 passed by learned Civil Judge (Junior Division),
C. M.P. No.181 of 2026
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Ranchi in M.C.A. No. 478 of 2025 arising out of Execution Case No.
26 of 2025 is set aside, there is scope for quashing of the subsequent
orders passed after the said order dated 02.12.2025 passed by
learned Civil Judge (Junior Division), Ranchi in M.C.A. No. 478 of
2025 arising out of Execution Case No. 26 of 2025; hence this Court
inclined to hear this Civil Miscellaneous Petition.
Accordingly, this interlocutory application is rejected.
(Anil Kumar Choudhary, J.)
C.M.P. No.181 of 2026
Heard the parties.
2. This Civil Miscellaneous Petition has been filed invoking the
jurisdiction of this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of
India with the prayer to set aside the order dated 02.12.2025 passed
by learned Civil Judge (Junior Division), Ranchi in M.C.A. No. 478
of 2025 arising out of Execution Case No. 26 of 2025 whereby and
whereunder the learned Executing Court has dismissed the
petition filed under Order XXI Rule 97 read with Section 151 of the
Code of Civil Procedure by observing that under Rule 97, it is only
the ‘decree-holder’ who is entitled to make an application, in case
where he is offered resistance or obstruction by ‘any person’ and
since as admitted by the petitioner itself that he is not the decreeholder, therefore, it is obvious that the petitioner cannot take
C. M.P. No.181 of 2026
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shelter of Rule 97 as stated above to raise objections against
execution of decree.
3. It is submitted by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the
Execution Case No. 26 of 2025 was filed in respect of execution of
the judgment and decree dated 13.07.2006 passed in Title Suit No.
174 of 1993 by the learned Sub-Judge-II Ranchi; consequent upon
dismissal of the Title Appeal No. 114 of 2026 preferred by the
defendants of the said suit, by the judgment dated 06.06.2008
passed by the A.J.C. XVII, Ranchi. The petitioner contended before
the learned Executing Court that all the right, title and interest over
the suit property of Title Suit No. 174 of 1993, exclusively belongs
to the petitioner. It is next submitted that both the parties of the
Title Suit No. 174 of 1993 knew pretty well that the petitioner is the
owner of the property and the petitioner was the necessary party
to Title Suit No. 174 of 1993, but even then, none of them made any
effort to implead the petitioner as party to the said suit.
4. It was next submitted that in respect of another dispute, Title Suit
No. 553 of 2011 has been filed wherein the pleadings are in
contradiction with the case of the parties herein. It was also
pleaded that as per the order passed by this Court in C.W.J.C. No.
1496 of 1996 (R), some portion of land of the petitioner has been
given to Whole-seller Fruit Merchants at Harmu including the land
in question and at present there is Whole-sale Fruits Mandi
established thereon. The petitioner prayed for staying the
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execution proceeding and admit the application after hearing the
parties. The petition filed by the petitioner was objected to by the
decree holder and the decree holder claimed that the suit land is
still recorded in Register-II of HEHAL Circle Office, in the name of
Shibu Ram Dhobi who is since deceased and Malgujari is being
paid in his name.
5. The learned Civil Judge (Junior Division) Ranchi relied upon para
24 of the judgement of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in the
case of Sri Ram Financing Housing Investment (India) Limited
versus Omesh Mishra Memorial Charitable Trust reported in
(2022) 15 SCC 176 wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India
reiterated the settled principle of law that it is only the ‘decree
holder’ who is entitled to make an application in case where he is
offered resistance or obstruction by ‘any person’ and as the
petitioner is not the decree holder, therefore, it was held that the
petitioner cannot take shelter of Order XXI, Rule 97 of the Code of
Civil Procedure and dismissed the said petition.
6. It is further submitted by the learned counsel relying upon the
judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in the case of Jini
Dhanrajgir and Another versus Shibu Mathew and Another
reported in (2023) 20 SSC 76, wherein, the Hon’ble Supreme Court
of India relied upon its own judgment in the case of Silverline
Forum (P) Ltd. v. Rajiv Trust reported in (1998) 3 SCC 723 which
judgment was also relied upon by the Hon’ble Supreme Court of
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India in the Case of Sriram Housing Finance & Investment (India)
Ltd. v. Omesh Mishra Memorial Charitable Trust (Supra) wherein
Hon’ble Supreme Court of India found it difficult to agree with the
High Court that resistance or obstruction made by a third party to
the decree put to execution cannot be gone into under Order XXI
Rule 97 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
7. The learned counsel for the petitioner further relied upon the
judgment of this Court in the case of Bhim Munda versus The State
of Jharkhand & Others reported in 2024:JHHC:3954 wherein this
Court relying upon the judgement of the Hon’ble Supreme Court
of India in the case of Rajasthan State Industrial Development &
Investment Corpn. V. Subhash Sindhi Coop. Housing Society,
Jaipur & Others reported (2013) 5 SCC 427, quoted paragraph 13 of
that and referred to the settled principle of law that a purchaser
subsequent to the issuance of a Section 4 notification in respect of
the land, cannot challenge the acquisition proceedings, and can
only claim compensation as the sale transaction in such a situation
is void qua the Government. Hence, it is submitted that the prayer
as prayed for in this Civil Miscellaneous Petition be allowed.
8. The learned counsel for the opposite parties at the outset raised a
preliminary objection that this Civil Miscellaneous Petition under
Article 227 of the Constitution of India is not maintainable because
in view of Rule 103 of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure
adjudication of an application under Rule 98 or Rule 100 have the
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same force and the subject to same condition; hence, an appeal will
lie against the impugned order. It is further submitted by the
learned counsel for the opposite parties that the undisputed facts
remains is that the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of
India in the Case of Sriram Housing Finance & Investment (India)
Ltd. v. Omesh Mishra Memorial Charitable Trust (Supra) has not
been overruled and still holds the field and in that judgment it has
categorically been held that it is only the decree holder who can
file an application under Order XXI, Rule 97 of the Code of Civil
Procedure. A different view may be possible, but this Court in its
limited jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India
in the absence of any grave illegality or impropriety being
committed, ought not to interfere with the impugned order. It is
further submitted that in the meanwhile the Execution Case No. 26
of 2025 has already been disposed of on full satisfaction of delivery
of possession and hence there is no scope to entertain the said
application on the part of the petitioner as the prayer has become
infructuous with the disposal of Execution Case No. 26 of 2025
vide order dated 01.08.2026 on full satisfaction. It is next submitted
that the decree has been executed without any resistance from any
quarter, peacefully and it is also submitted that as has been held in
the first two paragraphs of the judgment of Jini Dhanrajgir and
Another versus Shibu Mathew and Another wherein the Hon’ble
Supreme Court of India has quoted Privy Council judgement to the
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effect that difficulties of litigants in India indeed begin when they
obtain a decree and it is pretty well known though the litigation
between the parties to the decree was going on since 1993 i.e., for
almost 33 years, but at no point of time, the petitioner ever thought
it fit to get impleaded in the suit or the appeal and in order to
frustrate the fruit of the decree to the decree-holder and to drag on
litigation and deny the fruits of the decree to the decree-holder; at
the behest of the judgement debtor, this frivolous petition has been
filed. It is then submitted that the petition under Order XXI Rule 97
of the Code of Civil Procedure was filed without any entitlement
for same by the petitioner hence, the same has rightly been
rejected. The learned counsel for the opposite parties further
submits that there being no illegality in the impugned order hence,
this Civil Miscellaneous Petition being without any merit be
dismissed.
9.
Having heard the submissions made at the Bar and after going
through the materials in the record, so far as the preliminary
objection of the opposite parties that in view of an appeal being
provided for in rule 103 of Order -XXI of the Code of Civil
Procedure, this Court ought not to exercise its power under article
227 of the Constitution of India is concerned, it is pertinent to
mention here that rule 103 of Order -XXI of the Code of Civil
Procedure comes into operation where any application has been
adjudicated upon under rule 98 of Order -XXI of the Code of Civil
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Procedure. Adjudication under rule 98 of Order -XXI of the Code of
Civil Procedure requires questions to be determined referred to in
rule 101 of Order -XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure. Here
admittedly the cooking Court has not made any adjudication in
terms of rule 98 of Order -XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure, so in
the considered opinion of this court no appeal shall lie, from the
order impugned in this Civil Miscellaneous Petition in terms of rule
103 of Order -XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure. Therefore, there is
no impediment for this Court to exercise its power under Article
227 of the Constitution of India. Accordingly, this preliminary
objection raised by the opposite parties being without any merit is
not entertained by this Court.
10. Now coming to the merits of this case, it is a settled principle of
law that a decree passed in a suit is not binding upon a person who
is not a party to a suit. This Court has no hesitation in holding that
the decree passed in Title Suit No. 174 of 1993 passed by the SubJudge-II, Ranchi is not binding upon the petitioner. The undisputed
fact remains that the decree has been executed and the execution
case has been disposed of on full satisfaction of the decree without
any resistance from any quarters. In paragraph nos. 22 to 24 of the
judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in the case of Sriram
Housing Finance & Investment (India) Ltd. v. Omesh Mishra
Memorial Charitable Trust (Supra) which reads as under:“22. From a bare reading of the aforesaid provisions, it is
clear that Order 21 Rule 97 deals with the resistance or
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obstruction to possession of immovable property by “any
person” obtaining possession of the property against the
decree-holder. It empowers the “decree-holder” to make an
application complaining about such resistance or
obstruction. On the other hand, Rule 99 of Order 21 deals
with the right of “any person” other than the judgmentdebtor who is dispossessed by holder of a decree for
possession of such property or in case where such property is
sold in furtherance of execution of a decree. The said
provision vests “any person” with a right to make an
application complaining about such dispossession of
immovable property in the manner prescribed above. Rule 98
and Rule 100 deal with the power of the Court to pass
appropriate orders upon an application preferred under Rule
97 and Rule 99 respectively.
23. Insofar as Rule 101 is concerned, it confers jurisdiction
on the Court as well as casts an obligation to determine the
questions relating to right, title or interest in the property, if
any, arising between parties on an application made by the
person concerned under Rule 97 or Rule 99 in the same
proceedings for adjudication and not in a separate suit.
Lastly, Rule 102 clarifies that Rule 98 and Rule 100 shall
not apply in a case where resistance or obstruction in
execution of a decree for the possession of immovable
property is offered by “transferee pendente lite” i.e. the
person to whom the property is transferred by the judgmentdebtor after institution of the suit in which the decree sought
to be executed was passed.
24. On conjoint reading of the aforesaid provisions, it can
be observed that under Rule 97, it is only the “decree-holder”
who is entitled to make an application in case where he is
offered resistance or obstruction by “any person”. In the
present case, as admitted by the appellant itself, it is a bona
fide purchaser of the property and not the “decree-holder”.
As available from the material placed on record, it is the
respondent Trust along with legal heirs of late N.D. Mishra
who are the decree-holders and not the appellant. Therefore,
it is obvious that the appellant cannot take shelter of Rule 97
as stated above to raise objections against execution of decree
passed in favour of the respondent. Further, Rule 99 pertains
to making a complaint to the Court against “dispossession”
of the immovable property by the person in “possession” of
the property by the holder of a decree or purchaser thereof.”
(Emphasis supplied)
the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India has in no uncertain manner
laid down the law that it is only the decree holder who can file the
C. M.P. No.181 of 2026
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application under Rule 97 of the Order XXI. It is needless to
mention that the judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in
the case of Sriram Housing Finance & Investment (India) Ltd. v.
Omesh Mishra Memorial Charitable Trust (Supra) has not been
overruled and consequently, the ratio of that judgement is a good
law. There are other judgments which have been referred by the
Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in the case of Jini Dhangrajgir &
Another versus Shibu Mathew & Another (Supra), but the facts of
those cases were different in the sense that in those cases, during
the execution proceeding, the execution proceeding was resisted by
the parties unlike in this case where without any practical resistance
of the petitioner, the decree has already been executed on full
satisfaction. So, under such circumstances, this Court do not find
any illegality or impropriety on the part of learned Civil Judge,
(Junior Division) on relying upon the judgment of Sriram Finance
Housing Investment (India) Limited versus Omesh Memorial
Charitable Trust (Supra) to dismiss the application filed by the
petitioner under Order XXI, Rule 97 of the Code of Civil Procedure
as the petitioner is not the decree-holder. May be a different view is
also there, but this Court is conscious of its limited jurisdiction
under Article 227 of the Constitution of India and in this respect it is
relevant to refer to para 36 of the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme
Court of India reported in the case of Nandi Infrastructure Corridor
Enterprises Ltd. and Another versus B. Gurappa Naidu and Other
C. M.P. No.181 of 2026
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reported in (2026) SCC OnLine SC 745 para 36 of which read as
under:“36. Applying the aforesaid principles to the facts of the
present case, we are of the considered view that the High Court
has exceeded the jurisdiction vested in it under Article 227 of the
Constitution of India. We say so for the following reasons:
36.1. Firstly, the power of superintendence under Article
227 of the Constitution can be exercised where there is an
unwarranted assumption of jurisdiction by a court not vested
with such jurisdiction, or in cases of gross abuse of jurisdiction.
In the present case, it is evident from the record that the
Executing Court was duly vested with jurisdiction to deal with
the matter, and no case of gross abuse of jurisdiction is made out.
On this ground, the High Court could not to have exercised its
jurisdiction under Article 227.
36.2. Secondly, the power of superintendence may be
invoked where there is an unjustifiable refusal to exercise
jurisdiction vested in a court. In the present case, the Executing
Court did exercise the jurisdiction conferred upon it.
Consequently, no occasion arose for the High Court to invoke its
jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution on this ground.
36.3. Thirdly, the High Court, while exercising jurisdiction
under Article 227 of the Constitution, could not have acted as an
appellate court or substitute its own judgment for that of the
subordinate court to correct an error which was not apparent on
the face of the record. In the present case, while considering the
petition filed by N.I.C.E. under Article 227, the High Court ought
to have borne in mind that this Court, in the earlier round of
litigation, had specifically directed the Executing Court to
determine the guideline value of the property and accordingly the
Executing Court had determined the value of the land. In our
considered opinion, the High Court travelled beyond the limits of
its jurisdiction under Article 227 while adjudicating the writ
petition filed by N.I.C.E. and we say so for the following reasons:
36.3.1. While exercising its jurisdiction under Article 227 of
the Constitution, the High Court had a limited scope of
interference with the order passed by the Executing Court. What
the High Court has done in the present matter is precisely what
may be characterised as acting in the capacity of an Appellate
Court, which is impermissible in the exercise of supervisory
jurisdiction under Article 227. Firstly, while exercising
jurisdiction under Article 227, the High Court belatedly
impleaded the State Government to resolve an issue relating to the
interpretation of the manner in which the guideline value was to
be determined. In our considered opinion, such impleadment
ought not to have been resorted to, for the reason that the lis
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throughout was between private parties and arose solely out of a
compromise decree.
36.3.2. Secondly, the High Court, in effect, called upon the
State Government to file an affidavit seeking clarification on the
interpretation of the notification. Although the High Court
ultimately rejected the report submitted by the State, it
nonetheless accepted the State's clarification with regard to the
interpretation of the notification and proceeded to act upon the
same. In substance, the High Court permitted the State to
interpret its own notification and thereby influence a lis
exclusively between private parties. The State was thus placed in
the position of being a rule-maker, interpreter, and adjudicator of
its own notification simultaneously, all while the High Court was
exercising its jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution.
Such an approach, in our considered view, is impermissible. The
executive cannot be allowed to explain away or reinterpret a
statutory instrument during the course of litigation to the
prejudice of one of the parties.
36.3.3. Thirdly, the High Court accepted the interpretation
advanced by the State solely on the ground that an alternative
interpretation of the notification was possible. By doing so, the
High Court substituted its own view for that of the Executing
Court, thereby exhibiting the conduct of an Appellate Court
rather than that of a court exercising supervisory jurisdiction
under Article 227 of the Constitution.
36.3.4. Fourthly, at the very least, the interpretation, adopted
by the Executing Court constituted a plausible and reasonable
view. In such circumstances, the High Court could not, in
exercise of its supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the
Constitution, supplant that view with another interpretation,
merely because such an alternative view was also possible. By
exercising jurisdiction under Article 227 solely to demonstrate
that another view was possible, the High Court, in effect, acted as
an appellate court, which is impermissible in law.
36.4. Therefore, in our considered opinion, the High Court,
while exercising its jurisdiction under Article 227 of the
Constitution, travelled beyond the limits of the narrow and
circumscribed scrutiny permissible under the said provision, in
direct contravention of the principles set out in paragraph 35 of
this judgment.” (Emphasis supplied)
11. Under such circumstances, in view of the discussion made above,
this Court is of the considered view that this is not a fit case where
this Court accede to the prayer of the petitioner made in this Civil
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Miscellaneous Petition in exercise of its power under Article 227 of
the Constitution of India.
12. Accordingly, this Civil Miscellaneous Petition being without any
merit is dismissed.
13. In view of the disposal of this Civil Miscellaneous Petition, pending
I.A., if any is disposed of being infructuous.
(Anil Kumar Choudhary, J.)
High Court of Jharkhand, Ranchi
Dated /- 01.09.2026
AFR/ Amar
Uploaded on- 14/09/2026
C. M.P. No.181 of 2026
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