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THE HIGH COURT OF SIKKIM : GANGTOK
(Civil Appellate Jurisdiction)
DATED : 26th APRIL, 2019
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SINGLE BENCH : THE HON’BLE MRS. JUSTICE MEENAKSHI MADAN RAI, JUDGE
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IA No.01 of 2018 in MAC App No.11 of 2018
Appellant
:
The Branch Manager, National Insurance Company Limited
versus
Respondents :
Suk Dhoj Basnett and Others
Application under Section 173(1) of the Motor Vehicles Act,
1988 read with Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 read
with Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Appearance
Mr. Sushant Subba and
Advocates for the Appellant.
Mr.
Madan
Kumar
Sundas,
Mr. Ajay Rathi and Ms. Phurba Diki Sherpa, Advocates for
Respondents No.1 to 6.
None for Respondent No.7.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
ORDER
Meenakshi Madan Rai, J.
1.
By filing this Petition under Section 173(1) of the
Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (hereinafter, MV Act), the Appellant
Company seeks condonation of 379 days delay in filing the
Appeal. The grounds put forth for the delay are as follows;
“a.
That the Impugned award was passed by the Learned
Member, Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, East Sikkim at
Gangtok in M.A.C.T. Case No.53 of 2015 on 19.06.2017.
I.A. No.01 of 2018 in MAC App No.11 of 2018
The Branch Manager, National Insurance Company Limited
vs. Suk Dhoj Basnett and Others
b.
That the Impugned Award was received by the Branch
Office at Gangtok. The true copy of the Impugned award
was send (sic) to Siliguri Division Office.
c.
That the Division Office after receiving the true copy
award/judgment forwarded the same to the Kolkata
Regional Office for opinion as well as instruction.
d.
That as per the internal procedure the Regional Office
sent back the file to Siliguri Division Office for appointing
an advocate for preferring Appeal in the instant case.
e.
That finally the appellant had appointed the undersigned
counsel on 20.08.2018 for filling (sic) appeal in the
instant case.
f.
That after completion of all official formalities, the
Memorandum of Appeal was send (sic) by the applicant
counsel to Regional Office for verification.
g.
That the same was taken (sic) few days to verify.”
2.
It was further contended that due to the aforestated
unavoidable circumstances and delay in receiving the approval
from the concerned Authorities, the Appeal came to be filed
belatedly.
Learned Counsel would while reiterating the above
grounds further urge that it is a settled position of law that
Government and Government Undertakings have been permitted
some flexibility when delay is occasioned as it takes time for
transaction of official business.
That, should the delay not be
condoned the Appellant Company will suffer irreparable loss as
the impugned Award suffers from serious defects and is against
the law laid down by the various Courts. Hence, in consideration
of the grounds put forth the delay be condoned and the Appeal
admitted.
3.
Learned Counsel for the Respondents-Claimants on
the other hand would contend that Government Undertakings
I.A. No.01 of 2018 in MAC App No.11 of 2018
The Branch Manager, National Insurance Company Limited
vs. Suk Dhoj Basnett and Others
may be afforded some flexibility, but this cannot be interpreted
so widely as to include within its ambit those matters where
grounds for delay are not explained at all.
That, the grounds
given by the Appellant Company clearly do not reveal any dates
for the delay.
There is no reference as to when the certified
copy of the Judgment was applied for, obtained and when the
official process was initiated for approval from the concerned
Siliguri Division Office and the Kolkata Regional Office.
The
Appellant Company is duty bound to explain the delay in detail in
the interest of justice and should there be failure to do so the
delay ought not to be condoned. That, in the instant matter, the
delay is for more than a year while the Respondents herein who
suffered the death of their loved one have had to wait to even
receive the compensation granted to them on account of the loss
of their bread winner.
Hence, in view of the unsatisfactory
grounds put forth the Petition deserves no consideration and
ought to be dismissed.
4.
The rival contentions of Learned Counsel were heard
at length and the impugned Judgment and Award perused.
5.
Section 173 of the MV Act deals with Appeals which
lays down as follows;
“173.
Appeals.—(1) Subject
to
the
provisions of sub-section (2) any person aggrieved
by an award of a Claims Tribunal may, within
ninety days from the date of the award, prefer an
appeal to the High Court:
Provided that no appeal by the person who is
required to pay any amount in terms of such award
shall be entertained by the High Court unless he
I.A. No.01 of 2018 in MAC App No.11 of 2018
The Branch Manager, National Insurance Company Limited
vs. Suk Dhoj Basnett and Others
has deposited with it twenty-five thousand rupees
or fifty per cent of the amount so awarded,
whichever is less, in the manner directed by the
High Court:
Provided further that the High Court may
entertain the appeal after the expiry of the said
period of ninety days, if it is satisfied that the
appellant was prevented by sufficient cause from
preferring the appeal in time.
(2) No appeal shall lie against any award of
a Claims Tribunal if the amount in dispute in the
appeal is less than ten thousand rupees.”
[emphasis supplied]
6.
It is clear from the second proviso supra that the
High Court may entertain the Appeal after expiry of the period of
ninety days if it is satisfied that the Appellant was prevented by
“sufficient cause” from preferring the Appeal in time. Thus, the
Appellant is required to prove “sufficient cause” for the delay.
While explaining what “sufficient cause” entails, the Hon’ble
Supreme Court in Basawaraj and Another vs. Special Land
Acquisition Officer
held as follows;
“9. Sufficient cause is the cause for which
the defendant could not be blamed for his absence.
The meaning of the word “sufficient” is “adequate”
or “enough”, inasmuch as may be necessary to
answer the purpose intended. Therefore, the word
“sufficient” embraces no more than that which
provides a platitude, which when the act done
suffices to accomplish the purpose intended in the
facts and circumstances existing in a case, duly
examined from the viewpoint of a reasonable
standard of a cautious man. In this context,
“sufficient cause” means that the party should not
have acted in a negligent manner or there was a
want of bona fide on its part in view of the facts
and circumstances of a case or it cannot be alleged
that the party has “not acted diligently” or
“remained inactive”. However, the facts and
circumstances of each case must afford sufficient
ground to enable the court concerned to exercise
discretion for the reason that whenever the court
(2013) 14 SCC 81
I.A. No.01 of 2018 in MAC App No.11 of 2018
The Branch Manager, National Insurance Company Limited
vs. Suk Dhoj Basnett and Others
exercises discretion, it has to be exercised
judiciously. The applicant must satisfy the court
that he was prevented by any “sufficient cause”
from prosecuting his case, and unless a satisfactory
explanation is furnished, the court should not allow
the application for condonation of delay. The court
has to examine whether the mistake is bona fide or
was merely a device to cover an ulterior purpose.
(See Manindra
Land
and
Building
Corpn.
Ltd. v. Bhutnath Banerjee [AIR 1964 SC 1336], Mata
Dinv. A. Narayanan [(1969) 2 SCC 770 : AIR 1970 SC
1953], Parimal v. Veena [(2011) 3 SCC 545 : (2011) 2
SCC (Civ) 1 : AIR 2011 SC 1150] and Maniben Devraj
Shahv. Municipal Corpn. of Brihan Mumbai [(2012) 5
SCC 157 : (2012) 3 SCC (Civ) 24 : AIR 2012 SC 1629].)
10. In Arjun Singh v. Mohindra Kumar [AIR
1964 SC 993] this Court explained the difference
between a “good cause” and a “sufficient cause”
and observed that every “sufficient cause” is a
good cause and vice versa. However, if any
difference exists it can only be that the
requirement of good cause is complied with on a
lesser degree of proof than that of “sufficient
cause”.
11. The expression “sufficient cause” should
be given a liberal interpretation to ensure that
substantial justice is done, but only so long as
negligence, inaction or lack of bona fides cannot be
imputed to the party concerned, whether or not
sufficient cause has been furnished, can be decided
on the facts of a particular case and no straitjacket
formula is possible. (Vide Madanlal v. Shyamlal
[(2002) 1 SCC 535 : AIR 2002 SC 100] and Ram Nath
Sao v. Gobardhan Sao [(2002) 3 SCC 195 : AIR 2002 SC
1201].)
12. It is a settled legal proposition that law
of limitation may harshly affect a particular party
but it has to be applied with all its rigour when the
statute so prescribes. The court has no power to
extend the period of limitation on equitable
grounds. “A result flowing from a statutory
provision is never an evil. A court has no power to
ignore that provision to relieve what it considers a
distress resulting from its operation.” The
statutory provision may cause hardship or
inconvenience to a particular party but the court
has no choice but to enforce it giving full effect to
the same. The legal maxim dura lex sed lex which
means “the law is hard but it is the law”, stands
attracted in such a situation. It has consistently
been held that, “inconvenience is not” a decisive
factor to be considered while interpreting a
statute.
13. The statute of limitation is founded on
public policy, its aim being to secure peace in the
community, to suppress fraud and perjury, to
I.A. No.01 of 2018 in MAC App No.11 of 2018
The Branch Manager, National Insurance Company Limited
vs. Suk Dhoj Basnett and Others
quicken diligence and to prevent oppression. It
seeks to bury all acts of the past which have not
been agitated unexplainably and have from lapse of
time become stale. According to Halsbury's Laws of
England, Vol. 28, p. 266:
“605. Policy of the Limitation Acts.—
The courts have expressed at least three
differing reasons supporting the existence of
statutes of limitations namely, (1) that long
dormant claims have more of cruelty than
justice in them, (2) that a defendant might
have lost the evidence to disprove a stale
claim, and (3) that persons with good causes
of actions should pursue them with
reasonable diligence.”
An unlimited limitation would lead to a sense of
insecurity and uncertainty, and therefore, limitation
prevents disturbance or deprivation of what may
have been acquired in equity and justice by long
enjoyment or what may have been lost by a party's
own inaction, negligence or laches. (See Popat and
Kotecha Property v. SBI Staff Assn. [(2005) 7 SCC
510], Rajender Singh v. Santa Singh [(1973) 2 SCC
705 : AIR 1973 SC 2537]
and Pundlik Jalam
Patil v. Jalgaon Medium Project [(2008) 17 SCC 448 :
(2009) 5 SCC (Civ) 907].)”
[emphasis supplied]
7.
In
the
said
matter,
the
Supreme
Court
was
considering Appeals preferred against the Judgment passed by
the High Court of Karnataka in Basawaraj vs. Land Acquisition
Officer
by which the Appeals of the Appellants under Section 54
of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, had been dismissed on the
grounds of limitation.
The parameters discussed in the ratio of
Basawaraj and Another (supra) in the context of “sufficient cause”
is obviously not fulfilled in the instant matter as obtains from the
grounds put forth by the Appellant Company, which have been
extracted supra.
MFA No.10766 of 2007, decided on 10-6-2011 (KAR)
I.A. No.01 of 2018 in MAC App No.11 of 2018
The Branch Manager, National Insurance Company Limited
8.
vs. Suk Dhoj Basnett and Others
We may also beneficially advert to the ratio in Syed
Mehaboob vs. New India Assurance Company Limited
wherein it is
clarified that “The Motor Vehicle Act of 1988 is a beneficent
legislation intended to place the claimant in the same position
that he was before the accident and to compensate him for his
loss. Thus, it should be interpreted liberally so as to achieve the
maximum benefit.”.
The Respondents have lost an earning
member of their family thereby cutting into their income and
means of livelihood. The object of the MV Act has to be afforded
due consideration, which in the instant matter appears to be
lacking on the part of the Appellant.
9.
In Esha Bhattacharjee vs. Managing Committee of
Raghunathpur Nafar Academy and Others
Court
while
enunciating
the
the Hon’ble Supreme
principles
applicable
to
an
application for condonation of delay would inter alia hold as
hereinbelow extracted;
“21. From the aforesaid authorities
principles that can broadly be culled out are:
the
……………………………………………………………………….
21.4. (iv) No presumption can be attached to
deliberate causation of delay but, gross negligence
on the part of the counsel or litigant is to be taken
note of.
21.5. (v) Lack of bona fides imputable to a
party seeking condonation of delay is a significant
and relevant fact.
……………………………………………………………………….
21.7. (vii) The concept of liberal approach
has to encapsule the conception of reasonableness
and it cannot be allowed a totally unfettered free
play.
(2011) 11 SCC 625
(2013) 12 SCC 649
I.A. No.01 of 2018 in MAC App No.11 of 2018
The Branch Manager, National Insurance Company Limited
vs. Suk Dhoj Basnett and Others
……………………………………………………………………….
21.9. (ix) The conduct, behaviour and
attitude of a party relating to its inaction or
negligence are relevant factors to be taken into
consideration. It is so as the fundamental principle
is that the courts are required to weigh the scale of
balance of justice in respect of both parties and the
said principle cannot be given a total go by in the
name of liberal approach. 21.10. (x) If the
explanation offered is concocted or the grounds
urged in the application are fanciful, the courts
should be vigilant not to expose the other side
unnecessarily to face such a litigation.
……………………………………………………………………….
22. To the aforesaid principles we may add
some more guidelines taking note of the present
day scenario. They are:
22.1. (a) An application for condonation of
delay should be drafted with careful concern and
not in a haphazard manner harbouring the notion
that the courts are required to condone delay on
the bedrock of the principle that adjudication of a
lis on merits is seminal to justice dispensation
system.
………………………………………………………………….”
The principles are to be adhered to by parties as also the
Court who is vested with discretion, which obviously has to be
exercised judiciously.
10.
This Court is conscious that when delay is occasioned
at the behest of the Government, it would be difficult to explain
the delay on a day-to-day basis as transaction of business in the
Government is done leisurely by Officers who evince no personal
interest at different levels [see Special Tehsildar, Land Acquisition,
Kerala
vs. K. V. Ayisumma5]. It is true that adoption of strict
standards of proof leads to grave miscarriage of public justice
and the approach of the Court thus should be pragmatic but not
pedantic.
It is also true that the expression “sufficient cause”
(1996) 10 SCC 634
I.A. No.01 of 2018 in MAC App No.11 of 2018
The Branch Manager, National Insurance Company Limited
vs. Suk Dhoj Basnett and Others
should be considered with pragmatism in a justice-oriented
approach rather than technical detection of sufficient cause for
explaining every day’s delay. Nevertheless even on the anvil of
the aforecited ratiocination in the matter, it is apparent that the
Appellant has grossly failed to put forth even a semblance of the
grounds which could tantamount to “sufficient cause” for
condonation of delay. Merely pressing the argument that it is a
Government Company and stating that the File went from one
Office to the next without a semblance of an explanation does
not suffice to explain the delay.
The grounds are completely
bereft of any bona fides and reeks of a completely lackadaisical
and negligent attitude besides reflecting a cavalier attitude to
the circumstance of the Respondents herein.
12.
Consequently,
I
am
discretion to condone the delay.
not
inclined
to
exercise
The Petition deserves no
consideration and is dismissed and disposed of as also the
Appeal.
13.
No order as to costs.
Sd/( Justice Meenakshi Madan Rai )
Judge
26-04-2019
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