The court's order
The closing paragraphs of the judgment, in the court's own words. The reasons are in the full text below.
9. Consequently, in view of the discussions which have emanated hereinabove and circumstances put forth by Learned Counsel for the Petitioner/Appellant which do not explain the delay, I am not inclined to condone the delay. I.A. No.01 of 2020 in MAC App. No.11 of 2020 The Branch Manager, National Insurance Co. Ltd. vs.
10. Dechen Ongmoo Lepcha & Others I.A. No.01 of 2020 stands dismissed and disposed of as also the Appeal.
11. I.A. No.02 of 2020 also stands disposed of.
12. No order as to costs. ( Justice Meenakshi Madan Rai ) Judge
Full Judgment Text
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CC BY 4.0).
The court's own copy is the authoritative text.
THE HIGH COURT OF SIKKIM : GANGTOK
(Civil Appellate Jurisdiction)
DATED : 19th March, 2021
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
SINGLE BENCH : THE HON’BLE MRS. JUSTICE MEENAKSHI MADAN RAI, JUDGE
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
I.A. No.01 of 2020
in
MAC App. No.11 of 2020
Petitioner/Appellant
:
The Branch Manager,
National Insurance Company Limited.
versus
Respondents
:
Dechen Ongmoo Lepcha and Others
An application under Section 173(1) of the
Motor Vehicles Act, 1988.
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Appearance
Mr. Thupden G. Bhutia, Advocate for the Appellant.
Ms. Vidya Lama, Advocate for Respondents No.1 and 2.
Mr. K.B. Chettri, Advocate for Respondent No.3.
Mr. Umesh Gurung, Advocate for Respondent No.4.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
O R D E R (ORAL)
Meenakshi Madan Rai, J.
1.
The instant application is filed by the Petitioner/
Appellant under Section 173(1) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988
(“M.V. Act”), seeking condonation of 261 (two hundred and sixty
one) days’ delay in filing the Appeal.
2.
Learned Counsel for the Petitioner/Appellant, while
making an effort to justify the delay, submitted that the impugned
Judgment was pronounced on 31.10.2019, copy of the Judgment
was sought on 05.11.2019 vide application which was ready on
26.11.2019. The Appeal came to be filed on 05.11.2020 however
after curing the defects was re-submitted on 11.12.2020. The
I.A. No.01 of 2020
in
MAC App. No.11 of 2020
The Branch Manager, National Insurance Co. Ltd. vs.
Dechen Ongmoo Lepcha & Others
limitation period of 90 (ninety) days admittedly, was over on
19.02.2020, as per Learned Counsel for the Petitioner/Appellant.
Reliance was placed by Learned Counsel on the Circulars issued by
the Registry of this High Court from 24.03.2020 after the lockdown
owing to the COVID-19 pandemic. That, in view of the facts
submitted hereinabove, the delay be condoned.
3.
Learned Counsel appearing for Respondents No.1 and
2, Respondent No.3 and Respondent No.4 objected to the Petition
on grounds that the Appeal ought to have been filed on 19.02.2020
and reliance by the Petitioner/Appellant on the Circulars issued by
the High Court is erroneous as the first Circular, dated 24.03.2020,
was issued almost a month after the period of limitation was over
and was concerned with the lockdown after the COVID-19
pandemic broke out. The other Circulars dated 14.04.2020 and
18.04.2020 also have no relevance to the instant matter. That, as
no other grounds have been specified for the delay, in such
circumstances, the Petition merits no consideration.
4.
I have heard Learned Counsel for the parties and
considered their submissions. I have also perused the Petition and
the Memo of Appeal.
5.
The provisions of Section 173 of the M.V. Act which
deals with Appeals may relevantly be considered, which is
extracted hereinbelow;
“173. Appeals.—(1) Subject to the
provisions of sub-section (2) any person
aggrieved by an award of a Claims Tribunal
may, within ninety days from the date of the
award, prefer an appeal to the High Court:
Provided that no appeal by the person
who is required to pay any amount in terms of
such award shall be entertained by the High
Court unless he has deposited with it twentyfive thousand rupees or fifty per cent of the
I.A. No.01 of 2020
in
MAC App. No.11 of 2020
The Branch Manager, National Insurance Co. Ltd. vs.
Dechen Ongmoo Lepcha & Others
amount so awarded, whichever is less, in the
manner directed by the High Court:
Provided further that the High Court
may entertain the appeal after the expiry of
the said period of ninety days, if it is satisfied
that the appellant was prevented by sufficient
cause from preferring the appeal in time.
(2) No appeal shall lie against any award
of a Claims Tribunal if the amount in dispute in
the appeal is less than ten thousand rupees.”
[emphasis supplied]
6.
It is clear from the second proviso supra that the High
Court may entertain the Appeal after expiry of the period of ninety
days if it is satisfied that the Appellant was prevented by “sufficient
cause” from preferring the Appeal in time. Thus, the Appellant is
required to prove “sufficient cause” for the delay. While explaining
what “sufficient cause” entails, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in
Basawaraj and Another vs. Special Land Acquisition Officer1 held inter
alia as follows;
“11. The expression “sufficient cause”
should be given a liberal interpretation to
ensure that substantial justice is done, but only
so long as negligence, inaction or lack of bona
fides cannot be imputed to the party
concerned, whether or not sufficient cause has
been furnished, can be decided on the facts of
a particular case and no straitjacket formula is
possible. (Vide Madanlal v. Shyamlal [(2002) 1
SCC 535 : AIR 2002 SC 100] and Ram Nath
Sao v. Gobardhan Sao [(2002) 3 SCC 195 : AIR
2002 SC 1201].)
12. It is a settled legal proposition that
law of limitation may harshly affect a
particular party but it has to be applied with all
its rigour when the statute so prescribes. The
court has no power to extend the period of
limitation on equitable grounds. “A result
flowing from a statutory provision is never an
evil. A court has no power to ignore that
provision to relieve what it considers a
distress resulting from its operation.” The
statutory provision may cause hardship or
inconvenience to a particular party but the
court has no choice but to enforce it giving full
effect to the same. The legal maxim dura lex
sed lex which means “the law is hard but it is
the law”, stands attracted in such a situation.
It
has
consistently
been
held
that,
“inconvenience is not” a decisive factor to be
considered while interpreting a statute.
(2013) 14 SCC 81
I.A. No.01 of 2020
in
MAC App. No.11 of 2020
The Branch Manager, National Insurance Co. Ltd. vs.
Dechen Ongmoo Lepcha & Others
13. The statute of limitation is founded
on public policy, its aim being to secure peace
in the community, to suppress fraud and
perjury, to quicken diligence and to prevent
oppression. It seeks to bury all acts of the past
which have not been agitated unexplainably
and have from lapse of time become stale.”
[emphasis supplied]
7.
In
Esha
Bhattacharjee
vs.
Managing
Raghunathpur Nafar Academy and Others2
Committee
of
the Hon’ble Supreme
Court, while enunciating the principles applicable to an application
for condonation of delay would inter alia hold as hereinbelow
extracted;
“21. From the aforesaid authorities the
principles that can broadly be culled out are:
…………………………………………………………………
21.4. (iv) No presumption can be
attached to deliberate causation of delay but,
gross negligence on the part of the counsel or
litigant is to be taken note of.
21.5. (v) Lack of bona fides imputable to
a party seeking condonation of delay is a
significant and relevant fact.
………………………………………………………………………
21.7. (vii) The concept of liberal
approach has to encapsule the conception of
reasonableness and it cannot be allowed a
totally unfettered free play.
………………………………………………………………
21.9. (ix) The conduct, behaviour and
attitude of a party relating to its inaction or
negligence are relevant factors to be taken into
consideration. It is so as the fundamental
principle is that the courts are required to
weigh the scale of balance of justice in respect
of both parties and the said principle cannot be
given a total go by in the name of liberal
approach.
21.10. (x) If the explanation offered is
concocted or the grounds urged in the
application are fanciful, the courts should be
vigilant not to expose the other side
unnecessarily to face such a litigation.
…………………………………………………………………
22. To the aforesaid principles we may
add some more guidelines taking note of the
present day scenario. They are:
22.1. (a) An application for condonation
of delay should be drafted with careful concern
and not in a haphazard manner harbouring the
notion that the courts are required to condone
delay on the bedrock of the principle that
(2013) 12 SCC 649
I.A. No.01 of 2020
in
MAC App. No.11 of 2020
The Branch Manager, National Insurance Co. Ltd. vs.
Dechen Ongmoo Lepcha & Others
adjudication of a lis on merits is seminal to
justice dispensation system.
…………………………………………………………………”
The principles are to be adhered to by parties as also the
Court who is vested with discretion, which obviously has to be
exercised judiciously.
8.
this
In light of the facts and circumstances placed before
Court
today,
it
is
indeed
incongruous
for
the
Petitioner/Appellant to have placed reliance on Circulars dated
24.03.2020, 14.04.2020 and 18.04.2020 which were issued much
after the period of limitation had expired for filing the Appeal. No
grounds have been put forth as to why the delay of 261 (two
hundred and sixty one) days occurred prior to the COVID-19
pandemic and the issuance of the consequent Circulars. Although it
was also urged by Learned Counsel for the Petitioner/Appellant that
substantial justice ought to be meted out to the Appellant,
however, in the same vein, Learned Counsel may be reminded that
the compensation sought for is under benevolent legislation to
mitigate the sufferings of persons who lose an earning member of
the family in a motor accident besides suffering other nonpecuniary losses. The Circulars issued by the High Court, as
already pointed out by Learned Counsel for the Respondents, have
no relevance to the instant matter and are, therefore, outside the
ambit of consideration.
9.
Consequently, in view of the discussions which have
emanated hereinabove and circumstances put forth by Learned
Counsel for the Petitioner/Appellant which do not explain the delay,
I am not inclined to condone the delay.
I.A. No.01 of 2020
in
MAC App. No.11 of 2020
The Branch Manager, National Insurance Co. Ltd. vs.
10.
Dechen Ongmoo Lepcha & Others
I.A. No.01 of 2020 stands dismissed and disposed of as
also the Appeal.
11.
I.A. No.02 of 2020 also stands disposed of.
12.
No order as to costs.
( Justice Meenakshi Madan Rai )
Judge
19.03.2021
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