Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act, 1937 – In 1947, on the formation of India and Pakistan, the State of Rampur merged into the Union of India – Ruler of Rampur signed the Merger Agreement on 15.05.49 under which he was entitled to full ownership, use and enjoyment of all private properties (as distinguished from State properties) belonging to him – Constitution of India came into force on 26.01.50 – Ruler died intestate – Certificate issued inter alia certifying the eldest son of the Ruler, defendant no.1(since deceased) as the sole successor to his private properties – Certificate quashed– Plaintiff-granddaughter of the Ruler filed suit inter alia for partition of the suit properties on the ground that the properties being his private properties, all legal heirs were entitled to share in the property as per personal law – Contested by the defendants on the ground that the property was not the personal property of the Ruler but, was attached to the ‘Gaddi’ of the State of Rampur and thus, governed by law of succession being rule of male priomogeniture i.e. senior most male heir taking everything to the exclusion of all other heirs – Suit dismissed by the High Court – On appeal, held: Definition of ruler in Cl.(22) of Art.366 itself shows that the person who is defined as ruler is a former prince, chief or other person, who was, on or after 26.01.50 recognised as a ruler having signed the covenant of accession – Such person, though defined as a ‘Ruler’, had no territory and exercised no sovereignty over any subjects – They had no land other than the private properties – Since, they were rulers only as a matter of courtesy, to protect their erstwhile titles, the properties which were declared to be their personal properties had to be treated as their personal properties and could not be treated as properties attached to the Gaddi – A Gaddi or rulership and private property have two different connotations even in the merger agreement– Rulers enjoyed right to privy purses, private properties and privileges only because of the Constitution and in other respects they were ordinary citizens – Thus, on the death of the Ruler in 1966, succession to his private properties was governed by personal laws – Undisputedly, if personal law is to apply then the 1937 Act will apply and since the Ruler was a Shia, his estate will devolve under the Muslim personal law, as applicable to Shias – During the pendency of the suit, the plaint was amended from time to time because of the death of some of the defendants – After the amendment, the shares of all the legal heirs were worked out in para 9-F of the plaint – These shares have not been disputed by any one and hence, are accepted to be correct – Parties entitled to the property as per the shares set out in para 9-F of the plaint which shall form part of the decree – Judgments of Single Judge and Division Bench of the High Court, set aside – Decree passed – No order in the Contempt Petition in view of the directions issued – Succession –Constitution of India– Art.366(2), 363(A), 291 – Government of India Act, 1935 – s.6.
Words & Expressions –’Gaddi’ – Meaning of – Discussed.
Allowing the appeals, the Court
HELD : 1.1 The facts are not in dispute. It is also not disputed that the Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act, 1937 was applicable to the State of Rampur. The issue is whether the rulers continued to be rulers after executing the instruments of merger. They had agreed to merge their States with the Indian Union because they were to be paid privy purses and would enjoy certain privileges. They were also entitled to declare some properties to be their private properties. In case of disputes whether the property is private or State property, the Union could refer the dispute for decision to a committee headed by a judicial officer. The rulers were no longer sovereign. There was no paramountcy vested in the rulers. They had no land other than the private properties. They had no subjects. They were rulers only in name, left only with the recognition of their original title, a privy purse, some privileges, etc. The rulers were rulers only in name. They held no land except the personal properties. There were no subjects. They were Maharajas or Rajas without a Praja; without any sovereignty; and without any territory. [Paras 12, 32, 33] [822-B-C; 833-B-C; F]
1.2 The definition of ruler in clause (22) of Article 366 of the Constitution itself shows that the person who is defined as ruler is a former prince, chief or other person, who was, on or after 26.01.1950 recognised as a ruler having signed the covenant of accession. Necessarily, the ruler was a person who was recognised before independence by the British Crown and was the sovereign of his State. Such person, though defined as a ‘Ruler’, has no territory and exercises no sovereignty over any subjects. He has no attributes of a potentate nor does he enjoy all the powers and privileges which are normally exercised by a potentate. The President while exercising his powers under Article 366 (22) could not notify a ruler at his whims and fancy. Examples were also given where in cases of disputes, the same were referred to committees comprising of the Chief Justices of the States and erstwhile rulers. However, the declaration under clause (22) of Article 366 relates only to the Gaddi or the rulership and not to the properties which were declared to be private properties by the ruler. [Paras 34-36] [833-G-H; 834-A-E]
1.3 These were rulers without any subjects. These were rulers without any territory. These were so called rulers enjoying certain privileges and privy purses. They had been given the choice of declaring certain properties to be their private properties and these private properties could not be said to be attached to the Gaddi. When they were actual sovereigns, their entire State was attached to the Gaddi and not any particular property. There are no specific properties which can be attached to the Gaddi. It has to be the entire ‘State’ or nothing. Since, it is held that they were rulers only as a matter of courtesy, to protect their erstwhile titles, the properties which were declared to be their personal properties had to be treated as their personal properties and could not be treated as properties attached to the Gaddi. In Rajpal Hindi Shabdkosh, Gaddi has been given various meanings including small mattress, seat of an exalted person, title of a ruler. In the Oxford Hindi-English Dictionary, the meanings given are cushion, throne, royal seat, etc. Property is not mentioned as one of the attributes of a Gaddi. A Gaddi or rulership and private property have two different connotations even in the merger agreement/instrument of accession. In Article
2 of the agreement, it is clearly mentioned that Nawab would continue to enjoy the same personal rights, privileges, immunities and dignities and other titles which he would have enjoyed prior to the agreement. Conspicuously, the word ‘property’ or ‘personal property’ is missing. Article 2 deals only with personal rights, privileges, dignities, etc. Article 3 deals with privy purse which would also be a part of the rulership or Gaddi. Article 6 which deals with succession, guarantees the succession according to law and custom to the Gaddi of the State and to the Nawab’s personal rights, privileges, immunities, dignities and title. Gaddi would be the ‘throne’ or ‘title’ of Nawab in the context in which it has been used and the personal rights, privileges, immunities, dignities and titles will be those referred to in Article 2. The word ‘property’ is also conspicuously absent in Article 6. [Paras 37-39] [834-E-H; 835-A-D]
1.4 Article 4 states that the Nawab shall be entitled to full ownership, use and enjoyment of all private properties as distinct from State properties. Such properties must belong to him as on the date of agreement. Article 6 does not relate to the properties mentioned in Article 4 and the private properties would remain the private properties of the Nawab as a common citizen of the country. On the death of the ruler, Nawab RAK in the year 1966, succession to his private properties was governed by personal laws. The succession to the estate of Nawab ‘RAK’ opened in the year 1966, prior to the 26th Amendment Act. However, one thing which is clear is that the rulers enjoyed right to privy purses, private properties and privileges only because of the Constitution and in other respects they were ordinary citizens. It was urged that since the rights were guaranteed under the Constitution, the rule of primogeniture would apply. No force in this contention because in Article 362 reference is made only to the personal rights, privileges and dignities of the ruler of an Indian State and rights would not include succession to personal properties. [Paras 40, 41 and 42] [835-E-H; 836-A-B; H; 837-A-B]
1.5 The Trust, which has been referred to by the contesting defendants, was created in the year 1944, much before the Nawab ceded his property to the Dominion of India. At that time, there was no doubt that succession to the properties of the State of Rampur would be governed by the rule of primogeniture. Even after Nawab ceased to be the ruler, he gifted a number of extensive properties to the defendant no.1 during his lifetime including a property known as Rafat Club in Rampur, which the defendant no.1 sold to the State of U.P. in 1961. The erstwhile Nawab also gifted a property known as Kothi Bareilly and a house in Delhi to defendant no.1. Both the Division Bench and the Single Judge held that these properties gifted by the erstwhile Nawab to the defendant no.1 were given to him only to maintain his status as the ruler and, therefore, could not be taken into consideration while deciding the issue of succession of the erstwhile Nawab of Rampur. A contradiction is found in the findings of the High Court in this regard. On the one hand, it is said that the plaintiff and the other family members cannot urge that the estate of the Nawab should be governed by personal law because they have derived benefits from the Raza Trust and gifts in their life time and, on the other hand, when it comes to the defendant no.1, it is said that the gifts were made only with a view that defendant no. 1 should be able to maintain his status as the prospective heir. If he was to get all the properties of the Nawab, then why gifts would have to be made in his favour in his life time. Therefore, this contention is rejected. There is no dispute between the parties that if personal law is to apply then the Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act, 1937 will apply and since Nawab ‘RAK’ was a Shia, his estate will devolve upon his heirs under the Muslim personal law, as applicable to Shias. [Paras 43, 44 and 45] [837-C-H; 838-A-C]
1.6 During the pendency of the suit, the plaint was amended from time to time because of the death of defendant no.1, defendant no.1/1 and defendant no.3. After the amendment, the shares of all the legal heirs were worked out in para 9-F of the plaint. These shares have not been disputed by any one nor there is any dispute with regard to the manner in which the shares have been worked out. Therefore, these shares are accepted to be correct. The parties shall be entitled to the property as per the shares set out in para 9-F of the plaint which shall form a part of the decree. The judgments of Single Judge and Division Bench of the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad are set aside, and the shares of the properties are determined in terms of Para 9-F of the plaint. A decree is passed. I.A. No. 3 of 2014 is dismissed. The applicants shall, however, be at liberty to file a Civil Suit to establish their rights. [Paras 46-49] [838-D-F; 839-A-H; 840-A-B]
Visweshwar Rao v. The State of Madhya Pradesh
[1952] SCR 1020 ; Sudhansu Shekhar Singh Deo v. State of Orissa [1961] 1 SCR 779 – relied on.
K. S. V. R. Singh v. Union of India & Ors. (1969) 3 SCC 150 : [1970] 2 SCR 631 ; Revathinnal B. Varma v. H. H. Padmanabha Dasa (1993) Supp. 1 SCC 233 : [1991] 3 Suppl. SCR 30 ; Pratap Singh v. Sarojini Devi (1994) Supp. 1 SCC 734 : [1993] 1 Suppl. SCR 607; Madhav Rao Scindia, Etc. v. Union of India (1971) 1 SCC 85 : [1971] 3 SCR 9; Raghunathrao Ganpatrao v. Union of India (1994) Supp. (1) SCC 191 : [1993] 1 SCR 480 – referred to.
As published in the Supreme Court Reports, Supreme Court of India. Text from the Indian Supreme Court Judgments open data set (Dattam Labs), CC BY 4.0.
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