Sukhbiri Devi & Ors. vs Union of India & Ors.

HELD: 1.1 Interference with the concurrent findings in an appeal under Article 136 of the Constitution is to be made sparingly, that too when the judgment impugned is absolutely perverse. On appreciation of evidence another view is possible also cannot be a reason for substitution of a plausible view taken and confirmed. We will now, bearing in mind the settled position, proceed to consider as to whether the said appellate power invites invocation in the case on hand. [Para 4][530-H; 531-A-B]

1.2 ‘Statements’ by a party to proceedings are admissions and facts admitted need not be proved. The appellants cannot legally have any dispute or grievance in taking their statements in the plaint capable of determining the starting point of limitation for the purpose of application of Order XIV, Rule 2(2)(b) of the CPC. Though, limitation is a mixed question of law and facts it will shed the said character and would get confined to one of question of law when the foundational fact(s), determining the starting point of limitation is vividly and specifically made in the plaint averments. In such a circumstance, if the Court concerned is of the opinion that limitation could be framed as a preliminary point and it warrants postponement of settlement of other issues till determination of that issue, it may frame the same as a preliminary issue and may deal with the suit only in accordance with the decision on that issue. It cannot be said that such an approach is impermissible in law and in fact, it is perfectly permissible under Order XIV, Rule 2(2)(b), CPC and legal in such circumstances. The issue limitation can be framed and determined as a preliminary issue under Order XIV, Rule 2(2)(b), CPC in a case where it can be decided on admitted facts. [Paras 17 and 18][536-D-G]

1.3 A perusal of Article 136 of the Limitation Act would reveal the indubitable position that it applies only when an application for execution of any decree (other than a decree granting a mandatory injunction) or order of any Civil Court is to be filed. In the instant such a stage for application of Article 136 of the Limitation Act had not reached and, in troth, the question involved is relatable only to the time restriction for initiating legal proceedings to seek the alleged legal right. In the said circumstances, the inevitable conclusion can only be that Article

136 got no application in the case on hand and as such the Appellants could not claim for a larger period of limitation of 12 years. [Paras 19-21][538-F-H; 539-A]

1.4 The findings of the Trial Court with respect to preliminary issue of limitation are based on the relevant dates revealed from the pleadings of the plaintiffs in the plaint itself. True that in the plaint it is repeatedly alleged that the relinquishment deed was obtained fraudulently by the 5th respondent. However, conspicuously its date was not mentioned. But then the plaint averment is that their predecessor-in-interest Shri ‘NS’, on coming to know about the use of the said Relinquishment Deed, had preferred an objection on 05.04.1991 to the authorities whereunder he sought not only for its cancellation but also on the ground of obtainment by playing fraud for refraining them from issuing allotment of the alternative plot in the exclusive name of the 5th respondent. In this context it is also relevant to note that going by the plaint averments after the death of Shri ‘NS’ on 14.05.1993 the original first plaintiff, who is none other than one of the sons of Shri ‘NS’, filed representations on the lines of the objection taken up by his father. Even if nonmentioning of the date of Relinquishment Deed is not taken as purposeful that cannot and will not therefore save the plaintiffs from the inescapable, adverse finding on the question of limitation to bring in a suit against the said Relinquishment Deed. Evidently, Suit No.410 of 2000 was filed only on 14.06.2000. Thus, it is very much clear from the plaint averments that the Relinquishment Deed is anterior to the date of letter of intimation to the 5th respondent (08.03.1991) and obviously, the date of objection against the same was firstly preferred by deceased ‘NS’ viz., 05.04.1991. Evidently, the aforesaid two dates specifically mentioned in the plaint were taken into account by the Trial Court as also by the First Appellate Court and the High Court in the matter of consideration of the question “whether the suit was barred by limitation.” The manner of consideration by the Trial Court which ultimately resulted in dismissal of suit No.410/2000 would reveal, as stated hereinbefore, that it had determined the preliminary issue regarding the period of limitation with reference to the averments in the plaint. The dismissal of the suit was in accordance with the decision on the said preliminary issue. [Para 22][539-B-H]

1.5 Coming to the judgment of the First Appellate Court whereby it dismissed the appeals of the plaintiffs and confirmed the judgment and decree of the Trial Court it is evident that the various contentions raised by the appellants therein were considered in detail by the First Appellate Court. The First Appellate Court correctly exposited the legal position that the question of limitation is to be considered not with reference to the validity of the Relinquishment Deed. In this context it is also to be noted that despite taking up a specific allegation that the Relinquishment Deed was fraudulently obtained by the 5th respondent, the plaintiffs had not chosen to assail and seek for its setting aside. Even after seeking for cancellation of the relinquishment deed before the authorities as early as on 05.04.1991 the predecessor-in-interest had not chosen to get it set aside by approaching a competent civil court during his lifetime. Upon his death on 14.05.1993, though the period of limitation for seeking to set it aside did not get arrested and ran against the plaintiffs who stepped into the shoes of ‘NS’, none of them seek to get it set aside by moving a civil court, within the period of limitation. The pleadings in this appeal and the arguments advanced would show that till date with such a prayer no competent civil court was moved by the original plaintiffs and also the appellants herein. In short, in the absence of any successful challenge against the validity of the said Relinquishment Deed by making proper prayer in an appropriate proceedings, and that too within the prescribed period of limitation, the conclusion and finding of the First Appellate Court, as aforesaid, cannot be said to be perverse or illegal as there can be no doubt with respect to the position that consideration of validity of a relinquishment deed and consideration of the period of limitation with reference to the same are different and distinct. [Para 23][540-A-G]

1.6 The challenge against the impugned judgment of the High Court is that it wrongly applied Article 58 of the Limitation Act while confirming the concurrent decisions of the First Appellate Court and the Trial Court. In this context, it is relevant to note the prayers made in the suit by the plaintiffs which were extracted hereinbefore. Undoubtedly, the plaintiffs sought for declarations and thereby, made the nature of the suit as declaratory. This position is indisputable. It is true that the Trial Court though found the period of limitation as three years taking into account the nature of the reliefs it did not specifically mention the relevant provision in its judgment. There can be little doubt with respect to the position that misquoting or non-quoting of a provision by itself will not make an order bad so long as the relevant enabling provision is in existence and it was correctly applied though without specifically mentioning it. The High Court had only referred to the relevant, applicable provision under the Limitation Act upon considering the nature of the suit and the reliefs sought for, in the plaint. There is no perversity or illegality in the finding of the High Court for sustaining the concurrent findings with respect to the issue whether the suit was barred by limitation. [Paras 25][541-B-F]

1.7 The relief sought for, in suit No.410/2000 would reveal that the first prayer, which is the main prayer, is declaratory in nature. Even according to the plaintiffs, as revealed from the plaint the second prayer is only consequential relief. A perusal of the same would undoubtedly show that it is consequential and not an independent one and therefore the courts below are right in holding that the said prayer is grantable only if the first prayer is granted. In this case based on the determination on the preliminary issue of limitation and in accordance with the decision on that preliminary issue the suit was dismissed. The provisions under Order XIV Rule 2(1) and Rule 2(2)(b) permit to deal with and dispose of a suit in accordance with the decision on the preliminary issue. In the case on hand in view of the nature of the finding on the preliminary issue and the consequential consideration of the suit in terms of Order XIV Rule 2(2)(b) and taking note of the fact that the suit do not survive after such consideration there is no reason to consider the contention of the appellants with reference to Order VII Rule 11 based on the decisions relied on by them. So also, the contentions of the appellants based on Articles 17 and 65 also would pale into insignificance and warrant no consideration at all, in the circumstances. There is absolutely no perversity or illegality in the concurrent findings of the courts below warranting interference in invocation of the power under Article 136 of the Constitution of India. [Paras 26, 27][541-F-H; 542-A-C] Nusli Neville Wadia v. Ivory Properties (2020) 6 SCC

557 : [2019] 15 SCR 795; National Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Rattani (2009) 2 SCC 75 : [2008] 17 SCR 1251; Ranganayakamma & Anr. v. K.S. Prakash (Dead) By LRs. & Ors. (2008) 15 SCC 673 : [2008] 9 SCR 297 and Vimal Chand Ghevarchand Jain & Ors. v. Ramakant Eknath Jadoo (2009) 5 SCC 713; State of Rajasthan v. Shiv Dayal (2019) 8 SCC 637 : [2019] 10 SCR 243 – relied on.

C. Natarajan v. Ashim Bai & Anr. (2007) 14 SCC 183 : [2007] 11 SCR 33; Popat And Kotecha Property v. State Bank of India Staff Assn (2005) 7 SCC 510 : [2005] 2 Suppl. SCR 1030; Daya Singh & Anr. v. Gurdev Singh (Dead) by LRs. & Ors. (2010) 2 SCC 194; Mt. Bolo v. Mt. Koklan (2010) 2 SCC 194 : [2010] 1 SCR 194; Mst. Rukhmabai v. Lala Laxminarayan [1960] 2 SCR 253; Mongin Realty and Build Well Private Limited v. Manik Sethi 2022 SCC Online SC 156; Bikoba Deora Gaikwad & Ors. v. Hirabai Marutirao Ghorgare & Ors. (2008) 8 SCC 198 : [2008] 9 SCR 1038; Narinder Kaur & Anr. v. Amar Jeet Singh Sethi & Anr. 2000 III A D (Delhi), 599; M/s Crescent Petroleum Ltd. v. M. V. Monchegorsk & Ors. AIR 2000 Bombay 161 – referred to.