The court's order
The closing paragraphs of the judgment, in the court's own words. The reasons are in the full text below.
19. This Court also in specific terms held that: (SCC pp. 536–37, para 14) "[T]he condition laid down under Section 437(1)(i) is sine qua non for granting bail even under Section 439 of the Code. In the impugned order it is noticed that the High Court has given the period of incarceration already undergone by the accused and the unlikelihood of trial concluding in the near future as grounds sufficient to enlarge the accused on bail, in spite of the fact that the accused stands charged of offences punishable with life imprisonment or even death penalty. In such cases, in our opinion, the mere fact that the accused has undergone certain period of incarceration (three years in this case) by itself would not entitle the accused to be enlarged on bail, nor the fact that the trial is not likely to be concluded, in the near future either by itself or coupled with the period of incarceration would be sufficient for enlarging the appellant on bail when the gravity of the offence alleged is severe and there are allegations of tampering with the witnesses by the accused during the period he was on bail." 13). Relying on the above cited cases, the learned Addl. Public Prosecutor, submits that in an application under Section 480 BNSS, the Court has to consider the conditions laid down therein and has to examine whether there is reasonable ground for believing that the accused is guilty of an of…
07. 08.2026, in exercise of its discretionary power. 18). Learned counsel for the accused/respondents also submits that the charges have been framed against the accused persons and the trial has commenced. And till date, there is no allegation against any of the accused persons regarding violation of any of the bail conditions. The accused persons have been cooperating with the trial and they will continue to do so. 19). Learned counsel has also relied upon the Judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Mahboob Dawood Shaikh Vs. State of Maharashtra reported in 2004 2 SCC 362 in support of his Page No.# 9/12 arguments. 20). In view of his submissions, the learned counsel submits that the petitioner has not been able to make out a case for the interference of this Court and the petition deserves to be dismissed. 21). I have considered the rival submissions made by the parties and perused the materials available on record. 22). At the outset, it is observed that the jurisdiction of this Court to interfere with an order granting bail is not to be exercised merely because another view of the matter is possible. However, when the order granting bail is found to be perverse, arbitrary, suffers from non-application of mind or ignores relevant considerations having a bearing on the question of grant of bail, interference would be justified. 23). In the case of Mahipal Vs. Rajesh Kumar re…
Full Judgment Text
Text read from the judgment PDF published on the High Court's eCourts portal, through the
Indian High Court Judgments open data set (Dattam Labs,
CC BY 4.0).
The court's own copy is the authoritative text.
Page No.# 1/12
GAHC040015222026
THE GAUHATI HIGH COURT
(HIGH COURT OF ASSAM, NAGALAND, MIZORAM AND ARUNACHAL PRADESH)
(ITANAGAR BENCH)
Case No. : Crl.Petn./290/2026
Takai Wangsu
Son of Late Khuaden Wangsu, a permanent resident of Chanu Village, PO and PS
Longding, District Longding, Arunachal Pradesh.
VERSUS
The State of AP and 5 Ors
represented through the PP of AP 2:Nahpho Wangsu
Age: 0
Occupation :
Son of Shri Nyemphu Wangsu
a permanent resident of Village Longsom
PO and PS Longding
District Longding
Arunachal Pradesh.
3:Wangjing Wangsu
Age: 0
Occupation :
Son of Shri Nyemphu Wangsu
a permanent resident of Village Longsom
PO and PS Longding
District Longding
Arunachal Pradesh.
4:Nyemphu Wangsu
Age: 0
Occupation :
Son of Shri Jinghat Wangsu
a permanent resident of Village Longsom
PO and PS Longding
District Longding
Arunachal Pradesh.
Page No.# 2/12
5:Nokjing Wangpan
Age: 0
Occupation :
Son of Late Manlam Wangpan
a permanent resident of Village Longsom
PO and PS Longding
District Longding
Arunachal Pradesh.
6:Manno Wangsu
Age: 0
Occupation :
Son of Shri Tahdow Wangsu
a permanent resident of Village Longsom
PO and PS Longding
District Longding
Arunachal Pradesh
Advocate for the Petitioner
Mengu
: Kemo Lollen, Tojum Tao,Maryum Sora,Geli Taye,D Ado,Kaling
Advocate for the Respondent : P P of AP, Taloh Tabing,Omeng Taga,Bebeng Siboh,Aso Dalbong,W
Wangsu,Tabit Tapak
BEFORE
HONOURABLE MRS. JUSTICE YARENJUNGLA LONGKUMER
ORDER
11.11.2026
Heard Mr. Kemo Lollen, learned Counsel for the petitioner. Also
heard Mr T. Ete, learned Additional Public Prosecutor for the State as well
as Mr. T. Tapak, learned counsel for Respondent Nos. 2 to 6.
1).
The present petition has been filed under Section 483 (3) of the
BNSS read with Section 528 of the BNSS, praying for setting aside the
common bail order dated 07.08.2026, granted to the accused/Respondent
Nos. 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6, passed by the learned Sessions Judge, Khonsa
Page No.# 3/12
Sessions Division, Tirap District, Arunachal Pradesh, in connection with
Longding P.S. Case No. 15/2026 under Section 103(1)/3(5) of BNS.
2). The principal contention advanced on behalf of the petitioner is that
the learned Court below while granting the bail, failed to take into
consideration the relevant materials available in the Case Diary and the
Charge-sheet and the gravity and nature of the charges.
3).
The learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that, the
learned Court below failed to appreciate that the Charge-sheet had
already been filed on 22.07.2026 which was within the 90 days statutory
period and therefore, the grant of default bail did not arise in the instant
case. Further, the learned counsel also submits that the offence under
Section 103(1) of the BNS is an extremely grave and heinous offence.
However in spite of the fact that the bail applications were preferred by
the respondent accused under Section 480 of the BNSS corresponding to
Section 437 of the Cr.P.C., the Court did not consider the conditions laid
down under Section 480 of the BNSS while considering the bail
applications.
4). It is also the submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner that
the release of the accused/respondents on the ground of a non-existent
default ground has caused severe prejudice to the prosecution. Moreover,
as the accused/respondent No. 3 is a police personnel serving under the
Arunachal Pradesh Police.
5).
It is submitted by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the
petitioner is the biological elder brother of the deceased victim in the
instant case and he is the informant who had lodged the FIR dated
Page No.# 4/12
26.04.2026 in connection with the present case.
6). It is further submitted by the learned counsel for the petitioner that,
the impugned order dated 07.08.2026 suffers from total non application of
mind and does not disclose any consideration of the relevant parameters
governing the exercise of jurisdiction for grant of bail in a heinous
offences. Accordingly, it is prayed that the impugned order dated
07.08.2026 is unsustainable in law and is liable to be set aside.
7). Learned counsel for the petitioner relies on the following judgments
in support of his submission:
i) Kalyan Chandra Sarkar Vs. Rajesh Ranjan Alias Pappu Yadav
and Another reported in 2004 7 SCC 528;
ii) Pralad Singh Bhati Vs. NCT Delhi and Another reported in 2001
4 SCC 280
8).
The learned Addl. Public prosecutor Mr. T. Ete, appearing for the
State respondent has also adopted the submissions made by the learned
counsel for the petitioner and additionally submits that the impugned bail
order dated 07.08.2026 is absolutely perverse and has been passed
without considering any of the settled principles of law regarding grant of
bail.
9). The learned Addl. Public Prosecutor, submits that the Supreme Court
has distinguished between cancellation of bail on account of supervening
circumstances and setting aside an order granting bail on the ground that
the order suffers from illegality or perversity. It has been held that in a
case where the Court granting bail has failed to consider relevant factors,
the superior Court would be justified in setting aside such an order.
Page No.# 5/12
10). Learned Addl. Public Prosecutor, submits that the impugned order
dated 07.08.2026 is a cryptic order inasmuch as it is reflected that the bail
application is filed under Section 480 BNSS whereas on the other hand,
the Court has stated that the applicants have filed for default bail. The
learned Court below has wrongly placed reliance on the case of P.
Chidambaram Vs. CBI and Sanjay Chandra Vs. CBI inasmuch at the cited
cases, relate to economic offences under the Prevention of Corruption Act.
11). Learned Addl. Public Prosecutor by referring to the case of
Virupakshappa Gouda and Another Vs. State of Karnataka and
Another reported in 2017 5 SCC 406 , submitted that the Hon’ble
Supreme Court in the said case held that:
“The principle laid down in the case of Sanjay Chandra Vs. CBI cannot
be made applicable in each and every case for grant of bail. In the said case,
the appellant-accused was facing trial for the offences under Sections 120-B,
420, 468, 471 and 109 IPC and Section 13(2) read with Section 13(1)(d) of the
Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. Thus, the factual matrix was quite different.
That apart, it depends upon the nature of the crime and the manner in which it
is committed. A bail application is not to be entertained on the basis of certain
observations made in a different context. There has to be application of mind
and appreciation of the factual score and understanding of the pronouncements
in the field”.
12). The learned Addl. Public Prosecutor, has also relied on the case of
Rajesh Ranjan Yadav alias Pappu Yadav Vs. CBI reported in 2007
1 SCC 70, wherein the Supreme Court stated as under:
“11. The law in regard to grant or refusal of bail is very well settled. The
court granting bail should exercise its discretion in a judicious manner and not
as a matter of course. Though at the stage of granting bail a detailed
examination of evidence and elaborate documentation of the merit of the case
Page No.# 6/12
need not be undertaken, there is a need to indicate in such orders reasons for
prima facie concluding why bail was being granted particularly where the
accused is charged of having committed a serious offence. Any order devoid of
such reasons would suffer from non-application of mind. It is also necessary for
the court granting bail to consider among other circumstances, the following
factors also before granting bail; they are:
(a) The nature of accusation and the severity of punishment in case of
conviction and the nature of supporting evidence.
b) Reasonable apprehension of tampering with the witness or
apprehension of threat to the complainant.
(c) Prima facie satisfaction of the court in support of the charge. (See
Ram Govind Upadhyay v. Sudarshan Singh and Puran v. Rambilas)
19. This Court also in specific terms held that: (SCC pp. 536–37, para 14)
"[T]he condition laid down under Section 437(1)(i) is sine qua non for
granting bail even under Section 439 of the Code. In the impugned order it is
noticed that the High Court has given the period of incarceration already
undergone by the accused and the unlikelihood of trial concluding in the near
future as grounds sufficient to enlarge the accused on bail, in spite of the fact
that the accused stands charged of offences punishable with life imprisonment
or even death penalty. In such cases, in our opinion, the mere fact that the
accused has undergone certain period of incarceration (three years in this case)
by itself would not entitle the accused to be enlarged on bail, nor the fact that
the trial is not likely to be concluded, in the near future either by itself or
coupled with the period of incarceration would be sufficient for enlarging the
appellant on bail when the gravity of the offence alleged is severe and there are
allegations of tampering with the witnesses by the accused during the period he
was on bail."
13).
Relying on the above cited cases, the learned Addl. Public
Prosecutor, submits that in an application under Section 480 BNSS, the
Court has to consider the conditions laid down therein and has to examine
whether there is reasonable ground for believing that the accused is guilty
of an offence punishable with death or imprisonment for life. In the case
of Rajesh Ranjan Yadav (Supra), it was held that the Court has to also
Page No.# 7/12
consider the nature of accusation and the severity of the punishment in
case of conviction and the nature of the supporting evidence and,
moreover, the apprehension of tampering with the witnesses is also a
factor to be considered before granting bail. Further, the Supreme Court
also held that the conditions laid down under Section 437 of the Cr.P.C.
are sine qua non for granting bail even under Section 439 of the Cr.P.C.
and when the Court has taken into consideration the period of
incarceration already undergone by the accused and the likelihood of trial
not concluding in the near future as grounds to enlarge the accused on
bail, the mere fact that the accused had undergone a certain period of
incarceration by itself would not entitle the accused to be enlarged on bail.
14). Learned Addl. Public Prosecutor, therefore, submits that in the
present case the learned Court below has allowed the bail applications on
the ground that the Charge-sheet is filed and that there is no allegation of
tampering with the evidence and that the trial of the case will take a
considerable period of time. The learned Court could not have arrived at
such a finding as the accused respondents had only been in custody for
about 90 days and the trial had had not even commenced and it was not
possible for the Court to come to a conclusion that the trial will take a long
time.
15). Another pertinent factor which the learned Addl. Public Prosecutor
has pointed out is that, in the present case, there are 5 accused persons
and their bail applications were disposed of by the common impugned
order dated 07.08.2026. However, the learned Court below has not given
any finding in respect of each accused person and has not stated the
reasons and the grounds for granting bail with regard to each accused
Page No.# 8/12
person. Therefore, the order is a blanket bail order issued for all the
accused respondents in spite of the fact that the evidence against each of
the accused may be distinct and different and separate.
16). Learned Addl. Public Prosecutor, therefore, submits that the
impugned order granting bail cannot be sustained and is liable to be set
aside.
17). Per contra, learned counsel Mr. T. Tapak, appearing for all the
accused persons/respondents 2 to 6, submits that the accused persons
were enlarged on bail by a competent Court after due consideration of the
materials placed before the Court and this Court in a petition under 528 of
the BNSS cannot interfere with the exercise of discretion by the Court
below. The learned counsel submits that no sufficient ground has been
made out for interference with the impugned order. Learned counsel also
submits that the learned Court below has taken the entire facts and
circumstances into consideration before issuing the impugned order dated
07.08.2026, in exercise of its discretionary power.
18). Learned counsel for the accused/respondents also submits that the
charges have been framed against the accused persons and the trial has
commenced. And till date, there is no allegation against any of the
accused persons regarding violation of any of the bail conditions. The
accused persons have been cooperating with the trial and they will
continue to do so.
19). Learned counsel has also relied upon the Judgment of the Supreme
Court in the case of Mahboob Dawood Shaikh Vs. State of
Maharashtra reported in 2004 2 SCC 362 in support of his
Page No.# 9/12
arguments.
20). In view of his submissions, the learned counsel submits that the
petitioner has not been able to make out a case for the interference of this
Court and the petition deserves to be dismissed.
21). I have considered the rival submissions made by the parties and
perused the materials available on record.
22). At the outset, it is observed that the jurisdiction of this Court to
interfere with an order granting bail is not to be exercised merely because
another view of the matter is possible. However, when the order granting
bail is found to be perverse, arbitrary, suffers from non-application of mind
or ignores relevant considerations having a bearing on the question of
grant of bail, interference would be justified.
23). In the case of Mahipal Vs. Rajesh Kumar reported in 2020 2
SCC 118, the Supreme Court laid down important principles governing
the cancellation of bail and the exercise of appellate jurisdiction against an
order granting bail. Importantly, the Supreme Court distinguished
between:
i) Cancellation of bail when there is misuse of liberty, interference
with witnesses or likelihood of absconding subsequent to the grant of bail;
ii) Setting aside an order granting bail in view of the illegality of the
bail order itself and when the bail order is found to be perverse, illegal or
passed in disregard of relevant parameters concerning bail.
24). In the present case on examination of the impugned order dated
07.08.2026, this Court finds that the learned Court below has failed to
adequately consider whether a prima facie case existed against the
Page No.# 10/12
accused persons, the nature and gravity of the offence, the severity of the
punishment upon conviction, possibility of influencing witnesses or
likelihood of repetition of the offence.
25). The learned Court below is also not clear about the provision under
which the application has been taken up. On one hand, the bail
application is stated to be under section 480 BNSS. However, on the other
hand, the order also reflects that the application is a default bail
application. Assuming that it was a default bail application under Section
187 BNSS, there was no requirement of appreciating the bail application
against the parameters of granting bail. But the fact that the Charge-sheet
was already filed within the mandatory period would negate the
entertainment of a default bail application. Alternatively, if the bail
application is taken to be one filed under Section 480 BNSS, the statutory
conditions contained in Section 480 of the BNSS has to be considered by
the trial Court. Evidently, the application was not one under Section 187
BNSS as Charge-sheet had already been filed
26). The bail order must disclose the relevant considerations which
weighed with the Court. Merely stating that the Court has perused the
records and considered the facts and circumstances is insufficient. Where
an order granting bail does not disclose the reasons for the decision, it
raises a presumption of non-application of mind. This Court has also
observed that the learned Court below has not taken into consideration
the gravity of the offense, the nature of evidence or any other relevant
factors. The Court also could not have known that the trial of the case will
take a considerable period of time as the Charge-sheet had only been filed
at the time of considering the bail application and the trial had not yet
Page No.# 11/12
commenced.
27). As held in the case of Virupakshappa (Supra) , the principles laid
down in the case of P. Chidambaram and Sanjay Chandra could not have
been made applicable in this case, as the factual matrix was not the same.
The two cases relied upon by the Court below pertains to offences under
the Prevention of Corruption Act whereas in the instant case the accused
persons had been charged under Section 103(1) of the BNS with Section
3(5) of the BNS.
28). The impugned order dated 07.08.2026 therefore does not reflect a
proper consideration of the relevant materials and the settled parameters
governing the grant of bail. The omission is not merely an error in
appreciation of the materials but goes to the root of the exercise of
judicial discretion.
29). In the circumstances, this Court is of the considered view that the
impugned order dated 07.08.2026 cannot be sustained and is liable to be
set aside. It is however clarified that this Court has not examined the
merits of the charges against the accused for the purpose of determining
whether the accused persons are entitled to bail. The question of grant of
bail is required to be considered afresh by the learned Court below upon
an independent assessment of the materials and the relevant legal
principles.
30). Accordingly, the impugned order dated 07.08.2026 passed by the
learned Sessions Court, Khonsa Sessions Division, Tirap District, Arunachal
Pradesh in bail application Nos. 65, 66, 67, 68 and 69 of 2026 is hereby
set aside.
Page No.# 12/12
31). The matter is remitted to the learned Court below for a fresh
consideration of the bail application which will be filed by the accused
respondents within a period of 7 days from today. The learned Court
below shall consider the fresh bail application after affording an
opportunity of hearing to the accused, the prosecution and the present
petitioner uninfluenced by any observations made in this order and pass a
reasoned order on its own merits.
32). Having regard to the fact that the accused persons have been
enlarged on bail, the learned Court below shall dispose of the fresh bail
application so filed by the accused persons within a period of 3 days from
the day it is filed.
33). In the event the fresh bail application is not filed within a period of 7
days from today, the accused/respondents shall surrender before the
Sessions Court and shall be taken into custody and await the outcome of
the fresh order to be passed by the learned Session Judge.
34). It is further clarified that, the observations made in this order are
confined to the legality of the impugned bail order dated 07.08.2026 and
shall not be construed as an expression of opinion on the guilt or
innocence of the accused persons or on the ultimate merits of the bail
application.
35). The Criminal Petition stands allowed to the extent indicated above.
JUDGE
Digitally signed
by HAGE MEENA
Date: 2026.11.12
11:36:30 +05'30'
This page is for informational and research purposes only and does not constitute legal advice.
Consult a qualified advocate for advice specific to your situation.
Is your name in this judgment and should it be masked, or is something on this page wrong?
Request a review