Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 – Fatal accident – Award of compensation – Victim-Government School teacher riding a motorcycle, met with a fatal accident, in collision with a bus, rashly and negligently driven by respondent no.2 and owned by respondent no.1 – Pillion rider also sustained injuries – Award of compensation of Rs.48,33,235/- jointly and severally to the appellants and the parents of the victim, along with interest after deduction of income tax from the calculated income – High Court set aside the tribunal’s judgment – On appeal, held: High Court reversed the well considered and exhaustive judgment of the tribunal in a cryptic manner – Such a hyper-technical and trivial approach of the High Court cannot be sustained – Tribunal followed a just approach in the matter of appreciation of the evidence/materials on record whereas, the High Court adopted a strict interpretation of the evidence on the touchstone of proof beyond reasonable doubt – Non-examination of the pillion rider, not fatal to appellant’s case since the other evidence on record was good enough to prima facie establish the manner in which the accident had occurred and the identity of the parties involved in the accident – Tribunal justified in placing reliance on the evidence of witnesses, on the contents of FIR, charge-sheet and site plan which prima facie indicate the negligence of the bus driver in driving the bus – Thus, the order passed by the High Court is set aside and the award by the tribunal is restored.
Motor Vehicle Accident: Standard of proof – Held: While deciding cases arising out of motor vehicle accidents, the standard of proof to be borne in mind must be of preponderance of probability and not the strict standard of proof beyond all reasonable doubt which is followed in criminal cases – There is nothing in the Act to preclude citing of a witness in motor accident claim who has not been named in the list of witnesses in criminal cases. Evidence: Best Eye witness – Non-examination of – Effect of – Held: Approach is not to find fault with non-examination of some best eye-witness but to analyse the evidence already on record to ascertain whether that is sufficient to answer the matters in issue on the touchstone of preponderance of probability. Plea: New plea – Appellant seeking enhanced compensation before this Court –Permissibility of – Award of compensation amount by the tribunal, challenged on the limited ground of deduction of income tax from the calculated income before the High Court – Rejection of appeal by the High Court not challenged by the appellant – On appeal, held: The limited ground is not sustainable – Appellants cannot be permitted to widen the scope in the instant appeal, muchless pray for enhanced compensation – Award passed by the tribunal is restored – Compensation.
Allowing the appeal, the Court
HELD: 1.1 The well-considered and exhaustive judgment of the tribunal came to be reversed by the High Court, in a cryptic manner in few pages. The thrust of the reasoning given by the High Court rests on the unreliability of the witnesses presented by the appellants: evidence given by A.D.2 was unreliable because he was not shown as a witness in the list of witnesses mentioned in the charge sheet filed by the police and that the said witness could not identify the age of the pillion rider, R who was the “best” witness in the matter, was not presented for examination by the appellants. The High Court also relied on the site map to record the finding on the factum of negligence of the deceased in causing the accident which resulted in his death. Such a hyper-technical and trivial approach of the High Court cannot be sustained in a case for compensation, in connection with a motor vehicle accident resulting in the death of a family member. [Para 19, 20] [341-D; 342-E-G]
1.2 In motor accident claim cases, once the foundational fact, namely, the actual occurrence of the accident, has been established, then the tribunal’s role would be to calculate the quantum of just compensation if the accident had taken place by reason of negligence of the driver of a motor vehicle and, while doing so, the tribunal would not be strictly bound by the pleadings of the parties. Notably, while deciding cases arising out of motor vehicle accidents, the standard of proof to be borne in mind must be of preponderance of probability and not the strict standard of proof beyond all reasonable doubt. [Para 20] [348-E-F]
1.3 The tribunal had followed a just approach in the matter of appreciation of the evidence/materials on record. Whereas, the High Court adopted a strict interpretation of the evidence on the touchstone of proof beyond reasonable doubt to record an adverse finding against the appellants and to reverse the well considered judgment of the tribunal in a cryptic manner. There is no hesitation in upholding the finding recorded by the tribunal that there was an accident between the motorcycle driven by the victim and a bus belonging to respondent No.1-State Road Transport Corporation, coming from the opposite direction and being driven rashly and negligently by respondent No.2, which resulted in the death of S. Clearly, the evidence given by AD-2 withstood the respondents’ scrutiny and the respondents were unable to shake his evidence. In turn, the High Court has failed to take note of the absence of cross examination of this witness by the respondents, leave alone the tribunal’s finding on the same, and instead, deliberated on the reliability of (A.D.2)’s evidence from the viewpoint of him not being named in the list of eye witnesses in the criminal proceedings, without even mentioning as to why such absence from the list is fatal to the case of the appellants. This approach of the High Court is mystifying. There is nothing in the Act to preclude citing of a witness in motor accident claim who has not been named in the list of witnesses in the criminal case. What is essential is that the opposite party should get a fair opportunity to cross examine the concerned witness. Once that is done, it will not be open to them to complain about any prejudice caused to them. The High Court has not held that the respondents were successful in challenging the witnesses’ version of events, despite being given the opportunity to do so. The High Court accepts that the said witness was cross examined by the respondents but nevertheless reaches a conclusion different from that of the Tribunal, by selectively overlooking the deficiencies in the respondent’s case, without any proper reasoning. [Para 21, 26, 28, 29] [348-G; 350-E-F; 352-C-F; 353-F-G]
1.4 The inability of the witness-AD 2 to identify the age of the pillion rider cannot, per se, be a militating factor to discard the entire version especially since the presence of the witness at the time and place of the accident has remained unshaken and including his deposition regarding the manner of occurrence of the accident and identity of the driver of the offending vehicle. The filing of FIR and the subsequent filing of the charge-sheet corroborate the witnesses’ evidence. The view taken by the tribunal therefore, on the veracity of the evidence of A.D. 2, is unexceptionable and there was no reason for the High Court to interfere with the same. [Para 30] [353-G-H; 354-A-B]
1.5 The issue of non-examination of the pillion rider, would not be fatal to the case of the appellants. The approach in examining the evidence in accident claim cases is not to find fault with non examination of some “best” eye witness in the case but to analyse the evidence already on record to ascertain whether that is sufficient to answer the matters in issue on the touchstone of preponderance of probability. The tribunal was right in accepting the claim of the appellants even without the deposition of the pillion rider, since the other evidence on record was good enough to prima facie establish the manner in which the accident had occurred and the identity of the parties involved in the accident. [Para 31] [354-C-E]
1.6 Respondent No.2-driver failed to give any statement indicating that the accident occurred due to any mistake by the rider of the motorcycle. The tribunal further relied upon the evidence of AD 2 and also upon the site plan of the accident to reach a conclusion that respondent No.2 recklessly drove the speeding bus on the wrong side of the road, into the motorcycle being ridden by S who was on the correct side of the road, and caused his death, whereas, the High Court disregarded the evidence of A.D. 2. [Para 32] [354-F-G]
1.7 The site plan has been produced in evidence before the tribunal by appellant No.1 and the record seems to indicate that the accident occurred in the middle of the road. However, the exact location of the accident, as marked out in the site plan, has not been explained muchless proved through a competent witness by the respondents to substantiate their defence. Besides, the concerned police official who prepared the site plan has also not been examined. While the existence of the site plan may not be in doubt, it is difficult to accept the theory propounded on the basis of the site plan to record a finding against the appellants regarding negligence attributable to deceased S moreso in absence of ocular evidence to prove and explain the contents of the site plan. [Para 33] [355-A-C]
1.8 The evidence of witness A.D.2 unequivocally states that the respondent No.2 bus driver was negligent in driving recklessly at a high speed on the wrong side of the road, thus, resulting in the accident which caused the death of the victim. It was not open to the High Court to discard this evidence. Additionally, the tribunal had justly placed reliance on the contents of FIR and charge-sheet which prima facie indicate the negligence of respondent No.2 in driving the bus. The factum of negligence of the driver of the offending vehicle is answered against the respondents. [Para 34] [355-C-E]
Dulcina Fernandes and Ors. v.. Joaquim Xavier Cruz and Anr. (2013) 10 SCC 646 : [2013] 10 SCR 480; Mangla Ram v. Oriental Insurance Company Limited and Ors. (2018) 5 SCC 656 : [2018] 5 SCR 287
– relied on.
1.9 As regards, adequacy of compensation amount determined by the tribunal, the appellants have not assailed the order of the High Court rejecting their appeal. Further, in their appeal before the High Court the limited grievance was about deduction of income tax from the calculated income. That ground is unsustainable. The appellants cannot be permitted to widen the scope in the instant appeal, muchless pray for enhanced compensation. Instead the Award passed by the tribunal is restored as it has determined the just compensation amount, keeping in mind all the relevant parameters including the apportionment thereof between the family members of the deceased. It would be doing complete justice. The impugned judgment of the High Court is set aside. [Para 35, 36] [355-F-H; 356-A]
National Insurance Company Limited v.. Pranay Sethi and Ors. (2017) 16 SCC 680 – relied on.
Kusum Lata and Ors. v. Satbir and Ors. (2011) 3 SCC
646 : [2011] 3 SCR 480; Bimla Devi and Ors. v.. Himachal Road Transport Corporation and Ors.
(2009) 13 SCC 530 : [2009] 6 SCR 362; United India Insurance Company Limited v.. Shila Datta and Ors. (2011) 10 SCC 509 : [2011] 14 SCR 763; Kartar Singh v. State of Punjab (1994) 3 SCC 569 : [1994] 2 SCR
375 – referred to.
As published in the Supreme Court Reports, Supreme Court of India. Text from the Indian Supreme Court Judgments open data set (Dattam Labs), CC BY 4.0.
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