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1criwp756.20.odt
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE OF BOMBAY
BENCH AT AURANGABAD
CRIMINAL WRIT PETITION NO. 756 OF 2020 WITH
CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 1724 OF 2020
Syed Shah Anwarullah Hussaini
s/o Syed Shah Noorullah Hussaini
& another
.. Petitioners
versus
The State of Maharashtra
& another
.. Respondents
Mr. R. S. Deshmukh, Senior Counsel along with Mr. U. S. Hashmi,
Advocate, instructed by Mr. Taher Ali Quadri, Advocate for the
Petitioners.
Mr. N. R. Dayama, APP for the State.
Mr. N. E. Deshmukh, Advocate for Respondent No. 2.
Mr. G. R. Syed, Advocate for Applicant in Criminal Application No.
1724 of 2020.
CORAM : R. M. JOSHI, J.
RESERVED ON : 26th OCTOBER, 2026.
PRONOUNCED ON : 29th OCTOBER, 2026.
ORDER :
1.
This petition filed under Section 482 of Code of Criminal
Procedure r/w Articles 226 and 227 of Constitution of India takes
exception to the First Information Report bearing no. 79/2019
registered with Kandhar Police Station, Tq. Kandhar, District Nanded,
for the offences punishable under Sections 409, 420, 447, 468, 471,
120-B r/w 34 of Indian Penal Code, Section 52A of Wakf Act,1995
2criwp756.20.odt
(for short ‘the Act’) and charge-sheet filed in pursuance to the
investigation carried out therein. Similarly, it further takes exception
to the order dated 26.03.2021 passed by Judicial Magistrate First
Class, Kandhar, taking cognizance of the said proceeding and
issuance of summons against the Petitioners.
2.
The facts which led to filing of the present petition can be
narrated in brief as under :Petitioner No. 1 is the Mutawali of Kabrastan Dargah Hazrat
Khadak Shah Bedhadak Saheb, a Wakf under the Act. Petitioner No.
2 is the son of Petitioner No. 1, who held general power of attorney of
Petitioner No. 1. It is the case of the Petitioner that the Petitioners
are looking after the management of three dargahs and protecting the
wakf property.
In this regard, several suits were filed against the
encroachers.
According to the Petitioners, the Wakf property is
situated at outskirts of Kandhar city and it was prone to
encroachment. When the Wakf Board instructed/directed Petitioner
No. 1 to ensure that encroachment is not done on the said land,
Petitioner No. 1, therefore, decided to construct some temporary tin
shed on the border side of the land bearing Survey No. 1 situated at
Kandhar, District Nanded which, he claims to be the land which is
3criwp756.20.odt
abutting the road so that it will be easy for the Petitioner to keep
watch on the encroachers and the same would ensure that there is
no encroachment on the land.
Accordingly, 21 temporary tin
sheds/shops were erected. The shops were given on leave and licence
basis. The Petitioners claim that there is no alienation of the Wakf
land by them.
3.
According to Petitioners, Respondent No. 2 - the Deputy Chief
Executive Officer of Wakf Board filed private complaint before the
Judicial Magistrate First Class, Kandhar bearing Other Misc.
Criminal Application No. 14/2019 against the Petitioners contending
that the Petitioners have violated the provisions of Wakf Act and
constructed temporary tin sheds without sanction of Wakf Board and
by letting the same on lease, extracted huge amount. Pursuant to
the said complaint, by order dated 28.03.2019, the learned Judicial
Magistrate First Class, directed investigation therein. Accordingly, on
registration of crime bearing No. 79/2019, investigation was carried
out which culminated into filing of charge-sheet against the
Petitioners.
In the due course, the learned Trial Court took
cognizance of the proceeding and issued summons against the
Petitioners. Hence, this petition.
4criwp756.20.odt
4.
Learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the Petitioners
submitted that the learned Magistrate ought not to have taken
cognizance of the complaint made against the Petitioners for the
reason that apparently there was no violation of provisions of Wakf
Act nor any offence under penal code is attracted against them. He
took exception to the said complaint on the ground that without any
authority from the Wakf Board, such complaint came to be lodged
and entertained by the Magistrate. On merits, it is his submission
that admittedly, Petitioner No. 1 is the Manager of the Wakf and
Petitioner No. 2 is the constituted attorney of Petitioner No. 1. He
drew attention of the Court of the provisions of Section 3(i) of Wakf
Act which, according to him, indicates that Petitioner No. 1 as well as
Petitioner No. 2 are deemed to be Mutawali of the Wakf property and
no doubt public servant in view of provisions of Section 101 of the
Act.
It is his submission that in the capacity of Mutawali,
undisputedly, Petitioners are in possession of the land in question
belonging to the Wakf and as such, the issue with regard to the said
property being coming into possession of the Petitioners contrary to
the provisions of Wakf Act, does not arise. He drew attention of the
Court to the provisions of Sections 51 and 52A of the Wakf Act
contending that by no stretch of imagination any offence can be said
5criwp756.20.odt
to have been committed by the Petitioners.
According to him, no
malafides can be attributed against the Petitioners for construction of
tin shed as the same was intended to protect the Wakf property. By
referring to sketch of property, he argued that the construction was
not on actual graveyard but on the area beyond road which divides
the entire plot of land.
In so far as the allegation with regard to
erection of shops in the property and giving lease and licence is
concerned, according to him, what is prohibited under the Wakf Act
is lease and not licence. In order to distinguish licence from lease, he
drew attention
of the Court to Section 52 of the Easement Act.
According to him, while dealing with the criminal proceeding, it may
not be open for the Court to consider the licence as lease which may
be permitted to be considered in a civil proceeding depending upon
the facts and circumstances of the case. It is his submission that
admittedly, no right was created in favour of the licensees and further
in view of the compliance report (page No. 365) the sheds are
removed. It is his submission that none of the licensees raised any
issue with regard to their right in the said tin sheds and hence the
facts of the case indicate it to be a licence and not lease as sought to
be alleged. He drew attention of the Court to the observations made
by this Court while granting anticipatory bail to the Petitioners. He
6criwp756.20.odt
made reference to observations made therein that the Petitioners
herein have tried on their own to protect the Wakf property and there
is no connecting evidence against the Petitioners so far as the
allegations about their misdeeds in respect of the said Wakf property
are
concerned.
He
thereafter
took
this
Court
to
the
provisions of the Act in order to canvas that there is no violation of
any of the provisions of the Act and as such, no offence under
Section 51 or 52A of the Act is made out against the Petitioners.
According to him, for want of essential ingredients to constitute
offence under Indian Penal Code, this is a fit case for quashment of
the proceeding.
He further submits that there is no allegation
against the Petitioners that they mis-appropriated any fund received
from the licence issued in respect of the said shops. He claims that
as per the provisions of the Act, Petitioners were required to pay 7%
of the income to the Wakf Board which they have paid and rest of the
amount is invested/utilised for maintenance of the Wakf property.
He places reliance on following judgments :(i)
(ii)
(iii)
(iv)
CBI vs. Indra Bhushan Singh
(2014) 12 SCC 100
Ashok Bampto Pagui vs. Agencia Real Canacona Pvt. Ltd.
2007(6) Mh.L.J. 94
Puthukkodi Aboobacker vs. The Sub Inspector
2016 AIR Ker 96
Saroj Goyal v. State
2008 (1) M.W.N. (Cr.) 236
7criwp756.20.odt
(v)
M.A. Aziz vs. A.P. State Wakf Board and another
1998 AIR (AP) 61
(vi) Deelip & another vs. Maharashtra State Board of Wakfs,
Aurangabad
2014(4) Bom.C.R. 451
(vii) M.P. Wakf Board vs. Subhan Shah
2006 (10) SCC 696
(viii) Priyanka Srivastava and another vs. State of U.P.
& others
2015(6) SCC 287
(ix) Rajiv Thapar vs. Madan Lal Kapoor
2013(3) SCC 30
(x)
M/s Indian Oil Corporation vs. M/s NEPC India Ltd.
& others
2006(6) SCC 736
(xi) Joseph Salvaraj A. vs. State of Gujrat and others
2011(7) SCC 59.
5.
Learned APP, learned Counsel for Wakf Board and learned
Counsel for informant opposed the petition.
According to learned
Counsel for Wakf Board, admittedly the property is Wakf property
and though there is no dispute made with regard to the fact that
Petitioner No. 1 is maintaining the property, he submits that there
are disputes with regard to the locus standi of Petitioner No. 1 to be
Mutawali. He, however, concedes to the fact that as of now, Petitioner
No. 1 since managing the affairs of the Wakf property, he could be
considered as Mutawali.
It is his submission by referring to the
provisions of Section 51 of the Act, more particularly proviso thereof
that the lease of any kind in respect of a graveyard is prohibited.
According to him, there is no dispute about the fact that the property
8criwp756.20.odt
in question as a whole is a graveyard and as such, neither morally
nor legally it was open to the Petitioners to carry out any
construction thereon, much less commercial shops.
According to
him, the Petitioners cannot be permitted to say that for the purpose
of preventing encroachment on the property, construction is carried
out contrary to the law. According to him, this evidence is sufficient
to proceed against the Petitioners before the Criminal Court. It is his
further submission that the Mutawali is entrusted with the property
and that he committed breach of trust by carrying out construction
thereof and earning income from the same.
He places reliance on
observations of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in paragraph No. 27 of
the judgment in case of Associated Hotels of Indian Limited vs. R. N.
Kapoor, 1959 DGLS(SC) 122.
6.
Learned Counsel for intervenor submits that the term ‘Lease’
has not been defined in the Wakf Act and hence it would be
appropriate to take into consideration definition of ‘Lease’ as provided
under Transfer of Property Act. He drew attention of the Court to
Section 105 thereof.
Relying upon the said definition, it is his
submission that the alleged leave and licence is just a nomenclature
and infact it is lease which is prohibited under the provisions of Wakf
9criwp756.20.odt
Act. According to him, what is relevant to take into consideration is
the mens rea of the Petitioners which is apparent from record rather
than clever drafting done of agreements by Petitioner No. 2 who
himself is an Advocate. It is submitted that the spot panchanama
more than sufficiently demonstrates that there are 21 shops
constructed in the graveyard which is wholly unacceptable. According
to him, the conduct of Petitioners also dis-entitles them to seek any
relief.
7.
At the outset, it needs to be recorded that irrespective of the
fact that there are certain disputes with regard to the locus standi of
Petitioner No. 1 to act as a Mutawali, admittedly, he is maintaining
the Wakf property and as such, in view of provisions of Section 3(i) of
Wakf act, he is treated/accepted to be Mutawali of the Wakf. As far
as Petitioner No. 2 is concerned, he is the constituted attorney of
Petitioner No. 1 and in view of definition of ‘Mutawali’, the person
appointed by a Mutawali to perform the duties of Mutawali is also a
Mutawali. Petitioner No. 2, therefore, needs to be considered as the
Mutawali.
10 criwp756.20.odt
8.
Once it is accepted that the Petitioners are Mutawali, needless
to say that the Wakf property is in possession of the Petitioners, there
is no question of Petitioners having purchased or taken possession of
Wakf property either permanently or temporarily without prior
sanction of the Wakf Board. It would be fruitful to take note of the
relevant provisions of Section 51 and 52A of the Act which read
thus :51.
Alienation of waqf property without sanction of
Board to be void.—
(1)
Notwithstanding anything contained in the waqf
deed, any lease of any immovable property which is waqf
property, shall be void unless such lease is effected with
the prior sanction of the Board:
Provided
that
no
mosque,
dargah,
khanqah,
graveyard, or imambara shall be leased except any
unused graveyards in the States of Punjab, Haryana and
Himachal Pradesh where such graveyard has been leased
out before the date of commencement of the Wakf
(Amendment) Act, 2013 (27 of 2013).
(1A)
Any sale, gift, exchange, mortgage or transfer of
waqf property shall be void ab initio:Provided that in case
the Board is satisfied that any waqf property may be
developed for the purposes of the Act, it may, after
recording reasons in writing, take up the development of
such property through such agency and in such manner
as the Board may determine and move a resolution
11 criwp756.20.odt
containing recommendation of development of such waqf
property, which shall be passed by a majority of twothirds of the total membership of the Board:
Provided further that nothing contained in this
sub-section shall affect any acquisition of waqf properties
for a public purpose under the Land Acquisition Act,
1894 (1 of 1894) or any other law relating to acquisition of
land if such acquisition is made in consultation with the
Board:
Provided also that—
(a)the acquisition shall not be in contravention of the
Places of Public Worship (Special Provisions) Act, 1991
(42 of 1991);
(b)the purpose for which the land is being acquired shall
be undisputedly for a public purpose;
(c)no
alternative
land
is
available
which
shall
be
considered as more or less suitable for that purpose; and
(d)to safeguard adequately the interest and objective of
the waqf, the compensation shall be at the prevailing
market value or a suitable land with reasonable solatium
in lieu of the acquired property.
A bare perusal of the above provision indicates that alienation
of Wakf property is void if it sans sanction of Wakf Board.
The
alienation is indicated to be lease, sale, gift, mortgage, transfer of
Wakf property. This Court, thus, is required to ascertain whether on
12 criwp756.20.odt
the basis of material on record, there is alienation of Wakf property
by Petitioners.
52A.
Penalty
for
alienation
of
waqf
property
without sanction of Board.—
(1)
Whoever
alienates
or
purchases
or
takes
possession of, in any manner whatsoever, either
permanently or temporarily, any movable or immovable
property being a waqf property, without prior sanction
of the Board, shall be punishable with rigorous
imprisonment for a term which may extend to two
years:
Provided that the waqf property so alienated shall
without prejudice to the provisions of any law for the
time being in force, be vested in the Board without any
compensation therefor.
(2)
Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code
of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974) any offence
punishable under this section shall be cognizable and
non-bailable.
(3)
No court shall take cognizance of any offence
under this section except on a complaint made by the
Board or any officer duly authorised by the State
Government in this behalf.
13 criwp756.20.odt
(4)
No court inferior to that of a Metropolitan
Magistrate or a Judicial Magistrate of the first class
shall try any offence punishable under this section.
9.
Now, question arises as to whether the present case is one
wherein there is any material to show that the Petitioners in the
capacity of Mutawali alienated Wakf property without prior sanction
of the Board and offence punishable under Section 52A of the act is
made out against them. As observed above, the petitioners being
Mutawalli of Wakf cannot be said to have purchased the Wakf
property or taken possession thereof without prior sanction of the
Board. The said part of Section 52A(1) therefore has no application
to the instant case.
10.
The allegation against the Petitioners is that they constructed
21 tin sheds in the Wakf property which is a graveyard. There is
further allegation that these tin sheds are used as shops by giving on
leave and licence basis to number of persons and from whom income
is received by the Petitioners. In this regard, the evidence collected
during the course of investigation which forms part of the chargesheet shows the said documents to be leave and licence agreements
executed by Petitioners in favour of concerned persons.
14 criwp756.20.odt
11.
On one hand Petitioners claim the agreement to be licence and
not lease. Whereas on the other hand, it is the contention of learned
Counsel for the informant and learned Counsel for Wakf Board that
the alienation of property without prior sanction of the Board is void.
The proviso to Section 51, according to them, states that no lease is
permitted in respect of a mosque, dargah, graveyard except any
unused graveyard in the States of Punjab, Haryana and Himachal
Pradesh where such graveyard has been leased out before the date of
commencement of the Wakf (Amendment) Act, 2013.
12.
There cannot be dispute made with the preposition of law that
the penal laws are to be interpreted strictly and must be read literally.
It would not be open for the Court to expand scope of any provision
which constitute an offence and consequently becomes liable for
penal action. Needless to emphasize that an act unless clearly and
without any doubt falls within the ambit of the statutory provision, is
not an offence. Similarly the rule of benefit of doubt also must tilt in
favour of the accused. Finally, it is not open to the Court to rewrite
the penal provisions.
Keeping in mind these well recognised
15 criwp756.20.odt
principles of the law, the material on record is appreciated in the
context of the relevant provisions.
13.
This Court, therefore, is required to see as to whether the
material on record/documents and appending circumstances indicate
the transaction in respect of tin sheds to be ‘lease’ or ‘licence’. Since
reference is made by rival parties to the provisions of Easement Act
and Transfer of Property act, the reproduction of the said provisions
becomes relevant.
Section 52 of Easement Act.
52. License defined
.Where one person grants to another, or to a definite
number of other persons, a right to do, or continue to do,
in or upon the immovable property of the grantor,
something which would, in the absence of such right, be
unlawful and such right does not amount to an easement
or an interest in the property, the right is called a license.
This provision indicates that in case of a licence no right or
interest is created in the property but right would remain only to the
extent it is specifically granted.
Section 105 of Transfer of Property Act
105. Lease defined.—
16 criwp756.20.odt
A lease of immoveable property is a transfer of a right to
enjoy such property, made for a certain time, express or
implied, or in perpetuity, in consideration of a price paid
or promised, or of money, a share of crops, service or any
other thing of value, to be rendered periodically or on
specified occasions to the transferor by the transferee,
who accepts the transfer on such terms. Lessor, lessee,
premium and rent defined.—The transferor is called the
lessor, the transferee is called the lessee, the price is
called the premium, and the money, share, service or
other thing to be so rendered is called the rent.
On the other hand, provision under Transfer of Property Act
deals with right of lessee to enjoy such a property for period
expressed or implied or in perpetuity. Thus, application of definitions
in both Statutes are in the different context altogether.
14.
In this regard, it would be relevant to take note of the
observations made in Paragraph No. 27 of the judgment of Hon’ble
Supreme Court in case of Associated Hotels of Indian Limited (supra)
which reads thus :“27. There is a marked distinction between a lease
and a licence. Section 105 of the Transfer of Property
Act defines a lease of immovable property as a transfer
of a right to enjoy such property made for a certain
17 criwp756.20.odt
time in consideration of a price paid or promised.
Under s. 108 of the said Act, the lessee is entitled to be
put in possession of the property. A lease is therefore a
transfer of an interest in land. The interest, transferred
is called the leasehold interest. The lessor parts with
his right to enjoy the property during the term of the
lease, and it follows from it that the lessee gets that
right to the exclusion of the lessor. Whereas s. 52 of
the Indian Easement Act defines a licence thus :
‘Where one person grants to another, or to a definite
number of other persons, a right to do or continue to do
in or upon the immoveable property of the grantor,
something which would, in the absence of such right,
be unalwful, and such right does not amount to an
easement or an interest in the property, the right is
called a licence.’ Under the aforesaid section, if a
document gives only a right to use the property in a
particular way or under certain terms while it remains
in possession and control of the owner thereof, it will be
licence. The legal possession, therefore, continues to be
with the owner of the property, but the licensee is
permitted to make use of the premises for a particular
purpose. But for the permission, his occupation would
be unlawful. It does not create in his favour any estate
or interest in the property.
There is, therefore, clear
distinction between the two concepts. The dividing line
is clear though sometimes it becomes very thin or even
blurred.
At one time it was thought that the test of
18 criwp756.20.odt
exclusive possession was infalliable and if a person
was given exclusive possession of a premises, it would
conclusively establish that he was a lessee. But there
was a change and the recent trend of judicial opinion is
reflected in Errington v. Errington (1), wherein Lord
Denning reviewing the case law on the subject
summarizes the result of his discussion thus at p. 155:
‘The result of all these cases is that, although a person
who is let into exclusive possession is prima facie, to be
considered to be tenant, nevertheless he will not be
held to be so if the circumstances negative any
intention to create a tenancy.’
The court of Appeal
again in Cobb v. Lane (2) considered the legal position
and laid down that the intention of the parties was the
real test for ascertaining the character of a document.
At p. 1201, Somervell.. L.J., stated : ‘….. the solution
that would seem to have been found is, as one would
expect, that it must depend on the intention of the
parties.’ Denning, L.J., said much to the same effect at
p. 1202: ‘The question in all these cases is one of
intention: Did the circumstances and the conduct of the
parties show that all that was intended was that the
occupier should have a personal privilege with no
interest in the land ?’ The following propositions may,
therefore, be taken as well-established : (1) To
ascertain whether a document creates a licence or
lease, the substance of the document must be preferred
to the form; (2) the real test is the intention of the
19 criwp756.20.odt
parties-whether they intended to create a lease or a
licence; (3) if the document creates an interest in the
property, it is a lease; but, if it only permits another to
make use of the property, of which the legal possession
continues with the owner, it is a licence; and (4) if
under the document a party gets exclusive possession
of the property, prima facie, he is considered to be a
tenant; but circumstances may be established which
negative the intention to create a lease. Judged by the
said tests, it is not possible to hold that the document is
one of licence. Certainly it does not confer only a bare
personal privilege on the respondent to make use of the
rooms.
It puts him in exclusive possession of them,
untrammelled by the control and free from the
directions of the appellants. The covenants are those
that are usually found or expected to be included in a
lease deed. The right of the respondent to transfer his
interest under the document, although with the consent
of the appellants, is destructive of any theory of licence.
The solitary circumstance that the rooms let out in the
present case are situated in a building wherein a hotel
is run cannot make any difference in the character of
the holding.
The intention of the parties is clearly
manifest, and the clever phraseology used or the
ingenuity of the document writer hardly conceals the
real intent. I, therefore, hold that under the document
there was transfer of a right to enjoy the two rooms,
20 criwp756.20.odt
and, therefore, it created a tenancy in favour of the
respondent.”
The above observations clearly indicate that the nomenclature
of the document is not decisive for determination of a nature of
transaction to be ‘lease’ or ‘license’. As held by the Supreme Court,
the real test is the intention of the parties whether they intend to
create a lease or license. In the instant case, apart from the fact that
the documents in question are titled as leave and license agreement,
admittedly, these documents contain recitals with regard to there
being no exclusive possession of the licensee over the subject
property.
Further, admittedly, all sheds are removed as per
compliance report dated 04.03.2020.
Pertinently, none of the
occupiers of these sheds have claimed themselves to be the lessee of
the property. Thus, on the face of it, there is material on record to
indicate that this is a case of license and not lease. The rule of literal
and strict interpretation for the purpose of penal consequence would
undoubtedly lead to the conclusion that the transaction is ‘licence’
and the same is not covered by Section 51 of the Act.
15.
Learned Counsel for the informant and Wakf Board sought to
canvass that even license in respect of said construction carried out
21 criwp756.20.odt
on graveyard would be covered by the provisions of Section 51 of the
Act. They also argued with regard to the conduct of the Petitioners of
carrying out such construction which is wholly impermissible. Even
if it is accepted for the sake of arguments that the conduct of the
Petitioners of carrying out construction of tin sheds under the guise
of protecting the property is not justified, it could not become ipso
facto an offence unless it is so made by the Statute. Perusal of
Section 51 of the Act itself contemplates lease among others and not
license. This is more so when the title of the said section provides for
alienation of the properties being barred without consent of the Wakf
Board. Thus, to read the lease as license is wholly impermissible.
More particularly, in the facts of the case, as stated herein above,
there was license in respect of the said properties. Even though this
Court does not approve the conduct of Petitioners of carrying out
construction on a graveyard, it is not permissible for the Court to
hold that it becomes an offence since it has not been made so
specifically under the Wakf Act.
16.
Learned Counsel for Wakf Board refers to the provisions of
Section 32(4) and 32(5) to canvass that in view of the said provisions,
non-obtainment of permission for construction of sheds amounts to
22 criwp756.20.odt
offence. It would be relevant to take note of the said provisions which
reads thus :32.
Powers and functions of the Board :-
(1)
xxx
(2)
xxx
(3)
xxx
(4)
Where the Board is satisfied that any [waqf] land,
which
is
a
development
[waqf]
property
as
educational
an
[has
the
potential
institution,
for
shopping
centre, market, housing or residential flats and the like],
market housing flats and the like, it may serve upon the
mutawalli of the concerned [waqf] a notice requiring him
within such time, but not less than sixty days, as may be
specified in the notice, to convey its decision whether he is
willing to execute the development works specified in the
notice.
(5)
On consideration of the reply, if any, received to the
notice issued under sub-section (4), the Board, if it is
satisfied that the mutawalli is not willing or is not capable
of executing the works required to be executed in terms of
the notice, it may, take over the property, clear it of any
building or structure thereon, which, in the opinion of the
Board is necessary for execution of the works and execute
such work from [waqf] Funds or from the finances which
may be raised on the security of properties of the [waqf]
concerned, and control and manage the properties till such
23 criwp756.20.odt
time as all expenses incurred by the Board under this
section, together with interest thereon, the expenditure on
maintenance of such works and other legitimate changes
incurred on the property are recovered from the income
derived from the property:
Provided that the Board shall compensate annually
the mutawali of the concerned [waqf] to the extent of the
average annual net income derived from the property
during the three years immediately preceding the taking
over of the property by the Board.
(6)
xxx
Bare perusal of the said provision indicates that it is only
enabling provision, where the Board, if satisfied that the property has
potential for development, to serve upon the Mutawali of concerned
Wakf a notice requiring him to convey decision where he is willing to
develop the work specified in the notice. This cannot be construed as
non-obtainment of permission to constitute as an offence.
17.
As held earlier, since the Petitioners being Mutawali are in
possession of the Wakf property, there is no question of they
purchasing or being in possession of the same without prior sanction
of the Board. As such, this Court finds substance in the contention
24 criwp756.20.odt
of learned Senior Counsel for the Petitioners that no offence under
Section 52A of the Act is made out against them.
18.
Insofar as offences under Indian Penal Code are concerned, for
want of satisfying essential ingredients, no offence can be said to
have been committed of criminal breach of trust.
In order to
constitute said offence, necessary ingredients as contemplated by
Section 405 of the Indian Penal Code must be present.
Similarly,
there is nothing to indicate that the Petitioners have cheated anyone.
As such offence under Section 420 of the Indian Penal Code is also
not made out.
19.
Even it is sought to be canvassed before this Court that the
Petitioners have earned income from the said license, however, there
is no evidence to show that the Petitioners have mis-appropriated the
said amount. During the course of arguments, it was pointed out on
behalf of the Petitioners that the amount equivalent to 7% of the
income was deposited with the Wakf Board, so also rest of the
amount is used for maintenance of the property. There is nothing on
record to indicate contrary.
25 criwp756.20.odt
20.
The law on the point of exercise of extraordinary powers by
High Court to quash criminal proceeding is well settled in view of
judgment of Supreme Court in case of
State of Haryana and others
Vs. Bhajan Lal and others, 1992 SCC (SUPP) 1 335, which gives
guidelines for the decision of quashment of criminal proceedings.
The principles laid down therein which act like beacon to the Courts
are as under :
“ 102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various
relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of
the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series of
decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary power
under Article 226 or the inherent powers under Section 482
of the Code which we have extracted and reproduced above,
we give the following categories of cases by way of
illustration wherein such power could be exercised either to
prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to
secure the ends of justice, though it may not be possible to
lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently
channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and
to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein
such power should be exercised.
(1) Where the allegations made in the first information report
or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value
and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute
any offence or make out a case against the accused.
26 criwp756.20.odt
(2) Where the allegations in the first information report and
other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not
disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by
police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under
an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section
155(2) of the Code.
(3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or
complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same
do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out
a case against the accused.
(4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a
cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable
offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer
without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under
Section 155(2) of the Code.
(5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are
so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which
no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that
there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the
accused.
(6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of
the provisions of the Code of the concerned Act (under which
a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and
continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a
specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing
efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party.
(7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with
mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously
27 criwp756.20.odt
instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on
the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and
personal grudge.”
Consideration of these principles in the light of facts of the case
demonstrates that even if entire material collected during the
investigation is accepted as it is, no offence under penal code or the
Act has been made out.
In such circumstances to call upon the
Petitioners to undergo rigours of trial would amount to abuse of
process of Court.
21.
In view of above, this Court finds that this is a fit case for
quashment of the First Information Report, consequent filing of
charge-sheet and order of issuance of summons against the
Petitioners.
In the result, petition is allowed in terms of prayer
clauses ‘B’, ‘C’, ‘C-1’ and ‘D-3’.
22.
Pending application does not survive and stands disposed of.
( R. M. JOSHI, J.)
dyb
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