The Executive Engineer, Gosikhurd Project Ambadi, Bhandara, Maharashtra Vidarbha Irrigation Development Corporation vs Mahesh and Others

ss. 25, 24(1)(a) and 30 – Compensation u/s. 24(1)(a) – Determination of – Explained.

s.24(1)(a) and 25 –Words “all the provisions relating to determination of compensation” in s. 24(1)(a) – Meaning of – Held: It would be read as including the period of limitation specified in s.

25 of the 2013 Act – Word ‘all’ and the expression “relating to” used in s. 25 of the 2013 Act, are to be given a wide meaning to ensnare the legislative intent – Words and phrases. s. 24(1) – Interpretation of – Constitution Bench decision in Indore Development Authority’s case held that the 2013 Act operates prospectively, and that s. 114 of the 2013 Act effects a repeal but with certain savings, in accordance with s. 24 – Thus, the acquisition proceedings are preserved under the 1894 Act till the stage of making of the award – Where an award is not made, the provisions relating to determination of compensation under the 2013 Act would apply; where the award is made, proceedings would continue under the provisions of the 1894 Act as if the said Act has not been repealed. s. 24(2) – Interpretation of – Decision in Indore Development Authority’s case holding that where proceedings for acquisition had been initiated under the 1894 Act but no award u/s. 11 of the 1894 Act had been made, the provisions of the 2013 Act would apply limited to determination of compensation – Where, however, an award had been made under the 1894 Act, s. 24(1)(b) protects the vested rights of the parties – 2013 Act provides for higher compensation along with provisions for rehabilitation, which should not be taken away – Furthermore, full effect has to be given to the provisions contained in s. 24 as it is not for the court to legislate – Courts can and do, in appropriate cases, clear ambiguity in legislations.

Land Acquisition Act 1894: s. 11A – Two year period within which award to be made u/s. 11A – Application of, even after repeal – Held: s. 11A requires that an award u/s. 11 must be passed within a period of two years from the date of publication of the declaration and if no award is so made, the proceedings for acquisition of land would lapse – Period during which any action or proceedings to be taken pursuant to the declaration is stayed by an order of a court is to be excluded while calculating the period of two years. Limitation: Statutes of limitation – Nature of – Held: Is generally regarded as procedural as its object is not to create any right but prescribe periods within which legal proceedings should be instituted for enforcement of rights or adjudication orders should be passed – Statutes of limitation have retrospective effect insofar as they apply to all legal proceedings brought after they come into force – However, the laws relating to limitation have been held to be prospective since they do not have the effect of reviving the right of action which is already barred on the date of their coming into operation, nor do they have the effect of extinguishing a right of action subsisting on the date – Thus, unless the language of the provision dealing with period of limitation clearly manifests, in express terms or by necessary implication, a contrary intention divesting vested rights, such provision is to be construed as prospective.

General Clauses Act, 1897: s. 6 – Effect of repeal – Discussed. Interpretation of statutes: Retrospective application of statutes – Constitution Bench decision in Indore Development Authority’s case holding that extent of retrospectivity would also depend upon the degree of unfairness it causes to the parties – Absence of express limiting words is not to be used as a basis for implying retrospective operation as this would be reverse of the true presumption – However, presumption in favour of retrospectivity may be necessary when distinct implications typically arise in the context of the statute which repeals a previous statute, and would leave a ‘lacuna’ if the new statute were not construed as having retrospective effect – Statute which is prospective in its direct operation cannot be called as retrospective because a part of the requisites for its action is drawn from time antecedent to its passing – Furthermore, for interpretation, a construction which results in unreasonably harsh and absurd results must be avoided.

Allowing the appeals, the Court

HELD: 1. Section 25 of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 would apply to the awards made and published under Section 24(1)(a) of the 2013 Act. The limitation period for passing/making of an award under Section 24(1)(a) in terms of Section 25 would commence from 1st January 2014, that is, the date when the 2013 Act came into force. Period during which the Court order would inhibit action on the part of the authorities to proceed with the making of the award would be excluded while computing the period under Section 25 of the 2013 Act. Accordingly, period of 79 days from 26th May 2014 when the High Court had stayed operation of the notification dated 19th March 2014, till the new notification dated 13th August 2014 was issued has to be excluded. The award purportedly dated 30th October 2014, was in any case duly made on or before the extended date of 20th March 2015. Hence, the concerned award is valid. The State of Maharashtra may conduct an inquiry in reference to the imputation regarding manipulation and backdating of the subject award and take such remedial and corrective action as may be necessary and to ensure such situations do not arise in future.The impugned judgment setting aside the award and holding that the acquisition proceedings had lapsed is set aside. The acquisition proceedings had not lapsed and the award is legal and valid. [Paras 40, 41][1160-G; 1161-A-E]

2.1 Section 11A of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 requires that an award under Section 11 must be passed within a period of two years from the date of publication of the declaration and if no award is so made, the proceedings for acquisition of land shall lapse. As per the explanation, the period during which any action or proceedings to be taken pursuant to the declaration is stayed by an order of a court is to be excluded while calculating the period of two years. [Para 5][1140-G-H]

2.2 Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 interdicts the common law principle that an enactment after repeal is ineffective as if it had never existed, except as to matters past and closed. Section 6 is a general transitory provision that resurrects operation of the repealed law in terms of comprehensive and broadly worded clauses (a) to (e). Clauses (b), (c) and (e) of Section 6, in particular, state that the repeal does not affect anything duly done or suffered under the repealed enactment; any right, privilege, obligation or liability acquired or accrued under any repealed enactment; or any investigation, legal proceedings or remedy in respect of any such right, privilege, obligation, liability, penalty, etc. Legal proceedings, investigation or remedy may be instituted, continued or enforced, and any penalty, punishment or forfeiture may be enforced as if the repealed Act or regulation were still in existence notwithstanding its repeal. However, the savings of Section 6 do not apply to some extent or in entirety when the legislative intent is different. The contrary intent can be expressed or gathered by necessary implication. Further, the ambit of repeal cannot be wider than the boundary envisaged by the repealing enactment. Therefore, a comprehensive repeal may be limited if the repealing enactment directly or by necessary implication clamours that it will not apply to certain matters. [Para 7][1143-A-D]

2.3 Section 114 of the 2013 Act repeals the 1894 Act, which ceases to be effective and applicable from the date of enforcement of the 2013 Act. In terms of sub-section (2) to Section 114, the repeal shall not act so as to prejudice or affect application of Section 6 of the General Clauses Act. However, the application of Section 6 of the General Clauses Act is subject to “save as otherwise provided” by the 2013 Act. In other words, when it is commanded or imperative by the provisions of the 2013 Act, Section 6 of the General Clauses Act is not to be given legal effect. [Para 8][1143-E-F]

2.4 Sub-section (1) to Section 24 of the 2013 Act is a nonobstante clause. It confers the provision with an overriding status over other provisions. Accordingly, in terms of Sections 24(1) of the 2013 Act, Section 114 of the 2013 Act as well as Section 6 of the General Clauses Act will not apply to the extent hindered by Section 24(1) of the 2013 Act. The reason is that s. 114 of the 2013 Act, while accepting the applicability of Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, makes its application subject to “save as otherwise provided” in the 2013 Act. Further, s. 6 of the General Clauses Act itself states that the general savings will not apply when the legislative intent is contrary. [Para 9][1143-F-H]

2.5 Section 24(1) deals with two specific situations where the land acquisition proceedings were initiated before the repeal of the 1894 Act, namely: (i) where an award has been made, and

(ii) where an award has not been made. As per clause (b) to Section 24(1) where an award under Section 11 of the 1894 Act has been made, the proceedings would continue under the repealed 1894 Act, notwithstanding its repeal. In such cases, the 2013 Act will not apply. Clause (b) to s. 24(1) is not applicable in the case at hand as it is admitted that no award was made on or before 31st December 2013. [Para 10][1144-A-C]

2.6 In the instant case, clause (a) to Section 24(1) of the 2013 Act would apply as the land acquisition proceedings initiated under the 1894 Act had not culminated into an award till the repeal of the 1894 Act. Section 24(1)(a) partly nullifies the legal effect of savings under Section 6 of the General Clauses Act as it hybridizes application of the 1894 Act and the 2013 Act. While preserving validity of the acquisition proceedings by issue of declarations under the 1894 Act, it states that all the provisions for determination of compensation under the 2013 Act shall apply. The section consciously saves the legal effect of the notifications issued under Section 4 and/or Section 6 of the 1894 Act and obviates the necessity to issue a fresh notification under the 2013 Act. This ‘perseveration of the determination date’ for the computation of compensation for the awards made under Section 24(1)(a) of the 2013 Act is a thought through legislative invocation that curtails time delays and cost escalation of infrastructure projects, as well as checks the post-acquisition notification malpractices, and at the same time ensures that the landowners are entitled to the benefit of the enhanced compensation as per the 2013 Act. [Para 11][1144-C-F]

2.7 Section 11A of the 1894 Act and Section 25 of the 2013 Act prescribe two different periods of limitation with adverse consequences, as on failure to make the award the acquisition proceedings lapse. The choice is between Section 11A of the 1894 Act and s. 25 of the 2013 Act. Absence of precise words or express declaration would not inhibit from interpreting and exercising the right choice, keeping in view the language as also the object and purpose of clause (a) to s. 24(1). In other words, effect and meaning is to be given to the underlying intention of the Parliament in the words “all the provisions relating to determination of compensation” under the 2013 Act. [Para 15][1146-B-D]

2.8 The words “all the provisions relating to determination of compensation” in Section 24(1)(a) would be read as including the period of limitation specified in Section 25 of the 2013 Act. To elaborate, the word ‘all’ and the expression “relating to” used in Section 24(1)(a) are required to be given a wide meaning to ensnare the legislative intent. Given this trend in interpretation, the words “all the provisions of this Act relating to the determination of compensation” must not be imputed a restricted understanding of the word ‘relating’ only to the substantial provisions on calculation of compensation, that is, Sections 26 to

30 of the 2013 Act. Rather, the expression should be given an expansive meaning so as to include the provision on limitation period for calculation of compensation, that is, Section 25 of the 2013 Act. [Para 16][1146-D-F]

The State Wakf Board, Madras represented by its Secretary v. Abdul Azeez Sahib & Ors. AIR 1968 Madras 79; Navin Chemicals Mfg. and Trading Co. Ltd. v. Collector of Customs (1993) 4 SCC 320:[1993]

2 Suppl. SCR 326; Gujarat Urja Vikas Nigam Limited v. Amit Gupta and Others 2021 SCC Online SC 194; Renusagar Power Co. Ltd. v. General Electric Company and Another (1984) 4 SCC 679 : [1985] 1 SCR 432; Mansukhlal Dhanraj Jain and Others v. Eknath Vithal Ogale (1995) 2 SCC 665 : [1995] 1 SCR 996; M/s. Doypack Systems Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India and Others (1988) 2 SCC 299 : [1988] 2 SCR 962; H.H.

Maharajadhiraja Madhav Rao Jivaji Rao Scindia

Bahadur of Gwalior etc. v. Union of India & Anr. (1971)

1 SCC 85 : [1971] 3 SCR 9 – referred to.

2.9 Law of limitation is generally regarded as procedural as its object is not to create any right but prescribe periods within which legal proceedings should be instituted for enforcement of rights or adjudication orders should be passed. Statutes of limitation, therefore, have retrospective effect insofar as they apply to all legal proceedings brought after they come into force. However, the laws relating to limitation have been held to be prospective in the sense that they do not have the effect of reviving the right of action which is already barred on the date of their coming into operation, nor do they have the effect of extinguishing a right of action subsisting on the date. In this sense, the limitation provisions can be procedural in the context of one set of facts and substantive in the context of a different set of facts. Therefore, unless the language of the provision dealing with period of limitation clearly manifests, in express terms or by necessary implication, a contrary intention divesting vested rights, such provision is to be construed as prospective. In the context of clause (a) to Section 24(1) of the 2013 Act, it is to be stated that the said clause would apply only if the period for making of an award had not ended and time was available as on 1st January 2014. Where and if the period for making of the award had already lapsed before 1st January 2014, clause (a) to Section 24(1) would not apply so as to deprive and deny the vested rights which have already accrued in favour of the landowners. The instant case is not of divesting of vested rights of the landowners on enactment of the 2013 Act. [Para 17][1148-A-E]

2.10 Section 25 is a rule of procedure immediately following Section 24 and a part of fasciculus of “all the provisions”, from Sections 25-30, “relating to determination of compensation”. Hence, the expression “all the provisions relating to the determination of compensation” under the 2013 Act will encompass Section 25. [Para 18][1148-F]

2.11 Given the object and purpose behind Sections 24, and

26 to 30 of the 2013 Act, practical absurdities and anomalies may arise if the two-year period for making of an award in terms of Section 11A of the 1894 Act commencing from the date of issue of the declaration is applied to the awards to be made under Section 24(1)(a) of the 2013 Act. This would mitigate against the underlying legislative intent behind prescription of time for making of an award in respect of saved acquisition proceedings initiated under the repealed 1894 Act, which is two-fold: (i) to give sufficient time to the authorities to determine compensation payable under the 2013 Act; and (ii) to ensure early and expedited payment to the landowners by reducing the period from two years under Section 11A of the 1894 Act to twelve months under Section

25 of the 2013 Act. In case of declarations issued in January 2012, on application of Section 11A of the 1894 Act, the time to determine compensation under the 2013 Act would vary from a day to a month, and while in cases where the declarations were issued within twelve months of the repeal of the 1894 Act, the landowners would be at a disadvantage as an award beyond the twelve-month period specified in Section 25 of the 2013 Act would be valid. In the first set of cases, given the onerous factual and legal exercise involved in determination of compensation and the need to issue notification under Section 26(2) of the 2013 Act, publication of the awards would be impractical. Hasty and incorrect awards would be deleterious for the landowners. If the awards are not pronounced, the acquisition proceedings would lapse defeating the legislative intent behind Section 24(1)(a) of the 2013 Act to save such proceedings. Therefore, the choice is exercised to arrive at a just, fair and harmonious construction consistent with the legislative intent. A rational approach so as to further the object and purpose of Sections 24 and 26 to 30 of the 2013 Act is required. Section 25 refers to publication of a notification under Section 19 as the starting point of limitation. In the context of clause (a) to Section 24(1) of the 2013 Act there would be no notification under Section 19, but declaration under Section 6 of the 1894 Act. When the declarations under Section 6 are valid as on 1st January 2014, it is necessary to give effect to the legislative intention and reckon the starting point. In the context of Section 24(1)(a) of the 2013 Act, declarations under Section 6 of the 1894 Act are no different and serve the same purpose as the declarations under Section 19 of the 2013 Act. Consequently, in cases covered by clause (a) to Section 24(1) of the 2013 Act, the limitation period for passing/making of an award under Section 25 of the 2013 Act would commence from 1st January 2014, that is, the date when the 2013 Act came into force. Awards passed under clause (a) to Section 24(1) would be valid if made within twelve months from 1st January 2014. This dictum is subject to the caveat that a declaration which has lapsed in terms of Section 11A of the 1894 Act before or on 31st December 2013 would not get revived. [Para 20][1149-E-H; 1150-A-F]

2.12 The submission of the land owners, relying upon Rule

19 of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Settlement (Maharashtra) Rules, 2014, for giving a restrictive meaning and excluding Section 25 of 2013 Act is misplaced. This Rule states that the formula provided in Sections 26 to 30 of the 2013 Act would apply where a notification under Section 4(i) of the 1894 Act was issued before 31st December 2013, and an award has not been made before the 31st December 2013. The Rule refers to the formula for computation of compensation to be applied under Section 24(1)(a) of the 2013 Act, but it does not follow that Section 25 which prescribes the limitation for making of an award would not apply. Section 25 of the 2013 Act applies to awards made under Section 24(1)(a) and the period of limitation of twelve months would commence from 1st January 2014. [Para 21][1150-F-H; 1151-A-C]

2.13 The submission by the State that neither the period for making of an award under Section 11A of the 1894 Act nor Section 25 of the 2013 Act would apply, would result in a situation which the legislature had never envisaged. The consequence would be that there is no time period prescribed for making and passing of an award under clause (a) to Section 24(1) of the 2013 Act. This would be unacceptable and again completely contrary to the legislative intent in enacting Section 25 in the 2013 Act. Sensible and purposive construction to avoid absurdities and inconsistencies is, therefore, justified when Section 25 is interpreted. [Para 22][1151-C-E]

Indore Development Authority v. Manoharlal and Others (2020) 8 SCC 129 : [2020] 3 SCR 1 – followed.

2.14 The determination of compensation is a complex factual and legal exercise. Section 26(2) of the 2013 Act postulates that the market value calculated as per sub-section (1) shall be multiplied by a factor specified in the First Schedule. The First Schedule enumerates different components which constitute the minimum compensation package to be given to those whose land is acquired and to the tenants referred to in clause (c) of Section

3. Columns 2 and 3 of the First Schedule mandate that the market value in case of rural areas is to be multiplied/factored between 1 and 2 based on the distance of the project from urban area. The factor is to be notified by the “appropriate government”. When the factor/multiplier is more than 1, the compensation payable would be proportionately higher than the market value. [Paras 19, 23][1148-G; 1152-A-C]

2.15 The impugned judgment holds that the period when the stay order dated 26.05.2014 was effective is inconsequential and irrelevant as the High Court had not stayed the acquisition proceedings. It is difficult to accept the said reasoning for the simple reason that it ignores the language of the interim order and its true effect in redetermination of compensation. The interim order passed by the High Court had inhibited further action on the part of the authorities to proceed with the acquisition of land. This period of inhibition is excluded while computing the period for passing of the award by an authority, under section of the 1894 Act. Further, the stay granted would be applicable to others also who had not obtained stay in that behalf. [Para 25][1152-F-H; 1153-B]

Abhey Ram (D) by LRs. and Others v. Union of India and Others (1997) 5 SCC 421 : [1997] 3 SCR 931 – referred to.

2.16 The reasoning that the statute cannot provide for all possible scenarios, and it is for the courts to plug the gaps through the process of judicial interpretation by ascertaining the legislative intent and that the Court resorts to construe the words of the provision in a reasonable way having regard to the context would be applicable to Section 25 of the 2013 Act as well. If interpreted otherwise, it would bring inconsistencies and would cause injustice. [Paras 27, 29][1154-B-C; 1154-G-H]

Indore Development Authority v. Manoharlal and Others (2020) 8 SCC 129:[2020] 3 SCR 1 – followed.

2.18 Inasmuch as the High Court had, on 26th May 2014, stayed the operation of the notification dated 19th March 2014, and subsequently modified the order on 23rd September 2014 permitting publication of the awards, the intervening period of

129 days between 26th May 2014 until 23rd September 2014 and in any case of 79 days from 26th May 2014 till the new notification dated 13th August 2014 was issued must be excluded. Ordinarily, an award made or passed before 31st December 2014 would be valid. However, owing to the intervening period of 79 days, it could be made up to 20th March 2015. The specific case of the landowners before the High Court was about lapsing of acquisition proceedings owing to the mandate of Section 11A of the 1894 Act. It was not even remotely suggested that the acquisition proceedings had lapsed even in terms of the mandate of the new legislation being 2013 Act, in particular Section 25 thereof. In other words, the High Court was essentially called upon to answer the assail in reference to the lapsing provision in the 1894 Act. However, that will have no bearing on the fact situation of the instant case, to which the regime predicated in Section 25 of the 2013 Act ought to apply. [Para 30][1155-A-D]

2.19 Indeed, the High Court leaned in favour of the argument that the stated award dated 30th October 2014 is backdated. That, however, was in the context of applicability of Section 11A of the 1894 Act and by not excluding the period during which the High Court stay was operating. Indisputably, the High Court did not examine the matter in the context of applicability of provisions of Section 25 of the 2013 Act and further, as has been held hitherto, the period during which the court’s stay to the notification dated 19th March 2014 was operative, needs to be excluded. In the case of latter, the factum of manipulation and backdating of award becomes insignificant unless the High Court was to go a step further and hold that the award was not made even until 20th March 2015. In that view of the matter, the conclusion reached is inevitable and it must follow that the acquisition proceedings in question had not lapsed in law. [Para 34][1158-E-G]

2.20 Arguendo, if the afterthought plea raised by the landowners was to be entertained before this Court for the first time that the acquisition proceedings had lapsed even on account of the mandate of Section 25 of the 2013 Act, the same needs to be negatived for more than one reason. First, no factual foundation was set out by the landowners including to assert that the stated award was not made even till 20th March 2015 nor was the High Court called upon to examine that fact. Secondly, the landowners “themselves” stated (admitted) that the Commissioner had given permission/approval to the draft award on 20.11.2014. Further, the High Court had not held that the award was made or pronounced beyond the period specified under Section 25. [Para 35][1158-G-H; 1159-A-B]

2.21 Ordinarily, in terms of Section 25, the award ought to have been published up to 31.12.2014. However, the period of

79 days, when interim stay order was in operation, needs to be excluded, in which case the award could be validly made until 20th March 2015. Given this date, even if it is assumed that the award dated 30th October 2014 is backdated, it was duly made soon after the approval was accorded by the Commissioner on 20.11.2014, which was certainly without any doubt, before 20.03.2015. [Para 36][1159-C]

2.22 The prima facie opinion noted by the High Court on the factum of backdating of the subject award would not make any difference to the outcome of the relief pursued by the landowners by way of writ petition for a declaration that the subject acquisition proceedings had lapsed. Such declaration cannot be issued in the fact situation of the instant case. However, as the High Court noticed certain discrepancies, as pointed out to it by the landowners in the record and proceedings before the Special Land Acquisition culminating in making of the stated award, it would be appropriate to leave that aspect open for being enquired into by the appropriate authority by conducting enquiry to identify the relevant facts and circumstances and if it is found to be a mischief, responsible person therefor may be proceeded against as per law. Suffice it to state that neither the observations made by the High Court nor this decision may affect the final opinion or conclusion that may have to be reached in such an enquiry. In other words, the enquiry be proceeded independently on its own merits by giving opportunity to all concerned. [Paras 37, 38][1159-D-G]

2.23 It is submitted that the notice under Section 12(2) of the 1894 Act dated 6th May 2015 was served on the landowners on various dates in May 2015. Sub-section (1) to Section 37 of the 2013 Act as well as sub-section (1) to Section 12 of the 1894 Act state that the award shall be filed in the Collector’s office and shall be final and conclusive evidence as between the Collector and the persons interested. It would not matter whether the person interested have appeared before the Collector or not. Further, the award is final and conclusive evidence as of the true area. Sub-section (3) to Section 37 of the 2013 Act requires the Collector to keep open to public and display summary of the entire proceedings undertaken in the case of acquisition of land, including the amount of compensation awarded. These mandates must be complied with, but as they are post the making of the award and, therefore, would not affect the validity of the award when made within the statutory time. Issue of notice by the Collector to the persons interested, which is to be given to the persons not present personally or through the representatives when the award is made, is to be issued immediately, but the issue of notice is not a condition precedent for making the award. Belated issue of notice would not, therefore, legally affect the validity of the award, though there may be other consequences. Equally, limitation period to challenge and question the compensation awarded would commence on the service/intimation about making of the award on the landowners. When satisfied that the award was made/ published within the prescribed period, even when there was backdating of the award or delay in effecting service on the landowners, the land acquisition proceedings need not be set aside. [Para 39][1160-A-F] Raja Harish Chandra Raj Singh v. Deputy Land

Acquisition Officer and Another AIR 1961 SC 1500 : [1962] SCR 676 – referred to.