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AD -19
Ct No.16
14.01.2026
(SSS)
SAT 280 of 2025
with
CAN 1 of 2025
Taraknath Pyne
Vs.
Apurba Ash and Ors.
Mr. Partha Pratim Roy,
Mr. Kushal Chatterjee,
Mr. Sibashis Chowdhury
….For the appellant.
Mr. Pinaki Ranjan Mitra
….For the respondent no. 1.
1. Leave is granted to the learned advocate-onrecord for the appellant to rectify the defect
regarding the preamble of the memorandum of
appeal during the course of the day.
2. At the outset, a question of maintainability
arises with regard to the present second appeal.
3. The brief backdrop is that in a suit filed by the
respondents herein, an application filed by the
present appellant (defendant in the suit) under
Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure
was allowed, thereby rejecting the plaint.
4. Against such deemed decree, a regular first
appeal was preferred by the respondents which,
by
the
impugned
judgment,
was
allowed
on
contest by the First Appellate Court, thereby
setting aside the deemed decree of rejection of
plaint, giving rise to the present second appeal.
5. Learned counsel appearing for the appellant,
in support of the maintainability of the present
second appeal, cites a three-Judge Bench decision
of this Court in the matter of Deputy Director,
Employees’ State Insurance Corporation vs. Ward
Memorial Church School and Anr. reported at 2023
SCC OnLine Cal 2914 where the Hon’ble Larger
Bench inter alia observed, while finding that the
issue arose as to when the First Appellate Court
either affirms the order rejecting the plaint or
reverses the order thereby restoring the suit to be
tried on
merits,
what
would
be
the
remedy
available to an aggrieved party, held that it is in
effect an order of remand under Order XLI Rule 23
of the Code of Civil Procedure.
6. The Larger Bench further held that it is the
nature of the jurisdiction that was emphasized
and
given
predominance
in
the
judgments
discussed therein and ultimately found that the
proper remedy in the said case would be to file a
writ petition under Article 227 of the Constitution
of India.
7. Although separate judgments were delivered by
the Hon’ble Judges constituting the said Bench,
the conclusion was the same, to the above effect.
8. Learned counsel further cites a judgment of a
learned Single Judge of this Court in the matter of
The Lieutenant Governor of Andaman and Nicobar
Islands and Others vs. Andaman Plantation and
Development Corporation Pvt. Ltd. (CO 75 of 2025)
where it was held that, against an order whereby
the First Appellate Court reversed the rejection of
a plaint by the Trial Court, the exercise would be
under Order XLI Rule 23 of the Code and as such,
an appeal would lie against such order under
Section 104, read with Order XLIII Rule 1(u), of
the Code of Civil Procedure. While holding so, the
learned Single Judge observed that the findings of
the Larger Bench judgment referred to above,
insofar as the contrary was held therein, were
obiter dicta.
9. Lastly, learned counsel for the appellant cites
K. Valarmathi and Others vs. Kumaresan reported
at 2025 SCC OnLine SC 985 where the Hon’ble
Supreme
Court
deprecated
the
invocation
of
constitutional powers for rejecting a plaint.
10. Heard learned counsel for the parties.
11. With utmost respect to the erudition of the
members of the Larger Bench, in our opinion, the
observation of the said Bench to the effect that an
application under Article 227 of the Constitution
of India will lie in the event the Appellate Court
rejects an Order VII Rule 11 application was
obiter dictum in the context of the said case.
12. The
factual matrix of
the
said case
was
diametrically opposite to the present one. The
question which was referred to the said Bench, in
answer to which the judgment was passed by the
Larger Bench, was as follows:“Whether the remedy lies by filing Second
Appeal, if the Revisional Court reverses the order
of the Trial Court refusing to reject the plaint, as a
corollary effect the plaint is rejected in view of the
definition of “decree” given under Section 2(2) of
the Code.”
13. Thus, in the said case, the Trial Court had
rejected the application for rejection of plaint
under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil
Procedure,
which
was
reversed
by
the
First
Appellate Court. As such, the order of the First
Appellate Court rejecting the plaint was in the
nature of a deemed decree.
14. Hence, the said judgment does not come to
the aid of the appellant in the present case, not
being a precedent on the issue which has arisen
before us.
15. Insofar as the judgment of the learned Single
Judge in The Lieutenant Governor of Andaman and
Nicobar Islands and Others (supra) is concerned, it
was held therein that where the First Appellate
Court reverses the rejection of plaint, the said
order should be treated to be an order of remand
and a further appeal lies against the same under
Order XXIII Rule 1 (u) of the Code of Civil
Procedure. However, in the facts of the said case,
while rejecting the plaint, the trial court had
framed a preliminary issue in that regard and had
decided the same, which apparently prompted the
learned Single Judge to hold that
the First
Appellate Court’s judgment tantamounted to a
remand order.
16. A perusal of the language of Order XLI Rule
23 would be beneficial in the context.
17. The said provision is set out hereinbelow:“23. Remand of case by Appellate Court. Where the Court from whose decree an appeal is
preferred
has
disposed
of
the
suit
upon
a
preliminary point and the decree is reversed in
appeal, the Appellate Court may, if it thinks fit, by
order remand the case, and may further direct
what issue or issues shall be tried in the case so
remanded, and shall send a copy of its judgment
and order to the Court from whose decree the
appeal is preferred, which directions to re-admit
the suit under its original number in the register of
civil suits, and proceed to determine the suit; and
the evidence (if any) recorded during the original
trial shall, subject all just exceptions, be evidence
during the trial after remand.”
18.
From a comprehensive reading of the said
provision, it is amply clear that by the expression
“preliminary point” used therein, the legislature
intended to cover cases where a preliminary issue
is decided (for example under Order XIV of the
Code of Civil Procedure). Such construction would
be in consonance with the rest of the provision,
since in such a case, the Appellate Court has been
empowered under Rule 23, if it thinks fit, to
remand the case and further direct “what issue or
issues shall be tried” in the case so remanded.
19.
Furthermore, in Order XLI Rule 23, the
language used is that where the court from whose
decree an appeal is preferred “has disposed of the
suit upon a preliminary point”. The expression
“disposed of the suit”, obviously means that an
issue has been decided in the preliminary form.
20. The rejection of a plaint under Order VII Rule
11 of the Code is a deemed decree merely because
it is stated to be so in Section 2 of the Code of
Civil Procedure, which defines a decree. However,
per se, the rejection of a plaint does not involve
the disposal of a suit or the decision on any issue
whatsoever. For qualifying as an “issue”, an
averment has to be made in the plaint, which has
to be
controverted
in the
written statement,
thereby prompting the Trial Court to formulate a
specific issue. Unless such an issue is decided
while disposing of the suit, the trappings of Rule
23 of Order XLI cannot apply. However, the
rejection of a plaint simpliciter cannot be equated
with disposal of a suit - either on a preliminary
issue or otherwise.
21. Hence, in the event the First Appellate Court
sets aside a deemed decree merely rejecting the
plaint, without any issue being simultaneously
decided by the trial court, the effect is that the
application under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code
stands rejected by the First Appellate Court,
which acquires the character of an order and not
a decree or an appealable order or a remand
order.
22. In such view of the matter, in the event the
First Appellate Court reverses a deemed decree
rejecting a plaint without deciding any issue, such
judgment of the First Appellate Court is to be
treated as an order within the contemplation of
the Code of Civil Procedure simpliciter and not a
remand order in the true sense of the term.
23. In view of such order, if passed in favour of
the challenger, having finally decided the suit by
rejection of the plaint, the trappings of Section
115 (as amended) of the Code of Civil Procedure
are squarely applicable and as such, a revisional
application under Section 115 of the Code of Civil
Procedure is the remedy available to the aggrieved
party against the order of the First Appellate
Court rejecting the application under Order VII
Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
24. Thus, in any event, the proposition laid down
in The Lieutenant Governor of Andaman and
Nicobar Islands and Others (supra) does not come
to the aid of the appellant, since in the said case
an issue was decided by the learned trial Judge
alongwith rejection of the plaint, which lent the
judgment of the First Appellate Court the colour of
a remand order.
25.
In
view
of
the
above,
we
hold
the
maintainability issue against the appellant in the
present case.
26. It is hereby observed that no second appeal, as
preferred in the instant case, is maintainable
against the impugned judgment and order of the
First Appellate Court, whereby the rejection of the
plaint by the Trial Court was reversed, thereby in
effect rejecting the application under Order VII
Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
27. We make it clear that despite a decree having
been drawn up by the First Appellate Court in the
instant case, such decree was a misnomer and
drawing up of a decree was totally misconceived
and superfluous, in view of the order of the First
Appellate Court not being a decree from any
perspective whatsoever.
28. The mere ministerial act of drawing up of a
decree cannot govern the parent provisions of the
statute and/or determine the appellability or
otherwise of the judgment in respect of which
such decree has been drawn up. Thus, the
drawing up of a decree by the First Appellate
Court is totally irrelevant in the context of the
present
case
insofar
as
the
issue
of
maintainability is concerned.
29. Accordingly, SAT 280 of 2025 is dismissed as
not
maintainable
in
view
of
the
impugned
judgment of the First Appellate Court being in the
nature of an order simpliciter and not a decree. A
revisional application under Section 115 of the
Code of Civil Procedure, and not an appeal, would
be the appropriate remedy against such order.
30. Consequentially,
CAN
of
is
also
disposed of.
31. There will be no order as to costs.
32. Leave is granted to the learned advocate-onrecord for the appellant to take back the certified
copies of the judgments of both the Courts below
and
the
decree
of
the
trial
court
from
the
Department, upon furnishing photocopies thereof
for the records.
33. Since we are informed that the next date of
final hearing fixed in the Trial Court in the parent
suit is tomorrow, i.e. January 15, 2026, for the
ends of justice, we grant stay of all further
proceedings of the suit till January 22, 2026 in
order to enable the appellant to prefer a revisional
application before the appropriate Bench in the
meantime.
34. The court fees paid in connection with the
second appeal shall be refunded to the appellant
by the Department, upon being so approached by
the appellant.
(Sabyasachi Bhattacharyya, J.)
(Supratim Bhattacharya, J.)
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