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signed by
SHOUGRAKPAM Digitally
SHOUGRAKPAM
DEVANANDA SINGH
DEVANANDA
Date: 2024.07.18 15:58:23
SINGH
+05'30'
[1]
IN THE HIGH COURT OF MANIPUR
AT IMPHAL
WP(C) No. 626 of 2007
1. Smt. Mema Paul, aged about 65 years, W/o (L) Brajabihari
Paul, Keishamthong Top Leirak , P.O. & P.S. , Imphal, Imphal
West District, Manipur (expired)
By her Legal Representatives
2. Sujata Paul, aged about 55 years, D/o late Brajabihari Paul of
Keishamthong Top Leirak, P.O. & P.S. Imphal, Imphal West
District, Manipur-795001.
3. Shri Krishnadas Paul, aged about 52 years, S/o late Brajabihari
Paul of keishamthong Top Leirak, P.O. & P.S. Imphal, Imphal
West District, Manipur-795001.
... Petitioners
-Versus1. Income Tax Officer, Ward-2, Imphal.
2. Commissioner of Income Tax, NER, Shillong, Meghalaya.
3. Union of India through the Secretary (Finance/ Taxation),
Government of India, New Delhi
… Respondents
B E F O R E
HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE AHANTHEMBIMOL SINGH
For the petitioners
::
For the respondents
::
Date of hearing
Date of judgment & order
::
::
Mr. H.S. Paonam, Sr. Advocate
asstd. by Mr. Sushruta Yumnam,
Advocate
Mr. Kh. Samarjit, DSGI
asstd. by Mr. Armananda, Advocate
21-05-2024
18-07-2024
JUDGMENT & ORDER
[1]
Heard Mr. H.S. Paonam learned senior counsel assisted by
Mr Sushruta Yumnan, learned counsel appearing for the petitioners and
WP(C) No. 626 of 2007
Contd…/-
[2]
Mr. Kh. Samarjit, learned DSGI assisted by Mr. Armananda, learned
counsel appearing for the respondents.
[2]
The writ petition has been filed with the prayer for quashing and
setting aside the order dated 28-12-2006 passed by the Assessing Officer,
i.e., Income Tax Officer, Ward-2, Imphal and the consequential order
passed in penalty proceeding as illegal being violative of the provisions of
section 153(1)(2) of the Income Tax Act, 1961.
[3]
The facts of the present case are not in dispute. The original
petitioner was an assessee under the Income Tax Act, 1961 ("the Act",
for short) and for the Assessment Year, 2003-2004, the said petitioner filed
Return of her income on 04-06-2004 disclosing the total income of
Rs. 1,00,240/-. The Return filed by the said petitioner was processed under
section 143(1) of the Act on 14-12-2004 and thereafter, intimation was
issued on the same date. After about one year from the date of filing the
aforesaid Return, the Income Tax Officer, Ward-2, Imphal (hereinafter
referred to as "the Assessing Officer", for short), by holding that he had
reasons to believe that the income chargeable to tax had escaped
assessment within the meaning of section 147 of the Act, issued notice
under section 148 of the Act dated 28-07-2005 to the original petitioner
requiring her to submit a Return of her income in the prescribed form within
30 days from the date of service of the said notice. There is nothing on
record to indicate as to when the said notice was received by the original
petitioner, however, it has been submitted on behalf of the petitioner that
WP(C) No. 626 of 2007
Contd…/-
[3]
the said notice under section 148 was received on 06-12-2005 and the
respondents have not denied such contention.
[4]
On receiving the said notice, the original petitioner through her
counsel submitted an application dated 06-12-2005 to the Assessing
Officer with the request to make available information/ documents collected
from different sources for taking up proceedings of escaped income so as
to enable her to furnish details of the same for early settlement of the issue.
As there was non-compliance to the notice issued under section 148 of the
Act dated 28-07-2005, the Assessing Officer again issued another notice
dated 03-03-2006 under section 148 of the Act requiring the original
petitioner to submit her income for the said financial year in the prescribed
form within 30 days from the date of receipt of the said notice. On receiving
the said notice, the petitioner again wrote a letter to the Assessing Officer
requesting to furnish the reason and under what circumstances she had
been escaping taxable income so as to enable her to furnish the necessary
reply. As there was again non-compliance by the original petitioner to
the notice dated 03-03-2006, the Assessing Officer wrote a letter dated
12-04-2006 intimating to the petitioner that an opportunity was being given
to her to file the Return within 15 days from the date of receipt of the said
letter and that failure to comply will follow ex-parte assessment under
section 144 without further information.
[5]
When the petitioner again failed to submit her Return and instead
requested to make available or intimate the reasons and materials for
reassessment of her income, the Assessing Officer wrote another letter
WP(C) No. 626 of 2007
Contd…/-
[4]
dated 19-05-2006 requiring the original petitioner to show cause as to why
her case should not be completed ex-parte under section 144 of the said
Act and also requested her to attend the office on 02-06-2006 at 12:00
noon. The original petitioner was further informed that failure on her part to
do so will compel the authorities to complete her case ex-parte without any
further communication and penalty provisions under section 271(1) will be
attracted. Thereafter, the original petitioner filed her Return on 19-06-2006
in response to the notice issued under section 148 of the Act, disclosing the
same total income. In view thereof, the Assessing Officer dropped the
proceeding under section 144 of the Act and issued notice to the petitioner
under section 142(1) and 143(2) of the Act, both dated 22-06-2006. By
another letter, dated 22-06-2006, the Assessing Officer informed the
petitioner the reasons for initiation of proceeding under section 147 of the
Act by stating that the original petitioner did not disclosed her rental income
fully including arrear in her Return for Assessment Year, 2003-2004.
[6]
When the original petitioner (hereinafter referred to as "the
Assessee") complied with all the subsequent notices, the case was
discussed with the authorised representative of the Assessee, who
appeared before the Assessing Officer from time to time and thereafter, on
completion of the reassessment proceeding, the Assessing Officer passed
the assessment order dated 28-12-2006 under section 143(3)/ 147 of the
Act. By the said order, the Assessing Officer assessed the total income of
the assessee at Rs. 3,17,508/- and raised a demand of Rs. 1,07,969/-.
Following the same, notice of demand dated 28-12-2006 under section
156 of the Act was issued by the Assessing Officer raising a demand
WP(C) No. 626 of 2007
Contd…/-
[5]
of Rs. 1,07,969/- for the said assessment year and copies of the said
assessment order/ demand notice and challan were served on the
authorized representative of the assessee on 05-01-2007.
[7]
In terms of the direction contained in the assessment order
dated 28-12-2006, the Assessing Officer issued a Show Cause notice
dated 25-05-2007 asking the assessee to show cause as to why penalty
proceeding should not be initiated against her and also asking her to appear
in the Office of the Assessing Officer. When the assessee failed to respond
to the said show cause notice, the Assessing Officer passed the order dated
29-06-2007 imposing a penalty of Rs. 1,03,340/- on the assessee and the
consequential notice of demand was issued and served to her. Having
been aggrieved, the assessee filed the present writ petition for redressing
her grievances.
[8]
Mr. H S. Paonam, learned senior counsel appearing for the
petitioners raised only one ground in challenging the assessment order
dated 28-12-2006 passed by the Assessing Officer as well as the
subsequent order dated 29-06-2007 passed in the penalty proceeding. It
has been submitted by the learned senior counsel that the proceeding of
the reassessment and passing of the impugned assessment order dated
28-12-2006 as well as communication of the order was not completed within
the period prescribed under section 153(2) of the Act and as such, the
impugned assessment order and the consequential order passed in the
penalty proceeding are illegal being violative of the provisions of section
153(2) of the Act and accordingly, liable to be quash and set aside.
WP(C) No. 626 of 2007
Contd…/-
[6]
Elaborating the point, it has been submitted by the learned senior
counsel that under section 153(2) of the Act, it is, inter alia, provided that
no order of assessment, reassessment or recomputation shall be made
under section 147 after the expiry of one year from the end of the financial
year in which the notice under section 148 was served and that under the
second proviso to section 153(2) of the Act, it is provided that where the
notice under section 148 was served on or after the 1stday of April, 2005
but before the 1st day of April, 2011, the provisions of this sub-section shall
have effect as if for the words " one year", the words "nine months" had
been substituted. For ready reference, the provisions of section 153(2) of
the Act are reproduced hereunder:“Time limit for completion of assessments and reassessments
153. ***
(2) No order of assessment, reassessment or
recomputation shall be made under section 147 after the expiry
of one year from the end of the financial year in which the
notice under section 148 was served:
[Provided that where the notice under section 148 was
served on or after the 1st day of April, 1999 but before the 1st
day of April, 2000, such assessment, reassessment or
recomputation may be made at any time up to the 31st day of
March, 2002]
[Provided further that where the notice under section 148
was served on or after the 1st day of April, 2005 but before the
1st day of April, 2011, the provisions of this sub-section shall
have effect as if for the words “one year”, the words “nine
months” had been substituted]”
[9]
It has further been submitted by the learned senior counsel that
the first notice under section 148 dated 28-07-2005 was served to the
assessee on 06-12-2005 and the second notice under section 148 dated
03-03-2006 was served on the assessee in the month of March, 2006 and
as such, the period of nine months shall start from 01-04-2006 and will end
WP(C) No. 626 of 2007
Contd…/-
[7]
on 31-12-2006 as per the second proviso to section 153(2) of the Act. It has
been strenuously submitted that the impugned assessment order dated
28-12-2006 is a back dated one and a copy of the same was served to the
authorised representative of the assessee only on 05-01-2007, beyond the
prescribed period of nine months. The learned senior counsel submitted
that the impugned assessment order will take effect only from 05-01-2007,
on which date it was served to the representative of the assessee and not
from 28-12-2006, on which date it was allegedly passed. The learned senior
counsel, accordingly, submitted that since the impugned assessment order
shall deem to take effect only from 05-01-2007, beyond the period of
limitation prescribed under the second proviso to section 153(2) of the Act.,
the whole proceeding of the reassessment as well as the impugned order
are rendered illegal being violative of the provisions of section 153(2) of the
Act and are liable to be quashed and set aside.
In support of his contentions, the learned senior counsel cited the
following case laws:(1)
“Bachhittar Singh Vs. State of Punjab & anr.” reported in AIR
1963 SC 395, wherein it has been held as under:“10. The business of State is a complicated one and has necessarily to
be "conducted through the agency of a large number of officials
and authorities. The Constitution, therefore, requires and so did
the Rules of Business framed by the Rajpramukh of PEPSU
provide, that the action must be taken by the authority concerned
in the name of the Rajpramukh. It is not till this formality is
observed that the action can be regarded as that of the State or
here, by the Rajpramukh. We may further observe that,
constitutionally speaking, the Minister is no more than an adviser
and that the head of the State, the Governor or Rajpramukh, is to
act with the aid and advice of his Council of Ministers. Therefore,
until such advice is accepted by the Governor whatever the
Minister or the Council of Ministers may say in regard to a
particular matter does not become the action of the State until the
advice of the Council of Ministers is accepted or deemed to be
WP(C) No. 626 of 2007
Contd…/-
[8]
accepted by the Head of the State. Indeed, it is possible that after
expressing one opinion about a particular matter at a particular
stage a Minister or the Council of Ministers may express quite a
different opinion, one which may be completely opposed to the
earlier opinion. Which of them can be regarded as the “order” of
the State Government? Therefore, to make the opinion amount to
a decision of the Government it must be communicated to the
person concerned. In this connection we may quote the following
from the judgment of this Court in the State of Punjab v. Sodhi
Sukhdev Singh:
“Mr Gopal Singh attempted to argue that before the
final order was passed the Council of Ministers had decided
to accept the respondent's representation and to reinstate
him, and that, according to him, the respondent seeks to
prove by calling the two original orders. We are unable to
understand this argument. Even if the Council of Ministers
had provisionally decided to reinstate the respondent that
would not prevent the Council from reconsidering the matter
and coming to a contrary conclusion later on, until a final
decision is reached by them and is communicated to the
Rajpramukh in the form of advice and acted upon by him by
issuing an order in that behalf to the respondent.”
Thus it is of the essence that the order has to be communicated to
the person who would be affected by that order before the State and
that person can be bound by that order. For, until the order is
communicated to the person affected by it, it would be open to the
Council of Ministers to consider the matter over and over again and,
therefore, till its communication the order cannot be regarded as
anything more than provisional in character.”
(2) “State of Punjab Vs. Amar Singh Harika” reported in AIR 1966
SC 1313, wherein it has been held as under:“11. The first question which has been raised before us by Mr.
Bishan Narain is that though the respondent came to know
about the order of his dismissal for the first time on the 28th
May 1951, the said order must be deemed to have taken effect
as from the 3rd June 1949 when it was actually passed. The
High Court has rejected this contention; but Mr. Bishan Narain
contends that the view taken by the High Court is erroneous in
law. We are not impressed by Mr. Bishan Narain's argument. It
is plain that the mere passing of an order of dismissal would
not be effective unless it is published and communicated to the
officer concerned. If the appointing authority passed an order
of dismissal, but does not communicate it to the officer
concerned, theoretically it is possible that unlike in the case of
a judicial order pronounced in Court, the authority may change
its mind and decide to modify its order. It may be that in some
cases, the authority may fell that the ends of justice would be
met by demoting the officer concerned rather than dismissing
him. An order of dismissal passed by the appropriate authority
and kept with itself, cannot be said to take effect unless the
WP(C) No. 626 of 2007
Contd…/-
[9]
officer concerned knows about the said order and it is
otherwise communicated to all the parties concerned. If it is
held that the mere passing of the order of dismissal has the
effect of terminating the services of the officer concerned,
various complications may arise. If before receiving the order
of dismissal, the officer has exercised his power and
jurisdiction to take decisions or do acts within his authority and
power, would those acts and decisions be rendered invalid
after it is known that an order of dismissal had already been
passed against him? Would the officer concerned be entitled
to his salary for the period between the date when the order
was passed and the date when it was communicated to him?
These and other complications would inevitably arise if it is
held that the order of dismissal takes effect as soon as it is
passed, though it may be communicated to the officer
concerned several days thereafter. It is true that in the present
case, the respondent had been suspended during the material
period; but that does not change the position that if the officer
concerned is not suspended during the period of enquiry,
complications of the kind already indicated would definitely
arise. We are therefore, reluctant to hold that an order of
dismissal passed by an appropriate authority and kept on its
file without communicating it to the officer concerned or
otherwise publishing it will take effect as from the date on
which the order is actually written out by the said authority;
such an order can only be effective after it is communicated to
the officer concerned or is otherwise published. When a public
officer is removed from service, his successor would have to
take charge of the said office; and except in cases where the
officer concerned has already been suspended, difficulties
would arise if it is held that an officer who is actually working
and holding charge of his office, can be said to be effectively
removed from his office by the mere passing of an order by the
appropriate authority. In our opinion, therefore, the High Court
was plainly right in holding that the order of dismissal passed
against the respondent on the 3rd June 1949 could not be said
to have taken effect until the respondent came to know about it
on the 28th May 1951.”
(3) “Bipromasz Bipron Trading SA Vs. Bharat Electronics Limited
(BEL)” reported in (2012) 6 SCC 384, wherein it has been held
as under:“31. Apart from the aforesaid statutory provision, it is also settled
that an official order takes effect only when it is served on the
person affected. In Bachhittar Singh v. State of Punjab this Court
has clearly enunciated the principle of law in the following
words: (AIR p. 398, para 10)
“10. … Thus it is of the essence that the order has to be
communicated to the person who would be affected by that
order before the State and that person can be bound by that
WP(C) No. 626 of 2007
Contd…/-
[10]
order. For, until the order is communicated to the person
affected by it, it would be open to the Council of Ministers to
consider the matter over and over again and, therefore, till
its communication the order cannot be regarded as anything
more than provisional in character.”
Similarly, in this case until the order was communicated to
the petitioner, the Chairman-cum-Managing Director would
have been at liberty to reconsider the matter and thus
rendering the order only provisional in character.”
“32. A similar question arose before this Court in BSNL v. Subash
Chandra Kanchan wherein it has been clearly observed as
under: (SCC p. 283, para 12)
“12. Evidently, the Managing Director of the appellant was
served with a notice on 7-1-2002. The letter appointing
the arbitrator was communicated to the respondent on
7-2-2002. By that time, 30 days' period contemplated under
the Act lapsed. The Managing Director of the appellant was
required to communicate his decision in terms of Clause
25 of the contract.”
In reaching the aforesaid conclusion, this Court relied on
the earlier judgment rendered in State of Punjab v. Amar
Singh Harika wherein this Court has held as follows: (AIR
p. 1316, para 11)
“11. The first question which has been raised before us by
Mr Bishan Narain is that though the respondent came
to know about the order of his dismissal for the first
time on 28-5-1951, the said order must be deemed to
have taken effect as from 3-6-1949 when it was
actually passed. The High Court has rejected this
contention; but Mr Bishan Narain contends that the
view taken by the High Court is erroneous in law. We
are not impressed by Mr Bishan Narain's argument. It
is plain that the mere passing of an order of dismissal
would not be effective unless it is published and
communicated to the officer concerned. If the
appointing authority passed an order of dismissal,
but does not communicate it to the officer concerned,
theoretically it is possible that unlike in the case of a
judicial order pronounced in court, the authority may
change its mind and decide to modify its order.”
“33. The aforesaid observations make it clear that an order passed
by an authority cannot be said to take effect unless the same is
communicated to the party affected. The order passed by a
competent authority or by an appropriate authority and kept with
itself, could be changed, modified, cancelled and thus denuding
such an order of the characteristics of a final order. Such an
uncommunicated order can neither create any rights in favour of
a party, nor take away the rights of any affected party, till it is
communicated.”
WP(C) No. 626 of 2007
Contd…/-
[11]
“34. The aforesaid proposition has been reiterated in Laxminarayan
R. Bhattad v. State of Maharashtra, wherein it has been held that:
(SCC p. 431, para 52)
“52. … It is now well known that a right created under an order
of a statutory authority must be communicated so as to
confer an enforceable right.”
Similar view has been reiterated in Greater Mohali Area
Development Authority v. Manju Jain wherein it is observed
as follows: (SCC p. 164, para 24)
“24. Thus, in view of the above, it can be held that if an
order is passed but not communicated to the party
concerned, it does not create any legal right which can
be enforced through the court of law, as it does not
become effective till it is communicated.”
(4) “Cochin Plantations Ltd. Vs. State of Kerala” reported in
(1997) 227 ITR 38 (KER), wherein it has been held as under:“4. From the averments contained in the petition filed by the
assessee under section 19 it is seen that the managing director
of the petitioner-assessee-company was unwell and he was
admitted in Medical College Hospital for treatment during the
relevant period. These were the circumstance under which,
according to the assessee, it could not comply with the
directions contained in the earlier notice in time. But it is a fact
that the assessee had filed its returns on November 5, 1976, i.e.,
about a month before the assessment order was served on it.
Taking into consideration all the facts and circumstances of the
case, we are of the view that the assessee had made out a case
under section 19, which would justify an order in its favour. Apart
from the above, as mentioned earlier, the assessee had filed its
returns much before the assessment order was served on it. This
court had occasion to consider the validity of such assessment
order in a series of decisions. It has been uniformly held that the
assessment order becomes effective only when it is issued from
the office of the assessing authority. In T.R.C. No. 6 of 1981, a
Division Bench of this court has taken the view that assessment
will not be over until the assessment is communicated to the
assessee. The assessment order becomes operative only on
service on the party intended to be affected thereby. In Govt.
Wood Workshop v. State of Kerala [1987] 1 KLT 804, another
Division Bench had occasion to consider a similar question and
following the view taken by a Bench of this court in T.R.C.S. Nos.
15 and 16 of 1981, it was held that the order of any authority
cannot be said to be passed unless it is in some way pronounced
or published or the party affected has the means of knowing it.
It is not enough if the order is made, signed, and kept in the file,
because such order may be liable to change at the hands of the
authority who may modify it, or even destroy it, before it is made
known, based on subsequent information, thinking or change of
WP(C) No. 626 of 2007
Contd…/-
[12]
opinion. To make the order complete and effective, it should be
issued, so as to be beyond the control of the authority
concerned, for any possible change or modification therein. By
applying the above principle it has to be taken that before the
assessment order has become effective by issuing the same by
the office of the assessing authority, the assessee has filed its
returns. Taking into consideration all these aspects, we are of
the view that the application filed under section 19 by the
assessee is to be allowed and fresh opportunity should be given
to the assessee on the basis of the returns filed by it on
November 5, 1976.”
[10]
Mr. Kh. Samarjit, learned DSGI appearing for the respondents
submitted that there is provision for filing a statutory appeal under section
246 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, however, without availing such an
opportunity of filing a statutory appeal, the assessee approached this court
directly by filing the present writ petition for redressing her grievances. It
has been submitted that since there is an alternative and effective remedy
of filing an appeal, the present writ petition is not maintainable and liable to
be rejected outright. The learned DSGI further submitted that there is no
requirement under law for communicating the impugned assessment order
within the prescribed period of limitation stipulated under section 153(2) of
the Act. In support of his contentions, the learned DSGI cited the judgment
rendered by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of "South Indian Bank
Limited & ors. Vs. Naveen Mathew Philip & anr.” reported in 2023 SCC
Online SCC 435, wherein it has been held as under:“17. We shall reiterate the position of law regarding the interference of the
High Courts in matters pertaining to the SARFAESI Act by quoting a
few of the earlier decisions of this Court wherein the said practice has
been deprecated while requesting the High Courts not to entertain
such cases.
• Federal Bank Ltd. v. Sagar Thomas, (2003) 10 SCC 733,
“18. From the decisions referred to above, the position that emerges
is that a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of
India may be maintainable against (i) the State (Government); (ii)
an authority; (iii) a statutory body; (iv) an instrumentality or
WP(C) No. 626 of 2007
Contd…/-
[13]
agency of the State; (v) a company which is financed and owned
by the State; (vi) a private body run substantially on State
funding; (vii) a private body discharging public duty or positive
obligation of public nature; and (viii) a person or a body under
liability to discharge any function under any statute, to compel it
to perform such a statutory function.”
xxx
xxx
xxx
“26. A company registered under the Companies Act for the purposes
of carrying on any trade or business is a private enterprise to earn
livelihood and to make profits out of such activities. Banking is
also a kind of profession and a commercial activity, the primary
motive behind it can well be said to earn returns and profits.
Since time immemorial, such activities have been carried on by
individuals generally. It is a private affair of the company though
the case of nationalized banks stands on a different footing. There
may well be companies, in which majority of the share capital may
be contributed out of the State funds and in that view of the matter
there may be more participation or dominant participation of the
State in managing the affairs of the company. But in the present
case we are concerned with a banking company which has its
own resources to raise its funds without any contribution or
shareholding by the State. It has its own Board of Directors
elected by its shareholders. It works like any other private
company in the banking business having no monopoly status at
all. Any company carrying on banking business with a capital of
five lakhs will become a scheduled bank. All the same, banking
activity as a whole carried on by various banks undoubtedly has
an impact and effect on the economy of the country in general.
Money of the shareholders and the depositors is with such
companies, carrying on banking activity. The banks finance the
borrowers on any given rate of interest at a particular time. They
advance loans as against securities. Therefore, it is obviously
necessary to have regulatory check over such activities in the
interest of the company itself, the shareholders, the depositors as
well as to maintain the proper financial equilibrium of the national
economy. The banking companies have not been set up for the
purposes of building the economy of the State; on the other hand
such private companies have been voluntarily established for
their own purposes and interest but their activities are kept under
check so that their activities may not go wayward and harm the
economy in general. A private banking company with all freedom
that it has, has to act in a manner that it may not be in conflict with
or against the fiscal policies of the State and for such purposes,
guidelines are provided by Reserve Bank so that a proper fiscal
discipline, to conduct its affairs in carrying on its business, is
maintained. So as to ensure adherence to such fiscal discipline,
if need be, at times even the management of the company can be
taken over. Nonetheless, as observed earlier, these are all
regulatory measures to keep a check and provide guidelines and
not a participatory dominance or control over the affairs of the
company. For other companies in general carrying on other
WP(C) No. 626 of 2007
Contd…/-
[14]
business activities, maybe manufacturing, other industries or any
business, such checks are provided under the provisions of the
Companies Act, as indicated earlier. There also, the main
consideration is that the company itself may not sink because of
its own mismanagement or the interest of the shareholders or
people generally may not be jeopardized for that reason. Besides
taking care of such interest as indicated above, there is no other
interest of the State, to control the affairs and management of the
private companies. Care is taken in regard to the industries
covered under the Industries (Development and Regulation) Act,
1951 that their production, which is important for the economy,
may not go down, yet the business activity is carried on by such
companies or corporations which only remains a private activity
of the entrepreneurs/companies.”
”27. Such private companies would normally not be amenable to the
writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. But in
certain circumstances a writ may issue to such private bodies or
persons as there may be statutes which need to be complied with
by all concerned including the private companies. For example,
there are certain legislations like the Industrial Disputes Act, the
Minimum Wages Act, the Factories Act or for maintaining proper
environment, say the Air (Prevention and Control of Pollution)
Act, 1981 or the Water (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act,
1974 etc. or statutes of the like nature which fasten certain duties
and responsibilities statutorily upon such private bodies which
they are bound to comply with. If they violate such a statutory
provision a writ would certainly be issued for compliance with
those provisions. For instance, if a private employer dispenses
with the service of its employee in violation of the provisions
contained under the Industrial Disputes Act, in innumerable cases
the High Court interfered and has issued the writ to the private
bodies and the companies in that regard. But the difficulty in
issuing a writ may arise where there may not be any noncompliance with or violation of any statutory provision by the
private body. In that event a writ may not be issued at all. Other
remedies, as may be available, may have to be resorted to.”
• United Bank of India v. Satyawati Tondon, (2010) 8 SCC 110,
“42. There is another reason why the impugned order should be set
aside. If Respondent 1 had any tangible grievance against the
notice issued under Section 13(4) or action taken under Section
14, then she could have availed remedy by filing an application
under Section 17(1). The expression “any person” used in Section
17(1) is of wide import. It takes within its fold, not only the
borrower but also the guarantor or any other person who may be
affected by the action taken under Section 13(4) or Section 14.
Both, the Tribunal and the Appellate Tribunal are empowered to
pass interim orders under Sections 17 and 18 and are required to
decide the matters within a fixed time schedule. It is thus evident
that the remedies available to an aggrieved person under
the SARFAESI Act are both expeditious and effective.”
WP(C) No. 626 of 2007
Contd…/-
[15]
“43. Unfortunately, the High Court overlooked the settled law that the
High Court will ordinarily not entertain a petition under
Article 226 of the Constitution if an effective remedy is available
to the aggrieved person and that this rule applies with greater
rigour in matters involving recovery of taxes, cess, fees, other
types of public money and the dues of banks and other financial
institutions. In our view, while dealing with the petitions involving
challenge to the action taken for recovery of the public dues, etc.
the High Court must keep in mind that the legislations enacted by
Parliament and State Legislatures for recovery of such dues are a
code unto themselves inasmuch as they not only contain
comprehensive procedure for recovery of the dues but also
envisage constitution of quasi-judicial bodies for redressal of
the grievance of any aggrieved person. Therefore, in all such
cases, the High Court must insist that before availing remedy
under Article 226 of the Constitution, a person must exhaust the
remedies available under the relevant statute.”
“44. While expressing the aforesaid view, we are conscious that the
powers conferred upon the High Court under Article 226 of
the Constitution to issue to any person or authority, including in
appropriate cases, any Government, directions, orders or writs
including the five prerogative writs for the enforcement of any of
the rights conferred by Part III or for any other purpose are very
wide and there is no express limitation on exercise of that power
but, at the same time, we cannot be oblivious of the rules of selfimposed restraint evolved by this Court, which every High Court
is bound to keep in view while exercising power under
Article 226 of the Constitution.”
“45. It is true that the rule of exhaustion of alternative remedy is a rule
of discretion and not one of compulsion, but it is difficult to
fathom any reason why the High Court should entertain a petition
filed under Article 226 of the Constitution and pass interim order
ignoring the fact that the petitioner can avail effective alternative
remedy by filing application, appeal, revision, etc. and the
particular legislation contains a detailed mechanism for redressal
of his grievance.
xxx
xxx
xxx
“55. It is a matter of serious concern that despite repeated
pronouncement of this Court, the High Courts continue to ignore
the availability of statutory remedies under the DRT Act and
the SARFAESI Act and exercise jurisdiction under Article 226 for
passing orders which have serious adverse impact on the right of
banks and other financial institutions to recover their dues. We
hope and trust that in future the High Courts will exercise their
discretion in such matters with greater caution, care and
circumspection.”
• State Bank of Travancore v. Mathew K.C., (2018) 3 SCC 85,
WP(C) No. 626 of 2007
Contd…/-
[16]
“5. We have considered the submissions on behalf of the parties.
Normally this Court in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 136 of
the Constitution is loath to interfere with an interim order passed
in a pending proceeding before the High Court, except in special
circumstances, to prevent manifest injustice or abuse of the
process of the court. In the present case, the facts are not in
dispute. The discretionary jurisdiction under Article 226 is not
absolute but has to be exercised judiciously in the given facts of
a case and in accordance with law. The normal rule is that a writ
petition under Article 226 of the Constitution ought not to be
entertained if alternate statutory remedies are available, except in
cases falling within the well-defined exceptions as observed
in CIT v. Chhabil Dass Agarwal [(2014) 1 SCC 603], as follows:
(SCC p. 611, para 15)
“15. Thus, while it can be said that this Court has recognised
some exceptions to the rule of alternative remedy i.e. where
the statutory authority has not acted in accordance with
the provisions of the enactment in question, or in defiance of
the fundamental principles of judicial procedure, or has
resorted to invoke the provisions which are repealed, or
when an order has been passed in total violation of the
principles of natural justice, the proposition laid down
in Thansingh Nathmal v. Supt. of Taxes [AIR 1964 SC
1419], Titaghur Paper Mills Co. Ltd. v. State of Orissa [(1983)
2 SCC 433 : 1983 SCC (Tax) 131] and other similar judgments
that the High Court will not entertain a petition under
Article 226 of the Constitution if an effective alternative
remedy is available to the aggrieved person or the statute
under which the action complained of has been taken itself
contains a mechanism for redressal of grievance still holds
the field. Therefore, when a statutory forum is created by law
for redressal of grievances, a writ petition should not be
entertained ignoring the statutory dispensation.”
xxx
xxx
xxx
“8. The Statement of Objects and Reasons of the SARFAESI
Act states that the banking and financial sector in the country was
felt not to have a level playing field in comparison to other
participants in the financial markets in the world. The financial
institutions in India did not have the power to take possession of
securities and sell them. The existing legal framework relating to
commercial transactions had not kept pace with changing
commercial practices and financial sector reforms resulting in
tardy recovery of defaulting loans and mounting non-performing
assets of banks and financial institutions. Narasimhan Committee
I and II as also the Andhyarujina Committee constituted by the
Central Government Act had suggested enactment of new
legislation for securitisation and empowering banks and financial
institutions to take possession of securities and sell them without
court intervention which would enable them to realise long-term
assets, manage problems of liquidity, asset liability mismatches
WP(C) No. 626 of 2007
Contd…/-
[17]
and improve recovery. The proceedings under the Recovery of
Debts and Bankruptcy Act, 1993 (hereinafter referred to as “the
DRT Act”) with passage of time, had become synonymous with
those before regular courts affecting expeditious adjudication. All
these aspects have not been kept in mind and considered before
passing the impugned order.”
“9. Even prior to the SARFAESI Act, considering the alternate remedy
available under the DRT Act it was held in Punjab National
Bank v. O.C. Krishnan [(2001) 6 SCC 569] that : (SCC p. 570,
para 6)
“6. The Act has been enacted with a view to provide a special
procedure for recovery of debts due to the banks and the
financial institutions. There is a hierarchy of appeal provided
in the Act, namely, filing of an appeal under Section 20
and this fast-track procedure cannot be allowed to be
derailed either by taking recourse to proceedings under
Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution or by filing a civil suit,
which is expressly barred. Even though a provision under an
Act cannot expressly oust the jurisdiction of the court under
Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution, nevertheless, when
there is an alternative remedy available, judicial prudence
demands that the Court refrains from exercising its
jurisdiction under the said constitutional provisions. This was
a case where the High Court should not have entertained the
petition under Article 227 of the Constitution and should have
directed the respondent to take recourse to the appeal
mechanism provided by the Act.”
xxx
xxx
xxx
“15. It is the solemn duty of the court to apply the correct law without
waiting for an objection to be raised by a party, especially when
the law stands well settled. Any departure, if permissible, has to
be for reasons discussed, of the case falling under a defined
exception, duly discussed after noticing the relevant law. In
financial matters grant of ex parte interim orders can have a
deleterious effect and it is not sufficient to say that the aggrieved
has the remedy to move for vacating the interim order. Loans by
financial institutions are granted from public money generated at
the taxpayer's expense. Such loan does not become the property
of the person taking the loan, but retains its character of public
money given in a fiduciary capacity as entrustment by the public.
Timely repayment also ensures liquidity to facilitate loan to
another in need, by circulation of the money and cannot be
permitted to be blocked by frivolous litigation by those who can
afford the luxury of the same. The caution required, as expressed
in United Bank of India v. Satyawati Tondon [(2010) 8 SCC
110 : (2010) 3 SCC (Civ) 260], has also not been kept in mind before
passing the impugned interim order : (SCC pp. 123-24, para 46)
“46. It must be remembered that stay of an action initiated by the
State and/or its agencies/instrumentalities for recovery of
WP(C) No. 626 of 2007
Contd…/-
[18]
taxes, cess, fees, etc. seriously impedes execution of
projects of public importance and disables them from
discharging their constitutional and legal obligations
towards the citizens. In cases relating to recovery of the dues
of banks, financial institutions and secured creditors, stay
granted by the High Court would have serious adverse impact
on the financial health of such bodies/institutions, which (sic
will) ultimately prove detrimental to the economy of the
nation. Therefore, the High Court should be extremely careful
and circumspect in exercising its discretion to grant stay in
such matters. Of course, if the petitioner is able to show
that its case falls within any of the exceptions carved out
in Baburam Prakash Chandra Maheshwari v. Antarim Zila
Parishad [AIR 1969 SC 556], Whirlpool Corpn. v. Registrar of
Trade Marks [(1998) 8 SCC 1] and Harbanslal Sahnia v. Indian
Oil Corpn. Ltd. [(2003) 2 SCC 107] and some other judgments,
then the High Court may, after considering all the relevant
parameters and public interest, pass an appropriate interim
order.”
• Phoenix ARC (P) Ltd. v. Vishwa Bharati Vidya Mandir, (2022) 5 SCC
345,
“18. Even otherwise, it is required to be noted that a writ petition
against the private financial institution - ARC - the appellant
herein under Article 226 of the Constitution of India against the
proposed action/actions under Section 13(4) of the SARFAESI
Act can be said to be not maintainable. In the present case, the
ARC proposed to take action/actions under the SARFAESI
Act to recover the borrowed amount as a secured creditor. The
ARC as such cannot be said to be performing public functions
which are normally expected to be performed by the State
authorities. During the course of a commercial transaction and
under the contract, the bank/ARC lent the money to the
borrowers herein and therefore the said activity of the
bank/ARC cannot be said to be as performing a public function
which is normally expected to be performed by the State
authorities. If proceedings are initiated under the SARFAESI
Act and/or any proposed action is to be taken and the borrower
is aggrieved by any of the actions of the private bank/bank/
ARC, borrower has to avail the remedy under the SARFAESI
Act and no writ petition would lie and/or is maintainable and/or
entertainable. Therefore, decisions of this Court in Praga Tools
Corpn. v. C.A. Imanual, [(1969) 1 SCC 585] and Ramesh
Ahluwalia v. State of Punjab, [(2012) 12 SCC 331 : (2013) 3 SCC
(L&S) 45 : 4 SCEC 715] relied upon by the learned counsel
appearing on behalf of the borrowers are not of any assistance
to the borrowers.
xxx
xxx
xxx
“21. Applying the law laid down by this Court in State Bank of
Travancore v. Mathew K.C., [(2018) 3 SCC 85: (2018) 2 SCC (Civ)
41] to the facts on hand, we are of the opinion that filing of the
WP(C) No. 626 of 2007
Contd…/-
[19]
writ petitions by the borrowers before the High Court under
Article 226 of the Constitution of India is an abuse of process
of the court. The writ petitions have been filed against the
proposed action to be taken under Section 13(4). As observed
hereinabove, even assuming that the communication dated 138-2015 was a notice under Section 13(4), in that case also, in
view of the statutory, efficacious remedy available by way of
appeal under Section 17 of the SARFAESI Act, the High Court
ought not to have entertained the writ petitions. Even the
impugned orders passed by the High Court directing to
maintain the status quo with respect to the possession of the
secured properties on payment of Rs. 1 crore only (in all Rs. 3
crores) is absolutely unjustifiable. The dues are to the extent
of approximately Rs. 117 crores. The ad interim relief has been
continued since 2015 and the secured creditor is deprived of
proceeding further with the action under the SARFAESI Act.
Filing of the writ petition by the borrowers before the High
Court is nothing but an abuse of process of court. It appears
that the High Court has initially granted an ex parte ad interim
order mechanically and without assigning any reasons. The
High Court ought to have appreciated that by passing such an
interim order, the rights of the secured creditor to recover the
amount due and payable have been seriously prejudiced. The
secured creditor and/or its assignor have a right to recover the
amount due and payable to it from the borrowers. The stay
granted by the High Court would have serious adverse impact
on the financial health of the secured creditor/assignor.
Therefore, the High Court should have been extremely careful
and circumspect in exercising its discretion while granting
stay in such matters. In these circumstances, the proceedings
before the High Court deserve to be dismissed.”
• Varimadugu Obi Reddy v. B. Sreenivasulu, (2023) 2 SCC 168,
“36. In the instant case, although the respondent borrowers initially
approached the Debts Recovery Tribunal by filing an application
under Section 17 of the SARFAESI Act, 2002, but the order of
the Tribunal indeed was appealable under Section 18 of the Act
subject to the compliance of condition of pre-deposit and
without exhausting the statutory remedy of appeal, the
respondent borrowers approached the High Court by filing the
writ application under Article 226 of the Constitution. We
deprecate such practice of entertaining the writ application by
the High Court in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 of
the Constitution without exhausting the alternative statutory
remedy available under the law. This circuitous route appears to
have been adopted to avoid the condition of pre-deposit
contemplated under 2nd proviso to Section 18 of the 2002 Act.”
“18. While doing so, we are conscious of the fact that the powers
conferred under Article 226 of the Constitution of India are rather wide
but are required to be exercised only in extraordinary circumstances
in matters pertaining to proceedings and adjudicatory scheme qua a
WP(C) No. 626 of 2007
Contd…/-
[20]
statute, more so in commercial matters involving a lender and a
borrower, when the legislature has provided for a specific mechanism
for appropriate redressal.”
[11]
I have heard the learned counsel appearing for the parties at
length and the submissions advanced by them have been duly considered.
The only issue that needs to be considered and decided in the present writ
petition is whether the reassessment made by the Income Tax Officer
without communicating the order of reassessment and the demand notice
of the said reassessment within time can be treated as a valid assessment
made within the period of limitation prescribed under section 153(2) of the
Income Tax Act, 1961?
In the present case, as the two notices under section 148 of the
Act were served in the month of December, 2005 and March, 2006, the
period of limitation for completing the proceeding of the reassessment will
be nine months starting from 01-04-2006 and ending on 31-12-2006 as
provided under section 153 sub-section 2 of the said Act. The admitted
position in the present case is that even though the assessment order was
passed on 28-12-2006, the same was communicated to the authorized
representative of the assessee only on 05-01-2007. Therefore, the question
that arose for consideration is whether the said reassessment proceeding
shall be deemed to be completed when the impugned order of assessment
was passed on 28-12-2006 or whether such proceeding shall be deemed
to be completed only after communication of the impugned assessment
order to the assessee on 05-01-2007. In my considered view, this issue is
no longer res-integra and the same has been decided by the Hon'ble Apex
Court and various High Courts of the country in a catena of its decisions
WP(C) No. 626 of 2007
Contd…/-
[21]
that the order of any authority cannot be said to be passed unless it is in
some way pronounced or published or the party affected has the means of
knowing it and that it is not enough if the order is made, signed, and kept in
the file, because such order may be liable to change at the hands of the
authority who may modify it, or even destroy it, before it is made known,
based on subsequent information, thinking or change of opinion. This court
is also in complete agreement and bound by the principle of law laid down
by the Hon’ble Apex Court and other High Courts in the judgments cited by
the learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioners. Accordingly, it is
hereby held that the proceeding of the reassessment of the Return
submitted by the assesse for the Assessment Year, 2003-2004 shall be
deemed to be completed only on 05-04-2007 when the assessment order
was served/ communicated to the representative of the assesse and the
same was not completed within the period prescribed under section 153(2)
of the Act.
[12]
With regard to the objection raised by the learned DSGI about
the maintainability of the present writ petition on ground of availability of
filing a statutory appeal under section 246 of the Act, it is to be pointed out
that it is a settled principle of law that availability of an alternative and
effective remedy does not exclude or completely barred the High Court from
entertaining a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The
normal rule is that a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution ought
not to be entertained if alternate statutory remedies are available, however,
there are certain exceptions to this rule. Some of the exceptions are where
the statutory authority has not acted in accordance with the provisions of
WP(C) No. 626 of 2007
Contd…/-
[22]
the enactment in question, or in defiance of the fundamental principle of
judicial procedure, or has resorted to invoke the provisions which are
repealed, or when an order has been passed in total violation of the
principles of natural justice, or where the writ petition seeks enforcement of
any of the fundamental rights, or where the order or proceeding are wholly
without jurisdiction, or where the vires of an act is challenged or where the
controversy is purely a legal one and it does not involve disputed question
of facts but only question of law then such writ petition should be decided
by the High Court instead of dismissing the petition on ground of an
alternative remedy being available. In this connection, we can gainfully
relied on the following judgments rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court:(1) “Commissioner of Income Tax & ors Vs. Chhabil Dass
Agarwal” reported in (2014) 1 SCC 603, wherein it has been
held as under:"15. Thus, while it can be said that this Court has recognised some
exceptions to the rule of alternative remedy i.e. where the
statutory authority has not acted in accordance with the
provisions of the enactment in question, or in defiance of the
fundamental principles of judicial procedure, or has resorted to
invoke the provisions which are repealed, or when an order has
been passed in total violation of the principles of natural
justice, the proposition laid down in Thansingh Nathmal
case, Titaghur Paper Mills case and other similar judgments
that the High Court will not entertain a petition under
Article 226 of the Constitution if an effective alternative remedy
is available to the aggrieved person or the statute under which
the action complained of has been taken itself contains a
mechanism for redressal of grievance still holds the field.
Therefore, when a statutory forum is created by law for
redressal of grievances, a writ petition should not be
entertained ignoring the statutory dispensation.”
(2) “Godrej Sara Lee Ltd. Vs. Excise and Taxation Officer-cumAssessing Authority & ors.” reported in 2023 SCC Online SC
95, wherein it has been held as under:-
WP(C) No. 626 of 2007
Contd…/-
[23]
“4. Before answering the questions, we feel the urge to say a few
words on the exercise of writ powers conferred by Article 226 of
the Constitution having come across certain orders passed by
the high courts holding writ petitions as “not maintainable”
merely because the alternative remedy provided by the relevant
statutes has not been pursued by the parties desirous of
invocation of the writ jurisdiction. The power to issue
prerogative writs under Article 226 is plenary in nature. Any
limitation on the exercise of such power must be traceable in the
Constitution itself. Profitable reference in this regard may be
made to Article 329 and ordainments of other similarly worded
articles in the Constitution. Article 226 does not, in terms,
impose any limitation or restraint on the exercise of power to
issue writs. While it is true that exercise of writ powers despite
availability of a remedy under the very statute which has been
invoked and has given rise to the action impugned in the writ
petition ought not to be made in a routine manner, yet, the mere
fact that the petitioner before the high court, in a given case, has
not pursued the alternative remedy available to him/it cannot
mechanically be construed as a ground for its dismissal. It is
axiomatic that the high courts (bearing in mind the facts of each
particular case) have a discretion whether to entertain a writ
petition or not. One of the self-imposed restrictions on the
exercise of power under Article 226 that has evolved through
judicial precedents is that the high courts should normally not
entertain a writ petition, where an effective and efficacious
alternative remedy is available. At the same time, it must be
remembered that mere availability of an alternative remedy of
appeal or revision, which the party invoking the jurisdiction of
the high court under Article 226 has not pursued, would not oust
the jurisdiction of the high court and render a writ petition “not
maintainable”. In a long line of decisions, this Court has made it
clear that availability of an alternative remedy does not operate
as an absolute bar to the “maintainability” of a writ petition and
that the rule, which requires a party to pursue the alternative
remedy provided by a statute, is a rule of policy, convenience
and discretion rather than a rule of law. Though elementary, it
needs to be restated that “entertainability” and “maintainability”
of a writ petition are distinct concepts. The fine but real
distinction between the two ought not to be lost sight of. The
objection as to “maintainability” goes to the root of the
matter and if such objection were found to be of substance, the
courts would be rendered incapable of even receiving the lis
for adjudication. On the other hand, the question of
“entertainability” is entirely within the realm of discretion of the
high courts, writ remedy being discretionary. A writ petition
despite being maintainable may not be entertained by a high
court for very many reasons or relief could even be refused to
the petitioner, despite setting up a sound legal point, if grant of
the claimed relief would not further public interest. Hence,
dismissal of a writ petition by a high court on the ground that the
petitioner has not availed the alternative remedy without,
WP(C) No. 626 of 2007
Contd…/-
[24]
however, examining whether an exceptional case has been made
out for such entertainment would not be proper.
“5. A little after the dawn of the Constitution, a Constitution Bench
of this Court in its decision reported in 1958 SCR 595 (State of
Uttar Pradesh v. Mohd. Nooh) had the occasion to observe as
follows:
“10. In the next place it must be borne in mind that there is no
rule, with regard to certiorari as there is with mandamus,
that it will lie only where there is no other equally effective
remedy. It is well established that, provided the requisite
grounds exist, certiorari will lie although a right of appeal
has been conferred by statute, (Halsbury's Laws of
England, 3rd Edn., Vol. 11, p. 130 and the cases cited there).
The fact that the aggrieved party has another and adequate
remedy may be taken into consideration by the superior
court in arriving at a conclusion as to whether it should,
in exercise of its discretion, issue a writ of certiorari to
quash the proceedings and decisions of inferior courts
subordinate to it and ordinarily the superior court will
decline to interfere until the aggrieved party has exhausted
his other statutory remedies, if any. But this rule requiring
the exhaustion of statutory remedies before the writ will be
granted is a rule of policy, convenience and discretion
rather than a rule of law and instances are numerous where
a writ of certiorari has been issued in spite of the fact that
the aggrieved party had other adequate legal remedies. ***”
“6. At the end of the last century, this Court in paragraph 15 of
the its decision reported in (1998) 8 SCC 1 (Whirlpool
Corporation v. Registrar of Trade Marks, Mumbai) carved out the
exceptions on the existence whereof a Writ Court would be
justified in entertaining a writ petition despite the party
approaching it not having availed the alternative remedy provided
by the statute. The same read as under:
(i) where the writ petition seeks enforcement of any of the
fundamental rights;
(ii) where there is violation of principles of natural justice;
(iii) where the order or the proceedings are wholly without
jurisdiction; or
(iv) where the vires of an Act is challenged.”
“7. Not too long ago, this Court in its decision reported in 2021 SCC
OnLine SC 884 (Assistant Commissioner of State Tax v.
Commercial Steel Limited) has reiterated the same principles in
paragraph 11.”
“8. That apart, we may also usefully refer to the decisions of this
Court reported in (1977) 2 SCC 724 (State of Uttar Pradesh v.
Indian Hume Pipe Co. Ltd.) and (2000) 10 SCC 482 (Union of
India v. State of Haryana). What appears on a plain reading of the
former decision is that whether a certain item falls within an entry
in a sales tax statute, raises a pure question of law and if
WP(C) No. 626 of 2007
Contd…/-
[25]
investigation into facts is unnecessary, the high court could
entertain a writ petition in its discretion even though the
alternative remedy was not availed of; and, unless exercise of
discretion is shown to be unreasonable or perverse, this Court
would not interfere. In the latter decision, this Court found the
issue raised by the appellant to be pristinely legal requiring
determination by the high court without putting the appellant
through the mill of statutory appeals in the hierarchy. What
follows from the said decisions is that where the controversy is a
purely legal one and it does not involve disputed questions of fact
but only questions of law, then it should be decided by the high
court instead of dismissing the writ petition on the ground of an
alternative remedy being available.”
[13]
That apart, as the present proceeding having remained
pending in this court since 2007, this court do not consider it proper to
require the writ petitioners to go back to the departmental forum by filing
an appeal at this belated stage. Instead, it would be more appropriate to
consider and decide the merits of the controversy raised in the present
writ petition, particularly when there is no dispute with regard to the facts
of the case and the controversy is purely a legal one. Accordingly, this
court declines to reject the present writ petition on ground of availability
of an alternative remedy of filing a statutory appeal.
In the result, the writ petition is allowed by quashing and
setting aside the impugned assessment orders dated 28-12-2006 and
29-06-2007 passed by the Assessing Officer as being illegal and violative
of the provisions of section 153(2) of the Income Tax Act, 1961. With the
aforesaid directions, the present writ petition is disposed of. Parties are
to bear their own cost.
JUDGE
FR / NFR
Devananda
WP(C) No. 626 of 2007
Contd…/-
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