Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976: ss. 12(4), 13, 30, 33(1), 33(3), 33(4) and 40 – Land in question subjected to ceiling proceedings under the Act – Thereafter allotted to respondent-hospital on a long term lease of 30 years – The Notification issued u/s. 10(3) of the Act was challenged by respondent No. 1 – The notification was upheld by High Court and Supreme Court – However, Supreme Court observed that it was open to the respondent to avail any appropriate remedy – Thereupon respondents 1 to 7 filed the present suit seeking declaration that the proceedings under the Act which culminated in issuance of notification u/s. 10(1) of the Act be declared null and void and the respondents be declared owners of the suit property – Trial court dismissed the suit interalia holding that the suit was not maintainable and was also barred by limitation – In appeal, High Court interalia held that the civil court had the jurisdiction to try the suit on merits and hence the suit was maintainable and that the plaintiffs (respondent Nos. 1 to 7) were the owners of the suit property – On appeal, held: The Act is a self-contained code in itself providing complete machinery while dealing with the land-owners right in relation to the excess land prescribed under the Act – The Act gives finality to the orders passed by the appellate authority u/s. 33 and also provides bar to file civil suits in relation to cases falling u/s. 30(5) and s. 40 of the Act – Therefore, jurisdiction of civil courts to try the civil suits with respect to land which were subjected to ceiling proceedings under the Act, are impliedly barred – The civil court had no jurisdiction to grant the reliefs as sought in the present case – Belated challenge to the ceiling proceedings is meritless – Furthermore, the State after acquiring ownership of the suit property has allotted it to the hospital on 30 years lease and hence the situation has become irreversible – Jurisdiction.
Allowing the appeals, the Court
HELD: 1. The entire scheme of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 makes two things clear. First, the Act is a self-contained code in itself, which provides complete machinery while dealing with the rights of the land-owners in relation to their lands, which are in excess of the ceiling limits prescribed under the Act. It also provides adequate remedies to correct all kinds of errors committed by the competent authority under the Act; and Second, the Act gives finality to the orders passed by the appellate authority under Section 33, and also provides a bar to file the civil suits in relation to cases falling under Section 30 (5) and Section 40 of the Act. [Para 50] [348-B, C]
2. The jurisdiction of the civil court is held to be exclused by implication to try the civil suit in question. This is for the following reasons: First, the Act in question gives finality to the orders passed by the appellate authority [refer to Section 33(3)]. Second, the Act provides adequate remedies in the nature of appeals, such as first appeal to the Tribunal and second appeal to the High Court. [refer to Sections 12 (4), 13 and 33 (1)]. Third the Act is a complete code in itself and gives overriding powers on other laws (refer to Section 42). Fourth, the Act expressly excludes the jurisdiction of the Civil Court in relation to the cases falling under Sections 30 and 40 (refer to Section 30(5) and Section 40). Fifth, as a result of dismissal of writ petition and SLP in the first round of litigation it was held therein that the proceedings under the Act in question were done in conformity with the Act in question. In the light of the aforesaid five reasons - a fortiori, the jurisdiction of the civil court in relation to all the issues arising under the Act is held impliedly excluded thereby satisfying all the conditions set out in clause (1) of *Dhula Bai case. Therefore, the jurisdiction of the civil courts to try the civil suits with respect to the lands, which were subjected to ceiling proceedings under the Act, are held to be impliedly barred, since the Act excludes the jurisdiction of the civil court. [Paras 54, 55 and 56] [350-A-F]
3. It is evident from the relief prayed for in the plaint that the plaintiffs have sought a declaration that the notification dated 12.02.1990 issued under Section 10 of the Act be declared null and void; that a statement filed by defendant No. 2 under Section
6 of the Act before the Competent Authority be declared null and void; and that the statement filed by defendant No. 3 under Section
8 of the Act be declared null and void. The Civil Court had no jurisdiction to grant the afore-mentioned reliefs inasmuch as its jurisdiction to grant such reliefs is impliedly barred under the Act. [Paras 57, 58][350-G, H; 351-A, B]
4. If Respondent Nos. 1 to 7 - Plaintiffs claimed themselves to be the lawful owners and holders of the suit property to the exclusion of others, there were three remedies available in law which they could have availed of: (i) First, a remedy accrued to them when defendant No. 2 claimed to have purchased the suit property from the alleged vendors on 30.11.1962. The Respondents should have filed a Civil Suit against the vendors
(ii) The second remedy arose under Section 6 of the Act, for filing a statement as owners and holders of the suit property before the Competent Authority, after the Act came into force in 1976. This was also not availed of by the plaintiffs. (iii) The third remedy was in filing objections under Section 10(1) of the Act before the Competent Authority when the Competent Authority invited objections on 12.02.1990 from public and pursuant to it, the notice was issued in that behalf. The respondents again did not avail of this remedy, and failed to file any objections. [Para 59][351-B-F]
5. The Respondents-Plaintiffs having failed to avail any of the three remedies at appropriate time, resorted to fourth remedy of filing a Writ Petition to challenge the notifications dated 11.05.1990. This Writ Petition was, however, dismissed. The order of dismissal was affirmed by this Court in SLP. The dismissal of the SLP by this Court had a three-fold effect on the rights of the parties to the lis in relation to the suit property: First, the entire action taken by the competent authority initiated from Section 6 of the Act till issuance of notifications under Section 10(1) and (3) of the Act issued on 12.02.1990 and 11.05.1990 in relation to the suit property were held to be in conformity with the provisions of the Act. This satisfied the last condition of clause
(1) of *Dhula Bai case. Second, the suit property stood vested in the State free from all encumbrances under Section 10(3) of the Act. Third, the State Government was held to be in legal possession of the suit property as the owner on and after 11.05.1990, to the exclusion of all, by following the due procedure of law. In such a situation, the Respondent Nos.1 to 7 could not take recourse to filing of the civil suit on the basis of the observation made by this Court. [Paras 60-62][351-F-H; 352-A-C]
6. If there were any remedy available to the respondents in relation to the suit property, then any such remedy was under the Act but not by filing a civil suit in a civil court and start a fresh round of litigation with respect to the suit property. Such a suit was impliedly barred in the light of exclusion of jurisdiction of the civil court under the Act. [Para 63][352-D, E]
7. The intention of the Legislature is more explicit in excluding the jurisdiction of the civil court under the Act in question. It is clear from a reading of Sections 12(4), 13, 30, 33(1), 33(3), 33(5) and 40 of the Act in question. [Paras 70 and 71] [355-C, D]
8. Thus, the civil court had no jurisdiction to try the civil suit in relation to the land which is subject to ceiling proceedings under the Act in question; nor did the civil court have the jurisdiction to declare the proceedings held under the Act, as void or illegal or non est, since it was impliedly excluded and barred under the Act. [Para 72][355-F]
9. It cannot be said that prejudice was caused to respondent Nos. 1 to 7 by the ceiling proceedings which proceeded against them behind their back as it has been held that the civil court had no jurisdiction to entertain a civil suit with respect to proceedings under the Urban Land Ceiling Act, being a special and self-contained enactment. Furthermore, respondent Nos. 1 to 7/ Plaintiffs having failed to raise objections to the ceiling proceedings at any stage, the suit property stood vested in the State, free from all encumbrances. The belated challenge to the same is meritless. Having failed to avail of the remedies under the Urban Land Ceiling Act and the one resorted to resulted in rejection of the claim made therein upto this Court, Respondent Nos. 1 to 7/ Plaintiffs sought to start a fresh round of litigation by filing a civil suit, which was barred under the Act. Furthermore, the State after acquiring ownership over the suit land has allotted the suit land to the Hospitals on a 30 years lease. Hence, the situation has now become irreversible. [Paras 73-75][355-H; 356-A-D]
10. Therefore, the Division Bench of High Court was not justified in allowing the Respondents’ appeal, and decreeing the civil suit whereas the trial court was right in dismissing the civil suit. [Para 76][356-D]
Dhula Bai v. State of MP (AIR 1969 SC 78) : [1968] SCR 662 – followed.
State of Bihar v. Dhirendra Kumar (1995) 4 SCC 229 : [1995] 3 SCR 857; Laxmi Chand v. Gram Panchayat Kararia (1996) 7 SCC 218 : [1995] 4 Suppl. SCR 774; Bangalore Development Authority v. K. S Narayan (2006) 8 SCC 336 : [2006] 7 Suppl. SCR 186; State of Punjab v. Amarjit Singh (2011) 14 SCC 713 – relied on.
As published in the Supreme Court Reports, Supreme Court of India. Text from the Indian Supreme Court Judgments open data set (Dattam Labs), CC BY 4.0.
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