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THE HIGH COURT OF SIKKIM : GANGTOK
(Civil Appellate Jurisdiction)
DATED : 1st October, 2018
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------SINGLE BENCH : THE HON’BLE ACTING CHIEF JUSTICE MRS. JUSTICE MEENAKSHI MADAN RAI
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
RFA No.10 of 2016
Appellant
:
Taramani Devi Agarwal
versus
Respondent
:
M/s. Krishna Company
Appeal under Order XLI Rules 1 and 2 read with
Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Appearance
Mr. Rahul Rathi and Ms. Phurba Diki Sherpa, Advocates for the
Appellant.
Mr. Sudipto Mazumdar, Mr. Dibakar Roy and Mr. Bhushan
Nepal, Advocates for the Respondent.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
JUDGMENT
Meenakshi Madan Rai, ACJ
1.
This Appeal assails the Judgment and Decree, both
dated 22-04-2016, of the Learned District Judge, Special Division –
II, East Sikkim, at Gangtok, being Eviction Suit No.12 of 2013, Smt.
Taramani Devi Agarwal vs. M/s. Krishna Company.
The Learned
Trial Court dismissed the Suit of the Plaintiff seeking eviction of the
Defendant from the suit premises on account of default in payment
of rent for four months. (The Appellant shall hereinafter be referred
to as the “Plaintiff” and the Respondent as the “Defendant”.)
RFA No.10 of 2016
Taramani Devi Agarwal
2.
vs. M/s. Krishna Company
The facts, as per the Plaintiff, summarised herein are
that, the Defendant in the year 2001 took on rent a shop space
belonging to the Plaintiff, consisting of the entire first basement
floor measuring an area of 1,230 sq. ft., on a monthly rent of
Rs.6,000/- (Rupees six thousand) only, payable by the 10th day of
each succeeding English Calendar month. The rents were thereafter
successively enhanced in various years @ 20% on the previous rent.
From April, 2010 to March, 2012, the rent was increased to
Rs.11,520/- (Rupees eleven thousand, five hundred and twenty)
only. Although enhancement of rent for the years 2010 to 2012 was
made from April, 2010, but payment by the Defendant was made in
July, 2010, only, for the months of April to June, 2010, being a
consolidated amount of Rs.34,560/- (Rupees thirty four thousand,
five hundred and sixty) only.
Thereafter, the Defendant tendered
the monthly rents belatedly viz; for the months of July, 2010 on 2008-2010, for August, 2010 on 18-09-2010, for October, 2010 on 2011-2010 and for November, 2010 on 13-12-2010 much beyond the
10th day as stipulated. This was followed by default in payment of
rents for the months of December, 2010, to March, 2011, rendering
the
Defendant
liable
for
eviction
under
the
Gangtok
Rent
Control and Eviction Act I 1956 (hereinafter “the Act of 1956”).
Besides the shop premises were closed for the last two and half
years.
On account of the default, a lawyer‟s notice dated 29-04-
2011 was issued by the Plaintiff and responded to by the Defendant
on 02-06-2011 denying arrears of rent as alleged or of closure of
the shop. The Defendant also sent along with its reply a Demand
Draft bearing No.000334 for Rs.69,120/- (Rupees sixty nine
RFA No.10 of 2016
Taramani Devi Agarwal
vs. M/s. Krishna Company
thousand, one hundred and twenty) only, dated 01-06-2011, in
favour of the Plaintiff, drawn on the Union Bank of India, Gangtok
Branch, as payment of rent for the months of December, 2010 up to
May, 2011, which the Plaintiff declined to receive. A Notice dated
09-06-2011 was issued thereafter by the Plaintiff, demanding
immediate vacation of the premises by the Defendant, which the
Defendant failed to comply with but continued sending Demand
Draft of Rs.11,520/- (Rupees eleven thousand, five hundred and
twenty) only, every month as tender of monthly rent. It is averred
that the reason for the refusal of rent sent by the first Demand Draft
and others thereafter is that tenancy had determined on account of
default in payment of rent from December 2010 to March 2011.
Hence, the prayers for eviction of the Defendant and „khas‟
possession of “Schedule B” premises from the Defendant, arrears of
rent for the months of December, 2010 to March, 2011.
3.
The Defendant contested the Suit inter alia contending
that tenancy was on mutual understanding and good faith, the rents
were payable on demand and not on the 10th day of each successive
English Calendar Month as claimed. That, for the last few years rent
receipts were being issued on payment of rent however no
agreement for enhancing rent at a fixed percentage existed.
Admittedly rent was enhanced on 09-07-2010 @ Rs.11,520/(Rupees
eleven
thousand,
five
hundred
and
twenty)
only,
retrospectively from April to June, 2010, after a water tank was
installed by them on the terrace of the Plaintiff‟s building and on
agreement entered between the parties to construct a toilet in the
RFA No.10 of 2016
Taramani Devi Agarwal
vs. M/s. Krishna Company
tenanted premises. The Defendant was paying the said amount till
November, 2010, but from the month of December, 2010, the
Plaintiff stopped demanding rent. The Defendant thus sought to
make the payment personally through his staff which was refused
by the Plaintiff citing taxation problems faced by the Plaintiff‟s
husband, although rent was being accepted in the Plaintiff‟s name.
The explanation for such refusal was that the rent would be
accepted after the issue was resolved, which was accepted by the
Defendant in good faith due to the long period of tenancy with the
Plaintiff.
Only when the Plaintiff‟s legal notice dated 29-04-2011
was received by the Defendant, the Plaintiff‟s mala fide purposes for
refusal of rent came to light. The Defendant denied non-payment of
rent but admitted that the Plaintiff returned the Demand Draft,
dated 09-06-2011, for a sum of Rs.69,120/- (Rupees sixty nine
thousand, one hundred and twenty) only, which was issued for the
months of December, 2010 to May, 2011 and that the Plaintiff
demanded that the suit premises be vacated and handed over by
the Defendant. That, the Suit being harrasive deserves dismissal.
4.
The issues struck by the Learned Trial Court for
determination were as follows;
“1.
Whether the Defendant failed to pay the monthly
rents in respect of the “Schedule B” shop premises
to the Plaintiff for the months of December, 2010,
January, 2011, February, 2011 and March, 2011,
making the Defendant a defaulter, under the
provisions of the Gangtok Rent Control Act, 1956
and liable to be evicted?
RFA No.10 of 2016
Taramani Devi Agarwal
2.
vs. M/s. Krishna Company
Whether the Defendant has closed the shop
premises for the last more than two and half years
and not been running their business from the
“Schedule B” premises for the same period?
3.
5.
Any other reliefs?”
The Plaintiff examined herself as P.W.1 and her son
Shyam Agarwal as P.W.2, one Pawan Agarwal, P.W.3, Govind
Agarwal, P.W.4 and Rajesh Somani, P.W.5.
However, during the
stage of cross-examination on the non-appearance of P.W.4 and
P.W.5, the Plaintiff sought to and was allowed to drop the said
witnesses. The Defendant examined himself and two witnesses,
being one Sushil Marda as D.W.1 and his staff Naresh Kumar
Sharma as D.W.2.
The other witnesses cited by the Defendant
were dropped by the Defendant.
6.
the
Thereupon, the arguments of the parties were heard and
Learned
Trial
Court
took
up
each
of
the
Issues
for
determination. After examining the evidence on record and hearing
the final arguments of the parties, vide the impugned Judgment the
Suit of the Plaintiff was dismissed.
7.
While discussing Issue No.1, the Learned Trial Court
embarked on an exhaustive discussion of “wilful default”, garnering
strength from the ratio of S. Sundaram Pillai and Others vs. V. R.
Pattabiraman and Others
and decisions of various High Courts. The
Learned Trial Court concluded that the default for the months of
December, 2010 up to March, 2011 did not amount to “wilful
AIR 1985 SC 582
RFA No.10 of 2016
Taramani Devi Agarwal
default”.
vs. M/s. Krishna Company
Issue No.2 was next taken up for discussion and it was
concluded that the Plaintiff was unable to substantiate her claims
with documentary evidence, and the term ”Business” would include
all aspects of business including storage, the Issue thus stood
decided against the Plaintiff.
While deciding Issue No.3 it was
reasoned that the Plaintiff is not entitled to any relief other than the
arrears of rent for the month of December, 2010, January, 2011,
February, 2011 and March, 2011 as also arrears in rent till the filing
of the Suit.
In conclusion it was held that the Plaintiff failed to
establish her case which was accordingly ordered to be dismissed.
8.
Before this Court, Learned Counsel for the Plaintiff
advancing his arguments would contend that as averred in the Plaint
and as proved by the evidence of P.W.1, it is established that the
Defendant had defaulted in payment of rent for the months of
December, 2010, January, 2011, February, 2011 and March, 2011.
The
evidence
of
the
Plaintiff
pertaining
to
default
stood
undemolished in view of which the Defendant was liable to vacate
the suit premises in terms of the provisions of the Act of 1956.
That,
P.W.2,
the
Plaintiff‟s
son,
has
also
supported
and
substantiated the evidence of the Plaintiff indicating that the
Defendant was a defaulter and that the Defendant instead of paying
the monthly rent on the 10th day of the successive English Calendar
Month had started paying the rent belatedly.
Besides, although it
was averred by the Defendant that the suit premises was being
utilised as a shop, the evidence of P.W.3, the Plaintiff‟s neighbour
and thereby an independent witnesses, would indicate that the suit
RFA No.10 of 2016
Taramani Devi Agarwal
vs. M/s. Krishna Company
premises was being used as a store for their goods. The Defendant
being defaulters ought to vacate the suit premises.
9.
The contra arguments of Learned Counsel for the
Defendant was that, the cross-examination of the Plaintiff, the
alleged recipient of the rents, reveals that she did not understand
the contents of any of the documents that she had relied on and
was confronted with.
Her evidence reveals her ignorance of the
standard rent for the tenanted premises. According to her she had
not signed any documents pertaining to rent for the last fifteen
years but has furnished exhibits purporting to be the rent receipts in
the name of the Plaintiff which do not bear her signature.
The
evidence reveals that she was unaware of the rent for the period of
April, 2007 to March, 2012 of the tenanted premises.
It was her
specific evidence that she had not filed the instant case against
anyone and it was her sons who used to hand over the rent to her
from time to time informing her that it was rent from the tenancy.
It is also her admission that the rent of the tenanted premises used
to be tendered to her husband in his shop at M. G. Marg.
Contending that there was variance in pleading and proof as the
Respondent had not stated that her son took care of the rents, but
P.W.2. her son, had deposed to this effect, hence his evidence
cannot be looked into, reliance was placed on Gian Chand and
Brothers and Another vs. Rattan Lal alias Rattan Singh .
It was next
advanced that the title of the property was not established, in such
a circumstance the Plaintiff was not entitled to dispossess the
(2013) 2 SCC 606
RFA No.10 of 2016
Taramani Devi Agarwal
vs. M/s. Krishna Company
Defendant. Reliance was placed on R.V.E. Venkatachala Gounder vs.
Arulmigu Viswesaraswami & V. P. Temple and Another .
That, the
Plaintiff has to establish her own case on the basis of evidence led
by her, on which point succour was drawn from Nirakar Das vs.
Gourhari Das and Others .
The Plaintiff having failed to prove her
case the finding of the Learned Trial Court bears no error.
10.
The arguments of Learned Counsel were heard at length
and given due consideration.
The pleadings, documents and the
evidence of the parties have been duly perused and considered by
me as also the impugned Judgment.
11.
This Court is to determine whether there was a default
in payment of rent in terms of the Act of 1956, making the
Defendant liable to be evicted from the suit premises on account of
such default.
12.
The Act of 1956 was pressed into service by the Plaintiff
to prove their case. Section 4 of the Act of 1956 which is relevant
for the present purposes reads as follows;
“GANGTOK RENT CONTROL AND EVICTION ACT I OF
(Received assent of His Highness the Maharaja of
Sikkim on 3Ist May 1956)
Preamble. Whereas it is deemed expedient and
necessary
to
control
rent
and
eviction
of
accommodation in Gangtok Bazar premises ; it is
hereby enacted as follows :-
…………………………………………………………………………………….
4.
A Landlord may not ordinarily eject any
tenant. When, however, the whole or part of the
premises are required for the bonafide occupation of
(2003) 8 SCC 752
AIR 1995 Ori 270
RFA No.10 of 2016
Taramani Devi Agarwal
vs. M/s. Krishna Company
the landlord or his dependents or for thorough
overhauling (excluding additions and alterations) or
when the rent in arrears amount to four months rent or
more, the landlord may evict the tenant on filing a suit
of ejectment in the Court of the Chief Magistrate. …….
……………………………………………………………………”
13.
The
Section
provides
that
the
landlord
may
not
ordinarily eject a tenant, however, when grounds enumerated
therein are fulfilled which also includes rent in arrears amounting to
four months or more, the landlord may evict the tenant by filing a
Suit for ejectment.
The object of the Act of 1956 is apparent, viz;
to control rent and eviction from accommodation in the precincts of
the Gangtok Bazar area. Shortage of accommodation is not a new
phenomenon especially in the urban areas and disputes between
landlords and tenants rear its head on trivial issues, but the
legislation supra intervenes to prohibit eviction of the tenant on any
frivolous ground.
14.
Others
In Sidhharth Viyas and Another vs. Ravi Nath Misra and
the Hon‟ble Supreme Court was held that;
“10. The object of rent law is to balance the
competing claims of the landlord on the one hand to
recover possession of building let out to the tenant and
of the tenant to be protected against arbitrary increase
of rent or arbitrary eviction, when there is acute
shortage of accommodation. Though, it is for the
legislature to resolve such competing claims in terms of
statutory provisions, while interpreting the provisions
the object of the Act has to be kept in view by the
Court. Unless otherwise provided, a tenant who has
already acquired alternative accommodation is not
intended to be protected by the Rent Act.”
15.
In Malpe Vishwanath Acharya and Others vs. State of
Maharashtra and Another
(2015) 2 SCC 701
(1998) 2 SCC 1
the Hon‟ble Supreme Court said;
RFA No.10 of 2016
Taramani Devi Agarwal
vs. M/s. Krishna Company
“29. Insofar as social legislation, like the Rent
Control Act is concerned, the law must strike a balance
between rival interests and it should try to be just to
all. The law ought not to be unjust to one and give a
disproportionate benefit or protection to another
section of the society. When there is shortage of
accommodation it is desirable, may, necessary that
some protection should be given to the tenants in order
to ensure that they are not exploited. At the same time
such a law has to be revised periodically so as to
ensure that a disproportionately larger benefit than the
one which was intended is not given to the tenants.”
16.
Bearing the premise supra in mind, on the anvil of the
provision of the Act of 1956 and the evidence furnished by the
parties, it would be appropriate to examine whether the Plaintiff has
been able to establish a case for eviction.
17.
Addressing the argument of Learned Counsel for the
Defendant that there was variance in pleadings and proof of the
Plaintiff, reference can be made to Order VI Rule 2 of the Code of
Civil Procedure, 1908, which requires pleadings to state the material
facts.
Sub-Rule (1) of Rule 2 requires that every pleading shall
contain a statement in concise form of the material facts on which
the party pleading relies for his claim or defence. This essentially is
for the purpose of enabling the Opposite Parties to have knowledge
of the case that he is required to meet.
On this point, we may
briefly look at material facts in the pleadings of the Plaintiff. It is
her categorical statement that the Defendant failed and neglected to
tender monthly rents in respect of Schedule „B‟ premises for the
months of December, 2010, up to March, 2011, even by the 10 th
April, 2011, and thereby became a defaulter under the provisions of
the Act of 1956.
In view of the default of four months the
Defendant has made itself liable to be evicted from the schedule
RFA No.10 of 2016
Taramani Devi Agarwal
vs. M/s. Krishna Company
premises. Her evidence is no different. She has deposed that the
Defendant defaulted and was in arrears of rent for four months. The
fact that she did not state that her son was looking after the affairs
pertaining to rent, which however was elaborated in the evidence of
P.W.2 does not in my considered opinion tantamount to non
statement of material fact thereby resulting in variance of pleadings
and proof. The material facts which reveal the cause of action has
been categorically averred by her in her pleadings.
Her evidence
concerning the default thereby rendering the Defendants liable for
eviction
has
withstood
the
cross-examination
and
remain
undecimated. No specific question was evidently put to the witness
in this context under cross-examination, neither was she confronted
with the Demand Draft of Rs.69,120/- (Rupees sixty nine thousand,
one hundred and twenty) only, although it was her specific
statement that upon receipt of the reply of the Defendant together
with the Demand Draft of Rs.69,120/- (Rupees sixty nine thousand,
one hundred and twenty) only, she returned the same and
demanded immediate vacation of the Schedule „B‟ shop premises.
Her evidence thus establishes default in payment of rent.
18.
The
next
contention
of
Learned
Counsel
for
the
Defendant was that the rent was payable on demand. Evidently no
Lease Deed existed between the parties. The Plaintiff could furnish
no document to establish that the rent was payable by the 10th of
the
succeeding
month,
similarly
the
Defendant
was
not
in
possession of any document to prove that rent was payable on
demand. In the absence of such a document it is relevant to resort
RFA No.10 of 2016
Taramani Devi Agarwal
vs. M/s. Krishna Company
to the provisions of Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act,
1882 (hereinafter “the TP Act”), which inter alia provides that in the
absence of a contract or local law or usage to the contract, a lease
of immovable property shall be deemed to be a lease from month to
month terminable on the part of either a lesser or lessee by fifteen
days‟ notice.
I hasten to add that the Act of 1956 envisages no
notice for eviction of a tenant, it merely requires proof of default in
rent for four months or more hence Notice is not a mandate under
the Act of 1956.
Therefore, on applying the provisions of Section
106 of the TP Act it is evident that the tenancy shall be presumed to
be a tenancy on a month to month basis. In this view of the matter,
irrespective of lack of demand for payment of rent by the Plaintiff to
the Defendant, it became incumbent upon the Defendant to pay the
rent either at the end of the month or by the next month as was the
practice, even if it was beyond the 10th of the next month.
Although the Defendant was at pains to establish that rents were
paid on varied dates and not the 10th of the succeeding month by
cross-examining the Plaintiff on the contents of Exhibit 3 to Exhibit
44, it surely does not absolve the Defendant from payment of
monthly rent, nor can rent for four months remain unpaid by them
at any given point of time.
19.
This leads us to another question, i.e., whether the
Plaintiff has discharged the burden of proof. The Plaintiff indubitably
has asserted that the Defendant was a defaulter in view of the
grounds put forth above. To the contrary, the Defendant would hold
that all efforts were made for payment of the rent for months when
RFA No.10 of 2016
Taramani Devi Agarwal
vs. M/s. Krishna Company
default was alleged but rent was infact refused by the Plaintiff. We
may briefly look at the law on this aspect. Section 3 of the Indian
Evidence Act, 1872 (hereinafter “the Evidence Act”), defines
“proved” which reads as follows;
“3. ……………………………………………………………………
“Proved”.―A fact is said to be proved when,
after considering the matters before it, the Court either
believes it to exist, or considers its existence so
probable that a prudent man ought, under the
circumstances of the particular case, to act upon the
supposition that it exists.
……………………………………………………………………”
20.
In R.V.E. Venkatachala Gounder (supra) the Hon‟ble
Supreme Court laid down as follows;
“28. Whether a civil or a criminal case, the anvil
for testing of “proved”, “disproved” and “not proved”,
as defined in Section 3 of the Indian Evidence Act,
1872 is one and the same. A fact is said to be “proved”
when, if considering the matters before it, the court
either believes it to exist, or considers its existence so
probable that a prudent man ought, under the
circumstances of a particular case, to act upon the
supposition that it exists. It is the evaluation of the
result drawn by the applicability of the rule, which
makes the difference.
“The probative effects of evidence in civil
and criminal cases are not, however, always the
same and it has been laid down that a fact may
be regarded as proved for purposes of a civil
suit, though the evidence may not be considered
sufficient for a conviction in a criminal case. Best
says: „There is a strong and marked difference
as to the effect of evidence in civil and criminal
proceedings.
In
the
former
a
mere
preponderance of probability, due regard being
had to the burden of proof, is a sufficient basis
of decision: but in the latter, especially when the
offence charged amounts to treason or felony, a
much higher degree of assurance is required.‟
(Best, § 95) While civil cases may be proved by
a mere preponderance of evidence, in criminal
cases the prosecution must prove the charge
beyond reasonable doubt.” (See Sarkar on
Evidence, 15th Edn., pp. 58-59.)
In the words of Denning, L.J. (Bater v. Bater [(1950) 2
All ER 458 : 1951 P 35 (CA)], All ER at p. 459 B-C):
RFA No.10 of 2016
Taramani Devi Agarwal
vs. M/s. Krishna Company
It is true that by our law there is a higher
standard of proof in criminal cases than in civil
cases, but this is subject to the qualification that
there is no absolute standard in either case. In
criminal cases the charge must be proved
beyond reasonable doubt, but there may be
degrees of proof within that standard. So also in
civil cases there may be degrees of probability.
Agreeing with this statement of law, Hodson, L.J. said:
“Just as in civil cases the balance of
probability may be more readily tilted in one
case than in another, so in criminal cases proof
beyond reasonable doubt may more readily be
attained in some cases than in others.”
(Hornal v. Neuberger Products Ltd. [(1956) 3 All ER
970 : (1957) 1 QB 247 : (1956) 3 WLR 1034 (CA)] , All ER
at p. 977 D).”
21.
Section 101 of the Evidence Act deals with burden of
proof and provides as hereinbelow;
“101. Burden of proof.─Whoever desires any
Court to give judgment as to any legal right or liability
dependent on the existence of facts which he asserts,
must prove that those facts exist.
When a person is bound to prove the existence
of any fact, it is said that the burden of proof lies on
that person.”
22.
In Rangammal vs. Kuppuswami and Another7, the Hon‟ble
Supreme Court would hold that when a person is bound to prove the
existence of any fact, it is said the burden of proof lies on that
person.
Thus, the burden of proving a fact always lies upon the
person who asserts it. Unless such burden is discharged the other
party is not required to be called upon to prove his case.
23.
In
Addagada
Chenchamma and Another
Raghavamma
and
Another
vs. Addagada
the Hon‟ble Supreme Court has held that;
“12. ..................... There is an essential
distinction between burden of proof and onus of proof:
(2011) 12 SCC 220
AIR 1964 SC 136
RFA No.10 of 2016
Taramani Devi Agarwal
vs. M/s. Krishna Company
burden of proof lies upon the person who has to prove
a fact and it never shifts, but the onus of proof shifts.
The burden of proof in the present case undoubtedly
lies upon the plaintiff to establish the factum of
adoption and that of partition. The said circumstances
do not alter the incidence of the burden of proof. Such
considerations, having regard to the circumstances of a
particular case, may shift the onus of proof. Such a
shifting of onus is a continuous process in the
evaluation of evidence. The criticism levelled against
the judgment, of the lower Courts, therefore, only
pertain to the domain of appreciation of evidence. We
shall, therefore, broadly consider the evidence not for
the purpose of revaluation, but to see whether the
treatment of the case by the courts below is such that
it falls in the category of exceptional cases where this
Court, in the interest of justice, should depart from its
usual practice.”
The Hon‟ble Supreme Court in Anil Rishi vs. Gurbaksh
24.
Singh
laid down the following;
“9. In terms of the said provision, the burden of
proving the fact rests on the party who substantially
asserts the affirmative issues and not the party who
denies it. The said rule may not be universal in its
application and there may be an exception thereto. The
learned trial court and the High Court proceeded on the
basis that the defendant was in a dominating position
and there had been a fiduciary relationship between
the parties. The appellant in his written statement
denied and disputed the said averments made in the
plaint.”
25.
The law on burden of proof and preponderance of
probability as proof in a civil dispute is thus firmly in place. P.W.1
and P.W.2 both deny that rent was tendered by the Defendant for
the months of December, 2010 to March, 2011. P.W.2 denied that
D.W.2 ever came to tender the rent on behalf of the Defendant. To
the contrary, the Defendant‟s sole attempt was to establish that
infact D.W.2 had been dispatched to do the necessary, D.W.2 for his
part asserted that he did indeed go to P.W.2 and his brother to
tender the rent which was refused. If this be so, the onus
(2006) 5 SCC 558
RFA No.10 of 2016
Taramani Devi Agarwal
vs. M/s. Krishna Company
undoubtedly shifts to the tenant to prove by sufficient and
satisfactory evidence that they tendered the rent. Unfortunately no
evidence whatsoever obtains in this context from the side of the
Defendant who has failed to establish by proof that as soon as the
rent for the month of December, 2010, was refused, efforts were
made for payment thereof by way of Money Order or any other
available process.
There is no documentary evidence or the
presence of a witness to fortify the claim of D.W.2 that he went to
tender the rent to P.W.1 and his brother.
In the absence of any
such proof, the Courts would be beleaguered to accept the verbal
testimony.
On the contrary, the Defendant has to his detriment
relied upon Exhibit JJJ which is a Demand Draft dated 01-06-2011
indicating payment of a sum of Rs.69,120/- (Rupees sixty nine
thousand, one hundred and twenty) only, in favour of the Plaintiff.
The fact that the said Demand Draft of the aforestated sum was for
the rents of December, 2010 to May, 2011, was admitted by the
D.W.1, Sushil Marda and duly identified by D.W.2, Naresh Kumar
Sharma, establishing default in payment of rent of not only four
months, but more than four months.
26.
There is no merit in the argument of Learned Counsel
for the Defendant that according to the Plaintiff she had not signed
any document pertaining to the rent and the rent receipts do not
bear her signature.
This argument was advanced to establish the
ignorance of the Plaintiff pertaining to the matter in issue in the
Suit.
The purpose of filing the rent receipts was apparently to
buttress the claim of the Plaintiff that the Defendant had deposited
RFA No.10 of 2016
Taramani Devi Agarwal
vs. M/s. Krishna Company
rent beyond the stipulated time of the 10th of every succeeding
month, making him a tenant who deposited rent erratically.
This is
not the concern in the instant matter, default in payment of rent for
four months or more is the issue at hand.
27.
While
considering
the
argument
advanced
by
the
Defendant that the Plaintiff has not been able to establish her title
over the suit premises, this Court restrains itself from adjudicating
on an issue irrelevant to the matter at hand apart from which no
pleadings on this count ensues.
28.
The contention of the Plaintiff that the Defendant has
closed the shop premises is not relevant for the present purposes
either. Whether the premises are being run as a shop or otherwise,
the fact admittedly remains that the premises were rented out to
the Defendant and in the absence of any Lease Agreement, the
Court is not in a position to adjudicate as to whether the Defendant
ought to have been running it only as a shop or otherwise. The only
relevant consideration would be the payment of rent regularly or
default in payment thereof as already stated.
29.
That having been said, at this juncture, it is but apposite
to notice that the Learned Trial Court while discussing Issue No.1
already extracted hereinabove, would conclude that there was no
“wilful default” on the part of the Defendant, this conclusion having
been reached inter alia on such grounds that P.W.1 when confronted
with Exhibits 45 and 46, 47, 49, 55 and Exhibit 1 failed to indentify
the Exhibits besides admitting that she had not filed the case
RFA No.10 of 2016
Taramani Devi Agarwal
against anyone.
vs. M/s. Krishna Company
That apart, she lacked knowledge regarding the
tenancy and P.W.2, her son, admitted that they had not demanded
the rent for the months of December, 2010 to March, 2011. Besides
Exhibit 3 to Exhibit 44 and Exhibit A to Exhibit 3 were received by
one Pramod Agarwal, but he was not examined, while the rent
receipts relied on by both parties revealed that the rents were being
tendered on demand. The Learned Trial Court would also hold that
there were no pleadings about the role of her son P.W.2 and the
Plaintiff has failed to discharge the burden of proof.
30.
Pausing here for an instant, it can be noticed on scrutiny
of the Act of 1956 that Section 4 nowhere speaks of “wilful default”.
All that the provision envisages is that the landlord may evict the
tenant “when the rent in arrears amount to four months rent or
more”, “wilful default” does not find place in the Section and is
therefore alien to it. The requirement for eviction under the
provision would therefore be rent in arrears for the period specified,
and not wilful default as sought to be emphasised by the Learned
Trial Court.
31.
Further, it is worth recording that although the Learned
Trial Court concluded that there existed default in payment of rent
nevertheless proceeded to order as follows in Issue No.3;
“82.
In view of the detailed discussions,
observations, findings and analysis of the evidence, the
plaintiff is not entitled to any relief other than the
arrear rents for the month of December, 2010 January
2011, February 2011 and March 2011 and also arrear
rent till the filing of the suit. Further, plaintiff also is
entitled to recover the arrear rent deposited by the
defendant in the office of Nazir, District court East, vide
order of the Court dated 28.10.2013 during the
pendency of this suit.”
RFA No.10 of 2016
Taramani Devi Agarwal
vs. M/s. Krishna Company
32.
The conclusion of the Learned Trial Court in Issue No.3,
extracted
supra,
is
in
my
considered
opinion
unfathomable.
Accordingly, the impugned Judgment of the Learned Trial Court
deserves to be and is accordingly set aside, save the relief granted
for payment of the arrears of rent.
33.
In the result, the Appeal is allowed to the extent as
detailed hereinabove.
34.
Consequently, the Defendant shall vacate the suit
premises on or before 31-12-2018 and hand over vacant possession
to the Plaintiff.
The Defendant shall also pay the arrears in rent
from the month of December, 2010, till the time that they hand over
vacant possession of the suit premises to the Plaintiff, as ordered
herein. No interest accrues on the defaulted rent amounts.
35.
Copy of this Judgment and records of the Learned Trial
Court be remitted forthwith.
36.
No order as to costs.
37.
Appeal disposed of.
Sd/-
( Meenakshi Madan Rai )
Acting Chief Justice
01-10-2018
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