Full Judgment Text
Text read from the judgment PDF published on the High Court's eCourts portal, through the
Indian High Court Judgments open data set (Dattam Labs,
CC BY 4.0).
The court's own copy is the authoritative text.
IN THE HIGH COURT AT CALCUTTA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
(APPELLATE SIDE)
MAT/2150/2025
THE DISTRICT INSPECTOR OF SCHOOLS (S.E.), UTTAR DINAJPUR
VS.
DHRUBAJYOTI ROY AND OTHERS
Before:
The Hon’ble Justice Arijit Banerjee
&
The Hon’ble Justice Apurba Sinha Ray
For the appellant
: Mr. Ranjan Saha, Adv.
For the Respondent no. 8
: Mr. Arabinda Chatterjee, Sr. Adv.
Ms. Kakali Dutta, Adv.
For the Respondents Nos 15 /Writ Petitioners
:
Mr. Kamalesh Bhattacharyya, Adv.
For the State
: Mr. Kaustav Seal, Adv.
Mr. Aninda Bhattacharyya, Adv.
Ms. Soma Chakraborty, Adv.
For orders on
: 07.10.2026
Arijit Banerjee, J. :1.
This appeal is directed against a judgement and order dated July 22,
2025, whereby a learned Judge of our Court in effect allowed the writ
petition of the private respondents.
2.
The writ petitioners had approached the learned Single Judge with
primarily the following prayer: “Under the circumstances it is prayed that your Lordship would
graciously be pleased to issue:
a) Writ in the nature of Mandamus commanding the
respondents to forthwith grant approval of the appointment of
the petitioners as teaching and non-teaching staff (Petitioner
No. 1 to 4 teaching and petitioner No. 5 is non-teaching staff)
whose names are appearing in the DLIT report leading to first
recognition as unaided till 2013 and followed by recognition
with aide in 2021 and to ensure formal approval of
appointment with financial assistance to the petitioners in the
form of payment of salary month by month with effect from
the date of recognition of the said school with effect from the
date when financial aid was given to the school in 01.01.2021
and not to interfere with the service of the petitioner in any
manner till the formal approval of appointment of the
petitioners.”
3.
The aforesaid prayer was made in the following factual background:
i.
Writ petitioner nos. 1 to 4, having the requisite qualifications for
appointment as Assistant Teachers, and the petitioner no. 5 having
requisite qualification for a Non- Teaching Staff position, were
appointed by Lakshman Chandra Jageswar 4 - Class Junior High
School (in short ‘the school’) sometime prior to 2013. The school had
been set up in the area by the local residents as there was no other
school for children in that area.
ii.
The District Level Inspection Team (DLIT) conducted an
inspection of the school on July 22, 2013. The report submitted by the
DLIT acknowledged that the petitioners were working in the school in
their respective positions.
iii.
The managing committee of the school filed writ petition no.
32821 of 2013 for a direction on the government to extend financial aid
to the school. The writ petition was dismissed. Upon the matter being
carried to the Division Bench by way of FMA 1136 of 2017, the Division
Bench, by an order dated April 17, 2019, opined that the school was
entitled to financial aid and directed the State accordingly.
iv.
The authorities filed an application for review of the Division
Bench order dated April 17, 2019, which was dismissed by an order
dated July 15, 2019. However it was clarified that the conditions for
grant of financial aid would have to be scrupulously adhered to by the
school.
v.
The State’s Special Leave Petition against the parent order dated
April 17, 2019 and the order dated July 15, 2019, disposing of the
review petition, was dismissed on the ground of delay, leaving all
questions of law open.
vi.
Thereafter by an order dated August 9, 2021, the West Bengal
Board
of
Secondary
Education
(in
short
‘the
Board’),
granted
provisional recognition to the school with financial aid for the current
academic session in respect of classes V-VI and for classes VII-VIII from
the academic year commencing on January 1, 2022. By the said order,
three teaching posts were sanctioned for the current academic session
for classes V-VI and three other teaching posts were sanctioned for
classes VII – VIII effective from January 1, 2022, subject to fulfillment
of the conditions stipulated in the memo dated September 5, 2013.
vii.
The writ petitioners made several representations seeking
approval of their appointments. Alleging that such representations
received no attention from the authorities, the petitioners approached
the learned Single Judge.
4.
Before the learned Single Judge, the respondent authorities basically
contended that the School Education Department, by its memo dated
November 11, 2022, sanctioned six teaching posts for the school. However,
the school authority did not submit the requisite documents along with the
managing committee’s resolution specifying the subject-wise vacancies and
the register of appointments as per the Hundred-Point Roster to the office of
the District Inspector of Schools, nor did it enter into communication with
the West Bengal Central School Service Commission (SCC) or the Board for
filling the said posts. It was further contended that the District Inspector of
Schools, by a communication dated March 4, 2024, had instructed the
school authority to submit necessary documents for initiating the process of
filling up the vacant posts, but such documents were not submitted.
5.
Learned Single Judge noted that the DLIT report clearly mentioned
the petitioners. The Division Bench had directed grant of financial aid to the
school subject to conditions which included payment of prescribed pay
scales and retirement benefits under DCRB scheme to the teaching and
non-teaching staff of the school. The learned Judge rejected the contention
of the authorities that the six new posts had been created for being filled up
by initiating a recruitment process and not necessarily by absorbing the
petitioners in such posts. The learned Judge referred to and discussed the
relevant provisions of the West Bengal School Service Commission Act, 1997
as also a Circular dated September 30, 1992, issued by the Education
Department, Government of West Bengal. Such Circular provided for
approval of appointment of Organiser Teacher and non-teaching staff in
secondary schools upgraded by the Board. Ultimately the learned Judge
allowed the writ petition with the following observations: “36. Article 21A of the Constitution of India casts a duty upon the
State to provide free and compulsory education to all children
between the ages of 6 and 14 years, in such manner as the State
may determine by law. Similarly, Section 6 of the Right of Children
to Free and Compulsory Education Act, 2009 imposes an
obligation on the State to establish, within such area or limits of
neighbourhood, as may be prescribed, a school, where it is not so
established within a period of three years from the commencement
of this Act 4 of 2006.
37. However, in the present case, despite the absence of any
school within a 9 k.m.- radius of the locality, the State, though
vested with parens patriae responsibility towards its citizens,
particularly in matters of essential public services such as
education, failed to take any initiative to establish a school in the
area. Instead, it was the organising Managing Committee that took
the initiative to set up the school. The petitioners, serving as
teaching
and
non-teaching
staff,
have
been
operating
the
institution and imparting education to the children of the locality,
thereby fulfilling a critical obligation that rests with the State.
38. In the present case, most probably to discharge such duties,
the State seeks to utilise the infrastructure and other facilities
developed by the organising Managing Committee, along with the
running school, complete with the requisite number of students, to
cater the educational needs of children aged 11 to 14 in the
locality. However, in an apparent attempt to avoid assuming the
financial liability of paying the prescribed pay scales and
retirement benefits to the organising teaching and non-teaching
staff, the State is invoking the provisions of the 1997 Act, the 2005
Act, and various notifications as a shield. Such a stance is not
only inequitable but also unjustified.
39. An inevitable question that arises is whether it would be
appropriate to remit the matter to the concerned respondents for
resolution. In the decision reported at (2004) 8 SCC 683 (E.T.
Sunup vs. C.A. N.S.S. Employees Association), the Hon'ble
Supreme Court expressed concern over the growing tendency of
government officials to circumvent court orders by resorting to
various justifications. The Court observed that such conduct
reflects a complete lack of grace in accepting judicial directions
and cannot be tolerated. In a constitutional democracy, the
authority of the courts cannot be rendered subordinate to
administrative discretion. The executive and the legislature are
bound to act within the framework of the Constitution, and the
judiciary has been entrusted with the vital role of ensuring that
both remain within their constitutional limits.
40. Therefore, applying the principle established in E.T. Sunup
(supra), and in light of the respondents' stance in the present case
as well as the protracted history of litigation between the school
authority and the respondents, I am of the considered opinion that
issuing a directive to approve the appointment of the petitioners
would best serve the interests of justice.
Order:
41. Therefore, in view of the discussions and reasons set forth in
the preceding paragraphs, respondent no. 3 is directed to approve
the appointment of petitioner nos. 1 to 4 to the posts of teacher,
and petitioner no. 5 to the post of non-teaching staff of the school,
with effect from the date on which financial aid was granted to the
school. The respondent no.3 shall also release all consequential
benefits, including arrears of salary and retirement benefits, if
found admissible. The entire exercise shall be completed within a
period of 8 (eight) weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of this
order. Respondent nos. 1 and 2 shall ensure that respondent no. 3
complies with this order in its letter and spirit, and within the time
frame stipulated herein.”
6.
Being aggrieved, the District Inspector of Schools (S.E.), Uttar
Dinajpur, has come up by way of this appeal.
7.
Appearing for the appellant, learned Counsel argued that the writ
petitioners were not appointed following recruitment rules. Their initial
appointment being illegal, they are not entitled to approval.
8.
Learned Counsel further submitted that since the school has been
recognised, the teachers and non-teaching staff of the school are to be
appointed as per the provisions of the West Bengal School Service
Commission Act, and any recruitment made without SSC recommendation
is invalid.
9.
Learned Counsel for the respondent no. 8 submitted that since the
writ petitioners were appointed much prior to recognition of the School, the
question of following recruitment rules for their appointment did not arise. It
cannot be said that their appointments were illegal and therefore cannot be
approved. Learned Counsel relied on the decisions of two Division Benches
of this Court in the cases of Niranjan Sahoo @ Niranjan Sahoo & Anr. v.
State of West Bengal & Ors. [FMA 2089 of 2015] and Asit Ranjan
Gayen & Ors. v. State of West Bengal & Ors., (FMA 992 of 2021] and
2023 SCC OnLine Cal 2565.
10.
Learned Advocate for the respondent nos. 1 to 5 referred to a
Government Circular, dated December 20, 1984, issued by the Director of
School Education, in support of his submission that bona fide organiser
teachers appointed prior to recognition being granted to the concerned
school, should not be displaced. Learned Advocate also referred to a decision
of a learned Judge of this Court rendered on August 20, 2013, in the case of
Rakhal Chandra Das & Ors. v. The State of West Bengal and Ors.
[W.P. No. 19811 (W) of 2011] and 2013 SCC OnLine Cal 22943. In that
case, the learned Judge held that upon recognition of a school, its bona fide
organising staff including the Managing Committee should also be
recognised by the Government. Analysing the scheme of the West Bengal
School Service Commission Act, 1997, the learned Judge held that the
School Service Commission should recommend the petitioning teaching and
non-teaching staff who were appointed before recognition was granted to the
school. The respondent authorities should sanction the posts in the School
to accommodate the writ petitioners. The Government should make formal
appointments thereafter. Learned Counsel submitted that the said order
was accepted and implemented by the State Government by its order dated
August 8, 2019.
Learned Advocate also relied on an unreported decision of the Hon’ble
Supreme Court in the case of Prabir Kumar Ghosh & Ors. v. State of
West Bengal & Ors., [SLP (C) 27804 of 2019] and 2022 SCC OnLine SC
2523, dated May 6, 2022, and also on a Division Bench decision of this
Court rendered on December 24, 2024, in the case of State of West Bengal
& Ors. v. Mrinal Kanti Kumar & Ors. [FMA No. 1946 of 2018] and 2024
SCC OnLine Cal 11540.
11.
Learned Advocate for the appellants relied on the decisions of this
Court in State of West Bengal and Ors. v. Smritikana Maity & Ors.,
reported in (2008) 1 CHN 582 and in Manindra Nath Sinha & Ors. v.
State of West Bengal & Ors., reported at (2006) 4 CHN 513.
12.
We have given our anxious consideration to the rival contentions of
the parties.
13.
It is not in dispute that when the DLIT inspected the school in
question, the private respondents were found to be serving there. The DLIT
report clearly mentions their names.
14.
At the time when the respondents were appointed, the West Bengal
Service Commission Act, 1997, was not there. The school was also not a
recognised school at that point of time within the meaning of the 1997 Act.
Hence, the question of such appointments being invalid for alleged
contravention of the provisions of the 1997 Act and in particular Sections 7,
8 and 9 of the Act, does not arise.
15.
Since the appointments of the respondents cannot be said to be
illegal, in our opinion, while granting recognition to the school, it was the
duty of the concerned authorities to grant provisional approval to the
Organiser Teachers who have been instrumental in running the school for
decades, subject to subsequent formal approval.
16.
It has to be kept in mind that the respondents/writ petitioners being
the organising staff of the school, rendered valuable service by keeping the
school afloat in an area where there was no school for children. The school
and its staff were discharging a duty that The Right to Education Act, 2009
imposed on the State. It would be grossly unfair, inequitable and a misconstruction of the provisions of the 1997 Act to hold that once recognition
was granted, the school got transformed into a new institution and is
required to make fresh appointments of teachers following the provisions of
the 1997 Act.
17.
Our above view finds support from the decision dated September 2,
2022 of a Coordinate Bench in the case of Niranjan Sahoo @ Niranjan
Sahoo & Anr. v. State of West Bengal & Ors. (Supra) and also the
decision dated September 1, 2023 of another Coordinate Bench in Asit
Ranjan Gayen & Ors. v. State of West Bengal & Ors., (Supra).
18.
In Niranjan Sahoo @ Niranjan Sahoo & Anr. v. State of West
Bengal & Ors., (Supra) the Coordinate Bench quoted the observation of the
Hon’ble Supreme Court in Prabir Kumar Ghosh & Ors. v. State of West
Bengal & Ors., (Supra), to the following effect: “Considering the entirety of the matter, the Single Judge found
that in view of the report submitted by District Magistrate, Cooch
Behar, order dated 12.04.2002 of Director of Education, was not
sustainable.
The
Inspector
School
of
Single
Judge,
therefore,
directed
(Secondary
Education)
to
District
approve
the
appointments of writ petitioners except writ petitioner No. 6 with
effect from 05.06.2014.
The aforesaid decision of the Single Judge was, however, set aside
by the Division Bench in an appeal arising therefrom.
It was observed by the Division Bench that if the initial
appointment itself was illegal, the appointments could not be
regularized and that the decision rendered by the Single Judge
was otherwise unsustainable.
As the record indicates that the school was set up by the villagers.
The facility of the school in the neighbourhood was not made
available by the official agencies. In a situation such as that the
engagement of the writ petitioners cannot strictly be called to be
illegal. They were definitely imparting education in keeping with
the letter and spirit of the legislation enacted by the Parliament
being Right to Education Act.
In the circumstances, the Division Bench was not justified in
setting the order passed by the Single Judge. Consequently, we
allow the appeal, set aside the order passed by the Division Bench
and restore the order passed by the Single Judge of the High
Court.
The appeal is accordingly, allowed.”
19.
The two decisions relied upon by learned Counsel for the appellants
i.e., Manindra Nath Sinha & Ors. v. State of West Bengal & Ors.,
(Supra), and State of West Bengal and Ors. v. Smritikana Maity & Ors.,
(Supra), have been dealt with by the Coordinate Bench in Niranjan Sahoo
@ Niranjan Sahoo & Anr. v. State of West Bengal & Ors., (Supra). The
Bench in Niranjan Sahoo @ Niranjan Sahoo & Anr. v. State of West
Bengal & Ors., (Supra), held, and in our respectful opinion rightly held,
that the facts in Manindra Nath Sinha & Ors. v. State of West Bengal &
Ors., (Supra), and State of West Bengal and Ors. v. Smritikana Maity
& Ors., (Supra), were completely different. In those cases, the Court had
held that the initial appointment of the Organiser Staff was illegal. The
Coordinate Bench in Niranjan Sahoo @ Niranjan Sahoo & Anr. v. State
of West Bengal & Ors., (Supra), held that the decisions in Manindra Nath
Sinha & Ors. v. State of West Bengal & Ors., (Supra), and State of
West Bengal and Ors. v. Smritikana Maity & Ors., (Supra), have no
manner of application to appointment of teaching and non-teaching staff
upon recognition of a bona fide staffed school. We respectfully agree.
20.
In view of the aforesaid, we do not find any infirmity in the judgment
and order sought to be assailed in this appeal. The impugned order is a wellreasoned one and discusses the applicable case law. The view taken by the
learned Single Judge is an eminently plausible one. It is established law that
when a learned Single Judge while exercising discretionary power, comes to
a conclusion, the appeal Court, in an intra court appeal, will not interfere
only because the appeal court may have come to a different conclusion had
it acted as the court of first instance. Interference is warranted only if the
learned Single Judge takes an impossible view or his order is clearly wrong
or perverse. In this connection one may refer to the dicta of the Hon’ble
Supreme Court in the case of Wander Ltd. and Anr. v. Antox India (P)
Ltd., reported at 1990 Supp SCC 727 : 1990 SCC OnLine SC 490.
Paragraph 14 of the reported judgment reads as follows: “14. The appeals before the Division Bench were against the
exercise of discretion by the Single Judge. In such appeals, the
appellate court will not interfere with the exercise of discretion of
the court of first instance and substitute its own discretion except
where the discretion has been shown to have been exercised
arbitrarily, or capriciously or perversely or where the court had
ignored the settled principles of law regulating grant or refusal of
interlocutory injunctions. An appeal against exercise of discretion
is said to be an appeal on principle. Appellate court will not
reassess the material and seek to reach a conclusion different from
the one reached by the court below if the one reached by that
court was reasonably possible on the material. The appellate court
would normally not be justified in interfering with the exercise of
discretion under appeal solely on the ground that if it had
considered the matter at the trial stage it would have come to a
contrary conclusion. If the discretion has been exercised by the
trial court reasonably and in a judicial manner the fact that the
appellate court would have taken a different view may not justify
interference with the trial court's exercise of discretion. After
referring to these principles Gajendragadkar, J. in Printers
(Mysore) Private Ltd. v. Pothan Joseph [(1960) 3 SCR 713 : AIR
1960 SC 1156] : (SCR 721)
“... These principles are well established, but as has been
observed by Viscount Simon in Charles Osenton & Co. v.
Jhanaton [1942 AC 130] ‘...the law as to the reversal by a court
of appeal of an order made by a judge below in the exercise of
his discretion is well established, and any difficulty that arises
is due only to the application of well settled principles in an
individual case’.”
21.
In the result, the judgment and order under appeal does not call for
interference. The appeal is dismissed. There will be no order as to costs.
22.
Urgent Photostat certified copies of this judgment and order, if applied
for, be supplied to the parties on compliance of all necessary formalities.
I agree.
(Apurba Sinha Ray, J.)
(Arijit Banerjee, J.)
This page is for informational and research purposes only and does not constitute legal advice.
Consult a qualified advocate for advice specific to your situation.
Is your name in this judgment and should it be masked, or is something on this page wrong?
Request a review