Full Judgment Text
Text read from the judgment PDF published on the High Court's eCourts portal, through the
Indian High Court Judgments open data set (Dattam Labs,
CC BY 4.0).
The court's own copy is the authoritative text.
IN THE HIGH COURT OF SIKKIM : GANGTOK
(Civil Appellate Jurisdiction)
MAC App. No.11 of 2019
The Branch Manager,
National Insurance Company Limited,
having its office at 31-A, National Highway,
Opposite Tourism Department,
P.O. & P.S. Gangtok, East Sikkim.
...Appellant/Insurer
Versus
1.
Mr. Bishal Chettri,
Son of Late Kedar Nath Chettri,
Resident of Sinek, Tashiding,
P.O. Tashiding & P.S. Gayzing,
West Sikkim.
2.
Mrs. Tulsha Chettri,
Wife of Mr. Nanda Lall Chettri,
Resident of Tashiding Bazar,
P.O. Tashiding & P.S. Gayzing.
…Respondent/Claimant
…Respondent/Owner
BEFORE
HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE ARUP KUMAR GOSWAMI, C.J.
For Appellant
: Mr. Sushant Subba, Advocate.
For Respondent No. 1
: Mr. N. Rai, Senior Advocate with Mr. K.B. Chettri,
Advocate.
For Respondent No. 2
: Mr. Sishir Mothay, Advocate.
Date of Hearing
: 13.03.2020.
Date of Judgment
: 23.03.2020.
JUDGMENT AND ORDER
Heard Mr. Sushant Subba, learned counsel appearing for the
appellant.
Also heard Mr. N. Rai, learned Senior Counsel assisted by Mr.
K.B. Chettri, appearing for respondent no.1 and Mr. Sishir Mothay, learned
counsel appearing for respondent no. 2.
2.
This appeal is presented by the National Insurance Company Limited
under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, for short, the Act,
against the judgment and order dated 25.04.2019 passed by the learned
Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, East Sikkim, for short, Tribunal, in MACT
Case No. 30 of 2018.
3.
The learned Tribunal, on the basis of evidence on record, more
particularly, Exhibit-11, held that injured was having an annual income of
Rs.1,20,000/-. It was also held that he was 22 years of age at the time of
accident. On the basis of Exhbibit-9 it was also held that he suffered from
80% disablement. Accordingly, the learned Tribunal awarded compensation
by calculating as follows:
1.
Annual income of the claimant
Rs. 1,20,000/-
2.
40% added as future prospect
Rs.
3.
Net income of the deceased
Rs. 1,68,000/-
4.
Multiplier is taken as 17 as per
48,000/-
the second schedule of the Act
Rs.1,68,000 x 17
5.
Medical expenses (supported by
bills and cash memos)
Rs. 1,58,933/-
6.
Pain and suffering
Rs.
25,000/-
7.
Loss of amenities
Rs.
50,000/-
Total
4.
Rs.28,56,000/-
Rs.30,89,933/-
Accordingly, it was ordered that Branch Manager, National Insurance
Company Limited shall pay the compensation of Rs.30,89,933/-(Rupees
thirty lakhs eighty nine thousand nine hundred thirty three) only with
interest @ 10% per annum on the said sum to the claimant from the date
of filing of the claim petition i.e. 06.06.2018 till full and final payment.
5.
Mr. Subba has submitted that as the claim petition was filed under
Section 166 of the Act, it was necessary for the claimant to have proved that
he had sustained injury arising out of a vehicular accident as a result of rash
and negligent driving. It is contended by him that there was no evidence
whatsoever regarding the accident having occurred due to rash and
negligent driving and therefore, learned Tribunal committed manifest error
of law in passing the impugned Judgment awarding a sum of Rs.
30,89,933/- to the claimant. He submits that in the attending facts and
circumstances and having regard to the evidence on record, the learned
Tribunal ought to have awarded compensation under Section 163A of the
Act, as under the aforesaid Section, the claimant is not required to plead or
establish that the death or permanent disablement in respect of which the
claim has been made was due to any wrongful act or neglect or default of
the owner of the vehicle or vehicles concerned or of any other person. He
submits that the claimant, at the relevant time, was 22 years of age and,
therefore, following the Second Schedule of the Act, the learned Tribunal,
taking the upper limit of Rs.40,000/- as annual income of the injured, could
have awarded a sum of Rs.7,60,000/-.
6.
On a specific query made by the Court as to whether any dispute is
raised with regard to annual income and medical expenses as awarded by
the learned Tribunal, he submitted that medical expenses as awarded is not
disputed by him. He has also not disputed Exhibit-9, wherein it is certified
that the claimant is suffering from paraplegia and has 80% permanent
physical impairment. He has also submitted that though in the grounds of
memo of appeal, annual income certificate of injured claimant was disputed,
he is not disputing the finding arrived at by the learned Tribunal with regard
to the income of the injured.
7.
In support of his submissions, Mr. Subba has relied on decisions of the
Hon‟ble Supreme Court in the cases of Minu B. Mehta and Another vs.
Balkrishna Ramchandra Nayan and Another, reported in (1977) 2 SCC
441 and Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. vs. Meena Variyal and Others,
reported in (2007) 5 SCC 428.
8.
Mr. Rai, on the other hand, has submitted that claimant has proved
rash and negligent driving on the part of the driver of the vehicle and
therefore, there is no merit in the contention advanced by Mr. Subba that
the claimant had failed to prove rash and negligent driving. It is submitted
by him that whether or not there is sufficient evidence regarding rash and
negligent driving has to be judged on the touchstone of preponderance of
probability and approach of the Tribunal or Court ought not to be to find
fault with non-examination of witnesses.
9.
Learned Senior Counsel submits that, in fact, the learned Tribunal,
though enjoined in law to award just compensation, has failed to award just
compensation and therefore, although the respondent no. 1/claimant has
not filed any appeal or cross objection, there is no embargo or impediment
on the part of this Court to enhance the compensation awarded, when the
cause of justice so demands.
10.
While not disputing the income of the claimant assessed by the
learned Tribunal as well as the amount awarded on the head of „medical
expenses‟, he submits that adoption of multiplier of 17 by the learned
Tribunal is not in consonance with the principle laid down in the case of
Sarla Verma (Smt) and Others vs. Delhi Transport Corporation and
Another, reported in (2009) 6 SCC 121 and the learned Tribunal ought to
have taken 18 as the multiplier. He submits that if it was so taken, amount
of compensation awarded would have been Rs.30,24,000/- instead of
Rs.28,56,000/-as awarded by the learned Tribunal.
11.
He further submits that though the claimant had prayed for a sum of
Rs.1,00,000/- each on account of „pain and suffering‟ and „loss of amenities‟,
without
any
discussion,
amounts
of
Rs.25,000/-
and
Rs.50,000/-,
respectively, had been awarded on the about two counts. It is submitted by
him that the evidence on record demonstrates that the claimant cannot
move about without the help or assistance of others as he is suffering from
80% disability and that his condition will remain the same in the years to
come, award of Rs.25,000/- and Rs.50,000/- on account of „pain and
suffering‟ and „loss of amenities‟, respectively, is grossly on the lower side
and this Court may consider to enhance the same so that the injured gets
just compensation. In support of his submissions, learned Senior Counsel
places reliance on Minu B. Mehta (supra), Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd.
vs. Hansrajbhai V. Kodala and others, reported in (2001) 5 SCC 175,
Meena
Variyal
(supra),
Andhra
Pradesh
State
Road
Transport
Corporation, represented by its General Manager and Another vs. M.
Ramadevi and Others, reported in (2008) 3 SCC 379, Ningamma and
Another vs. United India Insurance Co. Ltd., reported in (2009) 13
SCC 710, Dulcina Fernandes and Others vs. Joaquim Xavier Cruz and
Another, reported in AIR 2014 SC 58, Sandeep Khanuja vs. Atul Dande
and Another, reported in (2017) 3 SCC 351, National Insurance Co.
Ltd. vs. Pranay Sethi and Others, reported in (2017) 16 SCC 680,
National Insurance Co. Ltd. vs. Darshana Devi, reported 2017 SCC
OnLine HP 888, Jagdish vs. Mohan and Others, reported in (2018) 4
SCC 571, Cholamandalam MS General Insurance Co. Ltd. vs. Sumitra,
reported in 2018 SCC OnLine Bom 140 and Sunita and Others vs.
Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation and Another, reported in
AIR 2019 SC 994.
12.
Mr. Mothay submits that there is no violation of the terms and
conditions of the insurance policy and all the documents relating to the
vehicle were valid and effective. He further submits that in the attending
facts and circumstances, it will be the Insurance Company which has to pay
the compensation.
13.
I have considered the submissions of the learned counsel for the
parties and perused the materials on record.
14.
In view of the submissions of the learned Counsel for the parties,
essentially, three questions arise for consideration in this appeal:(i)
Whether the claimant has been able to establish that the
vehicular accident occurred due to rash and negligent driving?
(ii)
Whether in absence of an appeal or a cross objection, it
will be permissible to enhance compensation to the injured victim?
(iii)
If the answer to the question no. (ii) is in the affirmative,
whether any case is made out for enhancing compensation on the
head of „pain and suffering‟ and „loss of amenities‟?
15.
In the claim petition, the claimant has stated that the ill-fated vehicle
was driven by his cousin brother Nitesh Chettri and that the injury suffered
by him was because of the accident that occurred due to rash and negligent
driving of the vehicle bearing No.SK-02P-1110 on 03.01.2017. He was
admitted into hospital on 09.03.2017 and was discharged on 29.03.2017. He
had suffered spinal injury (Paraplegia), as a result of which he is bed-ridden
and unable to stand and walk at all and his percentage of disability was
assessed at 80%. He needs assistance of helper round the clock and he
cannot move without the support of another person. He was self employed,
running a poultry farm and supplying broom, orange, ginger and vegetables
and earning Rs. 10,000/- per month.
16.
In the claim petition, age of the injured is written as 22 years in two
places and 23 years in one place. It is stated that the he had filed a petition
under Section 173 (8) CrPC for reinvestigation before the Court of learned
Judicial Magistrate at Soreng, objecting to Final Report submitted by the
Investigating Officer wherein it was stated that the vehicle was not driven in
a rash and negligent manner and that the accident occurred when the driver
drove the vehicle towards left side of the road in order to avert a collision
with a truck which had come from opposite side. On such petition, the Court
had directed the Investigating Officer to reinvestigate the case. A sum of
Rs.42,68,496/- was claimed as the compensation amount. Out of the
aforesaid amount, the claimant had claimed Rs.32,40,000/- on account of
„loss of earning‟ which was put under a head styled as „A‟ and a sum of Rs.
12,44,496/- on various heads such as „pain and suffering‟, „future medical
expenses‟, „loss of amenities‟, „medical expenses‟ etc. under heading ‟B‟.
However, the calculation with regard to the amount of compensation claimed
is not correct and addition of heads „A‟ and „B‟ actually adds up to
Rs.44,84,496/-.
17.
In Minu
B.
Mehta
(supra), the Hon‟ble Supreme Court was
considering a question as to whether in a claim for compensation under the
Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, proof of negligence was essential to support a
claim for compensation. It was noted that the liability of the owner of a car
to compensate the victim in a car accident due to negligent driving of his
servant is based on the law of tort. The Hon‟ble Supreme Court observed the
argument canvassed that the Tribunal is entitled to award compensation
which appears to be just when it is satisfied on proof of injury to a third
party arising out of the use of a vehicle on a public place without proof of
negligence, if accepted would lead to strange result. The Hon‟ble Supreme
Court held that proof of negligence remained the lynchpin to recover
compensation and proof of negligence is necessary before the owner or the
insurance company could be held to be liable for the payment of
compensation in a motor accident claims case.
18.
While
introduced
enacting the
Section
163-A
Motor
Vehicles
providing
for
Act, 1988, the
payment
of
Legislature
compensation
notwithstanding anything contained in the Act or in any other law for the
time being in force that the owner of a motor vehicle or the authorised
insurer shall be liable to pay in the case of death or permanent disablement
due to accident arising out of the use of the motor vehicle, compensation, as
indicated in the Second Schedule, to the legal heirs or the victim, as the
case may be, and in a claim made under sub-section (1) of Section 163-A of
the Act, the claimant shall not be required to plead or establish that the
death or permanent disablement in respect of which the claim has been
made was due to any wrongful act or neglect or default of the owner of the
vehicle concerned. If one proceeds under Section 163-A of the Act, the
compensation will be awarded in terms of the Schedule without calling upon
the victim or his dependants to establish any negligence or default on the
part of the owner of the vehicle or the driver of the vehicle.
19.
In Meena Variyal (supra), the Hon‟ble Supreme Court had observed
that the observations in Minu B. Mehta (supra) governs the claim under
Section 166 of the Act and they are inapplicable when the claim is made
under Section 163-A of the Act.
20.
In Hansrajbhai (supra), the Hon‟ble Supreme Court had observed
that purpose of Section 163-A and the Second Schedule, laying down a
structured formula, is to avoid long term litigation and delay in payment of
compensation to the victim or his heirs who are in dire need of reliefs. It is
also noted that benefit of Section 163-A can be availed of by the claimant by
restricting his claim on the basis of income at a slab of Rs.40,000/-, which is
the highest slab in the Second Schedule which indicates that the legislature
wanted to give benefit of no-fault liability to a certain limit only.
21.
Under the Act, the victim of an accident or his dependants have an
option either to proceed under Section 166 of the Act or under Section 163A of the Act. Though not stated in Section 166 of the Act, in view of Section
163-A, it has to be understood that under Section 166 of the Act, the
claimant has to establish proof of negligence.
22.
To establish the case, the claimant had examined himself and had
submitted his evidence on affidavit. The claimant was cross-examined on
commission. Though the appellant and the present respondent no.2 had
submitted their respective written objection, no evidence was led by them.
23.
In his evidence the claimant stated that he was 23 years old at the
time of the accident. He also exhibited birth certificate as Exhibit-12 wherein
the date of birth was recorded as 27.10.1994. Going by Exhibit-12, it is
evident that the age of the injured was 23 years at the time of accident.
24.
In the aforesaid factual matrix, it is inexplicable how the learned
Tribunal, at paragraph 28 of the judgment, could record that „admittedly‟ the
„deceased‟ was aged about 22 years. It is to be noted that at paragraphs 27
and 28 of the judgment, the learned Tribunal repeatedly referred to the
injured as deceased. A higher degree of punctiliousness is expected while
writing a judgment.
25.
In Sunita (supra), the Hon‟ble Supreme Court had observed that while
deciding cases arising out of motor vehicle cases, the claimants are merely
to establish their case on the touchstone of preponderance of probability and
standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt cannot be applied. In Dulcina
Fernandes (supra), the Hon‟ble Supreme Court reiterated that plea of
negligence on the part of the driver of the offending vehicle has to be
decided by the Tribunal on the touchstone of preponderance of probability
and certainly not on the basis of proof beyond reasonable doubt.
26.
In his evidence the claimant had stated that the vehicle met with the
accident due to rash and negligent act of the driver as he had lost control
over the vehicle due to over speed and had failed to negotiate with the curve
of the road. He reiterated that he sustained major spinal injury resulting in
Paraplegia (paralysis of the legs and lower body), due to which he cannot
perform any work on his own, cannot stand and move at all, has to take the
help of a helper even to attend to call of nature and that till his death he
would need a helper to survive. He had exhibited a report submitted by
Station House Officer of Nayabazaar Police Station dated 20.06.2017 to the
learned Judicial Magistrate, Soreng Sub-Division as Exhibit-20. In the said
report, Station House Officer of Nayabazaar Police Station stated that the
vehicle in question had tumbled down approximately 250 feet from the road
level. A perusal of the cross-examination of the claimant goes to show that
only a suggestion that the accident did not occur due to rash and negligent
driving on the part of the driver was given. The claimant was not even
confronted with Exhibit-20.
27.
Materials on record amply demonstrate the hapless condition to which
the Claimant had been placed and in a circumstance where the claimant is
totally immobile, his inability to adduce the evidence of any other witness
including an occupant of the car cannot be held against the claimant. The
fact that the vehicle had tumbled down 250 feet from the road leads to an
inference of rash and negligent driving on the part of the driver. As noted
earlier, the appellant had not led any evidence. I am of the considered
opinion that it must be held that there is sufficient evidence on record to
hold that the accident had occurred due to rash and negligent driving.
28.
In Jagdish (supra), the Hon‟ble Supreme Court observed that the
measure of compensation must reflect a genuine attempt of the law to
restore the dignity of the being. Noting that injured was even unable to eat
or to attend to a visit to the toilet without the assistance of an attendant, it
was held that it would be denial of justice to compute the disability at 90%
and held that the disability is total. The Hon‟ble Supreme Court held that
compensation must provide a realistic recompense for the pain of loss and
the trauma of suffering and awards of compensation, while not being law‟s
doles, in a discourse of rights, they constitute entitlements under law.
29.
In Ningamma (supra), the Hon‟ble Supreme Court held that Section
166 deals with „just compensation‟ and even if in the pleadings no specific
claim was made under Section 166 of the Act, a party should not be
deprived of getting „just compensation‟ in case the claimant is able to make
out a case under any provision of law. It was held that the Act being a
beneficial and welfare legislation, the Court is duty-bound and entitled to
award „just compensation‟ irrespective of the fact as to whether any plea in
that behalf was raised by the claimant or not. It was also held that there is
no restriction in the Act that the Tribunal/Court cannot award compensation
amount
exceeding
the
claimed
amount
and
the
function
of
the
Tribunal/Court is to award „just compensation‟ which is reasonable on the
basis of evidence produced on record.
30.
In
Sandeep
Khanuja
(supra),
the
injured
was
a
Chartered
Accountant and he had suffered 70% permanent disability of his legs. The
learned Tribunal had taken a view that the same would not impact in his
earning capacity and while arriving at the compensation amount, multiplier
method was not adopted. Having regard to the nature of injuries suffered by
the claimant, the Hon‟ble Supreme Court observed that there is a definite
loss of earning capacity of the claimant and accordingly, adopted a multiplier
of 17 as the age of the injured was of 25 years for the purpose of computing
compensation.
31.
In Sarala Verma (supra), the Hon‟ble Supreme Court at paragraphs
30, 31, 32 and 42 held as follows:
“30. Though in some cases the deduction to be made towards personal
and living expenses is calculated on the basis of units indicated
in Trilok Chandra [(1996) 4 SCC 362] , the general practice is to apply
standardised
deductions.
Having
considered
several
subsequent
decisions of this Court, we are of the view that where the deceased
was married, the deduction towards personal and living expenses of
the deceased, should be one-third (1/3rd) where the number of
dependent family members is 2 to 3, one-fourth (1/4th) where the
number of dependent family members is 4 to 6, and one-fifth (1/5th)
where the number of dependent family members exceeds six.
31. Where the deceased was a bachelor and the claimants are the
parents, the deduction follows a different principle. In regard to
bachelors, normally, 50% is deducted as personal and living expenses,
because it is assumed that a bachelor would tend to spend more on
himself. Even otherwise, there is also the possibility of his getting
married in a short time, in which event the contribution to the
parent(s) and siblings is likely to be cut drastically. Further, subject to
evidence to the contrary, the father is likely to have his own income
and will not be considered as a dependant and the mother alone will
be considered as a dependant. In the absence of evidence to the
contrary, brothers and sisters will not be considered as dependants,
because they will either be independent and earning, or married, or be
dependent on the father.
32. Thus even if the deceased is survived by parents and siblings, only
the mother would be considered to be a dependant, and 50% would be
treated as the personal and living expenses of the bachelor and 50%
as the contribution to the family. However, where the family of the
bachelor is large and dependent on the income of the deceased, as in
a case where he has a widowed mother and large number of younger
non-earning sisters or brothers, his personal and living expenses may
be restricted to one-third and contribution to the family will be taken
as two-third.
x
x
x
42. We therefore hold that the multiplier to be used should be as
mentioned
in
Column
(4)
of
the
table
above
(prepared
by
applying Susamma Thomas [(1994) 2 SCC 176 : 1994 SCC (Cri)
335], Trilok Chandra [(1996) 4 SCC 362] and Charlie [(2005) 10 SCC
720 : 2005 SCC (Cri) 1657] ), which starts with an operative multiplier
of 18 (for the age groups of 15 to 20 and 21 to 25 years), reduced by
one unit for every five years, that is M-17 for 26 to 30 years, M-16 for
31 to 35 years, M-15 for 36 to 40 years, M-14 for 41 to 45 years, and
M-13 for 46 to 50 years, then reduced by two units for every five
years, that is, M-11 for 51 to 55 years, M-9 for 56 to 60 years, M-7 for
61 to 65 years and M-5 for 66 to 70 years.”
32.
In Pranay Sethi (supra), the Constitution Bench of the Supreme
Court at paragraph-59 recorded the conclusions as follows: “59. In view of the aforesaid analysis, we proceed to record our
conclusions:
59.1. The two-Judge Bench in Santosh Devi [Santosh Devi v. National
Insurance Co. Ltd., (2012) 6 SCC 421 : (2012) 3 SCC (Civ) 726 :
(2012) 3 SCC (Cri) 160 : (2012) 2 SCC (L&S) 167] should have been
well advised to refer the matter to a larger Bench as it was taking a
different view than what has been stated in Sarla Verma [Sarla
Verma v. DTC, (2009) 6 SCC 121 : (2009) 2 SCC (Civ) 770 : (2009) 2
SCC (Cri) 1002] , a judgment by a coordinate Bench. It is because a
coordinate Bench of the same strength cannot take a contrary view
than what has been held by another coordinate Bench.
59.2. As Rajesh [Rajesh v. Rajbir Singh, (2013) 9 SCC 54 : (2013) 4
SCC (Civ) 179 : (2013) 3 SCC (Cri) 817 : (2014) 1 SCC (L&S) 149]
has not taken note of the decision in Reshma Kumari [Reshma
Kumari v. Madan Mohan, (2013) 9 SCC 65 : (2013) 4 SCC (Civ) 191 :
(2013) 3 SCC (Cri) 826], which was delivered at earlier point of time,
the decision in Rajesh [Rajesh v. Rajbir Singh, (2013) 9 SCC 54 :
(2013) 4 SCC (Civ) 179 : (2013) 3 SCC (Cri) 817 : (2014) 1 SCC
(L&S) 149] is not a binding precedent.
59.3. While determining the income, an addition of 50% of actual
salary to the income of the deceased towards future prospects, where
the deceased had a permanent job and was below the age of 40 years,
should be made. The addition should be 30%, if the age of the
deceased was between 40 to 50 years. In case the deceased was
between the age of 50 to 60 years, the addition should be 15%. Actual
salary should be read as actual salary less tax.
59.4. In case the deceased was self-employed or on a fixed salary, an
addition of 40% of the established income should be the warrant
where the deceased was below the age of 40 years. An addition of
25% where the deceased was between the age of 40 to 50 years and
10% where the deceased was between the age of 50 to 60 years
should be regarded as the necessary method of computation. The
established income means the income minus the tax component.
59.5. For determination of the multiplicand, the deduction for personal
and living expenses, the tribunals and the courts shall be guided by
paras 30 to 32 of Sarla Verma [Sarla Verma v. DTC, (2009) 6 SCC 121
: (2009) 2 SCC (Civ) 770 : (2009) 2 SCC (Cri) 1002] which we have
reproduced hereinbefore.
59.6. The selection of multiplier shall be as indicated in the Table
in Sarla Verma [Sarla Verma v. DTC, (2009) 6 SCC 121 : (2009) 2
SCC (Civ) 770 : (2009) 2 SCC (Cri) 1002] read with para 42 of that
judgment.
59.7. The age of the deceased should be the basis for applying the
multiplier.
59.8. Reasonable figures on conventional heads, namely, loss of
estate, loss of consortium and funeral expenses should be Rs 15,000,
Rs 40,000 and Rs 15,000 respectively. The aforesaid amounts should
be enhanced at the rate of 10% in every three years.”
33.
In Sumitra (supra), relying upon an earlier judgment of the Bombay
High Court in the case of State of Maharashtra vs. Smt. Kamaladevi
Kailashchandra Kaushal, the Bombay High Court reiterated that even in
absence of an appeal or cross-objection on the part of the claimants, the
Appeal Court is entitled to award „just compensation‟ to the claimants. While
arriving at the aforesaid conclusion, the Court was guided by the
consideration of claimants getting „just compensation‟. In Darshana Devi
(supra), the Himachal Pradesh High Court had also taken the view that in
absence of an independent appeal or a cross-objection, the Court is
competent to enhance the compensation award so as to ensure award of
„just compensation‟ in favour of the claimants.
34.
Factual matrix in Ramadevi (supra) was that the Tribunal took the
age of the deceased to be 40 years and take home pay was taken to be
Rs.2,367/-. Applying the multiplier of 12 the entitlement was fixed at
Rs.2,16,000/-. In addition, Rs.15,000/- for non-pecuniary damages and
Rs.5,000/- for loss of consortium were granted. On an appeal by the
Corporation, the High Court took the view that pay of the deceased was
Rs.3,536/- and accordingly, annual contribution was fixed at Rs.27,996/-.
Accordingly, entitlement was fixed at Rs.3,35,952/- to which was added the
sum of Rs.20,000/- additionally awarded by the Tribunal. Before the Hon‟ble
Supreme Court contention was urged that when there was no appeal by the
claimants, in the appeal filed by the Corporation, the High Court could not
have enhanced the amount of compensation. The Hon‟ble Supreme Court in
the aforesaid context referred to paragraph 21 of Nagappa vs. Gurudayal
Singh, reported in (2003) 2 SCC 274, which is as follows:
“21. For the reasons discussed above, in our view, under the MV Act,
there
is
no
restriction
that
the
Tribunal/court
cannot
award
compensation amount exceeding the claimed amount. The function of
the Tribunal/court is to award “just” compensation which is reasonable
on the basis of evidence produced on record. Further, in such cases
there is no question of claim becoming time-barred or it cannot be
contended that by enhancing the claim there would be change of cause
of action. It is also to be stated that as provided under sub-section (4)
to Section 166, even the report submitted to the Claims Tribunal under
sub-section (6) of Section 158 can be treated as an application for
compensation under the MV Act. If required, in appropriate cases, the
court may permit amendment to the claim petition.”
35.
After the 1976 Amendment of Order 41 Rule 22 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, 1908, the insertion made in sub-rule (1) makes it permissible for
respondent to file a cross-objection against a finding. The learned Tribunal
did not record any adverse finding against the claimant. Surely, the claimant
could have preferred an appeal seeking enhancement of the amount on the
grounds urged by Mr. Rai during the course of his argument. The Act being a
beneficial and welfare legislation, rules of procedure may not come in the
way to award „just compensation‟ to the claimant even in an appeal filed by
the Insurance Company or by the Owner on the basis of evidence. It is to be
noted that function of the Court is to award „just compensation‟. It is on the
aforesaid premise, Bombay and Himachal Pradesh High Courts had held that
in absence of appeal or cross-objection on the part of the claimant, the
Appellate Court is entitled to enhance the compensation amount so that the
claimant receives „just compensation‟. The decision in Ramadevi (supra),
also tends to support the aforesaid view. Therefore, I am of the considered
opinion that this Court can enhance the amount of compensation in this
appeal of the Insurance Company if the materials on record justify such
enhancement with the object of ensuring that the claimant receives „just
compensation‟.
36.
Let me now examine as to whether in view of submissions of Mr. Rai,
any enhancement is called for.
37.
In Pranay Sethi (supra), the Constitution Bench of the Supreme
Court held that selection of multiplier shall be as indicated in the Table
in Sarla Verma (supra) read with para 42 of that judgment. The operative
multiplier as laid down therein for the age groups 15 to 20 and 21 to 25
years is 18. It is not significant whether the injured was 22 years or 23
years at the time of accident for the purpose of selection of multiplier as for
both these years, multiplier remains same, which is 18. The learned
Tribunal, evidently, had adopted a lower multiplier when it applied multiplier
of 17. In order to grant „just compensation‟ to the claimant, this Court has to
apply multiplier of 18.
38.
Though the claimant had prayed for a sum of Rs.1,00,000/- each on
account of „pain and suffering‟ and „loss of amenities‟, the learned Tribunal
awarded Rs.25,000/- for „pain and suffering‟ and Rs.50,000/- for „loss of
amenities‟. The nature of the injury suffered by the claimant and the
consequences ensuing there from has already been noticed in an earlier part
of the judgment. A young man of 22 years has to be dependent on someone
else for every little single thing for his entire life and therefore, I am of the
considered opinion that the claimant is entitled to Rs.1,00,000/- each on
account of „pain and suffering‟ and „loss of amenities‟.
39.
Accordingly, amount of compensation is computed as follows: 1.
(Rs.1,68,000 x 18)
Rs.30,24,000/-
2.
Medical expenses
Rs. 1,58,933/-
3.
Pain and suffering
Rs. 1,00,000/-
4.
Loss of amenities
Rs. 1,00,000/Total
40.
Rs.33,82,933/-
The amount of Rs.33,82,933/- (Rupees thirty three lakhs eighty two
thousand nine hundred thirty three) only shall be paid by the Insurance
Company with interest @ 10% per annum to the claimant from date of filing
of the claim petition i.e. 06.06.2018 till full and final payment.
40.
Appeal stands disposed of.
41.
Records of the Tribunal be sent back.
Chief Justice
jk/
This page is for informational and research purposes only and does not constitute legal advice.
Consult a qualified advocate for advice specific to your situation.
Is your name in this judgment and should it be masked, or is something on this page wrong?
Request a review