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2025:KER:15486
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM
C. R.
PRESENT
THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE SATHISH NINAN
&
THE HONOURABLE MRS. JUSTICE SHOBA ANNAMMA EAPEN
MONDAY, THE 24TH DAY OF FEBRUARY 2025 / 5TH PHALGUNA, 1946
RFA NO. 856 OF 2013 (F)
AGAINST THE JUDGMENT AND DECREE DATED 29.06.2013 IN OS NO.5
OF 2008 OF SUB COURT, MAVELIKKARA
----APPELLANT/PLAINTIFF:
THE GOOD SAMARITAN CHARITABLE TRUST, NOORANADU,
REPRESENTED BY ITS CHAIRMAN, DR.JOSEKOSHY GEORGE,
AGED 53 YEARS, RESIDING AT MATTATHUKALAYIL BETHEL,
CHERUMYKHA, NOORANADU.
BY ADVS.
SMT.SUMATHY DANDAPANI (SR.)
SRI.MILLU DANDAPANI
RESPONDENTS/DEFENDANTS:
SAMUEL, [DIED]
S/O.OMMEN, AGED 79 YEARS, RESIDING AT
PEEDIKAYIL PUTHEN PURAYIL, VETTIYAR MURI,
VETTIYAR VILLAGE, MAVELIKKARA-690 557.
[IT IS RECORDED THAT R1 DIED AND THERE IS NO NECESSITY OF IMPLEADING LEGAL
REPRESENTATIVES OF DECEASED R1 VIDE ORDER DATED 8/8/16 IN MEMO DATED
17/2/16.]
JACOB DANIEL,
S/O.OMMEN DANIEL, AGED 34 YEARS, RESIDING AT
KEETHAPARAMBIL HOUSE, KURUMBANATTUKARA, CHANGANASSERY
VILLAGE AND TALUK, KOTTAYAM DISTRICT-686 101.
2025:KER:15486
RFA NO. 856 OF 2013
-2-
TOMY DANIEL,
S/O.OMMEN DANIEL, AGED 33 YEARS, RESIDING AT
KEETHAPARAMBIL HOUSE, KURUMBANATTUKARA, CHANGANASSERY
VILLAGE, CHANGANASSERY TALUK,
KOTTAYAM DISTRICT-686 101.
SUSAN DANIEL ALIAS MINI,
D/O.OMMEN DANIEL, AGED 27 YEARS, RESIDING AT
KEETHAPARAMBIL HOUSE, KURUMBATTUKARA, CHANGANASSERY
VILLAGE, CHANGANASSERY TALUK,
KOTTAYAM DISTRICT-686 101.
BABU SAMUEL,
S/O.SAMUEL, AGED ABOUT 35 YEARS, RESIDING AT PEEDIKAYIL
PUTHEN PURAYIL, VETTIYAR MURI, VETIYAR VILLAGE,
MAVELIKKARA-690 557.
THANKACHAN THOMAS,
AGED 57 YEARS,
S/O.THOMAS, NO.407, DOORDER BLOCK, PRESITGE ST.JOHNS
WOOD APARTMENT, CHIKKA ADUGODI, BANGLOOR-560 029, FROM
PALAMON NIVAS, PALAMON KONATTU MURI, ELAMAD VILLAGE.
SHYNI JOHNSON,
W/O.JOHNSON DAVID, EDAYILE VEETTIL, VETTIYAR MURI,
VETTIYAR VILLAGE-690 557.
JESSY JOSE,
W/O.JOSE DAVID, EDAYIL VEETTIL, VETTIYAR MURI,
VETTIYAR VILLAGE-690 557.
BY ADVS.
SRI.GEORGE POONTHOTTAM (SR.) - R6 TO R8
SMT.NISHA GEORGE
- R6 TO R8
THIS
REGULAR
FIRST
APPEAL
HAVING
COME
UP
FOR
HEARING
24.02.2025, THE COURT ON THE SAME DAY DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING:
ON
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SATHISH NINAN &
C. R.
SHOBA ANNAMMA EAPEN, JJ.
= = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = =
R.F.A. No.856 of 2013
= = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = =
Dated this the 24th day of February, 2025
J U D G M E N T
Sathish Ninan, J.
The suit for specific performance of an agreement
for sale was dismissed by the trial court. The plaintiff
is in appeal.
2. The plaint schedule property having an extent of
4 acres and 44.5 cents belong to defendants 2 to 4. The
plaintiff is a trust represented by its chairman. He is
hereinafter referred to as “the plaintiff”. According to
the plaintiff, he entered into Ext.A1 agreement for sale
dated 05.08.2004 with the owners, for purchase of the
property
for
a
total
sale
consideration
of
₹ 53,34,000/-. The agreement was entered into through
the first defendant as the power of attorney holder of
the owners, as per Ext.A12 power of attorney dated
20.07.2004, since they are abroad at United States of
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America. Under Ext.A1, the period fixed for performance
was three months. An amount of ₹ 1 lakh was paid on the
date
of
Ext.A1
towards
advance
sale
consideration.
Subsequently the period was extended till December and
thereafter, under Ext.A2, the period was extended up to
30.01.2008.
Alleging
failure
on
the
part
of
the
defendants to honour the agreement, the suit was filed.
3. The defendants denied Exts.A1 and A2 agreements,
and also Ext.A12 power of attorney. It was alleged that
the first defendant had, in the year 2004, availed a
loan from the plaintiff. As security he was caused to
sign on a blank stamp paper; the same was fabricated
into the agreement for sale.
4. At the time of trial, the witnesses to Exts.A1
and A2 agreements were not alive. The document writers
of Exts.A1 and A2 were examined as PWs.3 and 7. PW2, the
cousin brother of the first defendant, who claimed to
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have witnessed the execution of Ext.A1 agreement, was
also examined. The trial court, relying on the evidence
of the witnesses, upheld Exts.A1 and A2 agreements.
However it was found that the plaintiff has failed to
prove Ext.A12 power of attorney. Accordingly it was held
that, defendants 2 to 4 who are the title holders of the
property, are not bound by Exts.A1 and A2 agreements.
Thus the suit was dismissed.
5. We have heard Smt.Sumathy Dandapani, the learned
Senior
Counsel
Poonthottam,
the
for
the
learned
appellant
Senior
and
Counsel
Sri.George
for
the
defendants.
6. The following points arise for determination in
the appeal: (i) Is the finding of the trial court upholding Exts.A1 and A2
agreements sustainable on the evidence on record?
(ii) Was the trial court right in having held that the plaintiff failed
to prove the genuineness of Ext.A12, the photostat copy of Power of
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(iii) Do the decree and judgment of the trial court warrant any
interference?
7.
The
trial
court
held
that
the
plaintiff
succeeded in proving the due execution of Exts.A1 and A2
agreements. The respondents sought to contend against
the finding. According to the learned counsel for the
appellant, the said finding, which is in his favour, has
become final. In the absence of any appeal by the
defendants they are precluded from urging any challenge
against the said finding, it is argued.
8. We are unable to agree with the contention. In
terms
of
Order
XLI
Rule
of
the
Code
of
Civil
Procedure, an appeal or cross objection is necessary
only as against a decree. In an appeal against the
decree, the respondent is entitled to urge against the
findings, if any, entered against him in the impugned
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judgment, even without filing a cross objection. Of
course, the explanation to Order XLI Rule 22 makes it
clear that it may be open for the respondent to file a
cross objection but, it is not mandatory.
9.
Firstly
we
proceed
to
consider
whether
the
evidence on record justifies the finding of the trial
court regarding the due execution of Exts.A1 and A2.
10. Denying the genuineness of Exts.A1 and A2 the
defendants contend that the first defendant had, while
availing a loan from the plaintiff in the year 2004,
entrusted him a signed blank stamp paper as security.
The same has been used to fabricate the documents, is
the contention. Therefore, the admission is only with
regard to one signature of the first defendant and that
too in one stamp paper alone. The plaintiff could have
taken steps for comparison of the signatures of the
first defendant at the various pages of Exts.A1 and A2.
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However, such a course was not resorted to.
11. Both the witnesses to Ext.A1 agreement are no
more. The daughter of one of the witnesses was examined
as PW8. It is very important to note that she denied the
alleged signature of her father, in Ext.A1.
12.
PW2
is
the
cousin
brother
of
the
first
defendant. He was examined to prove the execution of
Ext.A1. The claim is that Ext.A1 was executed in his
presence. Pertinently, PW2 has not signed in Ext.A1 as a
witness.
Ext.A1
is
signed
by
two
other
persons
as
witnesses. If that be so, there was no necessity for the
presence of PW2 at the time of the alleged execution of
Ext.A1. No special reason is suggested as to why he
required the presence of PW2 at the time of execution of
Ext.A1 without he being a witness to the document. This
tells upon the reliability of the evidence of PW2.
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13. PW2 admitted that the plaintiff has a financing
business. It is the case of the first defendant that he
had availed a loan from the plaintiff in the year 2004
for one Baby. PW2 admitted the same. The said Baby was
examined as PW5. Though he does not admit the quantum,
he admitted such transaction. Therefore, the evidence of
PWs.2 and 5 reveal that the plaintiff is running a
financing business and that the first defendant had
transaction with him.
14. Ext.A1 agreement recites that the advance sale
consideration paid on the date of Ext.A1 is ₹ 1 lakh and
that
the
said
payment
is
through
a
cheque.
Though
defendants 2 to 4 are the owners of the property and the
first defendant is claimed to be merely the power of
attorney holder, the cheque is allegedly drawn in the
name of the first defendant. The original cheque is
produced by the plaintiff himself before the Court,
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putting forward a case that, subsequently the cheque was
got returned and the amount of ₹ 1 lakh was paid in cash
in two installments. Exts.A4(a) and (b) are vouchers
claimed to have been executed by the first defendant at
the time of receipt of the said two installments in
cash. The aforesaid claim of the plaintiff does not
stand to reason. As noticed, there was no reason why the
cheque should have been issued in the name of the first
defendant when he is not the owner of the property. So
also, there is no reason why the cheque was got returned
and the amount was paid subsequently in cash. Such
alleged return of cheque and payment of cash is not
endorsed on Ext.A1. Though the said amount of ₹1 lakh is
claimed to have been paid in two installments, it is not
stated as to when the cheque was got returned. If at the
time of payment of the first installment the cheque was
not got returned, then the first defendant would be
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having with him in addition to the cash, a cheque for
₹ 1 lakh. Anyway, the cheque would not be returned on
receipt of part payment without any security for payment
of the balance. Such a transaction is highly improbable.
15. The stamp paper upon which Ext.A1 agreement is
written is seen purchased in the name of the first
defendant. It is to be borne in mind that he is not the
owner of the property. When the purported transaction is
between the plaintiff and defendants 2 to 4, under
normal circumstances, the stamp paper would have been
purchased in the name of either of them. This, along
with the story of return of cheque and payment in cash
etc. has significance in the context of the contention
of the first defendant and the admission of PW2 that the
first defendant had borrowed amount from the plaintiff
who runs a finance business.
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16. Going by the recitals in Ext.A1 agreement, the
total
sale
consideration
is
more
than
₹
lakhs.
However, the advance amount paid is stated to be only
₹ 1 lakh. The period fixed was three months. It is
claimed that the period was extended up to December,
2007, and under Ext.A2, the period was extended up to
30.01.2008 i.e for a further period of three years. The
explanation offered for such long extension is that the
defendants 2 to 4 themselves wanted to come down to the
native place and execute the conveyance. It is very
difficult to accept the explanation. According to the
plaintiff, the purpose for purchase of the property is
to establish a medical college. That being the purpose,
he would have acquired the property at the earliest and
not delayed it and at any rate for a period of three
years. That apart, it is very difficult to believe that
an ordinary prudent vendor would enter into an agreement
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for sale fixing the period as four years, unless there
are such justifiable and compelling reasons. All the
above tells upon the genuineness of the agreement.
17. Further, in a suit for specific performance the
plaintiff
has
to
aver
and
prove
his
readiness
and
willingness to perform the agreement. There is not even
a scrap of paper to show that the plaintiff had at any
point of time prior to the filing of the suit sought
performance of the agreement.
18.
Yet
another
important
aspect
is
that,
the
property in question was alienated by defendants 2 to 4
in favour of defendants 6 to 8 through the 5 th defendant
as the power of attorney holder. 5 th defendant is the
son
of
the
first
defendant.
The
power
of
attorney
(Ext.B2) is dated 15.02.2008. The sale deeds (Exts.B5 to
B7) were executed on 03.03.2008. As per the said sale
deeds the total sale consideration is only ₹ 40,00,000/-
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(approx.), whereas under Ext.A1 the total consideration
fixed is more than ₹53 lakhs. Therefore, if there was
such an agreement for sale with the plaintiff for a
higher amount, defendants 2 to 4 would not have effected
sale of the property under Exts.B5 to B7 for such a
lesser
amount.
All
the
above
circumstances
points
against the genuineness of Exts.A1 and A2 agreements.
19. Overlooking all the above circumstances, the
trial court has upheld Exts.A1 and A2 solely relying on
the oral evidence of the document writers. The precision
with which the document writers PWs.3 and 7 have deposed
about
the
purchase
of
the
stamp
papers
and
the
transaction in its entirety, would only cast doubt on
the credibility and the acceptance of their evidence.
They would definitely have been involved in a lot of
transaction over the years, in spite of which, the
specifics are spoken to by them.
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20. Incidentally we may also notice that, a bare
glance at the signature in the first page of Ext.A1
agreement with the other pages and Ext.A2, casts a
suspicion on its genuineness. However we make it clear
that
we
have
not
arrived
at
a
conclusion
on
such
perusal, but on the basis of the entire circumstances as
noticed supra.
21. We set aside the finding of the trial court
with regard to proof of Exts.A1 and A2 and hold that the
plaintiff has failed to prove the due execution of the
said documents.
22. Now coming to Ext.A12, it is the photostat copy
of a power of attorney allegedly executed by defendants
2 to 4 in favour of the first defendant, the trial court
has held against its genuineness. The defendants have
denied the execution of such a power of attorney and
also the genuineness of Ext.A12. Ext.A12 is a mere
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photostat copy. Plaintiff had filed IA 595/2012 seeking
a
direction
to
the
first
defendant
to
produce
the
original of Ext.A12 power of attorney, alleging that the
original
is
with
the
first
defendant.
The
first
defendant filed an affidavit denying the very existence
of such document. The Court proceeded to order the
application
as,
closed.
During
trial,
the
Court
proceeded to admit the photostat copy, in spite of the
objection by the defendants.
23. Section 65 of the Evidence Act (corresponding
to S.60 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam) enables
admission
of
secondary
evidence
under
certain
circumstances. One contingency is, when the original
document is in the possession of the person against whom
it is sought to be proved, and he does not produce it
even after a notice to him as required under Section 66,
to produce the original. According to the plaintiff, the
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original power of attorney is with the first defendant
and in spite of he being called upon to produce the same
in compliance with Section 66, he did not produce it.
Therefore secondary evidence namely, the photostat copy
of the document, is liable to be admitted in evidence,
is the contention. The relevant part of the Section, is
extracted hereunder :“S.65: Cases in which secondary evidence relating to documents may be
given.Secondary evidence may be given of the existence, condition or contents of
a document in the following cases:
(a) When the original is shown or appears to be in the possession or
powerof the person against whom the document is sought to be proved, or
…………….
and when, after the notice mentioned in section 66, such person does not
produce it;
(b) ……….
(c) ………
(d) …….
(e) …….
(f) …….
R.F.A. No.856 of 2013
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In cases (a), (c) and (d), any secondary evidence of the contents of the
document is admissible.”
As
is
evident
from
the
section,
for
admission
of
secondary evidence it must be shown that, the original
is or appears to be in the possession or power of the
other person who is called upon to produce. Therefore,
the Court necessarily has to
find the existence of such
document. In a case where the very existence of the
document is denied by the other side, a mere notice to
produce
in
photostat
terms
copy
of
Section
(secondary
will
evidence)
not
make
the
admissible.
In
Smt.J.Yahoda v. Smt.K.Shobha Rani [2007 (5) SCC 730] , the Apex Court
held,
“In order to enable a party to produce secondary evidence it is
necessary for the party to prove existence and execution of the
original document.”
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In Rakesh Mohindra v. Anita Beri & ors. [2016 (16) SCC 483], the Apex Court
held,
“The pre-conditions for leading secondary evidence are that such original
documents could not be produced by the party relied upon such documents in
spite of best efforts, unable to produce the same which is beyond their
control. The party sought to produce secondary evidence must establish for
the non-production of primary evidence. Unless, it is established that the
original documents is lost or destroyed or is being deliberately withheld by
the party in respect of that document sought to be used, secondary evidence
in respect of that document cannot accepted. ….. …. ….. …. ….. ….. …. …....
…...... It is well settled that if a party wishes to lead secondary evidence, the
Court is obliged to examine the probative value of the document produced in
the Court or their contents and decide the question of admissibility of a
document in secondary evidence. At the same time, the party has to lay down
the factual foundation to establish the right to give secondary evidence where
the original document cannot be produced. It is equally well settled that
neither mere admission of a document in evidence amounts to its proof nor
mere making of an exhibit of a document dispense with its proof, which is
otherwise required to be done in accordance with law.”
Therefore,
for
admission
of
secondary
evidence,
the
party has to establish the foundational facts viz., that
there
existed
the
original
document
and
that
the
original is lost or destroyed or is being deliberately
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withheld by the party against whom it is sought to be
used. A mere demand under Section 66 to produce the
original of a document and the failure of the other side
to
produce
the
same
would
not
make
the
secondary
evidence admissible especially when the very existence
of such a document is denied. The foundational facts
need to be established, upon which alone the secondary
evidence becomes admissible.
24.
Further,
the
mere
admission
of
secondary
evidence does not constitute proof of the document. In
Jagmail Singh & another v. Karamjit Singh & ors. [(2020) 5 SCC 178] , the Apex
Court, after finding the prima facie existence of the
disputed document therein, which was a Will, and having
found that the factual foundation for adducing secondary
evidence has been established, held,
“The appellants would be entitled to lead secondary evidence in respect of
the will in question. It is, however, clarified that such admission of
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-: 19 :secondary evidence automatically does not attest to its authenticity,
truthfulness or genuineness which will have to be established during the
course of trial in accordance with law.”
In the case at hand, on the discussions hereunder, the
secondary evidence namely, the photostat copy is not
liable to be admitted in evidence; and even if admitted,
its genuineness is not established.
25. It is relevant to note that Ext.A1 agreement
does not give any details of the power of attorney
including its date. Ext.A1 does not mention that a copy
of the power of attorney was handed over. There is no
evidence that the copy was compared with the original.
Significantly, the first page of Ext.A12(the photostat
copy) does not contain even the stamp of the Treasury
(Depot). The reverse side of the first page of the power
of attorney is also not seen. The power of attorney is
claimed to be a notarised one, notarised by a notary
public at New York. The defendants have produced a
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certificate stating that there is no such notary public
with
the
name
as
seen
in
plaintiff
has
challenged
Ext.A12.
the
Of
course,
genuineness
of
the
the
certificate. The plaintiff could have very well produced
a certificate to prove that there exists such a notary
public and that the power of attorney was notarised by
him. However, such a course is not adopted. In Ext.A12,
in the seal of the notary public, the place is seen as
“Newyork” whereas in Ext.B2 power of attorney admittedly
executed by defendants 2 to 4 in favour of the 5 th
defendant and notarised at America, the place is stated
as “New York”. So also, in the seal of the notary public
as
seen
in
Ext.A12
it
reads
“Qualified
in
Nassau
Country” whereas in Ext.B2 it is stated as “Qualified in
Nassau County”. The place “New York” is never written as
a single word and so also the place Nassau is referred
to as “County” and not “Country”. The photostat copy is
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not
above
suspicion.
As
was
noticed
supra,
the
conveyance of the property under Ext.B2 was for a lesser
price. If there existed such an agreement as Ext.A1 and
A2 which were entered into on the strength of Ext.A12
power of attorney, the owners would have only stood to
gain. Ext.A12 photostat copy was not produced along with
the plaint. All the above tells upon the genuineness of
Ext.A12.
The
trial
court
was
right
in
having
held
against the same. The conclusion arrived at by the trial
court is based on the materials and is a possible one.
There is no sufficient material to overturn the said
finding.
26. On the discussions as above, we find that the
trial court was right in having dismissed the suit.
There is no merit in the appeal. We do not find any
reason to decline costs to the respondents.
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The appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.
Sd/SATHISH NINAN
JUDGE
Sd/SHOBA ANNAMMA EAPEN
JUDGE
kns///True Copy//
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