The court's order
The closing paragraphs of the judgment, in the court's own words. The reasons are in the full text below.
8. No suit or counter claim or proceeding was admittedly initiated by defendant No.3, the person who purports to have executed Ext.A3 sale deed dated 19.12.1978. The production of the original of the said document would satisfy the requirement of proof of its execution. Necessarily, the subsequent execution of another deed of conveyance by defendant No.3 with respect to the same property in favour of defendant No.1 is without any authority, right, title or interest R.S.A. No.163 of 2007 (C) :: 8 :: over the property and hence the same is not binding on the rights of the plaintiff over the plaint schedule property. The plaintiff can very well ignore the same without seeking a remedy by way of setting aside the document or declaration but it may be a clog on its title to the property in future and hence the relief sought for by the plaintiff has to be granted by setting aside Ext.A4 sale deed. The decree passed by the first appellate court reversing the judgment and decree of the lower court hence liable to be set aside.
9. Another ground was also raised by the learned counsel for the defendants disputing the location of the property in Ext.C1 mahazar and Ext.C1(a) plan. It is submitted by the learned counsel for the respondents that one property is lying on the south-eastern corner and the other one is lying on the north-eastern corner of a large extent of one acre 93 cents. But the commissioner who visited the property located both plaint 'E' and 'G' schedule as a single compact plot without separating the same. Going by Ext.C1(a) plan prepared by the R.S.A. No.163 of 2007 (C) :: 9 :: commissioner, it is clear that these two properties were located as a single compact plot without any separation. The respective description of 'G' and 'E' schedule would show that these two properties would take the eastern part of a large extent of one acre 93 cents. There is no intervening property and hence it is perfectly in tune with the description given in both the title deeds as well as the parental document Ext.A2. The trial court has accepted the abovesaid plan and decreed the suit. In the result, the second appeal is allowed. The decree and judgment of the first appellate court is hereby set aside. The decree and judgment passed by the trial court is restored. No costs. Sd/- P. Somarajan Judge ahz/
Full Judgment Text
Text read from the judgment PDF published on the High Court's eCourts portal, through the
Indian High Court Judgments open data set (Dattam Labs,
CC BY 4.0).
The court's own copy is the authoritative text.
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM
PRESENT:
THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE P.SOMARAJAN
WEDNESDAY, THE 11TH DAY OF JULY 2018 / 20TH ASHADHA, 1940
RSA.No. 163 of 2007 C
AGAINST THE JUDGMENT, DATED 6.4.2001, IN AS NO.59/1998 OF THE SUB COURT,
NEDUMANGAD.
AGAINST THE JUDGMENT AND DECREE, DATED 15.1.1998, IN OS NO.88/1996 OF THE
ADDL. MUNSIFF'S COURT, NEDUMANGAD.
APPELLANT/1ST RESPONDENT/PLAINTIFF:
RUDRAYANI DEVAKI, (DIED)
KUZHIVILAKATHU VEEDU, ERUTHUMMOOLA MURI,
PEROORKADA VILLAGE.
(LEGAL HEIRS IMPLEADED AS ADDL. APPELLANTS 2 TO 4)
ADDITIONAL APPELLANTS:
2.
S.SANTHA KUMAR,
PULLUVILAKATHU PUTHEN VEEDU, PEROORKADA,
THIRUVANANTHAPURAM - 695 005.
3.
MALATHY S., D/O.RUDRAYANI DEVAKI,
PULLUVILAKATHU PUTHEN VEEDU, PEROORKADA,
THIRUVANANTHAPURAM - 695 005.
4.
SUNITHA VENUGOPAL, D/O.RUDRAYANI DEVAKI,
PULLUVILAKATHU PUTHEN VEEDU, PEROORKADA,
THIRUVANANTHAPURAM - 695 005.
THE LEGAL HEIRS OF DECEASED SOLE APPELLANT ARE IMPLEADED AS
ADDITIONAL APPELLANTS 2 TO 4 AS PER ORDER DATED 28.3.2017 IN I.A.
NO.737 OF 2017.
BY ADVS.SRI.PIRAPPANCODE V.S.SUDHIR
SRI.JELSON J. EDAMPADAM
RESPONDENTS/APPELLANT & RESPONDENTS 2 AND 3/DEFENDANTS 3, 1 & 2:
1.
A.RAJESWARI, D/O.AMMU,
PERUNALLIVILA VEEDU, CHELLAMCODE MURI,
VATTAPPARA VILLAGE, VENCODE P.O., NEDUMANGAD TALUK,
THIRUVANANTHAPURAM DISTRICT.
2.
R.VERONICA,
MARIYA NAGAR, CHENTHIPOOR, CHELLAMCODE MURI,
VATTAPARA VILLAGE, NEDUMANGAD TALUK.
3.
C.NELSON @ BABI,
CHENTHIPOOR, CHELLANCODE MURI, VATTAPARA VILLAGE,
NEDUMANGAD TALUK, THIRUVANANTHAPURAM DISTRICT.
R.S.A.NO.163 OF 2007 C
:: 2 ::
R1 BY ADV. SRI.THIRUMALA P.K.MANI
R2 & R3 BY ADVS. SRI.R.S.KALKURA
SRI.M.S.KALESH
SRI.HARISH GOPINATH
SRI.V.VINAY MENON
SRI.KIRAN SANKAR
THIS REGULAR SECOND APPEAL HAVING BEEN FINALLY HEARD ON 11.07.2018,
THE COURT ON THE SAME DAY DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING:
“C.R.”
P.Somarajan, J.
-----------------------------------------------------R.S.A. No.163 of 2007 (C)
-----------------------------------------------------Dated this the 11th day of July, 2018
JUDGMENT
Against the decree and judgment of the first appellate
court (Sub Court, Nedumangad) in A.S.No.59 of 1998, dated
6.4.2001, reversing the judgment and decree in O.S.No.88 of
1996 of the Munsiff's Court, Nedumangad, dated 15.1.1998,
the plaintiff came up with this appeal.
The suit was for
declaration of title of plaint 'A' schedule property, recovery of
possession of 'B' schedule being part of 'A' schedule and for
cancellation of Ext.A4 sale deed alleged to have been executed
by defendant No.3 in favour of defendant No.1.
2.
Both the parties are claiming their respective title
under a parental document of partition, exhibited as A2, dated
13.7.1978, scheduled as 'E' and 'G' schedule in that document.
The property allotted to the share of one Asok Kumar
and
R.S.A. No.163 of 2007 (C)
:: 2 ::
Lalitha is having an extent of 6.5 cents ('G' schedule) and the
property allotted to the share of defendant No.3 is having an
extent of 6.5 cents ('E' schedule). On 19.12.1978, defendant
No.3 sold her 6.5 cents of property to one Vanajakshi. Later
on, it was purchased by the plaintiff along with the property
allotted to the share of Asok Kumar and Lalitha ('G' schedule in
Ext.A2 partition deed) and thereby obtained 13 cents.
The
cause of action for the suit has arisen when defendant No.3
executed another sale deed, exhibited as A4, on 24.1.1996 in
favour of defendant No.1 with respect to the very same
property. It is also alleged that subsequent to the execution of
Ext.A4 sale deed the defendants trespassed into plaint 'B'
schedule property and reduced the same into their possession.
Hence the suit for declaration and recovery of possession of
the trespassed area.
3.
The trial court, after the issuance of a survey
commission, decreed the suit. It was taken up in appeal by
defendant No.3 and the first appellate court reversed the
R.S.A. No.163 of 2007 (C)
:: 3 ::
finding of the trial court and dismissed the suit holding that
execution of Ext.A3 sale deed was disputed and denied by
defendant No.3 and hence there is failure to prove due
execution of the said document and transfer of title over the
property. It was also found that defendant No.3 has
subsequently transferred the property to defendant No.1 by
executing Ext.A4 sale deed on 24.1.1996. Based on the said
finding, the decree of the trial court was reversed and the suit
was dismissed by the first appellate court. Aggrieved by the
said reversal of the decree and judgment of the trial court by
the first appellate court, the plaintiff came up with this second
appeal.
4. The dispute is with respect to the execution of Ext.A3
registered sale deed dated 19.12.1978.
Both parties are
claiming their respective title over their respective properties
based on Ext.A2 partition deed of the year 1978. It was
submitted
by
the
respondents/defendants
learned
that
since
counsel
for
the
execution
of
Ext.A3
R.S.A. No.163 of 2007 (C)
:: 4 ::
registered sale deed is in dispute it has to be proved in
accordance with the mandate under Section 68 of the Evidence
Act.
It was further submitted that production of the
original/certified copy of the sale deed would not itself amount
to proof of execution of the said document and the person who
is seeking benefit under the document should prove the same
as mandated under Section 68 of the Evidence Act. It was also
submitted that when execution of the document was disputed
by the person by whom it purports to have been executed, it
has to be proved in accordance with the mandate under
Section 68 of the Evidence Act by summoning at least one of
the attesting witnesses or by complying with the requirement
mandated thereunder.
6. Section 68 of the Evidence Act is extracted below for
reference:
“68.
Proof of execution of document
required by law to be attested.-- If a document is
required by law to be attested, it shall not be used as
evidence until one attesting witness at least has been
R.S.A. No.163 of 2007 (C)
:: 5 ::
called for the purpose of proving its execution, if there
be an attesting witness alive, and subject to the
process of the Court and capable of giving evidence:
Provided that it shall not be necessary to call an
attesting witness in proof of the execution of any
document, not being a Will, which has been
registered in accordance with the provisions of the
Indian Registration Act, 1908 (16 of 1908), unless its
execution by the person by whom it purports to have
been executed is specifically denied.”
(emphasis supplied)
7. The expression “the person by whom it purports to
have been executed” engrafted under the proviso to Section 68
stands for a denial of execution of the document by the person
who purports to have been executed the same 'in a suit brought
by that person'.
The further expression “specifically denied”
should be understood as the denial of execution of document
specifically by the person by whom it purports to have been
executed, in a suit or proceeding initiated by him. It is available
only in a suit or proceeding initiated by the person by whom it
purports to have been executed.
In other words, (1) there
R.S.A. No.163 of 2007 (C)
:: 6 ::
should be a specific denial of execution of document by the
person by whom it purports to have been executed, and (2) it
has been raised by that person in a suit or proceeding initiated
by him for that purpose. Unless there is a suit or counter claim
or proceeding either filed or initiated or brought into existence
by that person, there cannot be any requirement of compliance
of mandate as envisaged in the main body of Section 68 of the
Indian Evidence Act. Proviso to Section 68 of the said Act is an
exception to its main body and a further exception carved out in
the proviso avoiding the application of the proviso when there is
specific denial of execution by the person by whom it purports
to have been executed.
In all other cases of execution of
documents required by law to be attested, except a will or
codicil, there is no requirement of compliance of mandate as
envisaged in the main body of Section 68 of the Indian
Evidence Act for its proof. A mere challenge by the
executant/the person who purported to have been executed the
document alone is not sufficient to bring the matter within the
exception to the proviso to Section 68 of the Indian Evidence
R.S.A. No.163 of 2007 (C)
:: 7 ::
Act, though he is in the party array of the suit either as a
defendant or as a co-defendant unless there is a relief sought
by him challenging its execution. The fact that the executant
(defendant No.3) is in the party array of the suit alone will not
bring the document within the purview of the exception carved
out of the proviso to Section 68 of the Evidence Act and hence,
the proviso to Section 68 alone would come into play without its
exception and hence, there is no need or necessity for
summoning or examining any of the attesting witnesses to
prove the document.
8. No suit or counter claim or proceeding was admittedly
initiated by defendant No.3, the person who purports to have
executed Ext.A3 sale deed dated 19.12.1978. The production
of the original of the said document would satisfy the
requirement of proof of its execution. Necessarily, the
subsequent execution of another deed of conveyance by
defendant No.3 with respect to the same property in favour of
defendant No.1 is without any authority, right, title or interest
R.S.A. No.163 of 2007 (C)
:: 8 ::
over the property and hence the same is not binding on the
rights of the plaintiff over the plaint schedule property.
The
plaintiff can very well ignore the same without seeking a
remedy by way of setting aside the document or declaration but
it may be a clog on its title to the property in future and hence
the relief sought for by the plaintiff has to be granted by setting
aside Ext.A4 sale deed.
The decree passed by the first
appellate court reversing the judgment and decree of the lower
court hence liable to be set aside.
9.
Another ground was also raised by the learned
counsel for the defendants disputing the location of the
property in Ext.C1 mahazar and Ext.C1(a) plan. It is submitted
by the learned counsel for the respondents that one property is
lying on the south-eastern corner and the other one is lying on
the north-eastern corner of a large extent of one acre 93 cents.
But the commissioner who visited the property located both
plaint 'E' and 'G' schedule as a single compact plot without
separating the same. Going by Ext.C1(a) plan prepared by the
R.S.A. No.163 of 2007 (C)
:: 9 ::
commissioner, it is clear that these two properties were located
as a single compact plot without any separation.
The
respective description of 'G' and 'E' schedule would show that
these two properties would take the eastern part of a large
extent of one acre 93 cents. There is no intervening property
and hence it is perfectly in tune with the description given in
both the title deeds as well as the parental document Ext.A2.
The trial court has accepted the abovesaid plan and decreed
the suit.
In the result, the second appeal is allowed. The decree
and judgment of the first appellate court is hereby set aside.
The decree and judgment passed by the trial court is restored.
No costs.
Sd/-
P. Somarajan
Judge
ahz/
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