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THE HIGH COURT OF SIKKIM : GANGTOK
(Civil Appellate Jurisdiction)
19th APRIL, 2017
DATED:
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------S.B. : HON’BLE MRS. JUSTICE MEENAKSHI MADAN RAI, JUDGE
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
I.A. No. 1 of 2016
in
RFA No. 16 OF 2016
Petitioner/Appellant
:
Shri Tara Kumar Pradhan,
S/o Late Krishna Prasad Pradhan,
R/o Phewa Busty,
Gangtok,
East Sikkim.
Versus
Respondent
:
Shri Yuba Kumar Pradhan,
S/o Late Krishna Prasad Pradhan,
R/o Deorali,
Gangtok,
East Sikkim.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Appearance
Mr. Jorgay Namka, Ms. Panila Thengh, Ms Pema Bhutia, Mr. Karma Sonam
Lhendup and Mr. Tashi D. Sherpa, Advocates for the Petitioner/Appellant.
Mr. Sudesh Joshi and Mrs. Manita Pradhan, Advocates for the Respondent.
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
ORDER
Meenakshi Madan Rai, J.
(1)
This Petition, purportedly for condonation of delay has
been filed under Rules 16, 17 and 18 of the Sikkim High Court
(Practice and Procedure) Rules 2011, seeking condonation of delay
of 59 days in filing the RFA.
(2)
For clarity in the matter, we may briefly advert to the
facts leading to the RFA and the instant Petition. Civil Misc. Case
I.A. No.1 of 2016 in RFA No. 16 of 2016
Shri Tara Kumar Pradhan vs. Shri Yuba Kumar Pradhan
No. 15 of 2011 was registered in the Court of the learned District
Judge, East District at Gangtok, on a Petition filed by the
Respondent herein, for letters of administration under Section 278
of the Indian Succession Act, 1925, duly contested by the
Petitioner/Appellant herein. The learned District Judge while
allowing the Petition held that the Will in dispute was a valid Will.
(3)
Aggrieved by the finding in the said Order, the
Petitioner/Appellant (hereinafter „Petitioner‟) preferred an RFA and
filed it for the first time on 12.08.2016 before the Registry of this
Court, which was however not listed on account of non-payment of
Court Fees. After rectifying other defects pointed out by the
Registry, the matter was refiled on 15.10.2016 but once again not
listed for non-payment of Court Fees. The issue was raised before
the Registrar, where the learned Counsel for the Petitioner sought
to explain that as the Petitioner was the Respondent No.1 before
the learned Trial Court and as the RFA was being preferred by him,
hence he was not required to pay the Court Fees. Regardless, the
Registry insisted on payment of Court Fees. Consequently, learned
Counsel for the Petitioner after conferring with the Petitioner on
the matter decided to pay the Court Fees, during the course of
which an entire month elapsed. The RFA was then filed on
22.10.2016, hence the delay of 59 days. That, the Petitioner bona
fide believed that the steps taken by him and his Counsel were
correct and came to learn of the anomalies on 21.10.2016. On
being advised, the instant Appeal was filed on 22.10.2016, his
case being strong on merits, hence the prayer for condoning the
delay of 59 days.
(4)
Per contra, learned Counsel for the Respondent while
drawing the attention of this Court to the provisions of Order XLI
Rule 3A of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (hereinafter „the
CPC‟), urged that the Law clearly lays down that when an appeal is
presented after expiry of the period of limitation, it shall be
accompanied by an application supported by affidavit setting forth
the facts on which the appellant relies, to satisfy the Court that he
I.A. No.1 of 2016 in RFA No. 16 of 2016
Shri Tara Kumar Pradhan vs. Shri Yuba Kumar Pradhan
had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal within such
period. It was put forth that Article 116 of the Limitation Act, 1963
(hereinafter „the Limitation Act‟), prescribes a period of 90 days for
filing of the RFA, whereas the Appeal was filed much later and
therefore, ought to be accompanied by an application under
Section 5 of the Limitation Act. On the question of Court fees, it
was contended that the Sikkim Court Fees and Stamps on
Documents Act, 1928 (hereinafter „the Act‟) at Rule 5, clearly
prescribes that Court Fee in Appeals shall be charged as in the
original court and the amendments in the Act in the year 2002 and
2013, also reiterates the same. Hence, the grounds agitated by
the Petitioner that he was the Respondent before the learned Trial
Court and was consequently not required to deposit the Court Fee
in Appeal has no legs to stand. It is evident that he chose not to
file the Court Fee despite the Registry clarifying the position to
him, in such a circumstance he cannot, therefore, feign ignorance
of the Law and seek reliefs, as ignorance of Law is no excuse. It
was further submitted that no material particulars pertaining to
payment of Court Fees have been reflected in the Petition and the
RFA. Attention of this Court was also invited to the fact that the
impugned
Order
was
passed
on
14.06.2016,
however,
in
Paragraph 5 of the RFA, under the caption “GROUNDS”, the
Petitioner has failed to reveal the date on which the Application
was made for certified copy of the impugned Order and has merely
stated that the copy was made ready on 14.07.2016. On the other
hand, a perusal of the details reflected in the rubber Stamp affixed
by the Head Copyist, District & Sessions Court, East Sikkim at
Gangtok, reveals that the Petitioner applied for the impugned
Order only on 07.07.2016, almost a month after the Order was
pronounced and a copy thereof was made ready on 14.07.2016.
Therefore, the Petitioner has attempted to mislead the Court by
the statements. Hence on the aforesaid grounds, the Petition
deserves a dismissal.
(5)
To buttress his submissions, learned Counsel for the
Respondent relied on Esha Bhattacharjee v. Managing Committee
I.A. No.1 of 2016 in RFA No. 16 of 2016
Shri Tara Kumar Pradhan vs. Shri Yuba Kumar Pradhan
of Raghunathpur Nafar Academy and Others : (2013) 12 SCC 649
and Basawaraj v. Land Acquisition Officer : (2013) 14 SCC 81.
(6)
In response, learned Counsel for the Petitioner held
that Article 116 of the Limitation Act, prescribes a limitation of 90
days, whereas the Appeal was in fact initially filed within 62 days.
(7)
The rival contentions of learned Counsel were heard at
length and have been given due consideration and the impugned
Order perused.
(8)
What emanates from the gamut of facts placed before
this Court is that the impugned Order was passed on 14.06.2016.
Evidently, the Petitioner did not apply for a certified copy on the
same date but did so only on 07.07.2016, as revealed from the
rubber Stamp details of the Head Copyist of the District Court and
the copy was ready on 14.07.2016. In the first instance, it is
rather unusual that the Petitioner failed to disclose the date of
Application for certified copy of the impugned Order dated
14.06.2016, which therefore appears to be an underhand conduct.
Be that as it may, even assuming that the period of limitation
began to run only from 14.7.2016, it is apparent that the delay
has also not been calculated correctly. It has been argued that the
RFA was initially filed within the period of limitation, i.e. 62, but
the defects unearthed by the Registry led to the delay. This, I am
afraid is no ground, as an application or RFA cannot be deemed to
be filed until all defects are cured. The date of filing will be the
date when the petition is placed before the Registry sans defects
and not prior to that. Therefore, this argument being fallacious is
not tenable.
(9)
Now coming to the provisions of the Sikkim High Court
(Practice and Procedure) Rules 2011 (hereinafter ‘P.P. Rules’)
invoked by the Petitioner to condone the delay, Rule 16 deals with
the Court‟s power to dispense with compliance with the Rules and
reads as follows;
I.A. No.1 of 2016 in RFA No. 16 of 2016
Shri Tara Kumar Pradhan vs. Shri Yuba Kumar Pradhan
“16.
Courts Power to dispense with compliance
with the Rules:- The Court may, for sufficient cause shown,
excuse the parties from compliance with any of the
requirements of these Rules and may give such directions in
matters of practices and procedure as if (sic, it) may consider just
and expedient.”
A bare perusal of Rule 16 would go to show that it merely
empowers the Court to permit dispensing with the provisions of
the Rules on sufficient cause being shown but does not clothe the
Court with powers to waive statutory provisions and is, therefore,
of no assistance to the case of the Petitioner.
(10)
Rule 17 of the P.P. Rules, reads as follows;“17. Power
of
Court
to
make
appropriate orders:- An application to be excused
from compliance with the requirements of any of
the rules shall, in the first instance, be placed
before the Registrar who may without interfering or
dispensing with any mandatory requirements of the
rule shall place before the court for appropriate
order thereon, on a convenient day.”
This Rule, therefore, requires an application to be placed
before the Registrar for exemption from compliance with the
requirements of any of the P.P. Rules. However, in the instant
matter, the records do not reveal any such application being
placed before the Registrar as required or subsequent thereto
before the Court for appropriate order. A bald statement of the
Petitioner to this effect will not suffice, in the absence of any
document or written order to fortify the argument.
(11)
Rule 18 of the P.P. Rules, reads as follows;
“18. Inherent power of the Court not
affected:- Nothing in these Rules shall be deemed
to limit or otherwise affect the inherent powers of
the Court to make such orders as may be necessary
for the ends of justice or to prevent abuse of the
process of the Court.”
Suffice it to reiterate that this Rule extends a latitude to the
Court to exercise its inherent powers over and above the Rules,
either for the ends of justice or to prevent abuse of the process of
the Court.
I.A. No.1 of 2016 in RFA No. 16 of 2016
Shri Tara Kumar Pradhan vs. Shri Yuba Kumar Pradhan
(12)
That, having been said on perusal of the Report of the
Registry dated 22.10.2016, it has been recorded therein that
“……………………….As the Appeal has been filed beyond the period
prescribed for amendment as required under Rule 7 of the Sikkim High
Court (Practice and Procedure) Rules 2011, and further some defects still
existed therein, it was accordingly brought to the notice of the learned
Registrar. As directed by the learned Registrar, the Appeal may be
registered subject to the filing of application for condonation of delay and
further, subject to the correction of the defects……………”.
(13)
This direction is lucid and easy to follow. Surely, the
Counsel for the Petitioner could not have been misled by the
directions of the Registrar who had issued a categorical direction
that an application for condonation of delay was to be filed by the
Petitioner. Apart from failing to comply with the directions of the
Registrar, the Petitioner cannot also circumvent the statutory
provisions of law viz.; filing of an application under Section 5 of
the Limitation Act and instead seek condonation of delay based on
the Rules of this Court.
(14)
I am also inclined to agree with the submissions of
learned Counsel for the Respondent that Order XLI Rule 3A of the
CPC is specific inasmuch when a prayer for condonation of delay is
made, the correct provision of law would be under Section 5 of the
Limitation Act. Besides, on careful perusal of the Petitioner‟s
Application, it is evident that the Petition has been drafted in a
lackadaisical manner with nary a care to details of the averments
made, as the application states the delay to be 30 days, whereas
on the verbal submissions of learned Counsel for the Petitioner,
the delay was said to be of 59 days. That apart, Paragraph 2(viii)
and
Paragraph
of
the
Application
of
the
Petitioner
are
contradictory and read as follows;
“2. …………………………………………………………………………….
(viii) That the Appellant’s Counsel therefore
brough(sic) the same to the notice of the Appellant,
after which they deliberated on the said subject and
once again came back to the Registry, High Court
of Sikkim and hence the entire process took almost
I.A. No.1 of 2016 in RFA No. 16 of 2016
Shri Tara Kumar Pradhan vs. Shri Yuba Kumar Pradhan
a month, after which they approached the High
court of Sikkim and filed the said RFA today.”
……………………..…………………………………………………………
5. That the Appellant who came to learn of the
above anamolies (sic) only on 21.10.2016 on being
advised, the Appellant is filing the present petition
as he has a strong case on merits in his favour.”
Thus, on the one hand, it is averred that after the matter
regarding the requirement of payment of Court fees was brought
to the notice of the Petitioner, they deliberated on the issue and
the entire process took almost a month consequent to which they
approached the High Court on 22.10.2016. In Paragraph 5 to the
contrary, it is said that the Petitioner came to learn of the
anomalies only on 21.10.2016 and on being advised, filed the
present Petition on 22.10.2016.
(15)
Being germane to the issue at hand, we may refer to
the decision of the Hon‟ble Apex Court in Esha Bhattacharjee
(supra), the appropriate paragraphs of which are extracted herein
below:
“21.4. (iv) No presumption can be attached to
deliberate causation of delay but, gross negligence
on the part of the counsel or litigant is to be taken
note of.
…………………………………………………………………………………..
21.9. (ix) The conduct, behaviour and attitude of a
party relating to its inaction or negligence are
relevant factors to be taken into consideration. It is
so as the fundamental principle is that the courts
are required to weigh the scale of balance of justice
in respect of both parties and the said principle
cannot be given a total go by in the name of liberal
approach.
21.10. (x) If the explanation offered is concocted
or the grounds urged in the application are fanciful,
the courts should be vigilant not to expose the
other side unnecessarily to face such a litigation.
21.11. (xi) It is to be borne in mind that no one
gets away with fraud, misrepresentation or
interpolation by taking recourse to the technicalities
of law of limitation.
21.12. (xii) The entire gamut of facts are to be
carefully scrutinized and the approach should be
based on the paradigm of judicial discretion which
is founded on objective reasoning and not on
individual perception.
……………………………………………………………………………………
I.A. No.1 of 2016 in RFA No. 16 of 2016
Shri Tara Kumar Pradhan vs. Shri Yuba Kumar Pradhan
22.1. (a) An application for condonation of delay
should be drafted with careful concern and not in a
haphazard manner harbouring the notion that the
courts are required to condone delay on the
bedrock of the principle that adjudication of a lis on
merits is seminal to justice dispensation system.
…………………………………………………………………………….…..
22.4. (d) The increasing tendency to perceive
delay should not be dealt with in a routine manner
on the base of individual philosophy which is
basically subjective.
………………………………………………………………….…………..”
(16)
The
condonation
of
principles
applicable
to
delay
therefore,
succinctly
is,
an
application
stated.
for
The
application as already observed has been drafted in a haphazard
manner, scant regard being given to project the actual delay. That
apart, the contradictions in the submissions as extracted supra
also reveal a careless attitude despite the knowledge that it is to
be considered by this Court. This Court is indeed conscious and
aware that a pedantic approach
has to be avoided while
considering petitions for condonation of delay, for the ends of
justice, but the Petition does not qualify as a petition for
condonation of delay, the statutory provisions not having been
being invoked. The Petitioner cannot take shelter under the P.P.
Rules.
(17)
In this context, it would also be apposite to refer to the
decision of Basawaraj (supra), wherein it was observed as follows;
“12. It is settled legal proposition that laws
of limitation may harshly affect a particular party
but it has to be applied with all its rigour when the
statute so prescribes. The court has no power to
extend the period of limitation on equitable
grounds. “A result flowing from a statutory
provision is never an evil. A court has no power to
ignore that provision to relieve what it considers a
distress resulting from its operation.” The statutory
provision may cause hardship or inconvenience to a
particular party but the court has no choice but to
enforce it giving full effect to the same. The legal
maxim dura lex sed lex which means “the law is
hard but it is the law”, stands attracted in such a
situation. It has consistently been held that,
“inconvenience is not” a decisive factor to be
considered while interpreting a statute.”
I.A. No.1 of 2016 in RFA No. 16 of 2016
Shri Tara Kumar Pradhan vs. Shri Yuba Kumar Pradhan
(18)
From the foregoing discussion, it is clear that the
Petition reflects negligence, inaction, misrepresentation and a lack
of bona fides and has failed to put forth substantial reasons for
allowing the prayer, even if the instant Petition is to be considered
as one for condonation of delay. In the said circumstances, the
Petition being devoid of merits deserves to be and is accordingly
dismissed as rejected.
(19)
Consequently, the Appeal is also dismissed.
Sd/-
( Meenakshi Madan Rai )
Judge
19-04-2017
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