Full Judgment Text
Text read from the judgment PDF published on the High Court's eCourts portal, through the
Indian High Court Judgments open data set (Dattam Labs,
CC BY 4.0).
The court's own copy is the authoritative text.
IN THE HIGH COURT OF SIKKIM: GANGTOK
(Civil Appellate Jurisdiction)
Heard on
: 17.07.2017
Pronounced on: 25.07.2017
---------------------------------------------------------------------Single Bench: HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE BHASKAR RAJ PRADHAN,
JUDGE
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
F.A.O No. 02 of 2015
State of Sikkim
Through Secretary,
SNT Department,
Government of Sikkim
.… Appellant/Plaintiff.
versus
1. Keshab Pd. Pradhan
S/o Lt. Punya Pd. Pradhan
R/O Pradhan House,
189/325, Nevedita Road,
Pradhan Nagar, Siliguri (W.B)
2. Shri Pushpa Pd. Pradhan,
S/o Lt. Punya Pd. Pradhan
R/O Pradhan House,
189/325, Nevedita Road,
Pradhan Nagar, Siliguri (W.B)
3. Shri Dibya Pd. Pradhan,
S/o Lt. Punya Pd. Pradhan
R/O Pradhan House,
189/325, Nevedita Road,
Pradhan Nagar, Siliguri (W.B)
4. Shri Hirendra Pd. Pradhan,
S/o Lt. Punya Pd. Pradhan
R/O Pradhan House,
189/325, Nevedita Road,
Pradhan Nagar, Siliguri (W.B)
… Respondents/Defendants.
F.A.O No. 02 of 2015
State of Sikkim v. Keshab Pd. Pradhan & Ors.
An Appeal under Order XLIII Rule 1(a) of the Civil
Procedure Code, 1908.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Appearance:
Mr. J.B Pradhan, Additional Advocate General with Ms. Pollin
Rai, Asstt. Government Advocate, for the Appellant/Plaintiff.
Mr. B. Sharma, Senior Advocate with Ms. Navtara Sarda,
Advocate for the Respondents/Defendants.
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
JUDGMENT
25.07.2017
Bhaskar Raj Pradhan. J.
1.
On the rival submissions of the learned Senior Counsels
appearing for the parties hereto and so well articulated, four
important issues merits judicial determination in the present case.
Primarily, the meaning of the words “determination of any other
right to or interest in immovable property” in Section 16 (d) of the
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (C.P.C). Secondly, whether counterclaim under Order VIII Rule 6A of C.P.C could be filed even if the
subject matter of the counter-claim was beyond the territorial
jurisdiction of the Court. Thirdly, the ambit and scope of Order VIII
Rule 6C of C.P.C to exclude counter-claim if the Court was of the
view that the claim ought to be raised in an independent suit?
Finally and consequently, whether the Principal District Judge was
right in returning the plaint under the provision of Order VII Rule
10 of C.P.C? All the above issues are taken together and sought to
be determined by this Court.
F.A.O No. 02 of 2015
State of Sikkim v. Keshab Pd. Pradhan & Ors.
2.
The Order dated 25.03.2015 (the impugned order) passed
by the learned Principal District Judge, East Sikkim at Gangtok
(the Learned Principal District Judge) in Money Suit no. 21 of 2014
(the said suit) filed by the Appellant, the State of Sikkim (the
Plaintiff) against Respondent no. 1, Keshab Pd. Pradhan (the
Defendant no. 1), Respondent no. 2, Pushpa Pd. Pradhan (the
Defendant no. 2), Respondent no. 3, Dibya Pd. Pradhan (the
Defendant no. 3) and Respondent no. 4, Hirendra Pd. Pradhan (the
Defendant no. 4) is impugned in the present F.A.O No. 02 of 2015
(the present appeal).
3.
The impugned order while disposing of a petition under
Order VIII Rule 6 (C) of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908 (C.P.C),
filed by the Plaintiff for exclusion of the counter-claim put forth by
the Defendants returned the plaint of the Plaintiff.
4.
The learned Principal District Judge held:(a).
the counter-claim filed by the Defendants seeking a decree
declaring that the Plaintiff is in illegal occupation of the suit
property; a declaration of eviction of the Plaintiff from the portion
of the landed property covered by plot no. 291 and other reliefs
are related to the immovable property situated in Pradhan Nagar,
Siliguri, West Bengal and beyond the jurisdiction of the Court of
the learned Principal District Judge and thus, barred by Section 16
(d) of the C.P.C.
(b).
The said suit filed by the Plaintiff on careful perusal of the
pleadings and the issue framed for settlement revealed that there
were unresolved questions with regard to title between the parties
F.A.O No. 02 of 2015
State of Sikkim v. Keshab Pd. Pradhan & Ors.
and thus, it was not merely a suit for recovery of money but also
for determination of the rights of the parties with regard to the suit
land and thus, the said suit filed by the Plaintiff also fell under
Section 16 (d) of the C.P.C. and beyond the territorial jurisdiction
of the Court of the Learned Principal District Judge and thus, the
plaint was liable to be returned.
(c).
In any event from the residential addresses of the
Defendants furnished by the Plaintiff, it was clear that the
Defendants are all residents of Pradhan Nagar, Siliguri.
(d).
That the four cheques received in the name of the four
Defendants were all received by the Defendant no. 3 at Turuk
Kothi, Turuk, South Sikkim and thus the Court of the learned
Principal District Judge had no territorial jurisdiction to try either
the said suit or the counter-claim.
5.
Mr. J.B. Pradhan, the learned Additional Advocate
General for the State of Sikkim, the Plaintiff herein would argue
that the plaint filed by the Plaintiff was purely a money suit and
therefore, outside the purview of the Section 16 C.P.C and
squarely falling under the purview of Section 20 in as much as it
has been specifically pleaded in the plaint that the part of the
cause of action i.e. payment of Rs. 34,50,000/-, having been
received by the Defendants at Gangtok had arisen within the
jurisdiction of the Court of the learned Principal District Judge. The
learned Additional Advocate General would argue that, therefore,
the impugned order to the extent that the learned Principal District
Judge returned the plaint under the provision of Order VII Rule 10
of CPC is illegal. The learned Additional Advocate General would
F.A.O No. 02 of 2015
State of Sikkim v. Keshab Pd. Pradhan & Ors.
also submit that the present case was a case in which the reliefs
sought can be entirely obtained through the personal obedience of
the Defendants. The learned Additional Advocate General would
further contend that in so far as the impugned order allowing the
Plaintiff‟s petition under Order VIII Rule 6C of CPC is concerned it
is correct and the Plaintiff has no grievance. The learned Additional
Advocate General would fairly concede, at the outset, that no
formal application would be necessary for the Court to return the
plaint under the provision of Order VII Rule 10 of C.P.C.
6.
In Contra, Mr. B. Sharma, learned Senior Advocate
appearing for the Defendants would argue that if this Court were
to hold that the return of the plaint of the Plaintiff was not correct
then in view of the provision of Order VIII Rule 6A of C.P.C the
counter-claim filed by the Defendants was perfectly maintainable
as he would argue that from the language of Order VIII Rule 6A of
C.P.C it is clear that there is no restriction regarding territorial
jurisdiction of the Court.
7.
The Plaintiff, in the said suit preferred on 06.03.2016 for
recovery of money amounting to Rs. 38,78,283 with interest and
cost, made the following prayers:-
“i. for a decree directing the defendants jointly and severally to pay
to the plaintiff an amount of Rs. 38,78,283/- (Rupees Thirty eight
lakhs seventy eight thousand two hundred and eighty three);
ii. for a decree directing the defendants jointly and severally to pay
to the plaintiff pendentelite interest on the principal amount of Rs.
34,50,000/- (Rupees Thirty four lakhs fifty thousand );
iii. for a decree directing the defendants to pay to the plaintiff the
entire cost of the suit.
F.A.O No. 02 of 2015
State of Sikkim v. Keshab Pd. Pradhan & Ors.
iv.
for any other relief or reliefs which the plaintiff may be found
entitled to in the facts and circumstances of the case. “
8.
In re: Begam Sabiha Sultan v. Nawab Mohd. Mansur
Ali Khan1 the Apex Court held:“ Although at the stage of consideration of the return of the plaint
under Order 7 Rule 10 of CPC, what is to be looked into is the plaint
and the averments therein it is also necessary to read the plaint in a
meaningful manner to find out the real intention behind the suit.”
9.
Thus, it is vital to appreciate the plaint set out by the
Plaintiff in a meaningful manner to find out the real intention
behind the suit. In so doing, the story of the Plaintiff as pleaded
in the plaint is that vide a lease deed dated 21.07.1953
registered in the office of the District Sub-Registrar, Darjeeling
the lessor Punya Pd. Pradhan, late father of the Defendants
granted lease of 2 & 1/2 bighas and 23.33 kothas of land situated
at Pradhan Nagar, Siliguri to the „Sikkim Darbar‟, for a period of
51 years for a salami of Rs. 9415/- and rent @ Rs. 147 per
annum. Sikkim became the 22nd State of India in April, 1975. By
virtue of the adaptation of Sikkim Laws ( No. 1) Order, 1975 on
and from the 26th day of April, 1975 the expression „Sikkim
Darbar‟ in the said lease deed stood substituted by the
expression
„State
Government‟
and
accordingly
the
State
Government of Sikkim assumed the position of the owner in
respect of the demised premises. After taking possession of the
demised premises the Plaintiff constructed 3 RCC buildings over
a portion of the demised premises. With the enforcement of
West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act, 1953 in the State of West
(2007) 4 SCC 343
F.A.O No. 02 of 2015
State of Sikkim v. Keshab Pd. Pradhan & Ors.
Bengal the rights of the lessor had extinguished and as such, on
and from the date from which the West Bengal Estate Acquisition
Act, 1953 came into force in the State of West Bengal the lessor
had no subsisting interest in the demised premises. The lessor,
Punya Pd. Pradhan, expired leaving behind four sons, the
Defendants in the said suit as legal heirs and successors. The
implication of the West Bengal Estate Acquisition Act, 1953 on
the rights of the lessor in respect of the demised premises
having not been brought to its notice, the Plaintiff on the
repeated insistence of the Defendants, expressed its desire to
purchase the demised premises from the legal heirs and
representatives of the deceased lessor. Negotiations were
accordingly carried out and the Plaintiff agreed to purchase the
demised premises for a consideration of Rs. 69,00,000/-.
Towards the said consideration, an amount of Rs. 34,50,000/was paid to the Defendants as advance vide four separate
cheques on 09.09.2002. All the above cheques were received by
Defendant no. 3 for self and on behalf of Defendant no. 1, 2 and
4 at Gangtok. The said cheques have been encashed by the
respective payees. In view of the provisions of West Bengal
Estate Acquisition Act, 1953, the rights of the intermediary had
got extinguished and the lessor had no subsisting interest in the
demised premises. Hence, the negotiation between the sons of
the deceased lessor (i.e. the Defendants) is illegal, invalid and
improper. The payment of Rs. 34,50,000/- made by the Plaintiff
to the Defendants as 50% payment towards demised premises is
also illegal and the said amount is liable to be recovered from
F.A.O No. 02 of 2015
State of Sikkim v. Keshab Pd. Pradhan & Ors.
the Defendants. When the error of payment of the public money
by the Plaintiff to the Defendants came to the knowledge of the
Plaintiff on 27.05.2003 through the Accountant General, Sikkim,
the Plaintiff requested the Defendants to refund the payment of
Rs. 34,50,000/-. In response to the said request the Defendants
vide an application dated 25.02.2005 admitted the mistake of
receiving the amount from the Plaintiff and expressed their
willingness to refund the entire amount, after which the
Defendant no. 1 and 2 sought further time vide application dated
28.04.2005. Vide application dated 16.06.2005 addressed to the
Transport Department, Government of Sikkim, Defendant no. 1
asserted the right of the Defendants on the demised premises.
Thereafter, in spite of repeated reminders the Defendants failed
to fulfil their commitment of refunding the amount and hence the
said suit.
10.
It is pleaded in the said plaint that the cause of
action for
the
said suit
arose
on 16.06.2005
when the
Defendants demurred to refund the amount received by them.
11.
The Plaintiff further pleaded that the payment of Rs.
34,50,000/- having been received by the Defendants at Gangtok
the Court of the District Judge, East Sikkim at Gangtok (the
District
Judge)
had
both
pecuniary
as
well
as
territorial
jurisdiction to try the said suit. It is on the basis of this averment
and this averment alone that the learned Additional Advocate
General would submit that part of the cause of action having
F.A.O No. 02 of 2015
State of Sikkim v. Keshab Pd. Pradhan & Ors.
arisen in Gangtok, the Court of the Principal District Judge had
territorial jurisdiction as contemplated under Section 20 of C.P.C.
12.
The learned Additional Advocate General in support
of his contention would rely upon a Judgment of the Delhi High
Court in re: Indira Rai v. Bir Singh2. The said case related to a
suit for recovery of money. The facts set out in the said
judgment reveals that an agreement to sale was signed between
the plaintiff and the defendant therein and the plaintiff had paid
a sum of money to the defendant as sale consideration for a land
in Faridabad. The defendant therein in turn agreed to handover
vacant possession of the land to the plaintiff therein by a
specified date. A sale deed was thereafter executed but the
defendants failed to handover possession of the said land. The
plaintiff therein rescinded the agreement and asked for refund.
The
defendant
therein
having
failed
to
refund
the
sale
consideration the plaintiff sought the recovery of money by filing
a suit. The defendant took out a preliminary objection that the
Delhi Court has no territorial jurisdiction. The defendant also
denied execution of the agreement to sale claiming it to be
forged and further denied having received any amount from the
plaintiff. The defendant also pleaded that he is not the owner of
the said land. In replication the plaintiff did not dispute the
averments of the defendants that he is not the owner of the said
land.
13.
The Delhi High Court while examining the issue
regarding its territorial jurisdiction held that the agreement to
2.
2010 scc Online Del 4095
F.A.O No. 02 of 2015
State of Sikkim v. Keshab Pd. Pradhan & Ors.
sell set up the plaintiff therein purports to have been executed in
Delhi. Hence, part of the “cause of the action” claimed by the
plaintiff, arose in Delhi and consequently, the suit could be filed
in Delhi. The Delhi High Court further held that the suit is not
suit for specific performance of the Contract in respect of an
immovable property. The Delhi High Court also held that it was
not a suit for possession of an immovable property nor was it a
suit for injunction in respect of immovable property and that it
was a suit for refund of sale consideration alleged to have been
paid by the plaintiff to the defendant on the ground that due to
non-performance of the agreement by the defendant, plaintiff
had rescinded the transaction and thus the suit was not covered
in any of the clauses of Section 16 of C.P.C.
14.
It is trite that the ratio of the case is to be deduced
from the facts involved in the case. In re: Indira Rai (supra) was
a case in which the agreement for sale was executed in Delhi.
The cause of action for the said suit had arisen on the failure of
the defendant therein to refund the sale consideration paid by
the plaintiff therein on the ground that due to the nonperformance of the agreement by the defendant the plaintiff had
rescinded the transaction. On such facts the Delhi High Court
had held that the suit was not covered in any of the clauses of
Section 16 of C.P.C. This Court is of the view that this was not a
case which involved “determination of any other right to or
interest in immovable property.”
F.A.O No. 02 of 2015
State of Sikkim v. Keshab Pd. Pradhan & Ors.
15. Section 16 (d) of C.P.C provides:“16. Suits to be instituted where subject-matter situate.subject to the pecuniary or other limitation prescribed by any law,
suits, (a)…… ……….
(b)…………….
(c)……………
(d). for the determination of any other right to or interest
in immovable property,
(e)…………………….
(f)………………………..
shall be instituted in the Court within the local limits of whose
jurisdiction the property is situate:
Provided that a suit to obtain relief respecting, or compensation for
wrong to, immovable property held by or on behalf of the defendant
may, where the relief sought can be entirely obtained through his
personal obedience, be instituted either in the Court within the local
limits of whose jurisdiction the defendant actually and voluntarily
resides, or carries own business, or personally works for gain.
Explanation.- in this section “property” means property situate in
India.”
16.
In Harshad Chimanlal Modi v. D.L.F Universal Ltd.3
the Apex Court held :“16. Section 16 thus recognises a well established principle that
actions against res or property should be brought in the forum where
such res is situate. A court within whose territorial jurisdiction the
property is not situate has no power to deal with and decide the
rights or interest in such property. In other words, a Court has no
jurisdiction over a dispute in which it cannot give an effective
judgment. The proviso to Section 16, no doubt, states that though
the Court cannot, in case of immovable property situate beyond
jurisdiction, grant a relief in rem still it can entertain a suit where
relief sought can be obtained through the personal obedience of the
defendant. The proviso is based on a well-known maxim “equity acts
in personam”, recognised by the Chancery Courts in England. The
Equity Courts had jurisdiction to entertain certain suits respecting
immovable properties situate abroad through personal obedience of
3.
(2005) 7 SCC 791
F.A.O No. 02 of 2015
State of Sikkim v. Keshab Pd. Pradhan & Ors.
the defendant. The principle on which the maxim was based was that
the Courts could grant reliefs in suits respecting immovable property
situate abroad by enforcing their judgments by process in personam
i.e. by arrest of defendant or by attachment of his property.”
“21. A plain reading of section 20 of the Code leaves no room for
doubt that it is residuary provision and covers those cases not falling
within the limitations of Section 15 to 19. The opening words of the
section, “subjection to the limitation aforesaid” are significant and
make it abundantly clear that the section takes within its sweep all
personal actions. A suit falling under section 20 thus, may be
instituted in a court within whose jurisdiction the defendant resides,
or carries on business, a personally work for gain or cause of action
wholly or partly arises.”
17.
In view of the clear provision of Section 16 of C.P.C and
the Judgment rendered by the Apex Court in re:
Harshad
Chimanlal Modi (supra) it has become imperative to examine
whether the said suit filed by the Plaintiff would fall within the
parameters of Section 16 (d) of C.P.C, or rather, whether the
said suit entails “determination of any other right to or interest
in immovable property.” It is only if the said suit does not fall
under the parameter of Section 16 of C.P.C can the question of
examining if the plaintiff be entitled to file the suit as per the
provisions of Section 20 of C.P.C would arise.
18.
It is well settled that the nature of the suit and its
purpose must be determined by reading the plaint as a whole. In
Moolji Jitha and Co. V. Khandesh Spg. and Wvg. Mills Co. Ltd. 4
the Federal Court held ( AIR p.92, para 25):“the inclusion or absence of a prayer is not decisive of the true nature
of the suit, nor is the order in which the prayers are arrayed in the
plaint. The substance or object of the suit has to be gathered from
the averments made in the plaint on which relieves asked in the
prayers are based.”
4.
AIR 1950 FC 83
F.A.O No. 02 of 2015
State of Sikkim v. Keshab Pd. Pradhan & Ors.
19.
The Apex Court in Sumer Builders Pvt. Ltd. V.
Narendra Gorani5 also examined the assertions made in the
application along with the relief clause, “read in entirety and
appreciated in a holistic manner” and came to the conclusion
that the core dispute pertains to possession of land.
20.
Section 16 of C.P.C does not use the words „cause of
action‟ which is integral to Section 20 of C.P.C. A suit would not
survive without a cause of action. In a money suit the cause of
action sufficient to justify the plaintiff to sue to obtain the money
decree must be pleaded and proved. Any transaction pleaded
must be an integral part of the cause of action sufficient to
clothe the Court with jurisdiction to entertain the suit. As is well
settled a cause of action is a bundle of facts which taken with the
law applicable to them gives the plaintiff a right to relief against
the defendants. Although, the expression „cause of action‟ has
not been defined in the C.P.C, the Apex Court has in a number of
decisions held that it is a bundle of essential facts necessary for
the plaintiff to prove before he can succeed. Failure to prove
such facts would give the defendant a right to Judgment in his
favour. „Cause of action‟ thus, gives occasion for and forms the
foundation of the suit. If therefore there is no „cause of action‟
the plaint has to be dismissed. (Vide State of Rajasthan V.
Swaika Properties6; ABC Laminarts (P) Ltd. and Another v. A.P
Agencies, Salem7; Alchemist Ltd. & Anr. V. State of Sikkim 8).
5.
(2016) 2 SCC 582
(1985) 3 SCC 217
7.
(1989) 2 SCC 163
8.
(2007) 11 SCC 335
6.
F.A.O No. 02 of 2015
State of Sikkim v. Keshab Pd. Pradhan & Ors.
21.
From a reading of the plaint the following essential
facts pleaded by the Plaintiff would be required to be proved
before the Plaintiff can obtain the money decree as prayed for:(i.)
Rs. 34,50,000/- was paid by the Plaintiff to the
Defendants
which
was
received
at
Gangtok
by
Defendant No. 3 for the purchase of the immovable
property situated at Pradhan Nagar, Siliguri, West
Bengal.
(ii.)
The said money sought to be realised by the Plaintiff
is the 50% payment paid towards the purchase of the
said immovable property.
(iii.)
The said money sought to be realised was money paid
by mistake by the Plaintiff to the Defendants as the
implications of and enforcement of the West Bengal
Estate Acquisition Act, 1953 on the rights of the lessor
to the lease deed dated 21.07.1953 not been brought to
the notice of the Plaintiff the negotiation between the
Plaintiff
and
Defendants
were
illegal,
invalid
and
improper in the eyes of the law.
(iv.)
As a result of the enforcement of the West Bengal
Estate Acquisition Act, 1953, the rights of the lessor of
the lease deed dated 21.07.1953 had extinguished and
had no subsisting interest in the demised premises and
consequently the Defendants as the sons and legal heirs
of the lessor also did not have any rights in the said
immovable property.
F.A.O No. 02 of 2015
State of Sikkim v. Keshab Pd. Pradhan & Ors.
22.
From the pleadings in the plaint it is absolutely clear that
the Plaintiff would not be entitled to a money decree of Rs.
38,78,283/- and the interest and cost as prayed for in the said
suit without examining any other right to or interest of the
Defendants in the immovable property, admittedly situated
outside the jurisdiction of the Courts in Sikkim in the State of
West Bengal. A perusal of the plaint makes it evident that the
Plaintiff has not pleaded as to where the negotiations and
agreement to purchase the said immovable property for a
consideration value of Rs. 69,00,000/- took place. In fact, the
only averment in the plaint by which the Plaintiff seeks to invoke
the jurisdiction of the Court of the District Judge, is that the
cheques referred to in paragraph 10 of the plaint were received
by Defendant no. 3 at Gangtok, for and on behalf of the
Defendant no. 1, 2 and 4.
23.
This Court is of the view, reading the plaint as a
whole, that although the prayers prayed for by the Plaintiff is for
money decree, the essential, integral and germane facts without
which the money decree cannot be passed by the Court is the
determination of the right to or interest of the Defendants in the
immovable property situated at Pradhan Nagar, Siliguri, West
Bengal and beyond the territorial jurisdiction of the Courts in
Sikkim. As such, Section 20 of C.P.C which starts with the words
“subject to the limitation aforesaid”
and thus a residuary
provision to Sections 15 to 19 of C.P.C has no application in the
present case. Thus, the said suit ought to have been filed by the
Plaintiff as per the provision of Section 16 (d) of C.P.C in the
F.A.O No. 02 of 2015
State of Sikkim v. Keshab Pd. Pradhan & Ors.
Court within the local limits of whose jurisdiction the immovable
property is situate as the said suit clearly involved “the
determination of any other right to or interest in immovable
property.”
24.
The learned Additional Advocate General would also
submit that the present case was a case in which the relief
sought can be entirely obtained through the personal obedience
of the Defendants. The proviso to section 16 of C.P.C makes it
abundantly clear that even where the relief sought can be
entirely obtained through the defendants personal obedience in a
suit to obtain relief respecting, or compensation for wrong to,
immovable property held by and on behalf of the defendant, the
suit could be instituted either in the Court within the local limits
of whose jurisdiction the defendant actually and voluntarily
resides, or carries on business, or personally works for gain. As
per the plaint the Defendants are all residents of Pradhan Nagar,
Siliguri, West Bengal. Material pleadings essential to determine
where the Defendants carries on business, or personally works
for gain is missing from the plaint.
Thus, even the proviso to
Section 16 of C.P.C does not further the case of the Plaintiff.
25.
The learned Additional Advocate General would then
argue that even if some of the prayers were not maintainable
being outside the territorial jurisdiction of the Court of the
District Judge, those prayers within the jurisdiction ought to
have been entertained and those outside the jurisdiction struck
out. Reliance was placed on the judgment of a Division Bench of
F.A.O No. 02 of 2015
State of Sikkim v. Keshab Pd. Pradhan & Ors.
the Calcutta High Court in re: Smt. Sheela Adhikari v. Rabindra
Nath Adhikari9. The present case is not a case where some of
the cause of actions united in the plaint are arising within the
territorial jurisdiction of the Court of the District Judge where the
suit has been filed, while other causes of action joined therein
are not triable by it for want of such jurisdiction as in the
Calcutta case. However, it is pertinent to note that the Division
Bench of the Calcutta High Court has clearly held that the Rules
in First Schedule of CPC cannot override or outweigh the
Sections in the body of CPC and further :“the result, therefore, is that though under the provisions of Order
2, Rule 3 any number of causes of action may be united in one suit
against the same defendant, yet because of the provisions of Section
16-20 of the Code, the Court in which suit is filed must have
territorial jurisdiction in respect of all such causes of action.”
26.
The Plaintiff having filed the said suit before the Court of
the District Judge on 06.03.2006, the Defendant no.1 filed his
written statement on 20.07.2006; the Defendant no. 3 and 4 on
22.07.2006 and Defendant No.2 on 25.11.2006. The Court of the
District Judge framed 5 issues on 14.02.2007. On 02.09.2008
the Defendant no. 3 and 4 preferred an application under Order
VI Rule 17 r/w Section 151 of C.P.C. for amendment of their
joint written statement. This was objected to by the Plaintiff vide
written objection dated 27.11.2008. On 30.07.2009, the Court of
the District Judge rejected the prayer of the Defendant No. 3 and
4 to amend their written statement. The order dated 30.07.2009
of the District Judge was assailed before this Court. This Court
vide Judgement and order dated 12.08.2010 set aside the order
AIR 1988 Cal 273
F.A.O No. 02 of 2015
State of Sikkim v. Keshab Pd. Pradhan & Ors.
dated 30.07.2009 of the
District
Judge
and allowed the
Defendant No. 3 and 4 to amend their written statement.
Consequently, on 06.10.2010 amended written statement was
filed on behalf of the Defendant no. 3 and 4. The said amended
written statement filed by Defendant No. 3 and 4 on 06.10.2010
also made the following counter-claims against the Plaintiff:“28-F.
The Defendants therefore claim the following reliefs by way
of counter claim(i).
a decree declaring that the Plaintiff is in occupation of the suit
property illegally:
(ii).
a decree declaring that the Defendants are entitled for
declaration for the eviction of the Plaintiff from the portion of landed
property covered by Plot No. 291;
(iii).
a decree declaring that the Defendants are entitled to a sum of
Rs. 2,500/- per day as measne profits since 20th June 2004; and
(iv).
any other relief or reliefs for which the Defendants are entitled
to under the law.”
27.
The
Plaintiff
filed
its
written
statement
dated
28.12.2010 to the counter-claim filed by the Defendant no. 3
and 4. In the said written statement the Plaintiff also pleaded
that this Hon‟ble Court lacks the territorial jurisdiction to
entertain the counter-claim setup by the Defendants.
28.
Ex facie, the reliefs sought for in the counter-claim filed
by the Defendant no. 3 and 4 are beyond the territorial
jurisdiction of the Court of the District Judge as barred by
Section 16 of C.P.C. Nevertheless, Mr. B Sharma, learned Senior
Advocate for the Defendants would submit that in view of the
provision of Order VIII Rule 6A of C.P.C, the only limitation being
pecuniary, the counter-claim filed with the afore quoted reliefs
even if beyond the territorial jurisdiction of the Court of the
F.A.O No. 02 of 2015
State of Sikkim v. Keshab Pd. Pradhan & Ors.
District Judge is entertainable by the said Court as the said suit
having been filed before the Court of the District Judge.
29.
Order VIII Rule 6A of C.P.C provides:“6A. Counter-claim by defendant.- (1) A defendant in a suit
may, in addition to his right of pleadings a set-off under rule 6, set
up, by way of counter-claim against the claim of the plaintiff, any
right or claim in respect of a cause of action accruing to the
defendant against the plaintiff either before or after the filing of the
suit but before the defendant has delivered his defence or before the
time limited for delivering his defence has expired, whether such
counter-claim is in the nature of a claim for damages or not:
Provided that such counter-claim shall not exceed the pecuniary
limits of the jurisdiction of the Court.
(2)
Such counter-claim shall have the same effect as a cross-suit so
as to enable the Court to pronounce a final judgment in the same
suit, both on the original claim and on the counter-claim.
(3)
The plaintiff shall be at liberty to file a written statement in
answer to the counter-claim of the defendant within such period as
may be fixed by the Court.
(4) The counter-claim shall be treated as a plaint and governed by
the rules applicable to plaints.”
30.
Mr. B. Sharma, learned Senior Advocate in support of
his aforesaid submission would cite in re: Jag Mohan Chawla v.
Dera Radha Swami Satsang10 ; and Barthels & Luders Gambh v.
M.V. Dominique11.
31.
In Jag Mohan Chawla (Supra), the Apex Court while
answering the question “whether in a suit for injunction, counterclaim for injunction in respect of the same or a different property
is maintainable?
Whether
counter-claim
different cause of action?” held:-
10.
(1996) 4 SCC 699
1988 Mh. L.J. 728: AIR 1988 Bombay 380.
can be
made
on
F.A.O No. 02 of 2015
State of Sikkim v. Keshab Pd. Pradhan & Ors.
“5................ Rule 6-A(1) provides that a defendant in a suit may, in
addition to his right of pleading a set-off under Rule 6, set up by way
of counter-claim against the claim of the plaintiff, any right or claim
in respect of a cause of action accruing to the defendant against the
plaintiff either before or after the filing of the suit but before the
defendant has delivered his defence or before the time limited for
delivering his defence has expired, whether such counter-claim is in
the nature of a claim for damage or not. A limitation put in
entertaining the counter-claim is as provided in the proviso to subrule (1), namely, the counter-claim shall not exceed the pecuniary
limits of the jurisdiction of the court. Sub-rule (2) amplifies that such
counter-claim shall have the same effect as a cross-suit so as to
enable the court to pronounce a final judgment in the same suit, both
on the original claim and on the counter-claim. The plaintiff shall be
given liberty to file a written statement to answer the counter-claim
of the defendant within such period as may be fixed by the court. The
counter-claim is directed to be treated, by operation of sub-rule (4)
thereof, as a plaint governed by the rules of the pleadings of the
plaint.
........ In sub-rule (1) of Rule 6-A, the language is so couched with
words of wide width as to enable the parties to bring his own
independent cause of action in respect of any claim that would be the
subject-matter of an independent suit. Thereby, it is no longer
confined to money claim or to cause of action of the same nature as
original action of the plaintiff. It need not relate to or be connected
with the original cause of action or matter pleaded by the plaintiff.
The words “any right or claim in respect of a cause of action accruing
with the defendant” would show that the cause of action from which
the counter-claim arises need not necessarily arise from or have any
nexus with the cause of action of the plaintiff that occasioned to lay
the suit. The only limitation is that the cause of action should arise
before the time fixed for filing the written statement expires. The
defendant may set up a cause of action which has accrued to him
even after the institution of the suit. The counter-claim expressly is
treated as a cross-suit with all the indicia of pleadings as a plaint
including the duty to aver his cause of action and also payment of the
requisite court fee thereon. Instead of relegating the defendant to an
independent suit, to avert multiplicity of the proceeding and needless
protection (sic protraction), the legislature intended to try both the
suit and the counter-claim in the same suit as suit and cross-suit and
have them disposed of in the same trial. In other words, a defendant
can claim any right by way of a counter-claim in respect of any cause
of action that has accrued to him even though it is independent of the
F.A.O No. 02 of 2015
State of Sikkim v. Keshab Pd. Pradhan & Ors.
cause of action averred by the plaintiff and have the same cause of
action adjudicated without relegating the defendant to file a separate
suit......”
32.
The Apex Court in re: Jag Mohan Chawla (supra) was not
examining „territorial jurisdiction‟ but the issue whether in a suit
for injunction, counter-claim for injunction in respect of the same
or a different property was maintainable and whether counterclaim can be made on different cause of action. It is in that
context that the Apex Court held the language is so couched with
words of wide width as to enable the parties to bring its own
independent cause of action. Similarly, the Apex Court in the
same context i.e. „cause of action‟ held that the only limitation is
that the cause of action should arise before the time fixed for
filing the written statement expires. Thus, the ratio decidendi of
the judgment in re: Jag Mohan Chawla (supra) would not lend
support to the argument of Mr. B. Sharma, learned Senior
Advocate that Order VIII Rule 6A of C.P.C does not have any
limitation of territoriality. „Territorial jurisdiction‟ and „cause of
action‟ are two different concepts of law.
33.
In re: Barthels & Luders Gambh (supra) the Bombay
High Court was examining the Chamber Summons taken out by
the plaintiff therein to the suit and the defendant therein to the
counter-claim for excluding from the suit the counter-claim filed
by the defendants therein. The Bombay High Court held that the
High Court had been set up as a Court of Admiralty under the
Colonial Courts of Admiralty (India) Act, 1891 and that the
counter-claim by the defendant therein did not strictly fall within
F.A.O No. 02 of 2015
State of Sikkim v. Keshab Pd. Pradhan & Ors.
the Admiralty jurisdiction of the High Court.
However, it held
that the counter-claim under the provisions of Order VIII Rule 6A
of C.P.C was maintainable.
34.
The Bombay High Court in re: Barthels & Luders
Gambh (supra) held that the only restriction as set out in the
proviso to Order VIII Rule 6A of C.P.C is that the counter-claim
shall not exceed the pecuniary limits of the jurisdiction of the
Court. The Bombay High Court took support for the aforesaid
view from the judgment of the Madras High Court in re: T.K.V.S.
Vidyapoornachary Sons v. M.R. Krishnamachary12 which held
that Rule 6C of Order VIII of C.P.C emphasizes by implication
that a general rule a suit claim and a counter-claim ought
properly to be regarded as constituting a unified proceeding and
a counter-claim, therefore, between the same party needs to be
only within the pecuniary jurisdiction of the Court where it is
filed. The Bombay High Court also relied upon an English
judgment rendered by Lord Coleridge in re: Griendtoveen v.
Hamlyn and Co.13 and further held that under Order VIII Rule 6A
of C.P.C, once the suit is within the jurisdiction of the Court, the
defendant is entitled to file a counter-claim provided the
counter-claim is within the four corners of Order VIII Rule 6A of
C.P.C and further that there is no provision under this Order that
the counter-claim must also comply with the requirement as to
territorial jurisdiction.
12 .
AIR 1983 Madras 291
(1892) VIII T.L.R. 231
F.A.O No. 02 of 2015
State of Sikkim v. Keshab Pd. Pradhan & Ors.
35.
The Bombay High Court in re: Barthels & Luders
Gambh (supra) was not called upon to examine the provision of
Section 16 of the C.P.C regarding territorial jurisdiction.
By
virtue of Section 120 of C.P.C, Section 16, 17 and 20 shall not
apply to the High Court in the exercise of its original civil
jurisdiction. This being the legal position Barthels & Luders
Gambh (supra) cannot be held to be an authority on the
proposition sought to be canvassed by Mr. B. Sharma, Senior
Advocate as “neither the C.P.C nor its principles can be made
applicable to the Letters patent qua Section 16, 17 and 20,
CPC.” (vide Jindal Vijaynagar Steel (JSW Steel Ltd.) v. Jindal
Praxair Oxygen Co. Ltd.14 paragraph 52).
36.
are
The Madras High Court and the Calcutta High Court
also
chartered
High
Courts
and
have
original
Civil
Jurisdiction. Section 120 of C.P.C is also applicable to the said
High Courts. In re : Ajay Kumar Saraff v. Sushil Kumar
Agarwal15 the Calcutta High Court was examining a counter-
claim relating to recovery of possession of immovable property
lying and situated outside the ordinary original civil jurisdiction
of the Calcutta High Court. Relying upon Barthels & Luders
Gambh (supra) it was contended that a counter-claim could be
lodged by the defendant therein which directly relates to the
same cause of action as made out in the plaint.
37.
The Calcutta High Court in re: Ajay Kumar Saraff
(supra) however, distinguished the judgment of the Bombay
15.
(2006) 11 SCC 521
2015 SCC online Cal 732: 2015 AIR CC 1953
F.A.O No. 02 of 2015
State of Sikkim v. Keshab Pd. Pradhan & Ors.
High Court in re: Barthels & Luders Gambh (supra) by holding,
intera-alia:“The suit premises involved in the present case is Premises No. 344,
Canal Street, Kolkata-700048. The suit property is situate outside the
territorial jurisdiction of this Court. If the defendant wanted to file a
suit with the reliefs as sought for in its counterclaim in respect of
such immovable property, the suit would not have been maintainable
before this Court.
Rule 12 of Chapter IX of the Original Side Rules states that a
counterclaim shall be treated as a plaint and be governed by the rules
applicable to plaints. In terms of Rule 12 of Chapter IX of the Original
Side Rules treating a counterclaim to be a plaint, the relief of
possession in respect of immovable property admittedly lying and
situate outside the territorial jurisdiction of this Court cannot be
entertained. The provisions of Order 8 Rules 6A to 6G of the Code of
Civil Procedure, 1908 do not assist the defendant in sustaining a
counterclaim before this Court when this Court does not have the
territorial jurisdiction to entertain the counterclaim made in the
written statement of the defendant.
Rule 6C Order 8 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 allows a plaintiff
to raise an issue that the claim raised in the counterclaim ought not
to be disposed of by way of a counterclaim. In the present case, the
plaintiffs have not appeared at the hearing of the suit. However, the
counterclaim made in the written statement of the defendant is such
that the counterclaim cannot be entertained by this Court due to lack
of territorial jurisdiction of this Court.
Barthels and Luders GmbH (supra) relates to an admiralty suit. The
Bombay High Court considered Order 8 Rules 6A to 6G of the Code of
Civil Procedure, 1908 and found that since the counterclaim related to
the same repairs as that which was the subject matter of the plaint, it
was found not to be fair to drive a defendant to a separate suit in a
different Court. The factual situation in the instant case is different.
The defendant has sought for relief with regard to an immovable
property situate admittedly outside the territorial jurisdiction of this
Court in its counterclaim. The defendant could not have filed an
independent suit seeking the same relief as that of the counterclaim
in this Court. It would not be proper to allow the defendant to invoke
the jurisdiction of this Court when this Court does not possess such
F.A.O No. 02 of 2015
State of Sikkim v. Keshab Pd. Pradhan & Ors.
jurisdiction by reason of the reliefs sought for in respect of immovable
property lying and situate outside its territorial jurisdiction.
In such circumstances, no relief can be granted to the defendant in
the counterclaim due to the lack of territorial jurisdiction of this Court
to entertain the counterclaim of the defendant.”
38.
Section 16 of C.P.C relates to „suits‟ when it provides
that suits to be instituted where subject matter is situate.
Section 16 of C.P.C falls within Part I of C.P.C under the heading
„Suits in General‟. Counter-claims falls under the First Schedule
of C.P.C which contains „Orders‟. Order VIII Rule 6A of C.P.C
deals with counter-claim. Under Order VIII Rule 1 of C.P.C the
defendant is required to file „written statement of his defence‟ on
receipt of the summons issued under Order V Rule 1 of C.P.C in
the suit instituted. Under Order VIII Rule 6 of C.P.C „set-off‟ is
required to be given in the written statement filed in defence of
the suit. Under Order VIII Rule 6 (2) of C.P.C
the written
statement shall have the same effect as a „plaint‟ in a cross-suit
so as to enable the Court to pronounce a final judgment in
respect both of the original claim and of the set off.
39.
Order VIII Rule 6A of C.P.C deals with counter-claim by
the defendant. A „defendant in a suit‟ in addition to his right of
„pleading a set-off‟ under Order VIII Rule 6A of C.P.C, set-up „by
way of counter-claim against the claim of the plaintiff‟, „any right
or claim‟ in respect of „a cause of action‟ accruing to the
defendant against the plaintiff. Under the proviso thereto, the
counter-claim shall not exceed the pecuniary limits of the
jurisdiction of the Court. Under Order VIII Rule 6A (2) of C.P.C
such counter-claim shall have the same effect as a „cross-suit‟ so
F.A.O No. 02 of 2015
State of Sikkim v. Keshab Pd. Pradhan & Ors.
as to enable the Court to pronounce a final judgment in the
same suit, both on the original claim and on the counter-claim.
The plaintiff is entitled to file a written statement in answer to
the counter-claim of the defendant under Order VIII Rule 6A (3)
of C.P.C and under Order VIII Rule 6A (4) the counter-claim
shall be treated as a „plaint‟ and governed by the „rules‟
applicable to plaints. „Rules‟ has been defined under Section 2
(18) of C.P.C to mean Rules and forms contained in the First
Schedule or made under Section 122 or Section 125 of C.P.C.
Order VII Rule 1 is part of the First Schedule of C.P.C. Order VII
Rule 1 (f) provides that the plaint shall contain the facts showing
the Court has jurisdiction.
40.
The Defendant No. 3 and 4 has filed a composite
amended written statement and a counter-claim. Para 1 to 27
thereof
are
the
averments
of
the
said
amended
written
statement. Para 28 consisting of para 28-A to 28-F in the said
amended written statement is the counter claim. There is no
separate averment in the counter-claim on facts showing the
Court has jurisdiction. However, para 27 of the said amended
written statement categorically states: “this Hon‟ble Court has
no jurisdiction to try the present case, as the suit premises is
situated within the jurisdiction of West Bengal.” This being the
statement in the amended written statement, the Defendant No.
3 and 4 may not be able to contend otherwise in the counterclaim.
F.A.O No. 02 of 2015
State of Sikkim v. Keshab Pd. Pradhan & Ors.
41.
The scheme of the C.P.C is clear. Suit must necessarily
be instituted in the Court that has territorial jurisdiction as
provided under Section 16 of C.P.C. Section 20 of C.P.C being a
residuary provision covers only those cases not falling within the
limitations of Section 15 to 19 of C.P.C. Once the suit has been
instituted as provided above, written statement, set-off or
counter claim has to be filed in that suit. The counter-claim so
filed need to comply with the provisions of Order VIII Rule 6A of
C.P.C. In Order VIII Rule 6A (1) of C.P.C “the language is so
couched with words of wide width as to enable the parties to
bring his own independent cause of action in respect of any
claim that would be the subject matter of an independent suit.”
(vide Jag Mohan Chawla (supra)). It must be straightaway
noticed that in re: Jag Mohan Chawla (supra) the Apex Court
has used the words “an independent suit” preceded by the words
“the subject matter of” clearly holding that under Order VIII Rule
6A of C.P.C a defendant could bring an independent cause of
action relating to a subject matter of an independent suit by way
of counter-claim. Allowing set-offs and counter-claims to be filed
in the suit in which the defendants are to file written statement
in its defence is to avoid multiplicity of litigation. In re: Ramesh
Chand Ardawatiya v. Anil Panjwani16
it has been held by the
Apex Court that the purpose of the provision enabling the filing
of a counter-claim is to avoid multiplicity of judicial proceedings
and saving of the Court‟s time as also to exclude inconvenience
to the parties by enabling claims and counter-claim, that is,
(2003) 7 SCC 350
F.A.O No. 02 of 2015
State of Sikkim v. Keshab Pd. Pradhan & Ors.
permitting all disputes between the same parties to be decided
in the course of the same proceedings.
42.
However, there could be cases when a counter-claim
may have to be excluded as provided under Order VIII Rule 6C
of C.P.C. In fact the impugned order was passed while
considering the Plaintiff‟s application under Order VIII Rule 6C of
C.P.C for exclusion of the counter-claim filed by the Defendant
no. 3 and 4 on the ground that the prayer for a declaration of
eviction against the Plaintiff from the immovable property
situated in Siliguri, West Bengal was beyond the territorial
jurisdiction of the Courts in Sikkim.
43.
Order VIII Rule 6C of C.P.C deals with exclusion of
counter-claim. Where a defendant sets up a counter-claim and
the plaintiff contends that the claim thereby raised ought not to
be disposed of by way of counter-claim but in an „independent
suit‟, the plaintiff may, at any time before issues are settled in
relation to the counter-claim, apply to the court for an order that
such counter-claim may be excluded, and the Court may, on the
hearing of such application makes such order as it thinks fit.
44.
The key words in Order VIII Rule 6C of C.P.C are
„independent suit‟. If the Court is of the view, in an application
made by the plaintiff at any time before the issues are settled in
relation to the counter-claim, that the counter-claim ought to be
disposed of by way of an „independent suit‟ the Court is
empowered to make such orders as it thinks fit. An „independent
suit‟ need to be instituted in the Court within the local limits of
F.A.O No. 02 of 2015
State of Sikkim v. Keshab Pd. Pradhan & Ors.
whose jurisdiction the property is situate in terms of Section 16
of C.P.C. The counter-claim filed by the Defendant No. 3 and 4
seeking a prayer for declaration of eviction of the Plaintiff from
the immovable property in possession of the Plaintiff situate in
Sliguri, West Bengal outside the territorial jurisdiction of the
Courts in Sikkim squarely falls within Section 16 of C.P.C and
would be liable to be rejected if it were to be filed as an
„independent suit‟. As such, this Court is of the view that the
application filed by the Plaintiff under Order VIII Rule 6C of
C.P.C for exclusion of counter-claim was maintainable. This
interpretation would avoid any embarrassment to the Court in
passing any judgment in a counter-claim which it could not have
passed being beyond its territorial jurisdiction. To the said extent
the application of the Plaintiff under Order VIII Rule 6C of C.P.C
filed on 19.06.2014 for exclusion of the counter-claim of the
Defendant no. 3 and 4 was maintainable and rightly held in
favour of the Plaintiff by the learned Principal District Judge in
the impugned order holding that the Court had no jurisdiction to
adjudicate upon the counter-claim of the Defendants.
45.
Be that as it may, as this Court has held that the said
suit filed by the Plaintiff ought to have been filed as per the
provisions of Section 16 (d) of the C.P.C in the Court within the
local limits of whose jurisdiction the property is situate the plaint
filed by the Plaintiff must necessarily be returned to be
presented to the Court in which the said suit should have been
instituted under Order VII Rule 10 of C.P.C as held by the
learned Principal District Judge. In such an event the counter-
F.A.O No. 02 of 2015
State of Sikkim v. Keshab Pd. Pradhan & Ors.
claim would also have to be filed before the same Court as per
the provision of Order VIII Rule 6A of C.P.C. The counter-claim
as filed by the Defendant No. 3 and 4 in the said suit, if it were
to be instituted in the Court within the local limits of whose
jurisdiction the immovable property is situate, Order VIII Rule
6C of C.P.C would not apply in the facts of the present case.
46.
In view of the aforesaid, the impugned order dated
25.03.2015 passed by the learned Principal District Judge, in
Money Suit no. 21 of 2014 is upheld and Appeal dismissed. The
said plaint must be returned under the provision of Order VII
Rule 10 of C.P.C to be presented to the Court in which the suit
should have been instituted. As a counter-claim shall be treated
as a plaint and governed by the Rules applicable to plaints under
the provision of Order VII Rule 10 of C.P.C the counter-claim
filed by the Defendant No. 3 and 4 must also be returned to be
presented to the Court in which the said counter-claim should be
filed. Consequently, the Court fee paid by the Defendant No. 3
and 4 for the counter-claim is also liable to be returned to the
Defendant No. 3 and 4. It is accordingly ordered. In view of the
final order the interim order shall cease to operate.
[
47.
No order as to cost.
(Bhaskar Raj Pradhan)
Judge
25.07.2017
/avi
Approved for reporting: yes
Internet: yes
This page is for informational and research purposes only and does not constitute legal advice.
Consult a qualified advocate for advice specific to your situation.
Is your name in this judgment and should it be masked, or is something on this page wrong?
Request a review